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Executive summary

‘Where should I go for dinner? What should I read, watch or listen to next? What should I buy?’ To answer these questions, we might go with our gut and trust our intuition. We could ask our friends and family, or turn to expert reviews. Recommendations large and small can come from a variety of sources in our daily lives, but in the last decade there has been a critical change in where they come from and how they’re used.

Recommendations are now a pervasive feature of the digital products we use. We are increasingly living a world of recommendation systems, a type of software designed to sift through vast quantities of data to guide users towards a narrower selection of material, according to a set of criteria chosen by their developers.

Examples of recommendation systems include Netflix’s ‘Watch next’ and Amazon’s ‘Other users also purchased’; TikTok’s recommendation system drives its main content feed.

But what is the risk of a recommendation? As recommendations become more automated and data-driven, the trade-offs in their design and use are becoming more important to understand and evaluate.

Background

This report explores the ethics of recommendation systems as used in public service media organisations. These independent organisations have a mission to inform, educate and entertain the public, and are often funded by and accountable to the public.

In media organisations, producers, editors and journalists have always made implicit and explicit decisions about what to give prominence to, both in terms of what stories to tell and what programmes to commission, but also in how those stories are presented. Deciding what makes the front page, what gets the primetime slot, what makes top billing on the evening news – these are all acts of recommendation. While private media organisations like Netflix primarily use these systems to drive user engagement with their content, public service media organisations, like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the UK, operate with a different set of principles and values.

This report also explores how public service media organisations are addressing the challenge of designing and implementing recommendation systems within the parameters of their mission, and identifies areas for further research into how they can accomplish this goal.

While there is an extensive literature exploring public service values and a separate literature around the ethics and operational challenges of designing and implementing recommendation systems, there are still many gaps in the literature around how public service media organisations are designing and implementing these systems. Addressing these gaps can help ensure that public service media organisations are better able to design these systems. With this in mind, this project has explored the following questions:

  • What are the values that public service media organisations adhere to? How do these differ from the goals that private-sector organisations are incentivised to pursue?
  • In what contexts do public service media use recommendation systems?
  • What value can recommendation systems add for public service media and how do they square with public service values?
  • What are the ethical risks that recommendation systems might raise in those contexts? And what challenges should teams consider?
  • What are the mitigations that public service media can implement in the design, development, and implementation of these systems?

In answering these questions, we focused on European public service media organisations and in particular on the BBC in the UK, who are project partners on this research.

The BBC is the world’s largest public service media organisation and has been at the forefront of public service broadcasters exploring the use of recommendation systems. As the BBC has historically set precedents that other public service media have followed, it is valuable to understand its work in depth in order to draw wider lessons for the field.

In this report, we explore an in-depth snapshot of the BBC’s development and use of several recommendation systems from summer and autumn 2021, alongside an examination of the work of several other European public service media organisations. We place these examples in the broader context of debates around 21st century public service media and use them to explore the motivations, risks and evaluation of the use of recommendation systems by public service media and their use more broadly.

The evidence for this report stems from interviews with 11 current staff from editorial, product and engineering teams involved in recommendation systems at the BBC, along with interviews with representatives of six other European public service broadcasters that use recommendation systems. This report also draws on a review of the existing literature on public service media recommendation systems and on interviews with experts from academia, civil society and government.

Findings

Across these different public service media organisations, our research has found five key findings:

  1. The contextual role of public service media organisations is a major driver for their increasing use of recommendation systems. The last few decades have seen public service media organisations lose market share of news and entertainment to private providers, putting pressure on public service media organisations to use recommendation systems to stay competitive.
  2. The values of public service media organisations create different objectives and practices to those in the private sector. While private-sector media organisations are primarily driven to maximise shareholder revenue and market share, with some consideration of social values, public service media organisations are legally mandated to operate with a particular set of public interest values at their core, including universality, independence, excellence, diversity, accountability and innovation.
  3. These value differences translate into different objectives for the use of recommendation systems. While private firms seek to maximise metrics like user engagement, ‘time on product’ and subscriber retention in the use of their recommendation systems, public service media organisations seek related but different objectives. For example, rather than maximising engagement with recommendation systems, our research found public service media providers want to broaden their reach to a more diverse set of audiences. Rather than maximising time on product, public service media organisations are more concerned with ensuring the product is useful for all members of society, in line with public interest values.
  4. Public service media recommendation systems can raise a range of well-documented ethical risks, but these will differ depending on the type of system and context of its use. Our research found that public service media recognise a wide array of well-documented ethical risks of recommendation systems, including risks to personal autonomy, privacy, misinformation and fragmentation of the public sphere. However, the type and severity of the risks highlighted depended on which teams we spoke with, with audio-on-demand and video-on-demand teams raising somewhat different concerns to those working on news.
  5. Evaluating the risks and mitigations of recommendation systems must be done in the context of the wider product. Addressing the risks of public service media recommendation systems should not just focus on technical fixes. Aligning product goals and other product features with public service values are just as important in ensuring recommendation systems positive contribute the experiences of audiences and to wider society.

Recommendations

Based on these key findings, we make nine recommendations for future research, experimentation and collaboration between public service media organisations, academics, funders and regulators:

  1. Define public service value for the digital age. Recommendation systems are designed to optimise against specific objectives. However, the development and implementation of recommendation systems is happening at a time when the concept of public service value and the role of public service media organisations is under question. Unless public service media organisations are clear about their own identities and purpose, it will be difficult for them to build effective recommendation systems. In the UK, significant work has already been done by Ofcom as well as the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport’s parliamentary Select Committee to identify the challenges public service media face and offer new approaches to regulation. Their recommendations must be implemented so that public service media can operate within a paradigm appropriate to the digital age and build systems that address a relevant mission.
  2. Fund a public R&D hub for recommendation systems and responsible recommendation challenges. There is a real opportunity to create a hub for R&D of recommendation systems that are not tied to industry goals. This is especially important as recommendation systems are one of the prime use cases of behaviour modification technology but research into it is impaired by lack of access to interventional data.  Therefore, as part of UKRI’s National AI Research and Innovation (R&I) Programme set out in the UK AI Strategy, it should fund the development of a public research hub on recommendation technology.
  3. Publish research into audience expectations of personalisation. There was a striking consensus in our interviews with public service media teams working on recommendations that personalisation was both wanted and expected by the audience. However, there is limited publicly available evidence underlying this belief and more research is needed. Understanding audience’s views towards recommendation systems is an important part of ensuring those systems are acting in the public interest. Public service media organisations should not widely adopt recommendation systems without evidence that they are either wanted or needed by the public. Otherwise, public service media risk simply following a precedent set by commercial competitors, rather than defining a paradigm aligned to their own missions.
  4. Communicate and be transparent with audiences. Although most public service media organisations profess a commitment to transparency about their use of recommendation systems, in practice there is little effective communication with their audiences about where and how recommendation systems are being used. Public service media should invest time and research into understanding how to usefully and honestly articulate their use of recommendation systems in ways that are meaningful to their audiences. This communication must not be one way. There must be opportunities for audiences to give feedback and interrogate the use of the systems, and raise concerns.
  5. Balance user control with convenience. Transparency alone is not enough. Giving users agency over the recommendations they see is an important part of responsible recommendation. Simply giving users direct control over the recommendation system is an obvious and important first step, but it is not a universal solution. We recommend that public service media providers experiment with different kinds of options, including enabling algorithmic choice of recommendation systems and ‘joint’ recommendation profiles.
  6. Expand public participation. Beyond transparency or individual user choice and control over the parameters of the recommendation systems already deployed, users and wider society could also have greater input during the initial design of the recommendation systems and in the subsequent evaluations and iterations. This is particularly salient for public service media organisations as, unlike private companies which are primarily accountable to their customers and shareholders, public service media organisations have an obligation to serve the interests of society. Therefore, even those who are not direct consumers of content should have a say in how public service media recommendations are shaped.
  7. Standardise metadata. Inconsistent, poor quality metadata – an essential resource for training and developing recommendation systems – was consistently highlighted as a barrier to developing recommendation systems in public service media, particularly in developing more novel approaches that go beyond user engagement and try to create diverse feeds of recommendations. Each public service media organisation should have a central function that standardises the format, creation and maintenance of metadata across the organisation. Institutionalising the collection of metadata and making access to it more transparent across each individual organisation is an important investment in public service media’s future capabilities.
  8. Create shared recommendation system resources. Given their limited resources and shared interests, public service media organisations should invest more heavily in creating common resources for evaluating and using recommendation systems. This could include a shared repository for evaluating recommendation systems on metrics valued by public service media, including libraries in common coding languages.
  9. Create and empower integrated teams. When developing and deploying recommendation systems, public service media organisations need to integrate editorial and development teams from the start. This ensures that the goals of the recommendation system are better aligned with the organisation’s goals as a whole and ensure the systems augment and complement existing editorial expertise.

How to read this report

This report examines how European public service media organisations think about using automated recommendation systems for content curation and delivery. It covers the context in which recommendation systems are being deployed, why that matters, the ethical risks and evaluation difficulties posed by these systems and how public service media are attempting to mitigate these risks. It also provides ideas for new approaches to evaluation that could enable better alignment of their systems with public service values.

If you need an introduction or refresher on what recommendation systems are, we recommend starting with the ‘Introducing recommendation systems’.

If you work for a public service media organisation

  • We recommend the chapters on ‘Stated goals and potential risks of using recommendation systems in public service media’ and ‘Evaluation of recommendation systems’.
  • For an understanding of how the BBC has deployed recommendation systems, see the case studies.
  • For ideas on how public service media organisations can advance their responsible use of recommendation systems, see the chapter on ‘Outstanding questions and areas for further research and experimentation’.

If you are a regulator of public service media

  • We recommend you pay particular attention to the section on ‘Stated goals and potential risks of using recommendation systems in public service media’ and ‘How do public service media evaluate their recommendation systems?’.
  • In addition, to understand the practices and initiatives that we believe should be encouraged within and experimented with by public service media organisations to ensure responsible and effective use of recommendation systems, see ‘Outstanding questions and areas for further research and experimentation’.

If you are a regulator of online platforms

  • If you need an introduction or refresher on what recommendation systems are, we recommend starting with the ‘Introducing recommendation systems’. Understanding this context can help disentangle the challenges in regulating recommendation systems, by highlighting where problems arise from the goals of public service media versus the process of recommendation itself.
  • To understand the issues faced by all deployers of recommendation systems, see the sections on the ‘Stated goals of recommendation systems’ and ‘Potential risks of using recommendation systems’.
  • To better understand how these risks change due to the context and choices of public service media, relative to other online platforms, and the difficulties even organisations explicitly oriented towards public value have in auditing their own recommendation systems to determine whether they are socially beneficial, beyond simple quantitative engagement metrics, see the section on ‘How these risks are viewed and addressed by public service media’ and the chapter on ‘Evaluation of recommendation systems’.

If you are a funder of research into recommendation systems or a researcher interested in recommendation systems

  • Public service media organisations, with mandates that emphasise social goals of universality, diversity and innovation over engagement and profit-maximising, can offer an important site of study and experimentation for new approaches to recommendation system design and evaluation. We recommend starting with the sections on ‘The context of public service values and public service media’ and ‘why this matters’, to understand the different context within which public service media organisations operate.
  • Then, the sections on ‘How do public service media evaluate their recommendation systems?’ and ‘How could evaluations be done differently?’, followed by the chapter on ‘Outstanding questions and areas for further research and experimentation’, could provide inspiration for future research projects or pilots that you could undertake or fund.

Introduction

Scope

Recommendation systems are tools designed to sift through the vast quantities of data available online and use algorithms to guide users towards a narrower selection of material, according to a set of criteria chosen by their developers. Recommendation systems sit behind a vast array of digital experiences. ‘Other users also purchased…’ on Amazon or ‘Watch next’ on Netflix guide you to your next purchase or night on the sofa. Deliveroo will suggest what to eat, LinkedIn where to work and Facebook who your friends might be.

These practices are credited with driving the success of companies like Netflix and Spotify. But they are also blamed for many of the harms associated with the internet, such as the amplification of harmful content, the polarisation of political viewpoints (although the evidence is mixed and inconclusive)1 and the entrenchment of inequalities.2 Regulators and policymakers worldwide are paying increasing attention to the potential risks of recommendation systems, with proposals in China and Europe to regulate their design, features and uses.3

Public service media organisations are starting to follow the example of their commercial rivals and adopt recommendation systems. Like the big digital streaming service providers, they sit on huge catalogues of news and entertainment content, and can use recommendation systems to direct audiences to particular options.

But public service media organisations face specific challenges in deploying these technologies. Recommendation systems are designed to optimise for certain objectives: a hotel’s website is aiming for maximum bookings, Spotify and Netflix want you to renew your subscription.

Public service media serve many functions. They have a duty to serve the public interest, not the company bottom line. They are independently financed and are controlled by, if not answerable to, the public.4 Their mission is to inform, educate and entertain. Public service media are committed to values including independence, excellence and diversity.5 They must fulfil an array of duties and responsibilities set down in legislation that often predates the digital era. How do you optimise for all that?

Developing recommendation systems for public service media is not just about finding technical fixes. It requires an interrogation of the organisations’ role in democratic societies in the digital age. How do the public service values that have guided them for a century translate to a context where the internet has fragmented the public sphere and audiences are defecting to streaming services? And how can public service media use this technology in ways that serve the public interest?

These are questions that resonate beyond the specifics of public service media organisations. All public institutions that wish to use technologies for societal benefit must grapple with similar issues. And all organisations – public or private – have to deploy technologies in ways that align with their values. Asking these questions can be helpful to technologists more generally.

In a context where the negative impacts of recommendation systems are increasingly apparent, public service media must tread carefully when considering their use. But there is also an opportunity for public service media to do what, historically, it has excelled at – innovating in the public interest.

A public service approach to building recommendation systems that are both engaging and trustworthy could not only address the needs of public service media in the digital age, but provide a benchmark for scrutiny of systems more widely and create a challenge to the paradigm set by commercial operators’ practices.

In this report, we explore how public service media organisations are addressing the challenge of designing and implementing recommendation systems within the parameters of their organisational mission, and identify areas for further research into how they can accomplish this goal.

While there is an extensive literature exploring public service values and a separate literature around the ethics and operational challenges of designing and implementing recommendation systems, there are still many gaps in the literature around how public service media organisations are designing and implementing these systems. Addressing that gap can help ensure that public service media organisations are better able to design these systems. With that in mind, this report explores the following questions:

  • What are the values that public service media organisations adhere to? How do these differ from the goals that private-sector organisations are incentivised to pursue?
  • In what contexts do public service media use recommendation systems?
  • What value can recommendation systems add for public service media and how do they square with public service values?
  • What are the ethical risks that recommendation systems might raise in those contexts? And what challenges should different teams within public service media organisations (such as product, editorial, legal and engineering) consider?
  • What are the mitigations that public service media can implement in the design, development and implementation of these systems?

In answering these questions, this report:

  • provides greater clarity about the ethical challenges that developers of recommendation systems must consider when designing and maintaining these systems
  • explores the social benefit of recommendation systems by examining the trade-offs between their stated goals and their potential risks
  • provides examples of how public service broadcasters are grappling with these challenges, which can help inform the development of recommendation systems in other contexts.

This report focuses on European public service media organisations and in particular on the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the UK, who are project partners on this research. The BBC is the world’s largest public service media organisation and has been at the forefront amongst public service broadcasters of exploring the use of recommendation systems. As the BBC has historically set precedents that other public service media have followed, it is valuable to understand its work in depth in order to draw wider lessons for the field.

In this report, we explore an in-depth snapshot of the BBC’s development and use of several recommendation systems as it stood in 2021, alongside an examination of the work of several other European public service media organisations. We place these examples in the broader context of debates around 21st century public service media and use them to explore the motivations, risks and evaluation of the use of recommendation systems by public service media and their use more broadly.

The evidence for this report stems from interviews with 11 current staff from editorial, product and engineering teams, involved in recommendation systems at the BBC, along with interviews with representatives of six other European public service broadcasters that use recommendation systems. This report also draws on a review of the existing literature on public service media recommendation systems and on interviews with experts from academia, civil society and regulation who work on the design, development, and evaluation of recommendation systems.

Although a large amount of the academic literature focuses on the use of recommendations in news provision, we look at the full range of public service media content, as we found more of the advanced implementations of recommendation systems lie in other domains. We have drawn on published research about recommendation systems from commercial platforms, however, internal corporate studies are unavailable to independent researchers and our requests to interview both researchers and corporate representatives of platforms were unsuccessful.

Background

In this chapter, we set out the context for the rest of the report. We outline the history and context of public service media organisations, what recommendation systems are and how they are approached by public service media organisations, and what external and internal processes and constraints govern their use.

The context of public service values and public service media

The use of recommendation systems in public service media is informed by their history, values and remit, their governance and the landscape in which they operate. In this section we situate the deployment of recommendation systems in this context.

Broadly, public service media are independent organisations that have a mission to inform, educate and entertain. Their values are rooted in the founding vision for public service media organisations a century ago and remain relevant today, codified into regulatory and governance frameworks at organisational, national and European levels. However the values that public service media operate under are inherently qualitative and, even with the existence of extensive guidelines, are interpreted through the daily judgements of public service media staff and the mental models and institutional culture built up over time.

Although public service media have been resilient to change, they currently face a trio of challenges:

  1. Losing audiences to online digital content providers including Netflix, Amazon, YouTube and Spotify.
  2. Budget cuts and outdated regulation, framed around analogue broadcast commitments, hampering their ability to respond to technological change.
  3. Populist political movements undermining their independence.

Public service media are independent media organisations financed by and answerable to the publics they serve.4 Their roots lie in the 1920s technological revolution of radio broadcasting when the BBC was established as the world’s first public service broadcaster, funded by a licence fee, and with the ambition to ‘bring the best of everything to the greatest number of homes’.7 Other national broadcasters were soon founded across Europe and also adopted the BBC’s mission to ‘inform, educate and entertain’. Although there are now public service media organisations in almost every country in the world, this report focuses on European public service media, which share comparable social, political and regulatory developments and therefore a similar context when considering the implementation of recommendation systems.

Public service media organisations have come to play an important institutional role within democratic societies in Europe, creating a bulwark against the potential control of public opinion either by the state or by particular interest groups.8 The establishment of public service broadcasters for the first time created a universally accessible public sphere where, in the words of the BBC’s founding chairman Lord Reith, ‘the genius and the fool, the wealthy and the poor listen simultaneously’. They aimed to forge a collective experience, ‘making the nation as one man’.9 At the same time public service media are expected to reflect the diversity of a nation, enabling the wide representation of perspectives in a democracy, as well as giving people sufficient information and understanding to make decisions on issues of public importance. These two functions create an inherent tension between public service media as an agonistic space where different viewpoints compete and a consensual forum where the nation comes together. 

Public service values

The founding vision for public service media has remained within the DNA of organisations as their public service values – often called Reithian principles, in reference to the influence of the BBC’s founding chairman.

The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), the membership organisation for public service media in Europe, has codified the public service mission into six core values: universality, independence, excellence, diversity, accountability and innovation, and member organisations commit to strive to uphold these in practice.5

 

Public service value Meaning
Universality ¡  reach all segments of society, with no-one excluded

¡ share and express a plurality of views and ideas

¡ create a public sphere, in which all citizens can form their own opinions and ideas, aiming for inclusion and social cohesion

¡ multi-platform

¡ accessible for everyone

¡ enable audiences to engage and participate in a democratic society.

Independence ¡ trustworthy content

¡ act in the interest of audiences

¡ completely impartial and independent from political, commercial and other influences and ideologies

¡ autonomous in all aspects of the remit such as programming, editorial decision-making, staffing

¡ independence underpinned by safeguards in law.

Excellence ¡ high standards of integrity professionalism and quality; create benchmarks within the media industries

¡  foster talent

¡ empower, enable and enrich audiences

¡ audiences are also participants.

Diversity ¡ reflect diversity of audiences by being diverse and pluralistic in the genres of programming, the views expressed, and the people employed

· support and seek to give voice to a plurality of competing views – from those with different backgrounds, histories and stories. Help build a more inclusive, less fragmented society.

Accountability ¡ listen to audiences and engage in a permanent and meaningful debate

¡ publish editorial guidelines. Explain. Correct mistakes. Report on policies, budgets, editorial choices

¡ be transparent and subject to constant public scrutiny

¡ be efficient and managed according to the principles of good governance.

Innovation ¡ enrich the media environment

¡ be a driving force of innovation and creativity

¡ develop new formats, new technologies, new ways of connectivity with audiences

¡ attract, retain and train our staff so that they can participate in and shape the digital future, serving the public.

As well as signing up to these common values, each individual public service media organisation has its own articulation of its mission, purpose and values, often set out as part of its governance.11 Ultimately these will align with those described by the EBU but may use different terms or have a different emphasis. Policymakers and practitioners operating at a national level are more likely to refer to these specific expressions of public values. The overarching EBU values are often referenced in academic literature as the theoretical benchmark for public service values. 

In the case of the BBC, the Royal Charter between the Government and the BBC is agreed for a 10 year period.12

The BBC: governance and values

 

Mission: to act in the public interest, serving all audiences through the provision of impartial, high-quality and distinctive output and services which inform, educate and entertain.

 

Public purposes:

  1. To provide impartial news and information to help people understand and engage with the world around them.
  2. To support learning for people of all ages.
  3. To show the most creative, highest quality and distinctive output and services.
  4. To reflect, represent and serve the diverse communities of all of the United Kingdom’s nations and regions and, in doing so, support the creative economy across the United Kingdom.
  5. To reflect the United Kingdom, its culture and values to the world.

 

Additionally, the BBC has its own set of organisational values that are not part of the governance agreement but that ‘represent the expectations we have for ourselves and each other, they guide our day-to-day decisions and the way we behave’:

  • Trust: Trust is the foundation of the BBC – we’re independent, impartial and truthful.
  • Respect: We respect each other – we’re kind, and we champion inclusivity.
  • Creativity: Creativity is the lifeblood of our organisation.
  • Audiences: Audiences are at the heart of everything we do.
  • One BBC: We are One BBC – we collaborate, learn and grow together.
  • Accountability: We are accountable and deliver work of the highest quality.

These kinds of regulatory requirements and values are then operationalised internally through organisations’ editorial guidelines which again will vary from organisation to organisation, depending on the norms and expectations of their publics. Guidelines can be extensive and their aim is to help teams put public service values into practice. For example, the current BBC guidelines run to 220 pages, covering everything from how to run a competition, to reporting on wars and acts of terror.

Nonetheless, such guidelines leave a lot of room for interpretation. Public service values are, by their nature, qualitative and difficult to measure objectively. For instance, consider the BBC guidelines on impartiality – an obligation that all regulated broadcasters in the UK must uphold – and over which the BBC has faced intense scrutiny:

‘The BBC is committed to achieving due impartiality in all its output. This commitment is fundamental to our reputation, our values and the trust of audiences. The term “due” means that the impartiality must be adequate and appropriate to the output, taking account of the subject and nature of the content, the likely audience expectation and any signposting that may influence that expectation.’

‘Due impartiality usually involves more than a simple matter of ‘balance’ between opposing viewpoints. We must be inclusive, considering the broad perspective and ensuring that the existence of a range of views is appropriately reflected. It does not require absolute neutrality on every issue or detachment from fundamental democratic principles, such as the right to vote, freedom of expression and the rule of law. We are committed to reflecting a wide range of subject matter and perspectives across our output as a whole and over an appropriate timeframe so that no significant strand of thought is under-represented or omitted.’ 

It’s clear that impartiality is a question of judgement and may not even be expressed in a single piece of content but over the range of BBC output over a period of time. In practice, teams internalise these expectations and make decisions based on institutional culture and internal mental models of public service value, rather than continually checking the editorial guidelines or referencing any specific public values matrix.13

How public service media differ from other media organisations

Public service media are answerable to the publics they serve.14 They should be independent from both government influence and from the influence of commercial owners. They operate to serve the public interest.

Commercial media, however, serve the interests of their owners or shareholders. Success for Netflix for example is measured in numbers of subscribers which then translates into revenues.15

The activities of commercial media are nonetheless limited by regulation. In the UK the independent regulator Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code requires all broadcasters (not just public service media) to abide by principles such as fairness and impartiality.16 Russia Today for example has been investigated for allegedly misleading reporting on the conflict in Ukraine.17 Streaming services are subject to more limited regulation which covers child protection, incitement to hatred and product placement,18 while the press – both online and in print – are largely lightly self-regulated through the Independent Press Standards Organisation, with some publications regulated by IMPRESS.19

However, public service media have extensive additional obligations, amongst others to ‘meet the needs and satisfy the interests of as many different audiences as practicable’ and ‘reflect the lives and concerns of different communities and cultural interests and traditions within the United Kingdom, and locally in different parts of the United Kingdom’,20 

These regulatory systems vary from country to country but hold broadly the same characteristics. In all cases, the public service remit entails far greater duties than in the private sector and broadcasters are more heavily regulated than digital providers.

These obligations are also framed in terms of public or societal benefit. This means public service media are striving to achieve societal goals that may not be aligned with a pure maximisation of profits, while commercial media pursue interests more aligned with revenue and the interests of their shareholders.

Nonetheless, public service media face scrutiny about how well they meet their objectives and have had to create proxies for these intangible goals to demonstrate their value to society.

‘[Public service media] is fraught today with political contention. It must justify its existence and many of its efforts to governments that are sometimes quite hostile, and to special interest groups and even competitors. Measuring public value in economic terms is therefore a focus of existential importance; like it or not diverse accountability processes and assessment are a necessity.’21

In practice this means public service media organisations measure their services against a range of hard metrics, such as audience reach and value for money, as well as softer measures like audience satisfaction surveys.22 In the mid-2000s the BBC developed a public value test to inform strategic decisions that has since been adopted as a public interest test which remains part of the BBC’s governance. Similar processes have been created in other public service media systems, such as the ‘Three Step Test’ in German broadcasting.23 These methods have their own limitations, drawing public media into a paradigm of cost-benefit analysis and market fixing, rather than articulating wider values to individuals, society and industry.13 

This does not mean commercial media are devoid of values. Spotify for example says its mission ‘is to unlock the potential of human creativity—by giving a million creative artists the opportunity to live off their art and billions of fans the opportunity to enjoy and be inspired by it’,25 while Netflix’s organisational values are judgment, communication, curiosity, courage, passion, selflessness, innovation, inclusion, integrity and impact.26 Commercial media are also sensitive to issues that present reputational risk, for instance the outcry over Joe Rogan’s Spotify podcast propagating disinformation about COVID-19 or Jimmy Carr’s joke about the Holocaust.27

However, commercial media harness values in service of their business model, whereas for public service media the values themselves are the organisational objective. Therefore, while the ultimate goal of a commercial media organisation is quantitative (revenue) the ultimate goal of public service media is qualitative (public value) – even if this is converted into quantitative proxies.

This difference between public and private media companies is fundamental in how they adopt recommendation systems. We discuss this further later in the report when examining the objectives of using recommendation systems.

Current challenges for public service media

Since their inception, public service media and their values have been tested and reinterpreted in response to new technologies.

The introduction of the BBC Light Programme in 1945, a light entertainment alternative to the serious fare offered by the BBC Home Service, challenged the principle of universality (not everyone was listening to the same content at the same time) as well as the balance between the mission to inform, educate and entertain (should public service broadcasting give people what they want or what they need?). The arrival of the video recorder, and then new channels and platforms, gave audiences an option to opt out of the curated broadcast schedule –where editors determined what should be consumed. While this enabled more and more personalised and asynchronous listening and viewing, it potentially reduced exposure to the serendipitous and diverse content that is often considered vital to the public service remit.28 The arrival and now dominance of digital technologies comes amid a collision of simultaneous challenges which, in combination, may be existential.

Audience

Public service media have always had a hybrid role. They are obliged to serve the public simultaneously as citizens and consumers.29

Their public service mandate requires them to produce content and serve audiences that the commercial market does not provide for. At the same time, their duty to provide a universal service means they must aim to reach a sizeable mainstream audience and be active participants in the competitive commercial market.

Although people continue to use and value public service media, the arrival of streaming services such as Netflix, Amazon and Spotify, as well as the availability of content on YouTube, has had a massive impact on public service media audience share.

In the UK, the COVID-19 pandemic has seen people return to public service media as a source of trusted information, and with more time at home they have also consumed more public service content.30

But lockdowns also supercharged the uptake of streaming. By September 2020, 60% of all UK households subscribed to an on-demand service, up from 49% a year earlier. Just under half (47%) of all adults who go online now consider online services to be their main way of watching TV and films, rising to around two-thirds (64%) among 18–24 year olds.31

Public service media are particularly concerned about their failure to reach younger audiences.32 Although this group still encounters public service media content, they tend to do so on external services: younger viewers (16–34 year olds) are more likely to watch BBC content on subscription video-on-demand (SVoD) services rather than through BBC iPlayer (4.7 minutes per day on SVoD vs. 2.5 minutes per day on iPlayer).31 They are not necessarily aware of the source of the content and do not create an emotional connection with the public service media as a trusted brand. Meanwhile, platforms gain valuable audience insight data through this consumption which they do not pass onto the public service media organisations.34

Regulation

Legislation has not kept pace with the rate of technological change. Public service media are trying to grapple with the dynamics of the competitive digital landscape on stagnant or declining budgets, while continuing to meet their obligations to provide linear TV and radio broadcasting to a still substantial legacy audience.

The UK broadcasting regulator Ofcom published recommendations in 2021, repeating its previous demands for an urgent update to the public service media system to make it sustainable for the future. These include modernising the public service objectives, changing licences to apply across broadcast and online services and allowing greater flexibility in commissioning across platforms.31

The Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee of the House of Commons has also demanded regulatory change. It warned that ‘hurdles such as the Public Interest Test inhibit the ability of [public service broadcasters] to be agile and innovate at speed in order to compete with other online services’ and that the core principle of universality would be threatened unless public service media were better able to attract younger audiences.34

Although there has been a great deal of activity around other elements of technology regulation, particularly the Online Safety Bill in the UK and the Digital Services Act in the European Union, the regulation of public service media has not been treated with the same urgency. There is so far no Government white paper for a promised Media Bill that would address this in the UK and the European Commission’s proposals for a European Media Freedom Act are in the early stages of consultation.37

Political context

Public service media have always been a political battleground and have often had fractious relationships with the government of the day. But the rise of populist political movements and governments has created new fault lines and made public service media a battlefield in the culture wars. The Polish and Hungarian Governments have moved to undermine the independence of public service media, while the far-right AfD party in eastern Germany refused to approve funding for public broadcasting.38 In the UK, the Government has frozen the licence fee for two years and has said future funding arrangements are ‘up for discussion’. It has also been accused of trying to appoint an ideological ally to lead the independent media regulator Ofcom. Elsewhere in Europe, journalists from public service media have been attacked by anti-immigrant and COVID-denial protesters.39

At the same time, public service media are criticised as unrepresentative of the publics they are supposed to serve. In the UK, both the BBC and Channel 4 have attempted to address this by moving parts of their workforce out of London.40 As social media has removed traditional gatekeepers to the public sphere, there is less acceptance of and deference towards the judgement of media decision-makers. In a fragmented public sphere, it becomes harder for public service media to ‘hold the ring’ – on issues like Brexit, COVID-19, race and transgender rights, public service media find themselves distrusted by both sides of the argument.

Although the provision of information and educational resources through the COVID-19 pandemic has given public service media a boost, both in audiences and in levels of trust, they can no longer take their societal value or even their continued existence for granted.30 Since the arrival of the internet, their monopoly on disseminating real-time information to a wide public has been broken and so their role in both the media and democratic landscape is up for grabs.42 For some, this means public service media is redundant.43 For others, its function should now be to uphold national culture and distinctiveness in the face of the global hegemony of US-owned platforms.44

The Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose has proposed reimagining the BBC as a ‘market shaper’ rather than a market fixer, based on a concept of dynamic public value,13 while the Media Reform Coalition calls for the creation of a Media Commons of independent, democratic and accountable media organisations, including a People’s BBC and Channel 4.46 The wide range of ideas in play demonstrates how open the possible futures of public service media could be.

Introducing recommendation systems

The main steps in the development of a recommendation: user engagement with the platform, data gathering, algorithmic analysis and recommendation generation.

Day-to-day, we might turn to friends or family for their recommendations when it comes to decisions large and small. From dining out and entertainment, to big purchases. We might also look at expert reviews. But in the last decade, there has been a critical change in where recommendations come from and how they’re used. Recommendations have now become a pervasive feature of the digital products we use.

Recommendation systems are a type of software that filter information based on contextual data and according to criteria set by its designers. In this section, we briefly outline how recommendation systems operate and how they are used in practice by European public service media. At least a quarter of European public service media have begun deploying recommendation systems. They are mainly used on video platforms but they are only applied on small sections of services – the vast majority of public service content continues to be manually curated by editors.

In media organisations, producers, editors and journalists have always made implicit and explicit decisions about what to give prominence to, from what stories to tell and what programmes to commission, to – just as importantly – how those stories are presented. Deciding what makes the front page, what gets prime time, what makes top billing on the evening news – these are all acts of recommendation. For some, the entire institution is a system for recommending content to their audiences.

Public service media organisations are starting to automate these decisions by using recommendation systems.

Recommendation systems are context-driven information filtering systems. They don’t use explicit search queries from the user (unlike search engines) and instead rank content based only on contextual information.47

This can include:

  • the item being viewed, e.g. the current webpage, the article being read, the video that just finished playing etc.
  • the item being filtered and recommended, e.g. the length of the content, when the content was published, characteristics of the content, e.g. drama, sport, news – often described as metadata about the content
  • the users, e.g. their location or language preferences, their past interactions with the recommendation system etc.
  • the wider environment, e.g. the time of day.

Examples of well-known products utilising recommendation systems include:

  • Netflix’s homepage
  • Spotify’s auto-generated playlists and auto-play features
  • Facebook’s ‘People You May Know’ and ‘News Feed’
  • YouTube’s video recommendations
  • TikTok’s ‘For You’ page
  • Amazon’s ‘Recommended For You’, ‘Frequently Bought Together’, ‘Items Recently Viewed’, ‘Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought’, ‘Best-Selling’ etc.48
  • Tinder’s swiping page49
  • LinkedIn’s ‘Recommend for you’ jobs page.
  • Deliveroo or UberEats’ ‘recommended’ sort for restaurants.

Recommendation systems and search engines

It is worth acknowledging the difference between recommendation systems and search engines, which can be thought of as query-driven information filtering systems. They filter, rank and display webpages, images and other items primarily in response to a query from a user (such as Google searching for ‘restaurants near me’). This is then often combined with the contextual information mentioned above. Google Search is the archetypal search engine in most Western countries but other widely used search engines include Yandex, Baidu and Yahoo. Many public service media organisations offer a query-driven search feature on their services that enables users to search for news stories or entertainment content.

In this report, we have chosen to focus on recommendation systems rather than search engines as the context-driven rather than query-driven approach of recommendation systems is much more analogous to traditional human editorial judgment and content curation.

Broadly speaking, recommendation systems take a series of inputs, filter and select which ones are most important, and produce an output (the recommendation). The inputs and outputs of recommendation systems are subject to content moderation (in which the pool of content is pre-screened and filtered) and curation (in which content is selected, organised and presented).

This starts by deciding what to input into the recommendation system. The pool of content to draw from is often dictated by the nature of the platform itself, such as activity from your friends, groups, events, etc. alongside adverts, as in the case of Facebook. In the case of public service media, the pool of content is often their back catalogue of audio, video or news content.

This content will have been moderated in some way before it reaches the recommendation system, either manually by human moderators or editors, or automatically through software tools. On Facebook, this means attempts to remove inappropriate user content, such as misinformation or hate speech, from the platform entirely, according to moderation guidelines. For a public service media organisation, this will happen in the commissioning and editing of articles, radio programmes and TV shows by producers and editorial teams.

The pool of content will then be further curated as it moves through the recommendation system, as certain pieces of content might be deemed appropriate to publish but not to recommend in a particular context, e.g. Facebook might want to avoiding recommending you posts in languages you don’t speak. In the case of public service media, this generally takes the form of business rules, which are editorial guidelines implemented directly into the recommendation system.

Some business rules apply equally across all users and further constrain the set of content that the system recommends content from, such as only selecting content from the past few weeks. Other rules apply after individual user recommendations have been generated and filter those recommendations based on specific information about the user’s context, such as not recommending content the user has already consumed.

For example, below are business rules that were implemented in BBC Sounds’ Xantus recommendation system, as of summer 2021:50

Non-personalised business rules Personalised business rules
Recency Already seen items
Availability Local radio (if not consumed previously)
Excluded ‘master brands’, e.g., particular radio channels51 Specific language (if not consumed previously)
Excluded genres Episode picking from a series
Diversification (1 episode per brand/series)

How different types of recommendation systems work

Not all recommendation systems are the same. One major difference relates to what categories of items a system is filtering and curating for. This can include, but isn’t limited to:

  • content, e.g. news articles, comments, user posts, podcasts, songs, short-form video, long-form video, movies, images etc. or any combination of these content types
  • people, e.g. dating app profiles, Facebook profiles, Twitter accounts etc.
  • metadata, e.g. the time, data, location, category etc. of a piece of content or the age, gender, location etc. of a person.

In this report, we mainly focus on:

  1. Media content recommendation systems: these systems rank and display pieces of media content, e.g. news articles, podcasts, short-form videos, radio shows, television shows, movies etc. to users of news websites, video-on-demand and streaming services, music and podcast apps etc.
  2. Media content metadata recommendation systems: these rank and display suggestions for information to classify pieces of media content, e.g. genre, people or places which appear in the piece of media, or other tags, to journalists, editors or other members of staff at media organisations.

Another important distinction between applications of recommendation systems is the role of the provider in choosing which set of items the recommendation system is applied to. There are three categories of use for recommendation systems:

  1. Open recommending: The recommendation system operates primarily on items that are generated by users of the platform, or otherwise indiscriminately automatically aggregated from other sources, without the platform curating or individually approving the items. Examples include YouTube, TikTok’s ‘For You’ page, Facebook’s ‘News Feed’ and many dating apps.
  2. Curated recommending: The recommendation system operates on items which are curated, approved or otherwise editorialised by the platform operating the recommendation system. These systems still primarily rely on items generated by external sources, sometimes blended with items produced by the platform. Often these external items will come in the form of licensed or syndicated content such as music, films, TV shows, etc. rather than user-generated items. Examples include Netflix, Spotify and Disney+.
  3. Closed recommending: The recommendation system operates exclusively on items generated or commissioned by the platform operating the recommendation system. Examples include most recommendation systems used on the website of news organisations.

Lastly, there are different types of technical approaches that a recommendation system may use to sort and filter content. The approaches detailed below are not mutually exclusive and can be combined in recommendation systems in particular contexts:

Type of filtering Example What does it do?
Collaborative filtering ‘Customers Who Bought This Item Also Bought’ on Amazon The system recommends items to users based on the past interactions and preferences of other users who are classified as having similar past interactions and preferences. These patterns of behaviour from other users are used to predict how the user seeing the recommendation would rate new items. Those item rating predictions are used to generate recommendations of items that have a high level of similarity with content previously popular with similar users.
Matrix factorisation Netflix’s ‘Watch Next’ feature A subclass of collaborative filtering, this method codifies users and items into a small set of categories based on all the user ratings in a system. When Netflix recommends movies, a user may be codified by how much they like action, comedy, etc. and a movie might be codified by how much it fits into these genres. This codified representation can then be used to guess how much a user will like a movie they haven’t seen before, based on whether these codified summaries ‘match’.

 

Content-based filtering Netflix’s ‘Action Movies’ list These methods recommend items based on the codified properties of the item stored in the database. If the profile of items a user likes mostly consists of action films, the system will recommend other items that are tagged as action films. The system does not draw on user data or behaviour to make recommendations.

Of these typologies, the public service media that we surveyed only use closed recommendation systems as they are applying recommendations to content they have commissioned or produced. However, we found examples of public service media using all types of filtering approaches: collaborative filtering, content-based filtering and hybrid recommendation systems.

How do European public service media organisations use recommendation systems?

The use of recommendation systems is common but not ubiquitous among public service media organisations in Europe. As of 2021, at least a quarter of European Broadcasting Union (EBU) member organisations were using recommendation systems on at least one of their content delivery platforms.52 Video-on-demand platforms are the most common use case for recommendation systems, followed by audio-on-demand and news content. As well as these public-facing recommendation systems, some public service media also use recommendation systems for internal-only purposes, such as systems that assist journalists and producers with archival research.53

Figure 1: Recommendation system use by European public service media by platform (EBU, 2020)

Platform on which public service media offers personalised recommendations Number of European Broadcasting Union member organisations Examples
Video-on-demand At least 18 BBC iPlayer
Audio-on-demand At least 10 BBC Sounds, ARD Audiothek
News content At least 7 VRT NWS app

Among the EBU member organisations which reported using recommendation systems in a 2020 survey, recommendations were displayed:

  • in a dedicated section on the on-demand homepage (by at least 16 organisations)
  • in the player as ‘play next’ suggestions (by at least 10 organisations)
  • as ‘top picks’ on the on-demand homepage (by at least 9 organisations).

Even among organisations that have adopted recommendation systems, their use remains very limited. NPO in the Netherlands was the only organisation we encountered that aims to have a fully algorithmically driven homepage on its main platform. In most cases, the vast majority of content remains under human editorial control, with only small sub-sections of the interface offering recommended content.

As editorial independence is a key public service value, as well as a differentiator of public service media from its private-sector competitors, it is likely most public service media will retain a significant element of curation. The requirement for universality also creates a strong incentive to ensure that there is a substantial foundation of shared information to which everyone in society should be exposed.

Recommendation systems in the BBC

The BBC is significantly larger in staff, output and audience than other European public service media organisations. It has a substantial research and development department and has been exploring the use of recommendation systems across a range of initiatives since 2008.54

In 2017, the BBC Datalab was established with the aim of helping audiences discover relevant content by bringing together data from across the BBC, augmented machine learning and editorial expertise.55 It was envisioned as a central capability across the whole of the BBC (TV, radio, news and web) which would build a data platform for other BBC teams that would create consistent and relevant experiences for audiences across different products. In practice, this has meant collaborating with different product teams to develop recommendation systems.

The BBC now uses several recommendation systems, at different degrees of maturity, across different forms of media, including:

  • written content, e.g. the BBC News app and some international news services, such as the Spanish-language BBC Mundo, recommending additional new stories56
  • audio-on-demand, e.g. BBC Sounds recommending radio programmes and music mixes a user might like
  • short-form video, e.g. BBC Sport and BBC+ (now discontinued) recommending videos the user might like
  • long-form video, e.g. BBC iPlayer recommending TV shows or films the user might like.
Approaches to the development of recommendation systems

Public service media organisations have the choice to buy an external ‘off the shelf’ recommendation system or build it themselves.

The BBC initially used third-party providers of recommendation systems but, as part of a wider review of online services, began to test the pros and cons of bringing this function in-house. Building on years of their own R&D work, the BBC found they were able to build a recommendation system that not only matched but could outperform the bought-in systems. Once it was clear that personalisation would be central to the future strategy of the BBC, they decided to bring all systems in-house with the aim of being ‘in control of their destiny’.57 The perceived benefits include building up technical capability and understanding within the organisation, better control and integration of editorial teams, better alignment with public service values and greater opportunity to experiment in the future.58

The BBC has far greater budgets and expertise than most other public service media organisations to experiment with and develop recommendation systems. But many other organisations have also chosen to build their own products. Dutch broadcaster NPO has a small team of only four or five data scientists, focused on building ‘smart but simple’ recommendations in-house, having found third-party products did not cater to their needs. It is also important to them that they should be able to safeguard their audience data and be able to offer transparency to public stakeholders about the way their algorithms work, neither of which they felt confident about when using commercial providers.59

Several public service media organisations have joined forces through the EBU to develop PEACH60 – a personalisation system that can be adopted by individual organisations and adapted to their needs. The aim is to share technical expertise and capacity across the public service media ecosystem, enabling those without their own in-house development teams to still adopt recommendation systems and other data-driven approaches. Although some public service media feel this is still not sufficiently tailored to their work,59 others find it not only caters to their needs but that it embodies their public service mission through its collaborative approach.62

Although we are aware that some public service media continue to use third-party systems, we did not manage to secure research interviews with any organisations that currently do so.

How are public service media recommendation systems currently governed and overseen?

The governance of recommendation systems in public service media is created through a combination of data protection legislation, media regulation and internal guidelines. In this section, we outline the present and future regulatory environment in the UK and EU, and how internal guidelines influence development in the BBC and other public service media. Some public service media have reinterpreted their existing guidelines for operationalising public service values to make them relevant to the use of recommendation systems.

The use of recommendation systems in public service media is not governed by any single piece of legislation or governance. Oversight is generated through a combination of the statutory governance of public service media, general data protection legislation and internal frameworks and mechanisms. This complex and fragmented picture makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of current governance arrangements.

External regulation

The structures that have been established to regulate public service media are based around analogue broadcast technologies. Many are ill-equipped to provide oversight of public service media’s digital platforms in general, let alone to specifically oversee the use of recommendation systems.

For instance, although Ofcom regulates all UK broadcasters, including the particular duties of public service media, its remit only covers the BBC’s online platforms and not, for example, the ITV Hub or All 4. Its approach to the oversight of BBC iPlayer is to set broad obligations rather than specific requirements and it does not inspect the use of recommendation systems. Both the incentives and sanctions available to Ofcom are based around access to the broadcasting spectrum and so are not relevant to the digital dissemination of content. In practice this means that the use of recommendation systems within public service media are not subject to scrutiny by the communications regulator.

However, like all other organisations that process data, public service media within the European Union are required to comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The UK adopted this legislation before leaving the EU, though  a draft Data Protection and Digital Information Bill (‘Data Reform Bill’) introduced in July 2022 includes a number of important changes, including removing the prohibition on automated decision-making, and maintaining restrictions for automated decision-making only if special categories of data are involved. The draft bill also introduces a new ground to allow the processing of special categories of data for the purpose of monitoring and correcting algorithmic bias in AI systems. A separate set of provisions centred around fairness and explainability for AI systems is also expected as part of the Government’s upcoming white paper on AI governance.

The UK GDPR shapes the development and implementation of recommendation systems because it requires:

  • Consent: the UK GDPR requires that the use of personal data be made with freely-given, genuine and unambiguous consent from an individual. There are other lawful bases for processing personal data that do not require consent, including legal obligations, processing in a vital interest and processing for a ‘legitimate interest’ (a justification that public authorities cannot rely on if they are processing for their tasks as a public authority).
  • Data minimisation: under Article 5(1), the ‘data minimisation’ principle of the UK GDPR states that personal data should be ‘adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which they are processed’. Under Article 17 of the UK GDPR, the ‘right to erasure’ grants individuals the right to have personal data erased that is not necessary for the purposes of processing.
  • Automated decision-making, the right to be informed and explainability:  under the UK GDPR, data subjects have a right not to be subject to solely automated decisions that do not involve human intervention, such as profiling.63 Where such automated decision-making occurs, meaningful information about the logic involved, the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing need to be provided to the data subject (Article 15 (1) h). Separate guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office also touches on making AI systems explainable for users.64

Our interviews with practitioners indicated that GDPR compliance is foundational to their approach to recommendation systems, and that careful consideration must be paid to how personal data is collected and used. While the forthcoming Data Reform Bill makes several changes to the UK GDPR, most of these effects on the development and implementation of recommendation systems will likely continue under the current bill’s language.

GDPR regulates the use of data that a recommendation system draws on, but there is not currently any legislation that specifically regulates the ways in which recommendation systems are designed to operate on that data, although there are a number of proposals in train at national and European levels.

In July 2022, the European Parliament adopted the Digital Services Act, which includes (in Article 24a) an obligation for all online platforms to explain, in their terms and conditions, the main parameters of their recommendation system and the options for users to modify or influence those parameters. There are additional requirements imposed on very large online platforms (VLOPs) to provide at least one option for each of their recommendation systems which is not based on profiling (Article 29). There are also further obligations for VLOPs in Article 26 to perform systemic risk assessments, including taking into account the design of the recommendation systems (Article 26 (2) a) and to implement steps to mitigate risk by testing and adapting their recommendation systems (Article 27 (1) ca).

In order to ensure compliance with the transparency provisions in the regulation, the Digital Services Act includes a provision that enables independent auditors and vetted researchers to have access to the data that led to the company’s risk assessment conclusions and mitigation decisions (Article 31). This provision ensures oversight over the self-assessment (and over the independent audit) that companies are required to carry out, as well as scrutiny over the choices large companies make around their recommendation systems.

The draft AI Act proposed by the European Commission in 2021 also includes recommendation systems in its remit. The proposed rules require harm mitigations such as risk registers, data governance and human oversight but only make obligations mandatory for AI systems used in ‘high-risk’ applications. Public service media are not mentioned within this category, although due to their democratic significance it’s possible they might come into consideration. Outside the high-risk categories, voluntary adoption is encouraged. These proposals are still at an early stage of development and negotiation and are unlikely to be adopted until at least 2023.

In another move, in January 2022 the European Commission launched a public consultation on a proposed European Media Freedom Act that aims to further increase the ‘transparency, independence and accountability of actions affecting media markets, freedom and pluralism within the EU’. The initiative is a response to populist governments, particularly in Poland and Hungary attempting to control media outlets, as well as an attempt to bring media regulation up to speed with digital technologies. The proposals aim to secure ‘conditions for [media markets’] healthy functioning (e.g. exposure of the public to a plurality of views, media innovation in the EU market)’. Though there is little detail so far, this framing could allow for the regulation of recommendation systems within media organisations.

In the UK, public service media are excluded from the draft Online Safety Bill which imposes responsibilities on platforms to safeguard users from harm. Ofcom, as well as the Digital Culture Media and Sport Select Committee, have called for urgent reform to regulation that would update the governance of public service media for the digital age. As of this report, there has been no sign of progress on a proposed Media Bill that would provide this guidance.

Internal oversight

Public service media have well-established practices for operationalising their mission and values through the editorial guidelines described earlier. But the introduction of recommendation systems has led many of them to reappraise these and, in some cases, introduce additional frameworks to translate these values for the new context.

The BBC has brought together teams from across the organisation to discuss and develop a set of machine learning engine principles, which they believe will uphold the Corporation’s mission and values:65

  • Reflecting the BBC’s values of trust, diversity, quality, value for money and creativity.
  • Using machine learning to improve our audience’s experience of the BBC
  • Carrying out regular review, ensuring data is handled securely and that algorithms serve our audiences equally and fairly
  • Incorporating the BBC’s editorial values and seeking to broaden, rather than narrow horizons.
  • Continued innovation and human-in-the-loop oversight.

These have then been adopted into a checklist for teams to use in practice:

‘The MLEP [Machine Learning Engine Principles] Checklist sections are designed to correspond to each stage of developing a ML project, and contain prompts which are specific and actionable. Not every question in the checklist will be relevant to every project, and teams can answer in as much detail as they think appropriate. We ask teams to agree and keep a record of the final checklist; this self-audit approach is intended to empower practitioners, prompting reflection and appropriate action.66

Reflecting on putting this into practice, BBC staff members observed that ‘the MLEP approach is having real impact in bringing on board stakeholders from across the organisation, helping teams anticipate and tackle issues around transparency, diversity, and privacy in ML systems early in the development cycle’.67

Other public service media organisations have developed similar frameworks. Bayerische Rundfunk, the public broadcaster for Bavaria in Germany, found that their existing values needed to be translated into practical guidelines for working with algorithmic systems and developed ten core principles.68 These align in many ways to the BBC principles but have additional elements, including a commitment to transparency and discourse, ‘strengthening open debate on the future role of public service media in a data society’, support for the regional innovation economy, engagement in collaboration and building diverse and skilled teams.69

In the Netherlands, public service broadcaster NPO along with commercial media groups and the Netherlands Institute for Sound and Vision drew up a declaration of intent.70 Drawing on the European Union high-level expert group principles on ethics in AI, the declaration is a commitment to the responsible use of AI in the media sector. NPO are developing this into a ‘data promise’ that offers transparency to audiences about their practices. 

Other stakeholders

Beyond these formal structures, the use of recommendation systems in public service media is shaped by these organisations’ accountability to, and scrutiny by wider society.

All the public service media organisations we interviewed welcomed this scrutiny in principle and were committed to openness and transparency.  Most publish regular blogposts about their work, present at academic conferences and invite feedback about their work. These, however, reach a small and specialist audience.

There are limited opportunities for the broader public to understand and influence the use of recommendation systems. In practice, there is little accessible information about recommendation systems on most public service media platforms and even where it exists, teams admit that it is rarely read.

The Voice of the Listener and Viewer, a civil society group that represents audience interests in the UK, has raised concerns with the BBC about a lack of transparency in its approach to personalisation but has been dissatisfied with the response. The Media Reform Coalition has proposed that recommendations systems used in UK public service media should be co-designed with citizens’ media assemblies and that the underlying algorithms should be made public.46

Despite this low level of public engagement, public service media organisations were sensitive to external perceptions of their use of recommendation systems. Teams expected that, as public service media, they would be held to a higher standard than their commercial competitors. At the BBC in particular, staff frequently mentioned concerns about how their work might be seen by the press, the majority of which tends to take an anti-BBC stance. In practice, we have found little coverage of the BBC’s use of algorithms outside of specialist publications such as Wired.

Public service media have a dual role, both as innovators in the use of recommendation services and as scrutineers of the impacts of new technologies. The BBC believes it has a ‘critical contribution, as part of a mixed AI ecosystem, to the development of beneficial AI both technically, through the development of AI services, and editorially, by encouraging informed and balanced debate’.72 At Bayerische Rundfunk, this combined responsibility has been operationalised by integrating the product team and data investigations team into an AI and Automation Lab. However, we are not aware of any instances where public service media have reported on their own products and subjected them to critical scrutiny. 

Why this matters

The history of public service media, their current challenges and the systems for their governance are the framing context in which these organisations are developing and deploying recommendation systems. As with any technology, organisations must consider how the tool can be used in ways that are consistent with their values and culture and whether it can address the problems they face.

In his inaugural speech, BBC Director-General Tim Davie identified increased personalisation as a pillar of addressing the future role of public service media in a digital world:73

‘We will need to be cutting edge in our use of technology to join up the BBC, improving search, recommendations and access. And we must use the data we hold to create a closer relationship with those we serve. All this will drive love for the BBC as a whole and help make us an indispensable part of everyday life. And create a customer experience that delivers maximum value.’

But recommendation systems also crystallise the current existential dilemmas of public service media. The development of a technology whose aim is optimisation requires an organisation to be explicit about what and who it is optimising for. A data-driven system requires an institution to quantify those objectives and evaluate whether or not the tool is helping them to achieve them.

This can seem relatively straightforward when setting up a recommendation system for e-commerce, for example, where the goal is to sell more units. Other media organisations may also have clear metrics around time spent on a platform, advertising revenues or subscription renewals.

In this instance, the broadly framed public service values that have proven flexible to changing contexts in the past are a hindrance rather than a help. A concept like ‘diversity’ is hard to pin down and feed into a system.74 Organisations that are supposed to serve the public as both citizens and consumers must decide which role gets more weight.

Recommendation systems might offer an apparently obvious solution to the problem of falling public service media audience share – if you are able to better match the vast amount of content in public service media catalogues to listeners and viewers, you should be able to hold and grow your audience. But is universality achieved if you reach more people but they don’t share a common experience of a service? And how do you measure diversity and ensure personalised recommendations still offer a balance of content?

‘The introduction of algorithmic systems will force [public service media] to express its values and goals as measurable key performance indicators, which could be useful and perhaps even necessary. But this could also create existential threats to the institution by undermining the core principles and values that are essential for legitimacy.’75

Recommendation systems force product teams within public service media organisations to settle on an interpretation of public service values, at a time when the regulatory, social and political context makes them particularly unclear.

It also means that this interpretation will be both instantiated and then systematised in a way that has never previously occurred. As we saw with the example of the impartiality guidelines of the BBC, individuals and teams have historically made decisions under a broad governance framework and founded on editorial judgement. Inconsistencies in those judgements could be ironed out through the multiplicity of individual decisions, the diversity of contexts and the number of different decision-makers. Questions of balance could be considered over a wider period of time and breadth of output. Evolving societal norms could be adopted as audience expectations change.

However, building a decision-making system sets a standardised response to a set of questions and repeats that every time. In this way it nails an organisation’s colours to one particular mast and then replicates that approach repeatedly.

Stated goals and potential risks of using recommendation systems in public service media

Organisations deploy recommendation systems to address certain objectives. However, these systems also bring potential risks. In this chapter, we look at what public service media aim to achieve through deploying recommendation systems and the potential drawbacks.

Stated goals of recommendation systems

In this section, we look at the stated objectives for the use of recommendation systems and the degree to which public service media reference those objectives and motivations when justifying their own use of recommendation systems.

Recommendation systems bring several benefits to different actors, including users who access the recommendations (in the case of public service media, audiences), as well as the organisations and businesses that maintain the platforms on which recommendation systems operate. Some of the effects of recommendation systems are also of broader societal interest, especially where the recommendations interact with large numbers of users, with the potential to influence their behaviour. Because they serve the interests of multiple stakeholders,76 recommendation systems support data-based value creation in multiple ways, which can pull in different directions.91

Four key areas of value creation are:

  1. Reducing information overload for the receivers of recommendations: It would be overwhelming for individuals to trawl the entire catalogue of Netflix or Spotify, for example. Their recommendation systems reduce the amount of content to a manageable number of choices for the audience. This creates value for users.
  2. Improved discoverability of items: E-commerce sites can recommend items they are particularly keen to sell, or direct people to niche products for which there is a specific customer base. This creates value for businesses and other actors that provide the items in the recommender’s catalogue. It can also be a source of societal value, for example where improved discoverability increases the diversity of news items that are accessed by the audience.
  3. Attention capture: Targeted recommendations which cater to users’ preferences encourage people to spend more time on services, generating revenue through subscriptions or advertising. This is a source of economic value for platform providers, who monetise attention via advertising revenue or paid subscriptions. But it can also be a source of societal value, if it means that people pay more attention to content that has public service value, in line with the mandate for universality.
  4. Data gathering to derive business insights and analysis: For example, platforms gain valuable insights into their audience through A/B testing which enables them to plan marketing campaigns or commission content. This is a source of economic value, when it is used to derive business insights. But under appropriate conditions, it could be a source of societal value, for example by enabling socially responsible scientific research (see our recommendations below).

We explored how these objectives map to the motivations articulated by public service media organisations for their use of recommendation systems.

1. Reducing information overload

‘Under conditions of information abundance and attention scarcity, the modern challenges to the realisation of media diversity as a policy goal lie less and less in guaranteeing a diversity of supply and more in the quest to create the conditions under which users can actually find and choose between diverse content.’78

We heard from David Graus: ‘So finding different ways to enable users to find content is core there. And in that context, I think recommender systems really serve to be able to surface content that users may not have found otherwise, or may surface content that users may not know they’re interested in.’

We heard from David Graus: ‘So finding different ways to enable users to find content is core there. And in that context, I think recommender systems really serve to be able to surface content that users may not have found otherwise, or may surface content that users may not know they’re interested in.’

2. Improved discoverability

Public service media also deploy recommendation systems with the objective of showcasing much more of their vast libraries of content. BBC Sounds, for example, has more than 200,000 items available, of which only a tiny amount can be surfaced either through broadcast schedules or an editorially curated platform. Recommendation systems can potentially unlock the long tail of rarely viewed content and allow individuals’ specific interests to be met.

They can also, in the view of some organisations, meet the public service obligation of diversity by exposing audiences to a greater variety of content.79 Recommendation systems need not simply cater to, or replicate people’s existing interests but can actively push new and surprising content.

This approach is also deployed in commercial settings, notably in Spotify’s ‘Discover’ playlists, as novelty is also required for audience retention. Additionally, some public service media organisations, such as Swedish Radio and NPO, are experimenting with approaches that promote content they consider particularly high in public value.

Traditional broadcasting provides one-to-many communication. Through personalisation, platforms have created a new model of many-to-many communication, creating ‘fragmented user needs’.80 Public service media must now grapple with how they create their own way of engaging in this landscape. The BBC’s ambition for the iPlayer is to make output, ‘accessible to the audience wherever they are, whatever devices they are using, finding them at the right moments with the right content’.81

Jonas Schlatterbeck, ARD (German public broadcaster), takes a similar view:

‘We can’t actually serve majorities anymore with one content. It’s not like the one Saturday night show that will attract like half of the German population […] but more like tiny mosaic pieces of different content that are always available to pretty much everyone but that are actually more targeted.’82

3. Attention capture

The need to maintain audience reach in a fiercely competitive digital landscape was mentioned by almost every public service media organisation we spoke to.

Universality, the obligation to reach every section of society, is central to the public service remit.

And if public service media lose their audience to their digital competitors, they cannot deliver the other societal benefits within their mission. As Koen Muylaert of Belgian VRT said: ‘we want to inspire people, but we also know that you can only inspire people if they intensively use your products, so our goal is to increase the activity on our platform as well. Because we have to fight for market share’.83

The assumption among most public service media organisations is that recommendation systems improve engagement, although there is still little conclusive evidence of this in academic literature. The BBC has specific targets for 16-34 year-olds to use the iPlayer and BBC Sounds, and staff consider recommendations as a route to achieving those metrics.81

From our interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs:

‘We have seen that finding in our research on several occasions that there’s sort of some transition that audiences and particularly younger audiences have gone through where there’s an expectation of personalization they don’t expect to be doing the same thing again and again and again, and in terms of active searching for things they expect they expect a personalized experience… There isn’t a lot of tolerance, increasingly with younger and digitally native audiences for friction in the experience. And so personalization is a major technique for removing friction from the experience because audience members don’t have to do all the work of discovery and selection and so on, they can have that done for them that this is.’85

Across the teams we interviewed from European public service media organisations there was widespread consensus that audiences now expect content to be personalised. Netflix and Spotify’s use of recommendation systems was described as a ‘gold standard’ for public service media organisations to aspire to. But few of our interviewees offered evidence to support this view of audience expectations.

‘I see the risk that when we are compared with some of our competitors that are dabbling with a much more sophisticated personalisation, there is a big risk of our services being perceived as not adaptable and not relevant enough.’86

4. Data gathering and behavioural interventions

Recommendation systems collect and analyse a wealth of data in order to serve personalised recommendations to their users. The data collected often pertains to user interactions with the system, including data that is produced as a result of interventions on the part of the system that are intended to influence user behaviour (interventional data).87 For example, user data collected by a recommendation system may include data about how different users responded to A/B tests, so that the system developers can track the effectiveness of different designs or recommendation strategies in stimulating some desired user behaviour. 

Interventional data can thus be used to support targeted behavioural interventions, as well as scientific research into the mechanisms that underpin the effectiveness of recommendations. This marks recommendation systems as a key instrument of what Shoshana Zuboff has called a system of ‘surveillance capitalism’.88 In this system, platforms extract economic value from personal data, usually in the form of advertising revenue or subscriptions, at the expense of the individual autonomy afforded to individual users of the technology.

As access to the services provided by the platforms becomes essential to daily life, users increasingly find themselves tracked in all aspects of their online experience, without meaningful options to avoid it. The possibility of surveillance constitutes a grave risk associated with the use of recommendation systems.

Because recommendation systems have been mainly researched and developed in commercial settings, many of the techniques and  types of data collected work within this logic of surveillance.89 However, it is also possible to envisage uses of recommendation systems that do not obey the same logic.90 Recommendation systems used by public service media are a case in point. Public service media organisations are in a position to decide which data to collect and use in the service of creating public value, scientific value and individual value for their audiences, instead of economic value that would be captured by shareholders.91

Examples of public value that could be created from user data include insights into effective and impartial communication that serves the public interest and fosters community building. Social science research into the effectiveness of behavioural interventions, and basic research into the psychological mechanisms that underpin audience’s trust in recommendations would contribute to the creation of scientific value from behavioural data. From the perspective of the audience, value could be created by fostering user empowerment to learn more about their own interests and develop their tastes, letting users feel more in control and understand the value of the content that they can access.

We found little evidence of public service media deploying recommendation systems with the explicit aim of capturing data on their audiences and content or deriving greater insights. On the contrary, interviewees stressed the importance of data minimisation and privacy. At Bayerische Rundfunk for example, a product owner said that the collection of demographic data on the audience was a red line that they would not cross.62

However, we did find that most public service media organisations introduced recommendation systems as part of a wider deployment of automated and data-driven approaches. In many cases, these are accompanied by significant organisational restructures to create new ways of working adapted to the technologies, as well as to respond to the budget cuts that almost all public service media are facing.

Public service media organisations are often fragmented, with teams separated by region and subject matter and with different systems for different channels and media that have evolved over time. The use of recommendation systems requires a consistent set of information about each item of content (commonly known as metadata). As a result, some public service media have started to better connect different services so that recommendation systems can draw on them.

For instance, Swedish Radio has overhauled its entire news output to improve its digital service, creating standalone items of content that do not need to be slotted into a particular programme or schedule but can be presented in a variety of contexts. Alongside this, it has introduced a scoring system to rank its content against its own public values, prompting a rearticulation of those values as well as a renewed emphasis on their importance.

Bayerische Rundfunk (BR) is creating a new infrastructure for the consistent use of data as a foundation for the future use of recommendation systems. This is already allowing for news stories to automatically upload data specific to different localities, as well as generating automated text on data-heavy stories such as sports results. This allows BR to cover a broader range of sports and cater to more specialist interests, as well as freeing up editorial teams from mundane tasks.

While there is not a direct objective of behavioural intervention and data capture at present, the introduction of recommendation systems is part of a wider orientation towards data-driven practices across public service media organisations. This has the potential to enable wider data collection and analysis to generate business insights in the future.

Conclusion

We find that public service media organisations articulate similar objectives to the field more broadly, in their motivations for deploying recommendation systems, although unlike commercial actors, they do not currently use recommendations for the explicit aim of data capture and behavioural intervention. In some respects they reframe these established motivations to align with their public service mission and values.

Many staff across public service media organisations display a belief that because the organisation is motivated by public service values, and produces content that adheres to those values, the use of recommendation systems to filter that content is a furtherance of their mission.

This has meant that staff at public service media organisations have not always critically examined whether the recommendation system itself is operating in accordance with public service values.

However, public service media organisations have begun to put in place principles and governance mechanisms to encourage staff to explicitly and systematically consider how the development of their systems furthers their public service values. For example, the BBC published its Machine Learning Engine Principles in 2019 and subsequently continues to iterate on a checklist for project teams to put those principles into practice.65

Public service media organisations are also in the early stages of developing new metrics and methods to measure the public service value of the outputs of the recommendation systems, both with explicit measures of ‘public service value’ and implicitly through evaluation by editorial staff. We explore these more in our chapter on evaluation and in our case studies on the BBC’s use of recommendation systems.

Additionally, we found that alongside these stated motivations, public service media interviewees had internalised a set of normative values around recommendation systems. When asked to define what a recommendation system is in their own terms, they spoke of systems helping users to find ‘relevant’, ‘useful’, ‘suitable’, ‘valuable’ or ‘good’ content.94

This framing around user benefit obscures the fact that the systems are ultimately deployed to achieve organisations’ goals, and so if they are ‘relevant’ or ‘useful’ this is because that helps achieve the organisations’ goals, not because of an inherent property of the system.95 It also adopts the vocabulary of commercial recommendation systems (e.g. targeted advertising options encourage users to opt for more ‘relevant’ adverts) which the Competition and Markets Authority has identified as problematic. This indicates that public service media are essentially adopting the paradigm established by the use of commercial recommendation systems.

Potential risks from recommendation systems

In this section, we explore some of the ethical risks associated with the use of recommendation systems and how they might manifest in uses by public service media.

A review of the literature on recommendation systems helps identify some of the potential ethical and societal risks that have been raised in relation to their use beyond the specific context of public service media. Milano et al highlight six areas of concern for recommendation systems in general:96

  1. Privacy risks to users of a recommendation system: including direct risks from non-compliance with existing privacy regulations and/or malicious use of personal data, and indirect risks resulting from data leaks, deanonymisation of public datasets or unwanted exposure of inferred sensitive characteristics to third parties.
  2. Problematic or inappropriate content could be recommended and amplified by a recommendation system.
  3. Opacity in the operation of a recommendation system could lead to limited accountability and lower the trustworthiness of the recommendations.
  4. Autonomy: recommendations could limit users’ autonomy by manipulating their beliefs or values, and by unduly restricting the range of meaningful options that are available to them.
  5. Fairness constitutes a challenge for any algorithmic system that operates using human-generated data and is therefore liable to (re)produce social biases. Recommendation systems are no exception, and can exhibit unfair biases affecting a variety of stakeholders whose interests are tied to recommendations.
  6. Social externalities such as polarisation, the formation of echo chambers, and epistemic fragmentation, can result from the operation of recommendation systems that optimise for poorly defined objectives.

How these risks are viewed and addressed by public service media

In this section, we examine the extent to which ethical risks of recommendation systems, identified in the literature, are present in the development and use of recommendation systems in practice by public service media.

1. Privacy

The data gathering and operation of recommendation systems can pose direct and indirect privacy risks. Direct privacy risks come from how personal data is handled by the platform, as its collection, usage and storage need to follow procedures to ensure prior consent from individual users. In the context of EU law, these stages are covered by General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

Indirect privacy risks arise when recommendation systems expose sensitive user data unintentionally. For instance, indirect privacy risks may come about as a result of unauthorised data breaches, or when a system reveals sensitive inferred characteristics about a user (e.g. targeted advertising for baby products could indicate a user is pregnant).

Privacy relates to a number of public service values: independence (act in the interest of audiences), excellence (high standards of integrity) and accountability (good governance).

Privacy was raised as a potential risk by every interviewee from a public service organisation. Specifically, public service media were concerned about users’ consent to the use of their data, emphasising data security as a key concern for the responsible collection and use of user data.82 Several interviewees stressed that public service media organisations do not generally require mandatory sign-in for certain key products, such as news. Other services, focusing more on entertainment, such as BBC iPlayer, do require sign-on, but the amount of personal data collected is limited.

Sebastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation at the European Broadcasting Union, emphasised how the need to comply with privacy regulations in practice means that projects have to jump through several hoops with legal teams before trials with user data are allowed. While this uses up time and resources in project development, it also means that robust measures are in place to protect users from direct threats to privacy. Koen Muylaert,  at Belgian VRT, also spoke to us about how there is a distinction between personal data, which poses privacy risks, and behavioural data, which may be safer to use for public service media recommendation systems and which they actively monitor.83

None of the organisations that we interviewed spoke to us about indirect threats to privacy or ways to mitigate them.

2. Problematic or inappropriate content

Open recommendation systems on commercial platforms that host limitless, user-generated content have a high risk of recommending low quality or harmful content. This risk is lower for public service media that deploy closed recommendation systems to filter their own catalogue of content which has already been extensively scrutinised for quality and adherence to editorial guidelines. Nonetheless, some risk may still exist for closed recommendation systems, such as the risk of recommended age-inappropriate content to younger users.

The risk of inappropriate content relates to the public service media values of excellence (high standards of integrity, professionalism and quality) and independence (completely impartial and independent from political commercial and other influences and ideologies).

In interviews, many members of public service media staff were generally confident that recommendations would be of high quality and represent public service values because the content pool had already passed that test. Nonetheless, some staff identified a risk that the system could surface inappropriate content, for example, archive items that include sexist or racist language that is no longer acceptable or through the juxtaposition of items that could be jarring.

However, a more commonly identified potential risk arises in connection to independence and impartiality. Many of the interviewees we spoke to mentioned that the algorithms used to generate user recommendations needed to be impartial. The BBC and other public service media organisations have traditionally operated a policy of ‘balance over time and output’, meaning a range of views on a subject or party political voices will be heard over a given period of programming on a specific channel. However, recommendation systems disrupt this. The audience is no longer exposed to a range of content broadcast through channels. Instead, individuals are served up specific items of content without the balancing context of other programming. In this way they may only encounter one side of an argument.

Therefore, some interviewees expressed that fine-tuning balanced recommendations are especially important in this context. This is an area where the close integration of editorial and technical teams was seen to be essential

3. Opacity of the recommendation

Like many other algorithmic systems, many recommendation systems operate as black boxes whose internal workings are sometimes difficult to interpret, even for their developers. The process by which a recommendation is generated is often not transparent to individual users or other parties that interact with a recommendation system. This can have negative effects, by limiting the accountability of the system itself, and diminishing the trust that audiences put in the good operation of the service.

Opacity is a challenge to the public service media values of independence (autonomous in all aspects of the remit) and accountability (be transparent and subject to constant public scrutiny). The issue of opacity and the risks that it raises was touched upon in several of our interviews.

The necessity to exert more control over the data and algorithms used for building recommendation systems was among the motivations for the BBC in bringing their development in house. The same is true of other public service media in Europe. While most European broadcasters did not choose to bring the development of recommendation systems in house, many of them now rely on PEACH, a recommendation system developed collaboratively by several public service media organisations under the umbrella of the European Broadcasting Union (EBU).

Previously, the BBC as well as other public service media had relied on external commercial contractors to build the recommendation systems they used. This however meant that they could exert little control over the data and algorithms used, which represented a risk. In the words of Sebastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation at the EBU:

‘As a broadcaster, you are defined by what you promote to the people, that’s your editorial line. This is, in a way, also your brand or your user experience. If you delegate that to a third party company, […] then you have a problem, because you have given your very identity, the way you are perceived by the people to a third party company […] No black box should be your editorial line.’99

But bringing the development of recommendation systems in-house does not solve all the issues connected with the opacity of these systems. Jannick Sørenson, Associate Professor in Digital Media at Aalborg University, summarised the concern:

‘I think the problem of the accountability, first within the public service institution, is that editors, they have no real chance to understand what data scientists are doing. And data scientists, neither they do. […] And so the dilemma here is that it requires a lot of specialised knowledge to understand what is going on inside this process of computing recommendation[s]. Right. And, I mean, with Machine Learning, it’s become literally impossible to follow.’42

Sørenson highlighted how the issue of opacity arises both internally and externally for public service media.

Internally to the institution, the opacity of the systems utilised to produce recommendations hinders the collaboration of editorial and technical staff. Some public service media organisations, such as Swedish Radio, have tried to tackle this issue by explicitly having both a technical and an editorial project lead, while Bayerische Rundfunk have established an interdisciplinary team with their AI and Automation Lab101

Documentation is another approach taken by public service media organisations to reduce the opacity of the system. For example, the BBC’s Machine Learning Engine Principles checklist (as of version 2.0) explicitly asks teams to document what their model does and how it was created, e.g. via a data science decision log, and to create a Plain English explanation or visualisation of the model to communicate the model’s purpose and operation.

Externally, public service media struggle to provide effective explanations to audiences about the systems that they use. The absence of industry standards for explanation and transparency was identified as a risk. Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio, also expressed this worry:

‘One particular risk, I think, with all these kind of more automatic services, and especially with the introduction of […] AI powered services, is that the audience doesn’t understand what we’re doing. And […] I know that there’s a big discussion going on at the moment, for example, about Explainable AI. How should we explain in a better way what the services are doing? […] I think that there’s a very big need for kind of industry dialogue about setting standards here, you know.’86

Other interviewees, however, highlighted that the use of explanations has limited efficacy in addressing the external opacity of individual recommendations, since users rarely pay attention to them. Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor at NPO in the Netherlands, cited internally conducted consumer studies as evidence that audiences might not care about explanations:

‘Recently, we did some experiments also on data insight, into what extent our consumers want to have feedback on why they get a certain recommendation? And yeah, unfortunately, our research showed that a lot of consumers are not really interested in the why. […] Which was quite interesting for us, because we thought, yeah, of course, as a public value, we care about our consumers. We want to elaborate on why we do the things we do and why, based on which data, consumers get these recommendations. But yeah, they seem to be very little interested in that.’103

This finding indicates that pursuing this strategy has limited practical effects in improving the value of recommendations for audiences. David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland, also told us that he is sceptical of the use of technical explanations, but that ‘what is more important is for people to understand what a recommender system is, and what it aims to do, and not how technically a recommendation was generated.’104 This could be achieved by providing high-level explanations of the processes and data that were used to produce the recommendations, instead of technical details of limited interest to non-technical stakeholders.

4. Autonomy

Research on recommendation systems has highlighted how they could pose risks to user autonomy, by restricting people’s access to information and by potentially being used to shape preferences or emotions. Autonomy is a fundamental human value which ‘generally can be taken to refer to a person’s effective capacity for self-governance’.105 Writing on the concept of human autonomy in the age of AI, Prunkl distinguishes two dimensions of autonomy: one internal, relating to the authenticity of the beliefs and values of a person; and the other external, referring to the person’s ability to act, or the availability of meaningful options that enables them to express agency.

The risk to autonomy relates to the public service media value of universality (creating a public sphere, in which all citizens can form their own opinions and ideas, aiming for inclusion and social cohesion).

Public service media historically have made choices on behalf of their audiences in line with what the organisation has determined is in the public interest. In this sense audiences have limited autonomy due to public service media organisations restricting individuals’ access to information, albeit with good intentions.

The use of recommendation systems could, in one respect, be seen as increasing the autonomy of audiences. A more personalised experience, that is more tailored to the individual and their interests, could support the ‘internal’ dimension of autonomy, because it could enable a recommendation system to more accurately reflect the beliefs and values of an individual user, based on what other users of that demographic, region or age might like.

At the same time, public service media strive to ‘create a public sphere, in which all citizens can form their own opinions and ideas, aiming for inclusion and social cohesion’.106 There is a risk in using recommendation systems that public service media might filter information in such a way that they inhibit people’s autonomy to form their views independently.85

By design, recommendation systems tailor recommendations to a specific individual, often in such a way where these recommendations are not visible to other people. This means individual members of the audience may not share a common context or may be less aware of what information others have access to, a condition that Milano et al have called ‘epistemic fragmentation’.108 Coming to an informed opinion often requires being able to have meaningful conversations about a topic with other people. If recommendations isolate individuals from each other, then this may undermine the ability of audiences to form authentic beliefs and reason about their values. Since this ability is essential to having autonomy, epistemic fragmentation poses a risk.

Recommendations are also based on an assumption that there is such a thing as a single, legible individual for whom content can be personalised. In practice, people’s needs vary according to context and relationships. They may want different types of content at different times of day, whether they are watching videos with family or listening to the news in the car, for example. However, contextual information is difficult to factor in a recommendation, and doing so requires access to more user data which could pose additional privacy risks. Moreover, recommendations are often delivered via a user’s account with a service that uses recommendation systems. However, some people may choose to share accounts, create a joint one or maintain multiple personal accounts to compartmentalise different aspects of their information needs and public presence.109

Finally, the use of recommendation systems by public service media can pose a risk to autonomy when the categories that are used to profile users are not accurate, not transparent or not easily accessible and modifiable by the users themselves. This concern is linked to the opacity of the system, but it was not addressed explicitly as a risk to user autonomy in our interviews.

As above, several interviews highlighted that internal research indicates users do not want more explanations and control over the recommendation system, when this comes at the cost of a frictionless experience. If so, public service media need to consider whether there is a trade-off between supporting autonomy and the ease of use of a recommendation system, and research alternative strategies to provide audiences with more meaningful opportunities to participate in the construction of their digital profiles.

5. Fairness

Researchers have documented how the use of machine learning and AI in applications ranging from credit scoring to facial recognition,110 medical triage to parole decisions,111 advert delivery112 to automatic text generation113 and many others, often leads to unfair outcomes which perpetuate historical social biases or introduce new, machine-generated ones. Given the pervasiveness of these systems in our societies, this has given rise to increasing pressure to improve their fairness, which has contributed to a burgeoning  area of research.

This risk relates to the public service media value of universality (reach all segments of society, with no-one excluded) and diversity (support and seek to give voice to a plurality of competing views – from those with different backgrounds, histories and stories. Help build a more inclusive, less fragmented society).

Developers of algorithmic systems today can draw on a growing array of technical approaches to addressing fairness issues; however, fairness remains a challenging issue that cannot be fully solved by technical fixes. Instead, as Wachter et al argue in the context of EU law, the best approach may be to recognise that algorithmic systems are inherently and inevitably biased, and to put in place accountability mechanisms to ensure that there are no biases that perpetuate unfair discrimination, but to the contrary biases are used to help to redress historical injustices.114

Recommendation systems are no exception. Biases in recommendation can arise at a variety of levels and for different stakeholders. From the perspective of users, a recommendation system could be unfair if the quality of the recommendations varies across users. For example, if a music recommendation system is much worse at predicting the tastes of and serving interesting recommendations to a minority group, this could be unfair.

Recommendations could also be unfair from a provider perspective. For instance, one recent study found a film recommendation system trained on a well-known dataset (MovieLens 10M), and designed to optimise for relevance to users, systematically underrepresented films by female directors.115 This example illustrates a phenomenon that is more pervasive. Since recommendation systems are primarily built to optimise for user relevance, provider-side unfairness has been observed to emerge in a variety of settings, ranging from content recommendations to employment websites.116

Because different categories of stakeholders derive different types of value from recommendation systems, issues of fairness can arise separately for each of them. In e-commerce applications, for example, users derive value from relevant recommendations for items that they might be interested in buying, while sellers derive value from their items being exposed to more potential buyers. Moreover, attempts to address unfair bias for one category of stakeholders might lead to making things worse for another category. In the case of e-commerce applications, for example, attempts to improve provider-side fairness could have negative effects on the relevance of recommendations for users. Bringing these competing interests together, comparing them and devising overarching fairness metrics remains an open challenge.117

Issues of fairness were not prominently mentioned by our interview participants. When fairness was referenced, it was primarily with regards to fairness concerns for users and whether recommendation systems performed better for some demographics than others. However, the extent to which recommendation systems are currently used across public service media organisations we spoke to was low enough that the risk did not generate too much concern among many staff. Sebastien Noir, European Broadcasting Union, said that ‘Recommendation appears, at least for the moment more than something like [the] cherry on the cake, it’s a little bit of a personalised touch on the world where everything is still pretty much broadcast content where everyone gets to receive the same content.’99 Since, for now, recommendations represent a very small portion of the content that users access on these platforms, the risk that this poses to fairness was deemed to be very low. 

However, if recommendations were to take a more prominent role in future, this would pose concerns that need to be addressed. Some of our BBC interviewees expressed a concern that some recommendations currently cater best to the interests of some demographics, while they work less well for others. Differential levels of accuracy and quality of experience across groups of users is a known issue in recommendation systems, although the way in which it manifests can be difficult to predict before the system is deployed.

In general, our respondents believed that ‘majority’ users, whose informational needs and preferences are closest to the average, and therefore more predictable, tend to be served best by a recommendation system – though many acknowledge this assertion has been difficult to empirically prove. If the majority of BBC users belong to a specific demographic, this could skew the system towards their interests and tastes, posing fairness issues with respect to other demographics. However, this can sometimes be reversed when other factors beyond user relevance, such as increasing the diversity of users and the diversity of content, are introduced. Therefore, the emerging patterns from recommendations are difficult to predict, but will need to be monitored on an ongoing basis. BBC interviewees reported that this issue is currently addressed by looping in more editorial oversight.

6. Social effects or externalities

One of the features of recommendation systems that has attracted most controversy in recent years is their apparent tendency to produce negative social effects. Social media networks that use recommendation systems to structure user feeds, for instance, have come under scrutiny for increasing polarisation by optimising for engagement. Other social networks have come under fire for facilitating the spread of disinformation.

The social externality risk relates to the public service media values of universality (create a public sphere, in which all citizens can form their own opinions and ideas, aiming for inclusion and social cohesion) and diversity (support and seek to give voice to a plurality of competing views – from those with different backgrounds, histories and stories. Help build a more inclusive, less fragmented society).

Pariser introduced the concept of a ‘filter bubble’, which can be understood as an informational ecosystem where individuals are only or predominantly exposed to certain types of content, while they never come into contact with other types.119 The philosopher C Thi Nguyen has offered an analysis of how filter bubbles might develop into echo chambers, where users’ beliefs are reflected at them and reinforced through interaction with media that validates them, leading to potentially dangerous escalation.120 However, some recent empirical research has cast doubt on the extent to which recommendation systems deployed on social media really give rise to filter bubbles and political polarisation in practice.121

In one study, it was observed that consuming news through social media increases the diversity of content consumed, with users engaging with a larger and more varied selection of news sources.122 These studies highlight how recommendation systems can be programmed to increase the diversity of exposure to varied sources of content.123 However, they do not control for the quality of the sources or the individual reaction to the content (e.g. does the user pay attention or merely scroll down on some of the news items?). Without this information it is difficult to know what the effects are of exposure to different types of sources. More research is needed to probe the links between exposure to diverse sources and the influence this has on the evolution of political opinions. 

Another known risk for recommendation systems is exposure to manipulation by external agents. Various states, for example Russia and China, have been documented to engage in what has been called ‘computational propaganda’. This type of propaganda exploits some features of recommendation systems on social media to spread mis- or disinformation, with the aim of destabilising the political context of the countries targeted. State-sponsored ‘content farms’ have been documented to produce content that is engineered to be picked up by recommendation systems to go viral. This kind of hostile strategy is made possible by the vulnerability of the recommendation system, especially open ones, because the system is programmed to optimise for engagement.

The risk that the use of recommendation systems could increase polarisation and create filter bubbles was regarded as very low by our interviewees. Unlike social media that recommend content generated by users or other organisations, the BBC and other public service media that we spoke to operate closed content platforms. This means that all the content recommended on their platforms has already passed multiple editorial checks, including for balanced and truthful reporting.

The relatively minor role that recommendation systems play on the platform currently also means that they do not pose a risk of creating filter bubbles. Therefore, this was not recognised as a pressing concern.

However, many raised concerns that recommendation systems could undermine the principle of diversity by serving audiences homogenous content. Historically, programme schedulers have had mechanisms to expose audiences to content they might not choose of their own accord – for example by ‘hammocking’ programmes of high public value between more popular items on the schedule and relying on audiences not to switch channels. Interviewees also mentioned the importance of serendipity and surprise as part of the public service remit. This could be lost if audiences are only offered content based on their previous preferences. These concerns motivate ongoing research into new methods for producing more accurate and diversified recommendations.124

Conclusion

The categories of risk related to the use of recommendation systems, identified in the literature, can be applied to their use in the context of public service media. However, the way in which these risks manifest and the emphasis that organisations put on them can be quite different to a commercial context.

We found that public service media have, to a greater or lesser extent, mitigated their exposure to these risks through a number of factors such as the high quality of the content being recommended; the limited deployment of the systems; the substantial level of human curation; a move towards greater integration of technical and editorial teams; ethical principles; associated practice checklists and system documentation. It is not enough for public service media organisations to believe that having a public service mission will ensure that recommendation systems serve the public. If public service media are to use recommendation systems responsibly, they must interrogate and mitigate the potential risks.

We find these risks can also be seen in relation to the six core public service values of universality, independence, excellence, diversity, accountability and innovation.

We believe it is useful for public service media to consider both the known risks, as understood within the wider research field, as well as the risks in relation to public service values. By approaching the potential challenges of recommendation systems through this dual lens, public service media organisations should be able to develop and deploy systems in line with their public service remit.

An additional consideration, broader than any specific risk category, is that of audience trust in public service media. Trust doesn’t fall under any specific category because it is associated with the relationship between  public service media and their audience more broadly. But failure to address the risks identified by the categories can negatively affect trust. All public service media organisations place trust as central to their mission. In the context of a fragmented digital media environment, their trustworthiness has taken on increased importance and is now a unique quality that distinguishes them from other media and which is pivotal to the argument in favour of sustaining public service media. Many public service media organisations are beginning to recognise and address the potential risks of recommendation systems and it is vital that this continues in order to retain audience trust.

Additional challenges for public service media

As well as the ethical risks described above, public service media face practical challenges in implementing recommendation systems that stem from their mission, the make-up of their teams and their organisational infrastructure.

Quantifying values

Recommendation systems filter content according to criteria laid down by the system developers. Public service media organisations that want to filter content in ways that prioritise public service values first need to translate these values into information that is legible to an algorithmic system. In other words, the values must be quantified as data.

However, as we noted above, public service values are fluid, can change over time and depend on context. And as well as the stated mission of public service media, laid down in charters, governance and guidelines, there are a set of cultural norms and individual gut instincts that determine day-to-day decision making and prioritisation in practice. Over time, public service media have developed a number of ways to measure public value, through systems such as the public value test assessment and with metrics such as audience reach, value for money and surveys of public sentiment (see section above). However, these only account for public value at a macro level. Recommendation systems that are filtering individual items of content require metrics that quantify values at a micro level.

Swedish Radio is a pioneer in attempting to do this work of translation. Olle Zachrison of Swedish Radio summarised it as: ‘we have central tenets to our public service mission stuff that we have been talking about for decades and also stuff that is in the kind of gut of the news editors. But in a way, we had to get them out there in an open way and into a system also, that we in a way could convert those kinds of editorial values that have been sitting in these kind of really wise news assessments for years, but to get them out there into a system that we also convert them into data.’86

Working across different teams and different disciplines

The development and deployment of recommendation systems for public service media requires expertise in both technical development and content creation and curation. This proves challenging in a number of ways.

Firstly, technology talent is hard to come by, especially when public service media cannot offer anything near the salaries available at commercial rivals.126 Secondly, editorial teams often do not trust or value the role of technologists, especially when the two do not work closely with each other.127 In some organisations, the introduction of recommendation systems stalls because it is perceived as a direct threat to editorial jobs and an attempt to replace journalists with algorithms.99

Success requires bridging this gap and coordinating between teams of experts in technical development, such as developers and data scientists, and experts in content creation and curation, the journalists and editors.67

As Sørensen and Hutchinson note: ‘Data analysts and computer programmers (developers) now perform tasks that are key determinants for exposure to public service media content. Success is no longer only about making and scheduling programmes. This knowledge is difficult to communicate to journalists and editors, who typically don’t engage in these development projects […] Deep understanding of how a system recommends content is shared among a small group of experts’.75

Some, such as Swedish Radio and BBC News Labs, have tried to tackle this issue by explicitly having two project leads, one with an editorial background and one with a technical background, to emphasise the importance of working together and symbolically indicate that this was a joint process.131 Swedish Radio’s Olle Zachrison noted that: 

‘We had a joint process from day one. And we also deliberately had kind of two project managers, one, clearly from the editorial side, like a very experienced local news editor. And the other guy was the product owner for our personalization team. So they were the symbols internally of this project […] that was so important for the, for the whole company to kind of team up behind this and also for the journalists and the product people to do it together.’

If this coordination fails, this can ‘weaken the organisation strategically and, on a practical level, create problems caused by failing to include or correctly mark the metadata that is essential for findability’.

Bayerische Rundfunk has established a unique interdisciplinary team. The AI and Automation Lab has a remit to not only create products, but also produce data-driven reporting and coverage of the impacts of artificial intelligence on society. Building from the existing data journalism unit, the Lab fully integrates the editorial and technical teams under the leadership of Director Uli KĂśppen. Although she recognises the challenges of bringing together people from different backgrounds, she believes the effort has paid off:

‘This technology is so new, and it’s so hard to persuade the experts to work in journalism. We had the data team up and running, these are journalists that are already in the mindset at this intersection of tech and journalism. And I had the hope that they are able to help people from other industries to dive into journalism, and it’s easier to have this kind of conversation with people who already did this cultural step in this hybrid world.

‘It was astonishing how those journalists helped the new people to onboard and understand what kind of product we are. And we are also reinventing our role as journalists in the product world. And this really worked out so I would say it’s worth the effort.’

Metadata, infrastructure and legacy systems

In order to filter content, recommendation systems require clear information about what that content is. For example, if a system is designed to show people who enjoyed soap operas other series that they might enjoy, individual items of content must be labelled as being soap operas in a machine-readable format. This kind of labelling is called metadata.

However, public service media have developed their programming around the needs of individual channels and stations organised according to particular audiences and tastes (e.g. BBC Radio 1 is aimed at a younger audience around music, BBC Radio 4 at an older audience around speech content) or by a particular region (e.g. in Germany Bayerische Rundfunk serves Bavaria, WDR serves West Germany but both are members of the federal broadcaster ARD). Each of these channels will have evolved their own protocols and systems and may label content differently – or not at all. This means the metadata to draw on for the deployment of recommendation systems is often sparse and low quality, and the metadata infrastructure is often disjointed and unsystematic.

We heard from many interviewees across public service media organisations that access to high-quality metadata was one of the most significant barriers to implementing recommendation systems. This was particularly an issue when they wanted to go beyond the most simplistic approaches and experiment with assigning public service value to pieces of content or measuring the diversity of recommended content.

Recommendation system projects often required months of setting up systems for data collection, then assessing and cleaning that data, before the primary work of building a recommendation system could begin. To achieve this requires a significant strategic and financial commitment on the part of the organisation, as well as buy-in from the editorial teams involved in labelling.

Evaluation of recommendation systems

We’ve explored the possible benefits and harms of recommendation systems, and how those benefits and harms might manifest in a public service media context. To try to understand whether and when those benefits and harms occur, developers of recommendation systems need to evaluate their systems. Conversely, looking at how developers and organisations evaluate their recommendation systems can tell us what benefits and harms, and to whom, they prioritise and optimise for in their work.132

In this chapter, we look at:

  • how recommendation systems can be evaluated
  • how public service media organisations evaluate their own recommendation systems
  • how evaluation might be done differently in future.

How recommendation systems are evaluated

In this section, we lay out a framework for understanding the evaluation of recommendation systems as a three-stage process of:

  1. Setting objectives.
  2. Identifying metrics.
  3. Selecting methods to measure those metrics.

This framework is informed by three aspects of evaluation (objectives, metrics and methods) as identified by Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science at the Free University of Bozen-Bolzano.

Objectives

Evaluation is a process of determining how well a particular system achieves a particular set of goals or objectives. To evaluate a system, you need to know what goals you are evaluating against.133

However, this is not a straightforward exercise. There is no singular goal for a recommendation system and different stakeholders will have different goals for the system. For example, on a privately-owned social media platform:

  • the engineering team’s goal might be to create a recommendation system that serves ‘relevant’ content to users
  • the CEO’s goal might be to maximise profit while minimising personal reputational risk
  • the audience’s goal may be to discover new and unexpected content (or just avoid boredom).

If a developer wants to take into account the goals of all the stakeholders in their evaluation, they will need to decide how to prioritise or weigh these different goals.

Balancing goals is ultimately a ‘political’ or ‘moral’ question, not a technical one, and there will never be a universal answer about how to weigh these different factors, or even who the relevant stakeholders whose goals should be weighted are.

Any process of evaluation ultimately needs a process to determine the relevant stakeholders for a recommendation system and how their priorities should be weighted.

This is made more difficult because people are often confused or uncertain about their goals, or have multiple competing goals, and so the process of evaluation will need to help people clarify their goals and their own internal weightings between those goals.134

Metrics

Furthermore, goals are often quite general and whether they have been met cannot be directly observed.133 Therefore, once a goal has been decided, such as ‘relevance to the user’, the goal needs to be operationalised into a set of specific metrics to judge the recommendation system against.136 These metrics can be quantitative, such as the number of users who click on an item, or qualitative, such as written feedback from users about how they feel about a set of recommendations.

Whatever the metrics used, the choice of metrics is always a choice of a particular interpretation of the goal. The metric will always be a proxy for the goal, and determining a proxy is a political act that grants power to the evaluator to decide what metrics reflect their view of the problem to be solved and the goals to be achieved.137

The people who define these metrics for the recommendation system are often the engineering or product teams. However, these teams are not always the same people who set the goals of an organisation. Furthermore, they may not directly interact with other stakeholders who have a role in setting the goals of the organisation or the goal of deploying the recommendation system.

Therefore, through misunderstanding, lack of knowledge or lack of engagement with others’ views, the engineering and product teams’ interpretation of the goal will likely never quite match the intention of the goal as envisioned by others.

Metrics will also always be a simplified vision of reality, summarising individual interactions with the recommendation system into a smaller set of numbers, scores or lines of feedback.138 This does not mean metrics cannot be useful indicators of real performance; this very simplicity is what makes them useful in understanding the performance of the system. However, those creating the metrics need to be careful not to confuse the constructed metric with the reality underlying the interactions of people with the recommendation system. The metric is a measure of the interaction, not the interaction itself.

Methods

Evaluating is then the process of measuring these metrics for a particular recommendation system in a particular context, which requires gathering data about the performance of the recommendation system. Recommendation systems are evaluated in three main ways:139

  1. Offline evaluations test recommendation systems without real users interacting with the system, for example by measuring recommendation system performance on historical user interaction data or in a synthetic environment with simulated users.
  2. User studies test recommendation systems against a small set of users in a controlled environment with the users being asked to interact with the system and then typically provide explicit feedback about their experience afterwards.
  3. Online evaluations test recommendation systems deployed in a live environment, where the performance of the recommendation system is measured against interactions with real users.

These methods of evaluation are not mutually exclusive and a recommendation system might be tested with each method sequentially, as it moves from design to development to deployment.

Offline evaluation has been a historically popular way to evaluate recommendation systems. It is comparatively easy to do, due to the lack of interaction with real users or a live platform. In principle, they are reproducible by other evaluators, and allow standardised comparison of the results of different recommendation system.140

However, there is increasing concern that offline evaluation results based on historical interaction data do not translate well into real-world recommendation system performance. This is because the training data is based on a world without the new recommendation system in it, and evaluations therefore cannot account for how that system might itself shift wider aspects of the service like user preferences.141 This limits their usefulness in evaluating which recommendation system would actually be the best performing in the dynamic live environments most stakeholders are interested in, such as a video-sharing website with an ever-growing set of videos and ever-changing set of viewers and content creators.

Academics we spoke to in the field of recommendation systems identified user studies in labs and simulations as the state of the art in academic recommendation system evaluation. Whereas in industry, common practice is to use online evaluation via A/B testing to optimise key performance indicators.126

How do public service media evaluate their recommendation systems?

In this section, we use the framework of objectives, metrics and methods to examine how public service media organisations evaluate their recommendation systems in practice.

Objectives

As we discussed in the previous chapter, recommendation systems are ultimately developed and deployed to serve the goals of the organisation using them; in this case, public service media organisations. In practice, however, the objectives that recommendation systems are evaluated against are often multiple levels of operationalisation and contextualisation down from the overarching public service values of the organisation.

For example, as discussed previously, the BBC Charter agreement sets out the mission and public purposes of the organisation for the following decade. These are derived from the public service values, but are also shaped by political pressures as the Charter is negotiated with the British Government of the time.

The BBC then publishes an annual plan setting out the organisation’s strategic priorities for that year, drawing explicitly on the Charter’s mission and purposes. These annual plans are equally shaped by political pressures, regulatory constraints and challenges from commercial providers. The plan also sets out how each product and service will contribute towards meeting those strategic priorities and purposes, setting the goals for each of the product teams.

For example, the goals of BBC Sounds as a product team in 2021 were to:

  1. Increase the audience size of BBC Sounds’ digital products.
  2. Increase the demographic breadth of consumption across BBC Sounds’ products, especially among the young.
  3. Convert ‘lighter users’ into regular users.
  4. Enable users to more easily discover content from the more than 50 hours of new audio produced by the BBC on an hourly basis.143

These objectives map onto the goals for using recommendation systems we discussed in the previous chapter. Specifically, the first three relate to capturing audience attention and the fourth relates to reducing information overload and improving discoverability for audiences.

These product goals then inform the objectives of the engineering and product teams in the development and deployment of a recommendation system, as a feature within the wider product.

At each stage, as the higher level objectives are interpreted and contextualised lower down, they may not always align with each other.

The objectives for the development and deployment of recommendation systems in public service media seem most clear for entertainment products, e.g. audio-on-demand and video-on-demand. Here, the goal of the system is clearly articulated as a combination of audience engagement with reaching underserved demographics and serving more diverse content. These are often explicitly linked by the development teams to achieving the public service values of diversity and a personalised version of universality, which they see as serving the needs of each and every group in society

In these cases, public service media organisations seem better at articulating goals for recommendation systems when they are using recommendation systems for a similar purpose as private-sector commercial media organisations. This seems, in part, because there is greater existing knowledge of how to operationalise those objectives, and the developers can draw on their own private sector experience and existing industry practice, open-source libraries and similar resources.

However, when setting objectives that focus more focus on public service value, public service media organisations often seem less clear about the goals of the recommendation system within the wider product.

This seems partly because in the domain of news, for example, the use of recommendation systems by public service media is more experimental and at an earlier stage of maturity. Here, the motivations often come further apart from commercial providers, with the implicit motivation of public service media developers seemingly to augment existing editorial capabilities with a recommendation system, rather than drive engagement with the news content. This means public service media developers have less existing practices and resources to draw upon for translating product goals and articulating recommendation system objectives in those domains.

In general, it seems that some public service values are easier to operationalise in the context of recommendation systems than others, such as diversity and universality. These values get privileged over others, such as accountability, in the development of recommendation systems, as they are the easiest to translate through from the overarching set of organisational values down to the product and feature objectives.

Metrics

Public service media organisations have struggled to operationalise their complex public service values into specific metrics. There seem to be three broad responses to this:

  1. Fall back on established engagement metrics, e.g. click-through rate and watch time, often with additional quantitative measures of the diversity of audience content consumption.
  2. The above approach combined with attempts to create crude numerical measures (e.g. a score from 1 to 5) of ‘public service value’ for pieces of content, often reducing complex values to a single number subjectively judged by journalists, then measuring the consumption of content with a ‘high’ public service value score.
  3. Try to indirectly optimise for public service value by making their metrics the satisfaction of editorial stakeholders, whose preferences are seen as the best ‘ground truth’ proxy for public service value. Then optimise for lists of recommendations which are seen to have high public service value by editorial stakeholders.

Karin van Es found that, as of 2017, the European Broadcasting Union and the Dutch public service media organisation NPO evaluated pilot algorithms using the same metrics found in commercial systems i.e. stream starts and average‐minute ratings.28 As van Es notes, these metrics are a proxy for audience retention and even if serving diverse content was an explicit goal in designing the system, the chosen metrics reflect – and will ultimately lead to – a focus on engagement over diversity.

Therefore, despite different stated goals, the public service media use of recommendation systems ends up optimising for similar outcomes as private providers.

By now, most public service media organisations using recommendation systems also have explicit metrics for diversity, although there is no single shared definition of diversity across the different organisations, nor is there one single metric used to measure the concept.

However, most quantitative metrics for diversity in the evaluation of public service media recommendation systems focus on diversity in terms of audience exposure to unique pieces of content or to categories of content, rather than on the representation of demographic groups and viewpoints across the content audiences are exposed to.145

Some aspects of diversity, as Hildén observes, are easier to define and ‘to incorporate into a recommender system than others. For example, genres and themes are easy to determine at least on a general level, but questions of demographic representation and the diversity of ideas and viewpoints are far more difficult as they require quite detailed content tags in order to work. Tagging content and attributing these tags to users might also be politically sensitive especially within the context of news recommenders’.74

Commonly used metrics for diversity include intra-list diversity, i.e. the average difference between each pair of items in a list of recommendations and inter-list diversity, i.e. the ratio of items recommended to total items recommended across all the lists of recommendations.

Some public service media organisations are experimenting with more complex measures of exposure diversity. For example, Koen Muylaert at Belgian VRT explained how they measure an ‘affinity score’ for each user for each category of content, e.g. your affinity with documentaries or with comedy shows, which increases as you watch more pieces of content in that category.83 VRT then measures the diversity of content that each user consumes by looking at the difference between a user’s affinity scores for different categories.148 RT see this method of measuring diversity as valuable because they can explain it to others and measure it across users over time, to track how new iterations of their recommendation system increase users’ exposure to diverse content.

To improve on this, some public service media organisations have tried to implement ‘public service value’ as an explicit metric in evaluating their recommendation systems. NPO, for example, ask a panel of 1,500 experts and ordinary citizens to assess the public value of each piece of content, including the diversity of actors and viewpoints represented in the content, and then ask those panellists to assign a single ‘public value’ from 1 to 100 to all pieces of content on their on-demand platform. They then calculate an average ‘public value’ score for the consumption history of each user. According to Sara van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor at NPO, their target is to make sure that the average ‘public value’ score of every user rises over time.103

At the moment, they are only specifically focusing on optimising for that metric within a specific ‘public value’ recommendations section within their wider on-demand platform, which is a mixture of recommendations based on user engagement and  the ‘public value’ of the content. However, through experiments, they found there was a trade-off between optimising for ‘public value’ and viewership, as noted by Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization at NPO:

‘When we’re focusing too much on the public value, we see that the percentage of people that are watching the actual content from the recommender is way lower than when you’re using only the collaborative filtering algorithm […] So when you are focusing more on the relevance then people are willing to watch it. And when you’re adding too much weight on the public values, people are not willing to watch it anymore.’

This resulted in them choosing to have a ‘low ratio’ of public value content to engaging content, making explicit the choice that public service media organisations often do and have to make between audience retention and other public service values like diversity, at least over the short-term these metrics measure.

Others, when faced with the inadequacy of conventional engagement and diversity metrics, have tried to indirectly optimise for public service value by making their metrics the satisfaction of editorial stakeholders, whose preferences are seen as the best ‘ground truth’ proxy for public service value.

In the early stages of developing an article-to-article news recommendation system in 2018,150 the BBC Datalab initially used a number of quantitative metrics for its offline evaluation.151

They evaluated these using offline metrics, with proxies for engagement, diversity and relevance to audiences, including:

  • hit rate, i.e. whether the list of recommended articles includes an article a user did in fact view within 30 minutes of viewing the original article
  • normalised discounted cumulative gain, i.e. how relevant the recommended articles were assumed to be to the user, with a higher weighting for the relevance of articles higher up in the list of recommendations
  • intra-list diversity, i.e. the average difference between every pair of articles in a list of recommendations
  • inter-list diversity, i.e. the ratio of unique articles recommended to total articles recommended across all the lists of recommendations
  • popularity-based surprisal, i.e. how novel the articles recommended were
  • recency, i.e. how old the articles recommended were when shown to the user.

However, they found that performance on these metrics didn’t match the editorial teams’ priorities. When they tried to instead operationalise into metrics what public service value meant to the editors,  existing quantitative metrics were unable to capture editorial preferences and creating new ones was not straightforward. As Alessandro Piscopo, Lead Data Scientist, BBC Datalab notes:152

‘We did notice that in some cases, one of the recommender prototypes was going higher in some metrics and went to editorial and [they would] say well we just didn’t like it […] Sometimes it was just comments from editorial world, we want to see more depth. We want to see more breadth. Then you have to interpret what that means.’

This difficulty in finding appropriate metrics led to the Datalab team changing their primary method of evaluation, from offline evaluation to user studies with BBC editorial staff, which they called ‘subjective evaluation’.153

In this approach, they asked editorial staff to score each list of articles generated by the recommendation systems as either: unacceptable, inappropriate, satisfactory or appropriate. The editors were then prompted to describe what properties they considered in choosing how appropriate the recommendations were. The development team would then iterate the recommendation system based on the scoring and written feedback along with discussion with editorial about the recommendation.

Early in the process, the Datalab team agreed with editorial what percentage of each grade they were aiming for, and so what would be a benchmark for success in creating a good recommendation system. In this case, the editorial team decided that they wanted:154

  1. No unacceptable recommendations, on the basis that any unacceptable recommendations would be detrimental to the reputation of the BBC.
  2. Maximum 10% inappropriate recommendations.

This change of metrics meant that the evaluation of the recommendation system, and the iteration of the system as a result, was optimising for the preferences of the editorial team, over imperfect measures of audience engagement, relevance and diversity. The editors are seen as the most reliable ‘source of truth’ for public service value, in lieu of better quantitative metrics.

Methods

Public service media often rely on internal user studies with their own staff as an evaluation method during the pre-deployment stage of recommendation system development. For example, Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist at Channel 4, said that when developing a recommendation system for All 4 in 2016, they would ask staff to subjectively compare the output of two recommendation systems side by side, based on the staff’s understanding of Channel 4’s values:

‘So we’re making our recommendations algorithms fight, “Robot Wars” style, pick the one that you think […] understood this view of the best, good recommendations are relevant and interesting to the viewer. Great recommendations go beyond the obvious. Let’s throw in something a little unexpected, or showcase the Born Risky programming that we’re most proud of, [clicking the] prefer button next to the […]one you like best […] Born Risky, which was one of the kind of Channel Four cultural values for like, basically being a bit cheeky. Going beyond the mainstream, taking a chance. It was one of, I think, a handful of company values.’155

Similarly, when developing a recommendation system for BBC Sounds, the BBC Datalab decided to use a process of qualitative evaluation. BBC Sounds uses a factorisation machine approach, which is a mixture of content matching and collaborative filtering. This uses your listening history, metadata about the content and other users’ listening history to make recommendations in two ways:

  1. It recommends items that have similar metadata to items you have already listened to.
  2. It recommends items that have been listened to by people with otherwise similar listening histories.

When evaluating this approach, BBC compared the new factorisation machine recommendation system head-to-head with the existing external provider’s recommendations.

They recruited 30 BBC staff members under the age of 35 to be test users.156 They then showed these test users two sets of nine recommendations side by side. One set was provided by the current external provider’s recommendation system, and the other set was provided by the team’s internal factorisation machine recommendation system. The users were not told which system had produced which set of recommendations, and had to choose whether they preferred ‘A’ or ‘B’, or ‘both’ or ‘neither’, and then explain their decision why in words.

Over 60% of test users preferred the recommendation sets provided by the internal factorisation machine.157 This convinced the stakeholders that the system should move into production and A/B testing, and helped editorial teams get hands-on experience evaluating automated curations, increasing their confidence in the recommendation system.

Similarly, when later deploying the recommendation system to create personalised sorting system for feature items, the Datalab team held a number of digital meetings with editorial staff, showing them the personalised and non-personalised featured items side-by-side. The Datalab then got feedback from the editors on which they preferred.152 This approach allowed them to more directly capture internal staff preferences and manually step towards meeting those preferences. However, the team acknowledged its limitations upfront, particularly in terms of scale.159 Editorial teams and other internal staff only have so much capacity to judge recommendations, and thus would struggle to assess every edge case or judge recommendations, if every recommendation changed depending on the demographics of the audience member viewing it. 

Once the recommendation systems are deployed to a live environment, i.e. accessible by audiences on their website or app, public service media all have some form of online evaluation in place, most commonly in the form of A/B testing in which viewers are given two different recommendations to choose from.

Channel 4 used online evaluation in the form of A/B testing to evaluate the recommendation system used by their video-on-demand service, All 4 Greg Detre noted that:

‘We did A/B test it eventually. And it didn’t show a significant effect. That said [Channel 4] had an already somewhat good system in place. That was okay. And we were very constrained in terms of the technical solutions that we were allowed, there were only a very, very limited number of algorithms that we were able to implement, given the constraints that have already been agreed when I got there. And so as a result, the solution we came up with was, you know, efficient in terms of it was fast to compute in real time, and easy to sort of deploy, but it wasn’t that great… I think perhaps it didn’t create that much value.’155

BBC Datalab also used A/B testing in combination with continued user studies and behavioural testing. By April/May 2020, editorial had given sign-off and the recommendation system was deemed ready for initial deployment.153

During deployment, the team took a ‘failsafe approach’ with weekly monitoring of the live version of the recommendation system by editorial staff. This included further subjective evaluation described above and behavioural tests. In these behavioural tests, developers use a list of pairs of inputs and desired outputs, comparing the output of the recommendation system with the desired output for each given input.162

After deployment, there was still a need to understand the effect and success of the recommendation systems. This took the form of A/B testing the live system. This included measuring the click-through rate on the recommended articles. However, members of the development team noted it was only a rough proxy for user satisfaction and were working to go beyond click-through rate.

Ultimately at the post-deployment stage, the success of the recommendation system is determined by the product teams, with input by development teams in the identification of appropriate metrics. It is editorial considerations that are central to product teams decide which metrics they think they are best suited to evaluate for.152

Once the system reaches the stage of online evaluation, these methods can only tell public service media whether the recommendation system was worthwhile after it is has already been built and considering the time and resources invested in building it. Therefore the evaluation becomes about whether to continue to use and maintain the system given the operating costs versus the costs involved in removing or replacing it. This can mean even systems that only provide limited value to the audience or to the public service media organisation will remain in use in this phase of evaluation.

How could evaluations be done differently?

In this section, we explore how the objectives, metrics and methods for evaluating recommendation systems could be done differently by public service media organisations.

Objectives

Some public service media organisations could benefit from more explicitly drawing a connection from their public service values to the organisational and product goals and finally to the recommendation system itself, showing how each level links to the next. This can help prevent value drift as goals go through several levels of interpretation and operationalisation, and help contextualise the role of the recommendation system in achieving public value within the wider process of content delivery.

More explicitly connecting these objectives can help organisations to recognise that, while a product as a whole should achieve public service objectives, a recommendation system doesn’t need to achieve every objective in isolation. While a recommendation system’s objectives should not be in conflict with the higher level objectives, they may only need to achieve some of those goals (e.g. its primary purpose might be to attract and engage younger audiences and thus promote diversity and universality). Therefore, its contribution to the product and organisational objectives should be seen in the context of the overall audience experience and the totality of the content an individual user interacts with. Evaluating against the recommendation system’s feature-level objectives alone is not enough to know whether a recommendation system is also consistent with product and organisational objectives.

Audience involvement in goal-setting

Another area worthy of further exploration is providing greater audience input and control over the objectives and therefore the initial system design choices. This could involve eliciting individual preferences from a panel of audience members and then working with staff to collaboratively trade-off and explicitly set different weighting for different objectives of the system. This should take place as part of a broader co-design approach at the product level. This is because the evaluation process for a recommendation system should include the option to say a recommendation system is not the most appropriate tool for achieving the higher-level objectives of the product and providing the outcomes the staff and the audiences want from the product, rather than constraining audiences to just choose between different versions of a recommendation system.

Making safeguards an explicit objective in system evaluation

A final area worthy of exploration is building in system safeguards like accountability, transparency and interpretability as explicit objectives in the development of the system, rather than just as additional governance considerations. Some interviewees suggested making considerations such as interpretability a specific objective in evaluating recommendation systems. By explicitly weighing those considerations against other objectives and attempting to measure the degree of interpretability or transparency, it would ensure greater salience of those safeguards in the selection of systems.155

Metrics

More nuanced metrics for public service value

If public service media organisations want to move beyond optimising for a mix of engagement and exposure diversity in their recommendation systems, then they will need to develop better metrics to measure public service value. As we’ve seen above, some are already moving in this direction with varying degrees of success, but more experimentation and learning will be required.

When creating metrics for public service value, it will be important to disambiguate between different meanings of ‘public service value’. A public service media organisation cannot expect to have one quantitative measure of ‘public service value’, which conflates a number of priorities that can be in tension with one another.

One approach would be to explicitly break each public service value down into separate metrics for universality, independence, excellence, diversity, accountability and innovation, and most likely sub-values within those. This could help public service media developers to clearly articulate the components of each value and make it explicit how they are weighted against each other. However, quantifying concepts like accountability and independence can be challenging to do, and this approach may struggle to work in practice. More experimentation is needed.

The most promising approach may be to adopt more subjective evaluations of recommendation systems. This approach recognises that ‘public service value’ is going to be inherently subjective and uses metrics which reflect that. Qualitative metrics based on feedback from individuals interacting with the recommendation system can let developers balance the tensions between different aspects of public service value. This places less of a burden on developers to weight those values themselves, which they might be poorly suited to, and can accommodate different conceptions of public service value from different stakeholders.

However, subjective evaluations do have their limits. They are only able to evaluate a tiny subset of the overall recommendations, and will only capture the subjective evaluation of features appearing in that subset. These evaluations may miss features that were not present in the content evaluated, or which are only able to be observed in aggregate over some wider set of recommendations. These challenges can be mitigated by broadening subjective evaluations to a more representative sample of the public, but that may raise other challenges around the costs of running these evaluations at that scale.

More specific metrics

In a related way, evaluation metrics could be improved by greater specificity and explicitness about what concept the metric is trying to measure and therefore explicitness about how different interpretations of the same high-level concept are weighted.28 In particular, public service media organisations could be more explicit about the kind of diversity they want to optimise, e.g. unique content viewed, the balance of categories viewed or the representation of demographics and viewpoints across recommendations, and whether they care about each individual’s exposure or exposure across all users.

Longer-term metrics

Another issue identified is that most metrics used in the evaluation of recommendation systems, within public service media and beyond, are short-term metrics, measured in days or weeks, rather than years. Yet at least some of the goals of stakeholders will be longer-term than the metrics used to approximate them. Users may be interested in both immediate satisfaction and in discovering new content so they continue to be informed and entertained in the future. Businesses may both be trying to maximise quarterly profits and also trying to retain users into the future to maximise profits in the quarters to come.

Short-term metrics are not entirely ineffective at predicting long-term outcomes. Better outcomes right now could mean better outcomes months or years down the road, so long as the context the recommendation system is operating in stays relatively stable and the recommendation system itself doesn’t change user behaviour in ways that lead to poorer long-term outcomes.

By definition, long-term consequences take a longer time to occur, and thus there is a longer waiting period between a change in the recommendation system and the resulting change in outcome. A longer period between action and evaluation also means a greater number of confounding variables which make it more challenging to assess the causal link between the change in the system and the change in outcomes.

Dietmar Jannach, Professor at the University of Klagenfurt, highlighted this was a problem across academic and industry evaluations, and that ‘when Netflix changes the algorithms, they measure, let’s see, six weeks, two months to try out different things in parallel and look what happens. I’m not sure they know what happens in the long run.’126

Methods

Simulation-based evaluation

One possible method to estimate long-term metrics is to use simulation-based offline evaluation approaches. In this approach, the developers use a virtual environment with a set of content which can be recommended and a user model which simulates the expected preferences of users based on parameters selected by the developers (which could include interests, demographics, time already spent on the product, previous interactions with the product etc.).167 This recommendation system then makes recommendations to the user model, which generates a simulated response to that recommendation. The user model can also update its preferences in response to the recommendations it has received, e.g. a user might become more or less interested in a particular category of content, and model the simulated users’ overall satisfaction with the recommendations over time.

This provides some indication of how the dynamics of the recommendation system and changes to it might play out over a long period of time. It can evaluate how users respond to a series of recommendations over time and therefore whether a recommendation system could lead to audience satisfaction or diverse content exposure over a period longer than a single recommendation or user session. However, this approach still has many of the limitations of other kinds of offline evaluation. Historical user interaction data is still required to model the preferences of users, and that data is not neutral because it is itself the product of interaction with the previous system, including any previous recommendation system that was in place.

The user model is also only based on data from previous users, which might not generalise well to new users. Given that many of these recommendation systems are put in place to reach new audiences, specifically younger and more diverse audiences than those who currently use the service, the simulation-based evaluation might lead to unintentionally underserving those audiences and overfitting to existing user preferences.

Furthermore, the simulation can only model the impact of parameters coded into it by the developers. The simulation only reflects the world as a developer understands it, and may not reflect the real considerations users take into account in interacting with recommendation systems, nor the influences on user behaviour beyond the product.

This means that if there are unexpected shocks, exogenous to the recommendation system, that change user interaction behaviour to a significant degree, then the simulation will not take those factors into account. For example, a simulation of a news recommendation system’s behaviour in December 2019 would not be a good source of truth for a recommendation system in operation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The further the simulation tries to look ahead at outcomes, the more vulnerable it will be to changes in the environment that may invalidate its results.

User panels and retrospective feedback

After deployment, asking audiences for informed and retrospective feedback on their recommendations is a promising method for short-term and long-term recommendation system evaluation.168 This could involve asking the users to review, rate and provide feedback on a subsection of the recommendations they received over the previous month, in a similar manner to the subjective evaluations undertaken by the BBC Datalab. This would provide development and product teams with much more informative feedback than through A/B testing.

This could be particularly effective in the form of a representative longitudinal user panel which returns to the same audience members at regular intervals to get their detailed feedback on recommendations.169 Participants in these panels should be compensated for their participations to recognise the contribution they are making to the improvement of the system and ensure long-term retention of participants. This would allow development and product teams to gauge how audience responses change over time, by seeing how they react to the same recommendations months later, to understand how their opinions on that recommendation may have changed over time, including in response to changes to the underlying system over longer periods.

Case studies

Through two case studies, we examine how the differing prioritisation of values in different forms of public service media and the differing nature of the content itself manifests itself in different approaches to recommendation systems. We will focus on the use of recommendation systems across BBC News for news content, and BBC Sounds for audio-on-demand.

Case study 1: BBC News

Introduction

BBC News is the UK’s dominant news provider and one of the world’s most influential news organisations.170 It reaches 57% of UK adults every week and 456 million globally. Its news websites are the most-visited English language news websites on the internet.171 For most of the time that BBC News has had an online presence, it has not used any recommendation systems on its platforms.

In recent years, BBC News has taken a more experimental approach to recommendation systems, with a number of different systems for recommending news content developed, piloted and deployed across the organisation.172

Goal

For editorial teams, the goal of adding recommendation systems to BBC News was to augment editorial curation and make it easier to scale on a more personalised level. This addresses challenges relating to editors facing an ‘information overload’ of content to recommend. Additionally, product teams at BBC believed this feature would improve the discoverability of news content for different users.151

What did they build?

From around 2019, , a team (which later become part of BBC Datalab) collaborated with a team building out the BBC News app to develop a content-to-content recommendation system. This focused on ‘onward journeys’ from news articles. Partway through each article the recommendation system generated a section that was titled ‘You might be interested in’ (in the language relevant to that news website) that listed four recommended articles.152

Figure 2: BBC News ‘You might be interested in’ section (image courtesy of the BBC)

The recommendation system is combined with a set of business rules which constrain the set of articles that the system recommends content from. The rules aim to ensure ‘sufficient quality, breadth, and depth’ in the recommendations.153

For example, these included:

  • recency, e.g. only selecting content from the past few weeks
  • unwanted content, e.g. content in the wrong language
  • contempt of court
  • elections
  • children-safe content.

In an earlier project, this team had developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website.151 Similar recommendation systems are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App.177

Figure 3: BBC Mundo recommendation system (image courtesy of the BBC)

Figure 4: Recommendation system on BBC World Service website in Hindi (image courtesy of the BBC)

Criteria (and how they relate to public service values)

The BBC News team eventually settled on a content-to-content recommendation system using a model (called ‘tf-idf’) that encoded article data (like text) and metadata (like the categorical tags that editorial teams gave the article) into vectors. Once articles were represented as vectors, additional metrics could be applied to measure the similarity between them. This enabled the ability to penalise more popular content.178

The business rules the BBC used sought to ensure ‘sufficient quality, breadth, and depth’ in the recommendations, which aligns with the BBC’s values around universality and excellence.153

There was also an emphasis on the recommendation system needing to be easy to understand and explain. This can be attributed to BBC News being more risk-averse than other parts of the organisation.180 Given the BBC’s mandate to be a ‘provider of accurate and unbiased information’ and BBC News that staff themselves identify as ‘the product that likely contributes most to its reputation as a trustworthy and authoritative media outlet’.151 It is unsurprising they would want to pre-empt any accusations of bias for any automated news recommendation system, by making it understandable to audiences.

Evaluation

The Datalab team experimented with a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data.

Initially, they found that a content-to-content approach to item recommendations was more suited to the editorial requirements for the product, and user interaction data was therefore less relevant to the evaluation of the recommender, prompting a shift to a different approach.

As they began to compare different content-to-content approaches, they found that performance in quantitative metrics often didn’t match the editorial teams priorities, and it was difficult to operationalise editorial judgement of public service value into metrics. As Alessandro Piscopo notes: ‘We did notice that in some cases, one of the recommender prototypes was going higher in some metrics and went to editorial and [they would] say well we just didn’t like it.’ And, ‘Sometimes it was just comments from editorial world, we want to see more depth. We want to see more breadth. Then you have to interpret what that means.’152

The Datalab team chose to take a subjective evaluation-first approach, whereby editors would directly compare and comment on the output of two recommendation systems. This approach allowed them to capture editorial preferences more directly and manually work towards meeting those preferences.

However, the team acknowledged its limitations upfront, particularly in terms of scale.159 They tried to pick articles that would bring up the most challenging cases. However, editorial teams only have so much capacity to judge recommendations, and thus would struggle to assess every edge case or judge every recommendation. This issue would be even more acute if in a future recommendation system, every article’s associated recommendations changed depending on the demographics of the audience member viewing it.

By May 2020, editorial had given sign-off and the recommendation system was deemed ready for initial deployment.153 During deployment, the team took a ‘failsafe approach’ with weekly monitoring of the live version of the recommendation system by editorial staff, alongside A/B testing measuring the click-through rate on the recommended articles. However, members of the development team noted it was only a rough proxy for user satisfaction and were working to go beyond click-through rate.

Case Study 2: BBC Sounds

Introduction

BBC Sounds is the BBC’s audio streaming and download service for live radio, music, audio-on-demand and podcasts,185 replacing the BBC’s previous live and catch-up audio service, iPlayer Radio.186 A key difference between BBC Sounds and iPlayer Radio is that BBC Sounds was built with personalisation and recommendation as a core component of the product, rather than as a radio catch-up service.187

Goal

The goals of BBC Sounds as a product team are:

  • increase the audience size of BBC Sounds’ digital products
  • increase the demographic breadth of consumption across BBC Sounds’ products, especially among the young143
  • convert ‘lighter users’ who only engage a certain number of times a week into regular users
  • enable users to more easily discover content from the more than 50 hours of new audio produced by the BBC on an hourly basis.

Product

BBC Sounds initially used an outsourced recommendation system from a third-party provider. Having knowledge about the inner working of the recommendation systems and the ability to quickly iterate were seen as valuable by the development team, as it proved challenging to request changes to the external provider. The BBC decided it wanted to own the technology and the experience as a whole, and believed they could achieve better value-for-money for TV License-payers by bringing the system in-house. So the BBC Datalab developed a hybrid recommendation system named Xantus for BBC Sounds.

BBC Sounds use a factorisation machine approach, which is a mixture of content matching and collaborative filtering. This uses your listening history, metadata about the content, and other users’ listening history to make recommendations in two ways:

  1. It recommends items that have similar metadata to items you have already listened to.
  2. It recommends items that have been listened to by people with otherwise similar listening histories.

Figure 5: BBC Sounds’ ‘Recommended For You’ section (image courtesy of the BBC)

Figure 6: ‘Music Mixes’ on BBC Sounds (image courtesy of the BBC)

Criteria (and how they relate to public service media values)

On top of this factorisation machine approach are a number of business rules. Some rules apply equally across all users and constrain the set of content that the system recommends content from, e.g. only selecting content from the past few weeks. Other rules apply after individual user recommendations have been generated and filter the recommendations based on specific information about the user, e.g. not recommending content the user has already consumed.

As of summer 2021, the business rules used in the BBC Sounds’ Xantus recommendation system were:50

Non-personalised business rules Personalised business rules
Recency Already seen items
Availability Local radio (if not consumed previously)
Excluded ‘master brands’, e.g. particular radio channels51 Specific language (if not consumed previously)
Excluded genres Episode picking from a series
Diversification (1 episode per brand/series)

Governance

Editorial and others help define the business rules for Sounds.191 The product team adopted the business rules from the incumbent system and then checked whether they made sense in the context of the new system. They constantly review the business rules. Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab, noted that: 

‘Making sure you are involving [editorial values] at every stage and making sure there is strong collaboration between data scientists in order to define business rules to make sure we can find good items. For instance with BBC Sounds you wouldn’t want to be recommending news content to people that’s more than a day or two old and that would be an editorial decision along with UX research and data. So, it’s a combination of optimizing for engagement while making sure you are working collaboratively with editorial to make sure you have the right business rules in there.’

Evaluation

To decide whether to progress further with the prototype, the team decided to use a process of subjective evaluation. The Datalab team showed recommendations generated by both the new factorisation machine recommendation system head-to-head with the existing external provider’s recommendations and got feedback from the editors on which of the two they liked.152 The factorisation machine recommendation system was preferred by the editors and so was deployed into the live environment.

After deployment, UX testing, qualitative feedback and A/B testing were used to fine-tune the system. In their initial A/B tests, they were optimising for engagement, looking at click-throughs, play throughs and play completes. In these tests, they were able to achieve:156

  • 59% increase in interactions in the ‘Recommended for You’ rail
  • 103% increase in interactions for under-35s.

 

Outstanding questions and areas for further research and experimentation

Through this research we have built up an understanding of the use of recommendation systems in public service media in the BBC and Europe, as well as the opportunities and challenges that arise. This section offers recommendations to address some of the issues that have been raised and indicate areas beyond the scope of this project that merit further research. These recommendations are directed at the research community, including funders, regulators and public service media organisations themselves.

There is an opportunity for public service media to define a new, responsible approach to the development of recommendation systems that work to the benefit of society as a whole and offer an alternative to the paradigm established by big technology platforms. Some initiatives that are already underway could underpin this, such as the BBC’s Databox project with the University of Nottingham and subsequent work on developing personal data stores.194 These personal data stores primarily aim to address issues around data ownership and portability, but could also act as a foundation for more holistic recommendations across platforms and greater user control over the data used in recommending them content.

But in making recommendations to public service media we recognise the pressures they face. In the course of this project, a real-terms cut to BBC funding has been announced and the corporation has said it will have to reduce the services it offers in response.195 We acknowledge that, in the absence of new resources and faced with the reality of declining budgets, public service media organisations would have to cut other activities to carry out our suggestions. 

We therefore encourage both funders and regulators to support organisations to engage in public service innovation as they further explore the use of recommendation systems. Historically the BBC has set a precedent for using technology to serve the public good, and in doing so brought soft power benefits to the UK. As the UK implements its AI strategy, it should build on this strong track record and comparative advantage and invest in the research and implementation of responsible recommendation systems.

1. Define public service value for the digital age

Recommendation systems are designed to optimise against specific objectives. However, the development and implementation of recommendation systems is happening at a time when the concept of public service value and the role of public service media organisations in the wider media landscape is rapidly changing.

Although we make specific suggestions for approaches to these systems, unless public service media organisations are clear about their own identities and purpose, it will be difficult for them to build effective recommendation systems. It is essential that public service media revisit their values in the digital age, and articulate their role in the contemporary media ecosystem.

In the UK, significant work has already been done by Ofcom as well as the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee to identify the challenges public service media face and offer new approaches to regulation. Their recommendations must be implemented so that public service media can operate within a paradigm appropriate to the digital age and build systems that address a relevant mission.

2. Fund a public R&D hub for recommendation systems and responsible recommendation challenges

There is a real opportunity to create a hub for the research and development of recommendation systems that are not tied to industry goals. This is especially important as recommendation systems are one of the prime use cases of behaviour modification technology, but research into it is impaired by lack of access to interventional data.196

Existing academic work on responsible recommendations could be brought together into a public research hub on responsible recommendation technology, with the BBC as an industry partner. It could involve developing and deploying methods for democratic oversight of the objectives of recommendation systems and the creation and maintenance of useful datasets for researchers outside of private companies.

We recommend that the strategy for using recommendation systems in public service media should be integrated within a broader vision to make this part of a publicly accountable infrastructure for social scientific research.

Therefore, as part of UKRI’s National AI Research and Innovation (R&I) Programme, set out in the UK AI Strategy, it should fund the development of a public research hub on recommendation technology. This programme could also connect with the European Broadcasting Union’s PEACH project, which has similar goals and aims.

Furthermore, one of the programme’s aims is to create challenge-driven AI research and innovation programmes for key UK priorities. The arrival of Netflix in 2006 spurred the development of today’s recommendation systems. The UK could create new challenges to spur the development of responsible recommendation system approaches  encouraging a better information environment. For example, the hub could release a dataset and benchmark for a challenge on generating automatic labels for a dataset of news items.

3. Publish research into audience expectations of personalisation

There was a striking consensus in our interviews with public service media teams working on recommendation systems that personalisation was both wanted and expected by the audience. However, we were offered little evidence to support this belief. Research in this area is essential for a number of reasons.

  1. Public service media exist to serve the public. They must not assume they are acting in the public interest without any evidence of their audience’s views towards recommendation systems.
  2. The adoption of recommendation systems without evidence that they are either wanted or needed by the public raises the risk that public service media are blindly following a precedent set by commercial competitors, rather than defining a paradigm aligned to their own missions.
  3. Public service media have limited resources and multiple demands. It is not strategic to invest heavily in the development and implementation of these systems without an evidence base to support their added value.

If research into user expectations of recommendation systems does exist, the BBC should strive to make this public.

4. Communicate and be transparent with audiences

Although most public service media organisations profess a commitment to transparency about their use of recommendation systems, in practice there is limited effective communication with their audiences about where and how recommendation systems are being used.

What communication there is tends to adopt the language of commercial services, for example talking about ‘relevance’. In our interviews, we found that within teams there was no clear responsibility for audience communication. Staff often assumed that few people would want to know more, and that any information provided would only be accessed by a niche group of users and researchers.

However, we argue that public service organisations have a responsibility to explain their practices clearly and accessibly and to put their values of transparency into practice. This should not only help retain public trust at a time when scandals from big technology companies have understandably made people view algorithmic

systems with suspicion, but also develop a new, public service narrative around the use of these technologies.

Part of this task is to understand what a meaningful explanation of a recommendation system looks like. Describing the inner workings of algorithmic decision-making is not only unfeasible but probably unhelpful. However, they can educate audiences about the interactive nature of recommendation systems. They can make salient the idea that when consuming content through a recommendation system, they are in effect ‘voting with their attention’. Their viewing behaviour is something private, but at the same time affects what the system learns and what others will view.

Public service media should invest time and research into understanding how to usefully and honestly articulate their use of recommendation systems in ways that are meaningful to their audiences.

This communication must not be one-way. There must be opportunities for audience members to give feedback and interrogate the use of the systems, and raise concerns where things have gone wrong.

5. Balance user control with convenience

However, transparency alone is not enough. Giving users agency over the recommendations they see is an important part of responsible recommendation. Simply giving users direct control over the recommendation system is an obvious and important first step, but it is not a universal solution.

Some interviewees pointed to evidence that the majority of users do not choose to use these controls and instead opt for the default setting. But there is also evidence that younger users are beginning to use a variety of accounts, browsers and devices, with different privacy settings and aimed at ‘training’ the recommendation algorithm to serve different purposes.

Many public service media staff we spoke with described providing this level of control. Some challenges that were identified include the difficulty of measuring how well the recommendations meet specific targets, as well as risks relating to the potential degradation of the user experience.

Firstly, some of our interviewees noted how it would be more difficult to measure how well the recommendation system is performing on dimensions such as diversity of exposure, if individual users were accessing recommendations through multiple accounts. Secondly, it was highlighted how recommendation systems are trained on user behavioural data, and therefore giving more latitude to users to intentionally influence the recommendations may give rise to negative dynamics that degrade the overall experience for all users over the long run, or even expose the system to hostile manipulation attempts.

While these are valid concerns, we believe that there is some space for experimentation, between giving users no control and too much control. For example, users could be allowed to have different linked profiles, and key metrics could be adjusted to take into account the content that is accessed across these profiles. Users could be more explicitly shown how to interact with the system to obtain different styles of recommendations, making it easy to maintain different ‘internet personas’. Some form of ongoing monitoring for detecting adversarial attempts at influencing recommendation choices could also be explored. We encourage the BBC to experiment with these practices and publish research on their findings.

Another trial worth exploring is allowing ‘joint’ user recommendation profiles, where the recommendations are made based on multiple individuals’ aggregated interaction history and preferences, such as a couple, a group of friends or a whole community. This would allow users to create their own communities and ‘opt-in’ to who and what influenced their recommendations in an intuitive way. This could enabled by the kind of personal data stores being explored by the BBC and Belgian VRT.197

There are multiple interesting versions of this approach. In one version, you would see recommendations ‘meant’ for others and know it was a recommendation based on their preferences. In another version, users would simply be exposed to a set of unmarked recommendations based on all their combined preferences.

Another potential approach to pilot would be to create different recommendation systems that coexist and allow users to choose which they want to use or offer different ones at different times of day or when significant events happen (e.g. switching to a different recommendation system during the run up to an election or overriding them with breaking news). Such an approach might offer a chance to invite audiences to play a more active part in the formulation of recommendations, and open up opportunities for experimentation, which would need to be balanced against the additional operational costs that would be introduced.

6. Expand public participation

Beyond transparency or individual user choice and control over the parameters of the recommendation systems already deployed, users and wider society could also have greater input during the initial design of the recommendation systems and in the subsequent evaluations and iterations.

This is particularly salient for public service media organisations, as unlike private companies, which are primarily accountable to their customers and shareholders, public service media organisations see themselves as having a universal obligation to wider society. Therefore, even those who are not direct consumers of content should have a say in how public service media recommendations are shaped.

User panels

One approach to this, suggested by Jonathan Stray, is to create user panels that provide informed, retrospective feedback about live recommendation systems.169 These would involve paying users for detailed, longitudinal data about their experiences with the recommendation system. 

This could involve daily questions about their satisfaction with their recommendations, or monthly reviews where users are shown a summary of their recommendations and interaction with them. They could be asked how happy they are with the recommendations, how well do their interests are served and how informed they feel.

This approach could provide new, richer and more detailed metrics for developers to optimise the recommendation systems against, which would potentially be more aligned with the interests of the audience. It might also open up the ability to try new approaches to recommendation, such as reinforcement learning techniques that optimise for positive responses to daily and monthly surveys.

Co-design

A more radical approach would be to involve audience communities directly in the design of the recommendation system. This could involve bringing together representative groups of citizens, analogous to citizens’ assemblies, which have direct input and oversight of the creation of public service media recommendation systems, creating a third core pillar in the design process, alongside editorial teams and developer teams. This is an approach that has been proposed by the Media Reform Coalition Manifesto for a People’s Media.46

These would allow citizens to ask questions of the editors and developers about how the system is intended to work, what kinds of data inform those systems and about what alternative approaches exist (including not using recommendation systems at all). These groups could then set out their requirements for the system and iteratively provide feedback on versions of the system as its developed, in the same way that editorial teams have, for example, by providing qualitative feedback on recommendations provided by different systems.

7. Standardise metadata

Each public service media organisation should have a central function that standardises the format, creation and maintenance of metadata across the organisation.

Inconsistent, poor quality metadata was consistently highlighted as a barrier to developing recommendation systems in public service media, particularly in developing more novel approaches that go beyond user engagement and try to create diverse feeds of recommendations.

Institutionalising the collection of metadata and making access to it more transparent across each individual organisation is an important investment in public service media’s future capabilities.

We also think it’s worth exploring how much metadata can be standardised across European media organisations. The European Broadcasting Union (EBU)’s ‘A European Perspective’ project is already trialling bringing together content from across different European public service media organisations onto a single platform, underpinned by the EBU’s PEACH system for recommendations and the EuroVOX toolkit for automated language services. Further cross-border collaboration could be enabled by sharing best practices among member organisations.

8. Create shared recommendation system resources

Some public service media organisations have found it valuable to have access to recommendations-as-a-service provided by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) through their PEACH platform. This reduces the upfront investment required to start using the recommendation system and provides a template for recommendations that have already been tested and improved upon by other public service media organisations.

One area identified as valuable for the future development of PEACH was greater flexibility and customisation. For example, some asked for the ability to incorporate different concepts of diversity into the system and control the relative weighting of diversity. Others would have found it valuable to be able to incorporate more information on the public service value of content into the recommendations directly.

We also heard from several interviewees that they would value a similar repository for evaluating recommendation systems on metrics valued by public service media, including libraries in common coding languages, e.g. Python, and a number of worked examples for measuring the quality of recommendations. The development of this could be led by the EBU or a single organisation like the BBC.

This would help systemise the quantifying of public service values and collate case studies of how values are quantified. This would be best as an open-source repository that others outside of public service media could learn from and draw on. This would:

  • lower costs and thus easier to justify investment
  • reduce the technical burden, making it easier for newer and smaller teams to implement
  • point to how they’re used elsewhere, reducing the burden of proof and making the alternative approach appear less risky
  • provide source of existing ideas, meaning the team have to spend less time either coming up with their own (which might be suboptimal and discover that for themselves) or spend time wading through the technical literature.

Future public service media recommendation systems projects, and responsible recommendation system development more broadly, could then more easily evaluate their system against more sophisticated metrics than just engagement.

9. Create and empower integrated teams

When developing and deploying recommendation systems, public service media organisations need to integrate editorial and development teams from the start. This ensures that the goals of the recommendation system are better aligned with the organisation’s goals as a whole and ensures the systems augment and complement existing editorial expertise.

An approach that we have seen applied successfully is having two project leads, one with an editorial background and one with a technical development background, who are jointly responsible for the project.

Public service media organisations could also consider adopting a combined product and content team. This can ensure that both editorial and development staff have a shared language and common context, which can reduce the burden of communication and help staff feel like they have a common purpose rather than competition between the different teams.

Methodology

To investigate our research questions, we adopted two main methods:

  1. Literature review
  2. Semi-structured interviews

Our literature review surveyed current approaches to recommendation systems, the motivations and risks in using recommendation systems, and existing approaches and challenges in evaluating recommendation systems. We then focused in on reviewing existing public information on the operation of recommendation systems across European public service media, and the existing theorical work and case studies on the ethics implications of the use of those systems.

In order to situate the use of these systems, we also surveyed the history and context of public service media organisations, with a particular focus on previous technological innovations and attempts at measuring values.

We also undertook 29 semi-structured interviews with 8 current and 3 former BBC staff members, across engineering, product and editorial, 9 interviews with current and former staff from other public service media organisations and the European Broadcasting Union, and 9 further interviews with external experts from academia, civil society and regulators.

Partner information and acknowledgements

This work was undertaken with support from the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).

This report was co-authored by Elliot Jones, Catherine Miller and Silvia Milano, with substantive contributions from Andrew Strait.

We would like to thank the BBC for their partnership on this project, and in particular, the following for their support, feedback and cooperation throughout the project:

  • Miranda Marcus, Acting Head, BBC News Labs
  • Tristan Ferne, Lead Producer, BBC R&D
  • George Wright, Head of Internet Research and Future Services, BBC R&D
  • Rhia Jones, Lead R&D Engineer for Responsible Data-Driven Innovation

We would like to thank the following colleagues for taking the time to be interviewed for this project:

  • Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab
  • Anna McGovern, Editorial Lead for Recommendations and Personalisation, BBC
  • Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, & Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep
  • Ben Clark, Senior Research Engineer, Internet Research & Future Services, BBC Research & Development
  • Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC
  • David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs
  • David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland
  • David Jones, Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds
  • Debs Grayson, Media Reform Coalition
  • Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt
  • Eleanora Mazzoli, PhD Researcher, London School of Economics
  • Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano
  • Greg Detre, Chief Product & Technology Officer, Filtered and former Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4
  • Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University
  • Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD
  • Jonathan Stray, Visiting Scholar, Berkeley Center for Human-Compatible AI
  • Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab
  • Koen Muylaert, Head of Data Platform, VRT
  • Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk
  • Myrna McGregor, BBC Lead, Responsible AI+ML
  • Natalie Fenton, Professor of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London
  • Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism
  • Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio
  • SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, European Broadcasting Union and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union
  • Sophie Chalk, Policy Advisor, Voice of the Listener & Viewer
  • Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk

  1. Cobbe, J. and Singh, J. (2019). ‘Regulating Recommending: Motivations, Considerations, and Principles’. European Journal of Law and Technology, 10(3), pp. 8–10. Available at: https://ejlt.org/index.php/ejlt/article/view/686; Steinhardt, J. (2021). ‘How Much Do Recommender Systems Drive Polarization?’. UC Berkeley. Available at: https://jsteinhardt.stat.berkeley.edu/blog/recsys-deepdive; Stray, J. (2021). ‘Designing Recommender Systems to Depolarize’, p. 2. arXiv. Available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/2107.04953
  2. Born, G. Morris, J. Diaz, F. and Anderson, A. (2021). Artificial intelligence, music recommendation, and the curation of culture: A white paper, pp. 10–13. Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ef0b24bc96ec4739e7275d3/t/60b68ccb5a371a1bcdf79317/1622576334766/Born-Morris-etal-AI_Music_Recommendation_Culture.pdf
  3. See: European Union. (2022). Digital Services Act, Article 27. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:277:TOC; For details of Article 17 of the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC)’s Internet Information Service Algorithm Recommendation Management Regulations, see: Huld, A. (2022). ‘China Passes Sweeping Recommendation Algorithm Regulations’. China Briefing News. Available at: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-passes-sweeping-recommendation-algorithm-regulations-effect-march-1-2022/
  4. Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision. (2001). Public broadcasting: why? how? pp. 11–15. UNESCO Digital Library. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000124058
  5. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  6. Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision. (2001). Public broadcasting: why? how? pp. 11–15. UNESCO Digital Library. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000124058
  7. BBC. (2022). The BBC Story – 1920s factsheet. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/historyofthebbc/1920s.pdf
  8. Tambini, D. (2021). ‘Public service media should be thinking long term when it comes to AI’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2021/05/12/public-service-media-should-be-thinking-long-term-when-it-comes-to-ai/
  9. Higgins, C. (2014). ‘What can the origins of the BBC tell us about its future?’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/15/bbc-origins-future
  10. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
  12. BBC. (2017). ‘Mission, values and public purposes’. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/mission/. For comparison, ARD, the German public service media organisation articulates its values as: ‘Participation, Independence, Quality, Diversity, Localism, Innovation, Value Creation, Responsibility’. See: ARD. (2021). Die ARD – Unser Beitrag zum Gemeinwohl. Available at: https://www.ard.de/die-ard/was-wir-leisten/ARD-Unser-Beitrag-zum-Gemeinwohl-Public-Value-100
  13. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
  16. Ofcom. (2020). The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (with the Cross-promotion Code and the On Demand Programme Service Rules). Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code
  17. Ofcom. (2022). ‘Ofcom launches 15 investigations into RT’. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/news-centre/2022/ofcom-launches-investigations-into-rt
  18. Ofcom. (2021). Guide to video on demand. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/advice-for-consumers/television/video-on-demand
  19. Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). (2022). ‘What we do’. Available at: https://www.ipso.co.uk/what-we-do/; IMPRESS. ‘Regulated Publications’. Available at: https://impress.press/regulated-publications/
  20. UK Government. Communications Act 2003, section 265. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/265
  21. Lowe, G. and Martin, F. (eds.). (2014). The Value and Values of Public Service Media.
  22. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22, Annex 1. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  23. The 12th Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty, the regulatory framework for public service and commercial broadcasting across Germany’s federal states, introduced a three-step test for assessing whether online services offered by public service broadcasters met their public service remit. Under the three-step test, the broadcaster needs to assess: first, whether a new or significantly amended digital service satisfies the democratic, social and cultural needs of society; second, whether it contributes to media competition from a qualitative point of view and; third, the associated financial cost. See: Institute for Media and Communication Policy. (2009). Drei-Stufen-Test. Available at: http://medienpolitik.eu/drei-stufen-test/
  24. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  25. Spotify. (2022). ‘About Spotify’. Available at: https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info/
  26. Netflix. (2022). ‘Netflix Culture’. Available at: https://jobs.netflix.com/culture
  27. Silberling, A. (2022). ‘Spotify adds COVID-19 content advisory’. TechCrunch. Available at: https://social.techcrunch.com/2022/03/28/spotify-covid-19-content-advisory-joe-rogan/; Jackson, S. (2022). ‘Jimmy Carr condemned by Nadine Dorries for “shocking” Holocaust joke about travellers in Netflix special His Dark Material’. Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/jimmy-carr-condemned-for-disturbing-holocaust-joke-about-travellers-in-netflix-special-his-dark-material-12533148
  28. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  29. BBC Trust. (2012). BBC Trust assessment processes Guidance document. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/pvt/assessment_processes_guidance.pdf
  30. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  31. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  32. Lowe, G.F. and Maijanen, P. (2019). ‘Making sense of the public service mission in media: youth audiences, competition, and strategic management’. Journal of Media Business Studies. doi: 10.1080/16522354.2018.1553279; Schulz, A., Levy, D. and Nielsen, R.K. (2019). ‘Old, Educated, and Politically Diverse: The Audience of Public Service News’, pp. 15–19, 29–30. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/old-educated-and-politically-diverse-audience-public-service-news
  33. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  34. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  35. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  36. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  37. European Commission. (2022). ‘European Media Freedom Act: Commission launches public consultation’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_85
  38. The Economist. (2021). ‘Populists are threatening Europe’s independent public broadcasters’. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/08/populists-are-threatening-europes-independent-public-broadcasters
  39. The Economist. (2021).
  40. The Sutton Trust. (2019). Elitist Britain, pp. 40–42. Available at: https://www.suttontrust.com/our-research/elitist-britain-2019/; Friedman, S. and Laurison, D. (2019). ‘The class pay gap: why it pays to be privileged’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/07/the-class-pay-gap-why-it-pays-to-be-privileged
  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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The article ‘From “walled gardens” to open meadows’ showed how anti-competitive practices could be addressed via interoperability and to what effects. Further exploring the questions and challenges around this intervention, this article focuses on more practical terms: what kinds of interoperability would most effectively break down platform power? And what type of safeguards would be necessary for reducing negative impacts?

One of the elements that contributes to large companies consolidating their power is their privileged access to user data and using compatibility between their own services to grow ever-larger, and expand into adjacent markets as digital conglomerates. Google’s consolidation of their business model into their operating system and search is a good example of this (as shown in Figure 1). 

Addressing the anticompetitive effects of these digital conglomerates requires a combination of limiting that use of personal data under data-protection law, alongside providing carefully targeted access for external competitors – ideally with users explicitly deciding whether/how their data is shared, or in effectively anonymised form (which can be difficult to achieve in practice). 

Where large firms provide privileged access within their own ecosystem of services (such as  Facebook’s ongoing integration of its three separate messaging services, Apple’s restriction of access to iPhone contactless payment hardware to its own payment service, or Google, as mentioned above), they should also be required to allow competitors similar access at users’ direction – with processes in place to assess agreed security, privacy and other standards.  Greg Crawford and colleagues have called this idea equitable interoperability.[footnote]Crawford et al. (2021). ‘Equitable Interoperability: The “Super Tool” of Digital Platform Governance’. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923602[/footnote]

Interpretation of Google's ecosystem of services
Figure 1. CMA (2020). Interpretation of Google’s ecosystem of services. (p.57).

What kinds of interoperability would most effectively break down platform power?

Interoperability as a pro-competitive measure varies by sector and service, meaning that careful market analysis (like that undertaken by the UK Competition & Markets Authority in the retail banking and online platform sectors) is required to show what types of interoperability would be most effective (and proportionate) in stimulating competition. 

In the UK financial sector, this has involved enabling data interoperability and cross-provider payments for personal and small business current accounts of the nine largest UK banks;[footnote]Competition & Markets Authority. (2016). Retail banking market investigation: Final report. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57ac9667e5274a0f6c00007a/retail-banking-market-investigation-full-final-report.pdf[/footnote] mandating competitor access to query and clickstream data from Google; or initially limited interoperability for competitor social-media services with Facebook (with the possibility of later moving to a fuller model).[footnote]Competition & Markets Authority. (2019). Online platforms and digital advertising: Market study final report. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5fa557668fa8f5788db46efc/Final_report_Digital_ALT_TEXT.pdf[/footnote] The latter would reflect developments in France, where the Conseil national du numérique has already called for limited interoperability requirements for social media.[footnote]Conseil national du numérique. (2020). Concurrence et régulation des plateformes: Étude de cas sur l’interopérabilité des réseaux sociaux. Available at:https://cnnumerique.fr/files/uploads/2020/2020.07.06.ra_cnnum_concurrence_web.pdf[/footnote] And freedom of expression group ARTICLE 19 has called for social media platforms to offer users the choice of interoperable third-party recommendation and curation systems, to ensure a plurality of choices of content moderation.[footnote]ARTICLE 19. (2021). Taming Big Tech: Protecting freedom of expression through the unbundling of services, open markets, competition, and users’ empowerment. Available at: https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Taming-big-tech_FINAL_8-Dec-1.pdf[/footnote] 

A careful analysis of the technical protocols and business relationships underpinning services, such as 5G, earlier wireless and broadband networks, and smartphone apps, can highlight regulatory opportunities for increasing their modularity by requiring incumbent firms to support interoperability between components of their services with competitors’ software or hardware.[footnote]Andersdotter, A. ‘Framework for studying technologies, competition and human rights’. Amelia Andersdotter. Available at: https://amelia.andersdotter.cc/osi_and_humanrights/tech_osi-competition-human-rights_framework_v2.pdf[/footnote] One of many examples is the Open Radio Access Network standard,[footnote]Mali, S. (2021). ‘Understanding Open Radio Access Network (O-RAN) From The Basics’. STL. Available at: https://www.stl.tech/blog/understanding-o-ran-from-the-basics/[/footnote] being promoted by European telecommunications manufacturers and the US Government, as an alternative to Huawei 5G equipment.

There are technical components used in many services, such as for identity management (see Figure 2), where increased modularity would allow users to plug in their own choice of component to larger services. (The EU is planning an update of its eIDAS Regulation in 2022, which would provide a specific legislative mechanism to require this.) Users wanting maximum control over their data could store it on their own hardware, such as a FreedomBox.[footnote]FreedomBox is a private server for non-experts: it lets you install and configure server applications with only a few clicks. It runs on cheap hardware of your choice, uses your internet connection and power, and is under your control. See: https://www.freedombox.org[/footnote]

Siddarth and Weyl suggest managing such common components and protocols as a digital commons, ‘for an inclusive and sustainable ecosystem with shared social benefit’ (as well as ‘a commons-oriented infrastructure for data coalitions, that allows for active participation in and ownership over shared datasets’ generated by the participants).[footnote]Siddarth, D. and Weyl, E. G. (2021). ‘The case for the digital commons’. World Economic Forum. Available at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/06/the-case-for-the-digital-commons/[/footnote]

Twitter OAuth consent dialog that's about to be rejected
Figure 2. Twitter OAuth consent dialog that’s about to be rejected. Ade Oshineye. Available at: https://www.flickr.com/photos/adewale_oshineye/8955714889

In comparison, the German Cartel Office has required Facebook to seek explicit consent from users to profile their activity elsewhere on the World Wide Web, a remedy more familiar from data protection law – although that order is still being contested through the German and European courts.[footnote]Inverardi, M. (2021). ‘German court turns to top European judges for help on Facebook data case’. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/business/legal/german-court-turns-top-european-judges-help-facebook-data-case-2021-03-24/[/footnote]

While a number of competition authorities are increasingly paying attention to non-economic factors in their analysis – for example, environmental sustainability[footnote]Holmes, S. et al. (2020). ‘Competition Policy and Environmental Sustainability’. International Chamber of Commerce, The World Business Organization. Available at: https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/12/2020-comppolicyandenvironmsustainnability.pdf[/footnote] – individual empowerment and social value are higher-level political goals that require a complex and multifaceted approach. They can best be addressed through a combination of an evolution of competition-law frameworks (e.g. to more highly prioritise the modularity and diversity of available products/services in a market over efficiencies from vertical integration); stronger enforcement of data and consumer-protection laws; and market-specific regulation. 

Can interoperability be profitable?

Requiring the largest social media companies to enable interoperable filtering and recommendation services, as proposed by ARTICLE 19, is a useful concrete example to analyse the business model impact. Daphne Keller and Nathalie MarĂŠchal have noted two significant and related challenges for firms providing such services.[footnote]Keller, D. (2021) ‘The Future of Platform Power: Making Middleware Work’. Journal of Democracy. Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-platform-power-making-middleware-work/[/footnote] [footnote]Fukuyma, F. (2021). ‘The Future of Platform Power: Solving for a Moving Target’. Journal of Democracy, vol. 32, no. 3, July 2021, pp. 173-77. Available at: https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/the-future-of-big-tech-solving-for-a-moving-target/[/footnote] Firstly, without a clear mechanism to profit from these services, are they able to scale fast enough to make a significant difference to advertising-supported ‘free’ platforms with billions of users? And secondly,with the global content-moderation industry projected to reach $8.8bn in 2022,[footnote]Satariano, A., and Isaac, M. (2021) ‘The Silent Partner Cleaning Up Facebook for $500 Million a Year’. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/technology/facebook-accenture-content-moderation.html[/footnote] with Facebook employing tens of thousands of moderators and sophisticated machine-learning systems, is it feasible for small firms to provide such services?

As Keller notes, there are options for smaller providers to prioritise the types of content that are of most interest to their users, and to share the burden of assessing content – although this risks a homogeneity of subjective assessments, reducing the benefits of this whole approach for freedom of expression. We already see such collaboration in the tech industry-funded Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism. Twitter’s Nick Pickles has suggested governments consider requiring large platforms to make available their tools for identifying ‘harmful’ content, such as hate speech, to smaller firms.[footnote]Pickles, N. (2020). 18 February. Available at: https://twitter.com/nickpickles/status/1229577370220130304?s=21[/footnote] 

One option would be for civil-society groups to provide such services as part of their membership programmes, possibly supported by philanthropic organisations; and for some of the data to be crowd-sourced. At a smaller scale, civil-society groups could develop detailed curation settings to overlay large platform services, such as Facebook, if those companies were required to support them, avoiding the costs for civil society of providing real-time, human curation services. For example, a free speech organisation such as ARTICLE 19 could develop settings their supporters could choose for Facebook content moderation, which maximised open debate and discourse. A faith community might develop settings relating to moderation of religious content. Users could be prompted when they sign up to incumbent social-media services as to which curation service they wished to use.

In another model, crowd-sourced curation by community groups in federated social-media services such as the Twitter-like Mastodon (shown in Figure 3) can support community ownership of content-curation decisions, while reducing their individual impact compared to decisions affecting potentially billions of users on a global platform.

Figure 3. Mastodon users can communicate via 500-character 'toots' with other users on their own 'instance', and on other connected instances and services. Moderation is done on a per-instance basis.
Figure 3. Mastodon users can communicate via 500-character ‘toots’ with other users on their own ‘instance’, and on other connected instances and services. Moderation is done on a per-instance basis.

For widely illegal content, such as child sexual-abuse material, organisations including the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children maintain ‘hash lists’ of known, illegal material that can be checked by platforms. And a number of governments report these and other types of content they have identified as illegal to platforms. (External scrutiny of these reports is important to ensure they are accurate and proportionate.) In assessing the desirability of a federated solution, it’s worth noting that it would be less easy for illegal content to be suppressed across a diverse ecosystem of services than in centralised, concentrated systems.

A more radical measure would be to require the largest firms to share advertising revenues relating to the use of alternative curation systems – or even to require the unbundling of service provision from the systems’ advertising-based funding,[footnote]Davies, T., and Georgieva, Z. (2021). ‘Zero Price, Zero Competition: How Marketization Fixes Anticompetitive Tying in Monetized Markets’. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3868332[/footnote] which could enable users to choose from advertising platforms with different approaches to profiling and privacy, or to pay directly, with the option to pay separately for a social-media service and a curation system.

What safeguards are necessary to ensure that interoperability respects rights?

It is important to note that ‘frictions’ in gathering user data have played an important role in the past in practical protection of privacy. Since interoperability can reduce these frictions, it means regulatory enforcement of data-protection principles will become even more important. Cyphers and Doctorow note: ‘To the extent that the tech companies are doing a good job shielding users from malicious third parties, users stand to lose some of that protection.’[footnote]Cyphers, B., and Doctorow, C. (2021) ‘Privacy Without Monopoly: Data Protection and Interoperability’ Electronic Frontier Foundation. Available at: https://www.eff.org/wp/interoperability-and-privacy[/footnote]

Keller, Maréchal and others have also noted that careful attention is needed to ensure interoperability remedies and greater modularity do not have a negative impact on user privacy. This is particularly the case for data relating to users’ contacts rather than themselves, since users cannot consent to the processing of their contacts’ data. 

Arguably, specific provisions in the GDPR (listed below) could comprehensively cover interoperability in Europe, and there are over a hundred other countries with similar comprehensive privacy laws; ‘the existence of the GDPR solves the thorniest problem involved in interop and privacy. By establishing the rules for how providers must treat different types of data and when and how consent must be obtained and from whom during the construction and operation of an interoperable service, the GDPR moves hard calls out of the corporate boardroom and into a democratic and accountable realm.’[footnote]Cyphers, B., and Doctorow, C. (2021).[/footnote] And in jurisdictions without such legislation (notably the United States), privacy protections can be included in legislation enabling interoperability.

The most important relevant principles in the GDPR and similar laws are explicit user consent, data minimisation[footnote]Cyphers, B., and Doctorow, C. (2021).[/footnote] and purpose limitation. With explicit user consent, users would be in full control of interoperability features, with meaningful information provided about the privacy and security consequences before enabling them. (The UK’s Open Banking programme, which allows personal and small business current account customers of the UK’s nine largest banks to authorise third-party services to access their account records and make payments, chose to require explicit consent for all interoperability functions, to build user trust).[footnote]Competition & Markets Authority. (2016).[/footnote] 

Data minimisation means the minimum personal data needed for a task should be collected. Purpose limitation means a company should process data only for the purposes for which it was collected (or in the case of less sensitive data, ‘compatible’ purposes). The GDPR also requires that technical systems preserve data-protection rights by design and by default (Article 25), and ensure ‘appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures’ (Article 5(1)(f)).  

If interoperability was enacted consistently with the GDPR, a user of one social media service who had become ‘friends’ with the user of another, interoperable service, should receive status updates and other content shared by their ‘friend’ but not any other information from that service. That user may also be able to see the number of times an update has been ‘liked’, but not the identities of the users of the second service who have done so. And the user’s social media service should likewise process information from the ‘friend’ solely for the purpose of facilitating interoperability – not, for example, for creating an advertising profile of the friend. Cyphers and Doctorow suggest the first service might also be required to ‘serve as a ‘consent conduit,’ through which consent to allow… friends to take data with muddled claims with them to a rival platform can be sought, obtained, or declined.’[footnote]Cyphers, B., and Doctorow, C. (2021).[/footnote]

A more data-focused example is where a user is enabling one service to access their customer records on a second service – for example, to let a mortgage provider assess their monthly current account activity. The access should be limited in relation to data about other natural persons in their transaction history, while the mortgage provider should not be allowed to build a user profile based on the data it has accessed unless the user explicitly consents to this. A related example is given by the German consumer protection union, VZBZ: ‘a provider who certifies the freedom from rent debt by regularly debiting rental payments does not need access to cancellations from the trade union, the party or the fertility clinic (examples of data of a special category according to Article 9 GDPR).’[footnote]Verbraucherzentrale (2021). Privatsphäre bei digitalen Finanzdienstleistungen schützen. Available at: https://starke-verbraucher.de/sites/default/files/downloads/2021/04/01/210324_position_psd2.pdf[/footnote]

Interoperability: not a risk-free endeavour

There is the risk that Big Tech firms could use the veil of interoperability to justify processing large volumes of user data for relatively trivial purposes, such as targeted advertising. Campaigner and researcher Wolfie Christl has noted: ‘Mandating personal data interoperability can make sense, but without strictly enforced limits and considering the political economy of data it will lead to yet another cesspool of data exploitation by both small and large firms.’[footnote]Christl, W. (2021). 19 January. Available at https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1351634600049651713.html[/footnote] 

Cyphers and Doctorow add: ‘Interoperability without privacy safeguards is a potential disaster, provoking a competition to see who can extract the most data from users while offering the least benefit in return… Having both components – an interoperability requirement and a comprehensive privacy regulation – is the best way to ensure interoperability leads to competition in desirable activities, not privacy invasions.’ 

Where regulators wish to impose large-scale data access provision on a large firm, these privacy considerations are even more important. Where possible, access should only be given to aggregate statistics about data, or machine-learning model parameters. 

As far as possible, any access to raw data should be only to pseudonymised data – in other words, with information explicitly identifying individuals (such as names, dates of birth and addresses) removed. However, because any detailed information about individuals can often be linked with other data sources to reidentify or link it back to them, regulators will need to carefully consider what is the minimum amount of personal information needed, and what technical measures (such as differential privacy) can be applied to ensure these limits are not breached.[footnote]de Montjoye, Y-A., Taquet, M. (2019). ‘Anonymity Takes More than Protecting Personal Details’. Nature. 574, no. 7777 (8 October 2019): 176. Available at https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-03023-3[/footnote] In all these cases, baseline privacy requirements such as data minimisation and purpose limitation should continue to apply.

However, looked at another way, interoperability could provide strong market-driven, retention incentives to companies to improve user privacy, both generally by increasing competition and the ability of privacy-sensitive customers to switch services, and specifically by supporting users to choose more privacy-friendly components of services (such as a personal data store running sandboxed analysis apps), where such modularity has been enabled.

How have interoperability remedies been used?

Interoperability remedies have been used under existing competition laws in some of the key cases of the digital era: preventing Microsoft from locking competitor browsers out of Windows,[footnote]European Commission. (2009). COMMISSION DECISION of 16.12.2009 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/39530/39530_2671_5.pdf[/footnote] and more recently requiring Google to make it easier for European Android users to choose an alternative default search engine[footnote]European Commission. (2018). COMMISSION DECISION of 18.7.2018 relating to a proceeding under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the Treaty) and Article 54 of the EEA Agreement (AT.40099 – Google Android). Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/40099/40099_9993_3.pdf[/footnote] and for specialised search engines to feature in search results.[footnote]General Court of the European Union. (2021). Judgment in Case T-612/17 Google and Alphabet v Commission (Google Shopping). Available at: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2021-11/cp210197en.pdf[/footnote] The slow pace of competition enforcement has also encouraged policymakers in the US, Europe, India, Australia and elsewhere to develop explicit, up-front rules imposing interoperability on the largest technology and financial services companies.[footnote]Brown, I. (2021). ‘Recent developments in digital competition’. Ian Brown. Available at: https://www.ianbrown.tech/digital-competition-briefing-1/[/footnote] 

These rules show great potential in reversing the trend over the last fifteen years towards ever-larger digital conglomerates dominating a range of key digital markets in many countries – ‘an approach focused on creating a more vibrant and diverse ecosystem of smaller digital applications, technologies and infrastructures.’ Siddarth and Weyl highlight the positive model provided by Taiwan’s g0v programme, with common ‘social communications protocols, data and compute sharing infrastructure, open source software, identity and payments standards, and large machine learning models trained on data created in a Creative Commons framework.’ This will become ever-more important as software continues ‘eating the world’ by becoming a core part of a growing number of industries, such as the automotive sector.

Careful analysis of platforms’ business models and individual services is needed to design optimal interoperability remedies. But the effort is worth serious consideration: they could enable the emergence of an Internet that allows individuals to control much better the use of their personal data via their own personal data store; to choose freely from a range of interoperable services, including social media, instant messaging, video sharing and search engines; and to replace key common components of these services, such as identity management, cloud storage and curation engines. This would support a much greater diversity of services and service providers, rather than the near-monoculture we see today, promoting individual autonomy and incentivising businesses to better meet the needs of their users. 

This is the second in a series of posts from Ian Brown, a leading specialist on internet regulation and pro-competition mechanisms.

The first explores how interoperability could be the key to addressing platform power. Read From ‘walled gardens’ to open meadows.


Image credit: Malik Evren

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  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
  12. BBC. (2017). ‘Mission, values and public purposes’. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/mission/. For comparison, ARD, the German public service media organisation articulates its values as: ‘Participation, Independence, Quality, Diversity, Localism, Innovation, Value Creation, Responsibility’. See: ARD. (2021). Die ARD – Unser Beitrag zum Gemeinwohl. Available at: https://www.ard.de/die-ard/was-wir-leisten/ARD-Unser-Beitrag-zum-Gemeinwohl-Public-Value-100
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  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
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  23. The 12th Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty, the regulatory framework for public service and commercial broadcasting across Germany’s federal states, introduced a three-step test for assessing whether online services offered by public service broadcasters met their public service remit. Under the three-step test, the broadcaster needs to assess: first, whether a new or significantly amended digital service satisfies the democratic, social and cultural needs of society; second, whether it contributes to media competition from a qualitative point of view and; third, the associated financial cost. See: Institute for Media and Communication Policy. (2009). Drei-Stufen-Test. Available at: http://medienpolitik.eu/drei-stufen-test/
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  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
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  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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These findings are from the previous survey (2023). Explore latest findings: 2025

Executive summary

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies already interact with many aspects of people’s lives. Their rapid development has resulted in increased national attention on AI and surrounding policy. In November 2022, the Ada Lovelace Institute and The Alan Turing Institute conducted a nationally representative survey of over 4,000 adults in Britain, to understand how the public currently experience AI.

We asked people about their awareness of, experience with and attitudes towards different uses of AI. This included asking people what they believe are the key advantages and disadvantages, and how they would like to see these technologies regulated and governed.

While the term AI appears frequently in public discourse, it can be difficult to define and is often poorly understood, particularly as it encompasses a wide range of technologies that are used in different contexts and for distinct purposes. There is no single definition of AI, and the public may see the term applied in a wide variety of settings.

Making matters even more challenging is the fast pace of AI development. OpenAI’s ChatGPT was released two weeks after we began our fieldwork. The widespread media coverage of generative AI – AI that can generate content such as images, videos, audio and text – has probably already impacted public discourse, and this survey therefore reflects the attitudes of the British public before the surge of interest in this topic.

The multifaceted and continually evolving nature of AI can present a challenge for public attitudes research, as it can be difficult to ask people meaningfully how they feel about a complex topic which may evoke different interpretations. Taking this into account, we focused on asking people about specific technologies that make use of AI and we gave people clear descriptions of each.

We asked the British public about their attitudes towards and experiences with 17 different uses of AI. These uses ranged from applications that are visible and commonplace, such as facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones and targeted advertising on social media; to those which are less visible, such as assessing eligibility for jobs or welfare benefits; and applications often associated with more futuristic visions of AI, such as driverless cars and robotic care assistants.

For each specific use of AI, people were given the opportunity to express their perceptions of the benefits and their concerns about the technology, recognising that people may see potential benefit and concern simultaneously. We also offered people the chance to tell us how they thought each technology might yield both benefits and risks. Additionally, respondents were asked more general questions about their preferences for AI governance and regulation, including how explainable they would like AI decision-making to be.

Broadly, our findings highlight the complex and nuanced views that people in Britain have about the many different uses of AI across public and personal life. People’s awareness varies greatly across the different technologies we asked about, with the highest levels of awareness reported for everyday applications, such as facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones, and applications that are less commonplace but have received media attention, such as driverless cars. Public awareness is lowest for less visible technologies, such as AI for assessing eligibility for welfare or risk in healthcare outcomes. Key findings relating to public attitudes across these technologies are summarised below.

Key findings:

  • For the majority of AI uses that we asked about, people had broadly positive views, but expressed concerns about some uses. Many people think that several uses of AI are generally beneficial, particularly for technologies related to health, science and security. For 11 of the 17 AI uses we asked about, most people say they are somewhat or very beneficial. The use of AI for detecting the risk of cancer is seen as beneficial by nine in 10 people.
  • The public also express concern over some uses of AI. For six of the 17 uses, over 50% find them somewhat or very concerning. People are most concerned about advanced robotics such as driverless cars (72%) and autonomous weapons (71%).
  • People’s perceived benefit levels outweigh concerns for 10 of the 17 technologies, while concerns outweigh benefits for five of the 17. For two technologies, benefits and concerns are evenly balanced.
  • Digging deeper into people’s perceptions of AI shows that the British public hold highly nuanced views on the specific advantages and disadvantages associated with different uses of AI. For example, while nine out of 10 British adults find the use of AI for cancer detection to be broadly beneficial, over half of British adults (56%) are concerned about relying too heavily on this technology rather than on professional judgements, and 47% are concerned about the difficulty in knowing who is responsible for mistakes when using this technology.
  • People most commonly think that speed, efficiency and improving accessibility are the main advantages of AI across a range of uses. For example, 70% feel speeding up processing at border control is a benefit of facial recognition technology.
  • However, people also note concerns relating to the potential for AI to replace professional judgements, not being able to account for individual circumstances, and a lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making. For example almost two-thirds (64%) are concerned that workplaces will rely too heavily on AI for recruitment compared to professional judgements.
  • Additionally, for technologies like smart speakers and targeted social media advertisements, people are concerned about personal data being shared. Over half (57%) are concerned that smart speakers will gather personal information that could be shared with third parties while 68% are concerned about this for targeted social media adverts.
  • The public want regulation of AI technologies, though this differs by age.
  • The majority of people in Britain support regulation of AI. When asked what would make them more comfortable with AI, 62% said they would like to see laws and regulations guiding the use of AI technologies. In line with our findings showing concerns around accountability, 59% said that they would like clear procedures in place for appealing to a human against an AI decision.
  • When asked about who should be responsible for ensuring that AI is used safely, people most commonly choose an independent regulator, with 41% in favour. Support for this differs somewhat by age, with 18–24-year-olds most likely to say companies developing AI should be responsible for ensuring it is used safely (43% in favour), while only 17% of people aged over 55 support this.
  • People say it is important for them to understand how AI decisions are made, even if making a system explainable reduces its accuracy. For example, a complex system may be more accurate, but may therefore be more difficult to explain. When considering whether explainability is more or less important than accuracy, the most common response is that humans, not computers, should make ultimate decisions and be able to explain them (selected by 31%). This sentiment is expressed most strongly by people aged 45 and over. Younger adults (18–44) are more likely to say that an explanation should only be given in some circumstances, even if that reduces accuracy.

Taken together, this research makes an important contribution to what we know about public attitudes to AI and provides a detailed picture of the ways in which the British public perceive issues surrounding the many diverse applications of AI. We hope that the research will be useful in helping researchers, developers and policymakers understand and respond to public expectations about the benefits and risks that these technologies may pose, as well as public demand for how these technologies should be governed.

1.   How to read this report

If you’re a policymaker or regulator concerned with AI technologies:

  • The report highlights the nuance in the perceived benefits and concerns that adults in Britain identify across a range of AI uses. Section 4.2 presents an overview of the perceived benefits and concerns; and Section 4.3 provides more detail on the specific benefits and concerns for each type of technology.
  • Section 4.4 identifies a widely shared expectation for independent regulation that involves explainability and redress. It includes more detail on age differences and expectations of responsibility by different stakeholders.

If you’re a developer or designer building AI-driven technologies, or an organisation or body using them or planning to incorporate them:

  • Section 4.4 includes findings related to the expectations and trust the public have for different stakeholders, including private companies and government, and the views from the public on who is responsible for ensuring AI is used safely.
  • Sections 4.2 and 4.3 cover people’s perceived benefits and concerns for different AI uses, with insights on expectations around capabilities and risk.

If you’re a researcher, civil society organisation, public participation practitioner or member of the public interested in technology and society:

  • Section 3 includes an overview of the survey methodology. There is more detail in the appendices and the separate technical report.[1] In Appendix 6.1, we include the descriptions of each AI use that we shared with respondents before asking about their awareness and experience of the uses; and about their view of the potential benefits and concerns.
  • Section 4.1 includes an overview of people’s awareness and experience of different AI uses. An overview of overall net benefits and concerns for each technology can be found in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 includes specific perceived benefits and concerns about particular technologies.

2.   Introduction

Artificial intelligence (AI) technology, and its widespread use in many aspects of public and private life, is developing at a rapid pace. It is therefore crucial to understand how people experience the many applications of AI, including their awareness of these technologies, their concerns, the perceived benefits, and how attitudes differ across demographic groups. To effectively inform the design of policy responses, it is also important to understand people’s views on how these technologies should be governed and regulated.

To answer these questions, The Alan Turing Institute and the Ada Lovelace Institute partnered to conduct a new, nationally representative random sample survey of the British public’s attitudes towards, and experiences of, AI. While previous surveys have tackled related questions, there remain several gaps in our understanding of public attitudes to AI.

For example, other work has tended to ask about a single definition of AI or has only covered specific uses, meaning that findings regarding positive or negative sentiment toward AI are broad and somewhat ambiguous. Additionally, few large-scale studies elicit people’s preferences for how AI technologies should be regulated, or how explainable a decision made by an AI system should be.

Asking people about their views on AI in general can be difficult because the term is hard to define and often poorly understood. Previous surveys have tended to find that people’s knowledge of AI is low, and that few are able to define the term.

Only 13% of respondents in a 2022 Public Attitudes to Data and AI tracker survey,[2] and 10% in a 2017 Royal Society survey reported being able to give a full explanation of AI.[3] However, the limited evidence available to date suggests that people tend to be aware of some specific applications of AI, including in healthcare, job application screening, driverless cars, and military uses.[4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

With these considerations in mind, we sought to examine attitudes towards a large and varied set of AI uses in society. We wanted to include routine uses that people may not typically think of as AI, and that are often excluded from other studies, such as targeted advertising and smart speakers, as well as uses more commonly associated with the term, such as advanced robotics.

Importantly, we aimed to capture the potential complexity of the public’s views. Previous studies suggest that people’s attitudes to AI are nuanced and vary according to specific uses and across countries.[9] For example, people tend to be more supportive of the use of AI where it enhances human decision-makers, such as in healthcare settings,[10] but are more negative where it is seen as replacing human decision-making, such as in cases of criminal justice and driverless cars.[11] We therefore sought to delve deeper into some of the factors underlying these differences, offering people the chance to express both benefits and concerns about uses of AI, recognising that people may simultaneously see positives and negatives in these technologies.

We also wanted to understand what people think about the specific benefits and risks associated with different AI uses. Other surveys have found that people report feeling concerned about the potential risks associated with AI, rather than feeling optimistic about the benefits. For example, less than half of the US public believe AI technologies will ‘improve things over the current situation’, and in particular they express high concern about the potential for AI to increase inequality.[12]

To build on these findings, we offered people the chance to express how they thought each technology might yield benefits and risks by selecting from a range of possibilities designed to reflect overall themes including accuracy, speed, bias, accountability, data security, job security and more. Our aim was to acknowledge that people may have nuanced views of all the possible benefits and concerns surrounding AI uses, rather than simply measuring positive or negative sentiment, or attitudes to only a few potential risks.

To effectively inform policy responses to public concerns surrounding the development and use of AI, it is crucial to understand attitudes towards its governance and regulation. Previous research shows some support for independent or government regulation of AI, with a 2019 UK Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) report showing 33% favour an independent AI regulator, and 22% favour a government regulator.[13]

The same report showed that the UK public are not confident that UK data protection regulations can adapt to new technologies, expressing concerns over adequate regulation in the face of a fast-changing landscape. Additionally, citizens’ juries have found that people prioritise the explainability of an AI system over its accuracy,[14] and other work offers important resources and guidelines for aiding AI explainability.[15] However, there is currently little available evidence about explainability preferences from a large-scale and recent sample.

Through the results of this survey, we provide a detailed picture of how the British public perceive issues surrounding the many diverse applications of AI. We hope that the research will be useful for informing researchers, developers and policymakers about the concerns and benefits that the public associate with AI, thereby helping to maximise the potential benefits of AI.

3. Methodology

In this chapter we provide a summary of the key aspects of the study’s methodology. A technical report[16] containing full details of the methodological approach including how we designed our questions for the study can be accessed separately.[17]

Sample

The sample was drawn from the Kantar Public Voice random probability panel.[18] This is a standing panel of people who have been recruited to take part in surveys using random sampling methods. At the time the survey was conducted, it comprised 24,673 active panel members who were resident in Great Britain and aged 18 or over. This subset of panel members was stratified by sex/age group, highest educational level and region, before a systematic random sample was drawn.

We undertook fieldwork in November and December 2022, and issued the survey in three stages: a soft launch with a random subsample of 500 panel members, a launch with the remainder of the main panel members, and a final launch with reserve panel members.

A total of 4,010 respondents completed the survey and passed standard data quality checks.[19] The majority of respondents completed the questionnaire online, while 252 were interviewed by telephone either because they do not use the internet or because this was their preference.

Respondents were aged between 18 and 94. Unweighted, a total of 1,911 (48%) identified as male, and 2,096 (52%) as female, with no sex recorded for three participants. The majority (3,544; 88%) of respondents were white; 261 (7%) were Asian or Asian British; 90 (2%) were Black, African, Caribbean or Black British; and 103 (3%) were mixed, multiple or other ethnicities; with no ethnicity recorded for 12 participants.[20]

The data was weighted based on official statistics to match the demographic profile of the population (see technical report).[21] However, with a sample size of 4,010, it is not possible to provide robust estimates of differences across minority ethnic groups, so these are not reported here.

Survey

We told respondents that the questions focus on people’s attitudes towards new technologies involving artificial intelligence (AI), and presented the following definition of AI to them:

AI is a term that describes the use of computers and digital technology to perform complex tasks commonly thought to require intelligence. AI systems typically analyse large amounts of data to take actions and achieve specific goals, sometimes autonomously (without human direction).

Respondents then answered some general questions about attitudes to new technologies and how confident they feel using computers for different tasks. They were then asked questions about their awareness of and experience with specific uses of AI; how beneficial and concerning they perceive each use to be; and about the key risks and benefits associated with each.

The specific technologies we asked about were:

  • facial recognition (uses were unlocking a mobile phone or other device, border control, and in policing and surveillance)
  • assessing eligibility (uses were for social welfare and for job applications)
  • assessing risk (uses were risk of developing cancer from a scan and loan repayments)
  • targeted online advertising (for consumer products and political adverts)
  • virtual assistants (uses were smart speakers and healthcare chatbots)
  • robotics (uses were robotic vacuum cleaners, robotic care assistants, driverless cars and autonomous weapons)
  • simulations (uses were simulating the effects of climate change and virtual reality for educational purposes).

These 17 AI uses were chosen based on emerging policy priorities and increased usage in public life. See Section 4.1 or Appendix 6.1 for the descriptions of each use. See the technical report [22] for information about our questionnaire design.

To keep the duration of the survey to an average of 20 minutes, we employed a modular questionnaire structure. Each person responded to questions about nine of the 17 different AI uses. All participants were asked about facial recognition for unlocking a mobile phone and then responded to one of the two remaining uses of facial recognition.

They were then asked about one of the two uses for the other technologies, other than robotics, for which there were four uses. For robotics, each participant considered either robotic vacuum cleaners or robotic care assistants, and then either driverless cars or autonomous weapons. After responding to questions for each specific AI use, participants answered three general questions about AI governance, regulation and explainability.

The survey was predominantly made up of close-ended questions, with respondents being asked to choose from a list of predetermined answers.

Analysis

We analysed the data between January 2023 and March 2023, using descriptive analyses for all survey variables followed-up with chi-square testing of differences across specific demographic groups. We then used regression analyses to understand relationships between demographic and attitudinal variables, and perceived benefit of specific technologies (see Appendix 6.3 for further information).

We analysed the data using the statistical programming language R, and used a 95% confidence level to assess statistically significant results. Analysis scripts and the full survey dataset can be accessed on the Ada Lovelace Institute GitHub site.[23]

In this report, we generalise from a nationally representative sample of the population of Great Britain to refer to the ‘British public’ (sometimes shortened to ‘the public’) or ‘people in Britain’ (sometimes shortened to ‘people’) throughout. This phrasing does not refer to British nationals, but rather to people living in Great Britain at the time the survey was conducted.

 4. Key findings

We asked about the uses of AI listed below. Detailed definitions for each technology can be found in Appendix 6.1.

Facial recognition…
… to unlock a mobile phone … at border control
… for policing and surveillance
Assess eligibility…
… for welfare benefits … for a job
Determine risk…
… of cancer from a scan … of repaying a loan
Targeted advertisements online…
… for consumer products … for political parties
Virtual assistant technologies…
… smart speakers … virtual assistants for healthcare
Robotics…
… robotic vacuum cleaners … robotic care assistants
… driverless cars …autonomous weapons

4.1. Awareness and experience of AI uses

To understand people’s awareness of and experience with each of the AI technologies included, participants were asked to indicate whether they had heard of each technology before and their self-reported personal experience with each. The question on personal experience was not included for autonomous weapons, driverless cars, robotic care assistants and simulation technologies for advancing climate change research, where direct experience would be unlikely for most respondents.

Overall, awareness of and experience with AI technologies varies substantially according to the specific use.

Awareness of AI technologies is mixed. For 10 of the 17 technologies we asked about, over 50% of the British public say they have heard of them before. Awareness is highest for the use of facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones, with 93% having heard of this before. People are also largely aware of driverless cars (92%) and robotic vacuum cleaners (89%).

People are least aware of the use of AI for assessing eligibility for welfare benefits, with just 19% having heard of this before. People are also less aware of robotic care assistants (32%), using AI to detect risk of cancer from a scan (34%), and using AI to assess eligibility for jobs or risks relating to loan repayments (both 35%). It is important to note that people’s awareness of technologies for assessing risk and eligibility is relatively low. Some of these technologies are already being used in public services,[24] and these results show that people may be largely unaware of the technologies that help make decisions which directly impact their lives.

Awareness of AI technologies differs somewhat according to age, with people aged 75 and over less likely to indicate they have heard of the use of facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones (69% reported being aware, compared to 95% of under 75s), border control (61% reported being aware, compared to 72% of under 75s), or for consumer social media adverts (68% reported being aware, compared to 89% of under 75s).

Our findings about people’s awareness of AI technologies align with those from other studies, which highlight gaps in awareness of AI that are less visible in day-to-day life or the media.

For example, a Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) 2022 mixed-methods study [25] found that the public have high levels of awareness of more visible uses of AI, such as recommendation systems, and futuristic associations of AI based on media images such as robotics. In contrast, the same study found low levels of awareness of AI in technologies that are part of wider societal systems’, such as the prioritisation of social housing.

People report mixed levels of personal experience with AI technologies. Over 50% of the public report personal experience with four of the 13 technologies we asked about. People report most experience with targeted online adverts for consumer products (with 81% reporting some or a lot of experience), smart speakers (with 64% reporting some or a lot of experience), and facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones and at border control (with 62% and 59% respectively reporting some or a lot of experience).

People report least experience with AI for determining risk of cancer from a scan (8%), for calculating welfare eligibility (11%) and with facial recognition for police surveillance (12%).

Experience with some of the technologies differs according to age. People aged 75 and over report less experience with facial recognition to unlock mobile phones (23% report having some or a lot of experience compared to 67% of under 75s), facial recognition at border control (32% report having some or a lot of experience compared to 62% of under 75s), and social media advertisements for consumer products (51% vs 84%) and political parties (18% report having some or a lot of experience compared to 52% of under 75s).

Figure 1 shows level of awareness for each of the 17 AI uses, and Figure 2 shows how much personal experience people report having with the 13 AI uses for which experience level was asked.

4.2. How beneficial do people think AI technologies are, and how concerning?

To find out about overall attitudes towards different AI technologies, for each technology they were asked about, respondents indicated the extent to which they think the technology will be beneficial, and the extent to which they are concerned about the technology.

The extent to which AI is perceived as beneficial or as concerning varies greatly according to the specific use.

The British public tend to perceive facial recognition technologies, virtual and robotic assistants, and technologies having health or science applications as very or somewhat beneficial.

A majority says facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones, at border control and for police surveillance is somewhat or very beneficial. In addition, over half also say that virtual assistants, both smart speakers and healthcare assistants; simulations to advance knowledge in both climate change research and in education; risk assessments for cancer and loan repayments; and robotics for vacuum cleaners and care assistants are beneficial.

AI uses with the highest percentage of people indicating ‘very’ or ‘somewhat’ beneficial are cancer risk detection (88% think beneficial) and facial recognition for border control and police surveillance (87% and 86% respectively think beneficial).

These attitudes resonate with previous research, which found that people are positive about the role of AI in improving the efficiency of day-to-day tasks, the quality of healthcare, and the ability to save money on goods and services.[26] Figure 3 shows how beneficial people believe each use of AI to be.

The British public are most concerned about AI uses that are associated with advanced robotics, advertising and employment.

More than half of British adults are somewhat or very concerned about the use of robotics for driverless cars and autonomous weapons, the use of targeted advertising online for both political and consumer adverts, for calculating job eligibility and for virtual healthcare assistants.

These findings complement those from previous studies that indicate concern around the use of AI in contexts that replace humans, such as driverless cars,[27] and in advertising.[28] Figure 4 shows the level of concern people have about each use of AI.

The proportion of the public selecting ‘don’t know’ in response to how concerned they are about each AI use is relatively small, suggesting little ambivalence or resignation towards AI across different uses.

The British public do not have a single uniform view of AI – rather, there are mixed views about the extent to which AI technologies are seen as beneficial and concerning depending on the type of technology.

To further understand these views, we created net benefit scores by subtracting the extent to which each respondent indicated the AI use was concerning from the extent to which they indicated the AI use was beneficial.

Positive scores indicate that perceived benefit outweighs concern, negative scores indicate that concern outweighs perceived benefit and scores of zero indicate equal levels of concern and perceived benefit. More detail on this analysis can be found in Appendix 6.3.

  • Benefit level outweighs concern for 10 of the 17 technologies. These are: cancer risk detection; simulations for climate change research and education; robotic vacuum cleaners; smart speakers; assessing risk of repaying a loan; robotic care assistants; and facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones, border control and police surveillance. These findings add to the Ada Lovelace Institute’s 2019 research into attitudes towards facial recognition, where findings showed that most people support the use of facial recognition technology where there is demonstrable public benefit.[29]
  • Concern outweighs benefit level for five of the 17 technologies. These are: autonomous weapons; driverless cars; targeted social media advertising for consumer products and political ads; and AI for assessing job eligibility.
  • Some technologies are seen as more divisive overall, with equal levels of concern and perceived benefit reported. This is the case for virtual healthcare assistants, and welfare eligibility technology. Figure 5 shows mean net benefit scores for each technology.

4.2.1. Individual and group level differences in perceptions of net benefits

We analysed whether perceived net benefits for each AI technology differed according to differences in the sample such as sex, age, education level, and how aware, informed or interested people are in new technologies.

  • The public think differently about facial recognition technologies depending on their level of education, how informed they feel about new technologies, and their age.
    • People who feel more informed about technologies or who hold degree-level qualifications are significantly less likely than those who feel less informed or do not hold degree-level qualifications to believe that the benefits of facial recognition technologies outweigh the concerns.
    • People aged 65 and over are significantly more likely than those under 65 to believe that the benefits of facial recognition technologies outweigh the concerns.
  • Awareness of a technology is not always a significant predictor of whether or not people perceive it to be more beneficial than concerning. For uses of AI in science, health, education and robotics, being aware of the technology is associated with perceiving it to be more beneficial than concerning. These include: virtual healthcare assistants, robotic care assistants, robotic vacuum cleaners, autonomous weapons, cancer risk prediction, and simulations for climate change and education.
  • However, awareness can also exacerbate concerns. Being aware of the use of targeted social media advertising (both for consumer and political ads) is associated with concern outweighing perceived benefits. Those who feel more informed about technology are also less likely to see targeted advertising on social media for consumer products as beneficial, compared with those who feel less informed.

Appendix 6.3 provides more information about the analyses outlined in this section, including further results showing the effects of demographic and attitudinal differences on perceived net benefit for each technology. Appendix 6.3 also includes a figure showing how the perceived net benefits for each AI technology differ according to differences in sex, age, education level, and how aware, informed or interested people are with new technologies.

These findings support existing research from the Ada Lovelace Institute into public attitudes around data, suggesting that public concerns should not simply be dismissed as reflecting a lack of awareness or understanding of AI technologies, and further that raising awareness alone will not necessarily increase public trust in these systems.[30]

More qualitative and deliberative research is needed to understand the trade-offs people make between specific benefits and concerns.

The nuanced impact of awareness about attitudes towards AI technologies is evident in the range of specific benefits and concerns people select relating to each one technology, described in the next section.

4.3. Specific benefits and concerns around different AI uses

To further understand how people view the possible benefits and concerns surrounding different uses of AI, we asked respondents to select specific ways they believe each technology to be beneficial and concerning from multiple choice lists.

The benefits and concerns included in each list were created to reflect common themes, such as speed and accuracy, bias and accountability, though each list was specific to each technology (see full survey for all benefits and concerns listed for each technology). Participants could select as many statements from each list as they felt applied, with ‘something else’, ‘none of the above’, and ‘don’t know’ options also given for each.

Overall, people most commonly identify benefits related to speed, efficiency and accessibility, and most commonly express concerns related to overreliance on technologies over professional human judgement, being unable to account for personal circumstances, and a lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making processes.

However, the specific benefits and concerns most commonly selected vary across technologies.

The following sections describe the specific benefits and concerns that people chose for each AI use. We cluster these by categories of technologies for risk and eligibility assessments, facial recognition technologies, robotics, virtual assistants, targeted online advertising, and simulations for science and education.

Tables 1–12 show the three most commonly chosen benefits and concerns for each technology. A full list of benefits and concerns presented to participants and the percentage of people selecting each can be found in Appendix 6.3.4.

4.3.1. Risk and eligibility assessments

We asked about the following uses of assessing eligibility and risk using AI: to calculate eligibility for jobs, to assess eligibility for welfare benefits, to predict the risk of developing cancer from a scan, and to predict the risk of not repaying a loan.

The public’s most commonly chosen benefit for risk and eligibility assessments is speed (for example, ‘applying for a loan will be faster and easier’).

Just under half, 43%, think speed is a benefit of using AI to assess eligibility for welfare benefits, 49% for job recruitment, and 52% for assessing risk of repaying a loan. An overwhelming majority of 82% think that earlier detection of cancer is a key advantage in using AI to predict the risk of cancer from a scan, a consensus not reached in any other technologies.

In addition to speed, reduction of human bias and error are seen as key benefits of technologies in this group. For the use of AI in recruiting for jobs and for assessing risk of repaying a loan, the technologies being less likely than humans to ‘discriminate against some groups of people in society’ is the second most commonly selected benefit, selected by 41% and 39% respectively.

Reduction in ‘human error’ is the second most commonly selected benefit for the use of AI in determining risk of cancer from scans and for assessing eligibility for welfare benefits, selected by 53% and 38% respectively.

The technologies being more accurate than human professionals overall, however, is not selected as a key benefit of most uses of AI in this group. Less than one third of people in Britain perceive this to be a key benefit for the use of AI in determining risk for the repayment of loans (29% selected), determining eligibility for welfare benefits (22% selected) and determining eligibility for jobs (13% selected).

An exception to this pattern is in the use of AI to determine risk of cancer from scans, where 42% of people perceive a key benefit as improved accuracy over professionals.

The most common concerns the British public have about using AI for these eligibility and risk assessments include the technology being less able than a human to account for individual circumstances, overreliance on technologies over professional judgement, and a lack of transparency about how decisions are made.

These concerns are particularly high in relation to the use of AI in job recruitment processes with 64% saying they think that professionals will ‘rely too heavily on their technology rather than their professional judgements’; 61% saying that the technology will be ‘less able than employers and recruiters to take account of individual circumstances’; and 52% saying that ‘it will be more difficult to understand how decisions about job application assessments are reached’.

These concerns add to findings from CDEI’s latest research into public expectations around AI governance, where people felt it was important to have a clear understanding of the criteria AI uses to make decisions in the case of job recruitment and to have the ability to challenge such decisions.[31]

The British public express repeated concerns around a lack of human oversight in AI technologies, even for the use of AI to determine cancer risk from a scan – a technology that is seen as largely beneficial.

As seen in the previous section, AI for predicting risk of cancer from a scan is perceived to be one of the most beneficial technologies in the survey.

Yet, over half of British adults (56%) still express concern about relying too heavily on this technology rather than professional judgements, while 47% are concerned that if the technology made a mistake it would be difficult to know who is responsible. These attitudes suggest that the public see value in human oversight in AI for cancer risk detection, even when this use of AI is perceived as largely positive.

4.3.2. Facial recognition

We asked the British public about the following uses of facial recognition technologies: its use for unlocking mobile phones, for policing and surveillance and facial recognition use at border control.

Most of the British public feel speed is the main benefit offered by facial recognition technologies.

Over half, 61%, of people say ‘it is faster to unlock a phone or personal device’ in relation to phone unlocking, 77% say ‘the technology will make it faster and easier to identify wanted criminals and missing persons’ in relation to policing and surveillance and 70% identify ‘processing people at border control will be faster’ as a benefit in relation to border control.

Although half of the public perceive accuracy to be a substantial benefit of these technologies, half have concerns around these technologies making mistakes.

On the one hand, the technology being more accurate than professionals is the second most selected benefit for the use of facial recognition in policing and surveillance (chosen by 55% of people) and the use of facial recognition at border control (chosen by 50% of people). On the other hand, the most commonly selected concern for policing and surveillance is false accusations (54% of people worry that ‘if the technology makes a mistake it will lead to innocent people being wrongly accused’); while for border control, the most selected concern is related to accountability (‘if the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong’).

Therefore, while speed is seen by a majority as a benefit, there are a range of concerns that are mentioned by approximately half of people over the use of facial recognition for border control and police surveillance. A survey conducted by the Ada Lovelace Institute in 2019 found that a majority supported facial recognition technology when there was a demonstrable public benefit and appropriate safeguards in place.[32]

Very few people identify concerns about the use of facial recognition in policing, surveillance and border control as discriminatory technologies. However, there may be socio-demographic differences around these concerns.

The responses suggest that Black people, students and those with no formal qualifications might be more concerned about the discriminatory potential of these technologies.

However, it is important to note that our sample sizes for various subgroups are too small to be statistically significant, and we need to follow up these indicative findings through other research methods.

More research is also needed to understand the lived experiences of different groups and concerns about how these technologies can impact, or can be perceived to impact, people in different ways.

4.3.3. Robotics

In the case of robotics, specific benefits vary depending on the area in which the AI is applied, with accessibility and speed being the most common benefits.

Accessibility is the most commonly selected benefit for robotic technologies that can make day-to-day activities easier for people who otherwise might not be physically able to do them (driverless cars and vacuum cleaners), highlighting positive perceptions, and potentially high expectations, around AI making tasks easier for all of society.

People are concerned about a lack of human interaction in AI technologies, the potential overreliance on the technology at the expense of human judgement and issues of who to hold accountable when the technology makes a mistake. As with benefits, concerns also vary depending on where robotics are applied.

For robotic care assistants, people note significant advantages relating to efficiency (that is, faster, and more accurate). However, people are most worried about the potential loss of human interaction (78% worry that ‘patients will miss out on the human interaction they would otherwise get from human carers’), suggesting that people do not want AI-powered technologies to replace human-to-human care.

This is consistent with findings from the Public Attitudes to Science survey in 2019, which found that people were concerned that the use of AI and robotics in healthcare would reduce human interaction, and that the public were open to the idea of the use of this technology to support, rather than replace, a doctor.[33]

Nearly half of people identify concerns relating to the technology leading to job cuts to human caregiving professionals (46%), and that it would be difficult to assign responsibility for what went wrong if the robot care assistant made a mistake (45%).

In the case of driverless cars, the most selected concerns relate to: lack of reliability (62% chose ‘the technology will not always work, making the cars unreliable’); accountability for mistakes (59% chose ‘if the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong’); and lack of clarity on how decisions were made (51% chose ‘it will be more difficult to understand how the car makes decisions compared to a human driver’).

Similarly, people’s concerns about autonomous weapons centre on overreliance on the technology (selected by 54%) and lack of clarity on who would be responsible if the technology made a mistake (selected by 53%).

4.3.4. Virtual assistants

In relation to virtual assistants, we asked specifically about smart speakers and about the use of virtual assistants in healthcare.

The British public most commonly chose accessibility and speed as benefits in relation to virtual assistants, a similar finding to the benefits chosen for robotics.

Accessibility (‘The technology will allow people with difficulty using devices to access features more easily’) is the most selected benefit of smart speakers, selected by 71% of people. To a lesser extent, accessibility is also the top benefit mentioned in relation to virtual health assistants (53% chose ‘The technology will be easier for some groups of people in society to use, such as those who have difficulty leaving their home’).

Speed is the second most selected benefit for both technologies. Over half, 60%, of people selected speed as a benefit for smart speakers, while 50% selected it for virtual mental health assistants.

People are most concerned about the gathering and sharing of personal data for smart speakers. This is also a common concern across other technologies that are more visible and commonplace in day-to-day lives, such as the use of facial recognition for unlocking mobile phones, and targeted online social media advertisements.

Over half (57%) of the British public selected ‘the technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties’ as a concern. This concern aligns with previous research into attitudes towards the use of personal data, where data security and privacy were felt to be the greatest risk for data use in society.[34] This concern is particularly salient among those who are more generally concerned by smart speakers, where the top two concerns relate to personal information. In this group, 79% are concerned that their personal information could be shared with third parties and 68% are concerned their personal information is less safe and secure. These concerns suggest that people see data security as more significant for AI technologies that are designed for more personal use, particularly in spaces like home or work.

The biggest concern in relation to virtual assistants in healthcare relates to the potential difficulty for some people to use it, and the technology not being able to account for individual differences.

Almost two thirds of the British public (64%) identify difficulty in use (‘some people may find it difficult to use the technology’) as a concern in relation to virtual assistants in healthcare, which is higher than the 53% who mention accessibility as a benefit. This concern reiterates the value people place on AI technologies working for all members of society. Another major concern raised around virtual assistants in healthcare is that the technology may not account for individual circumstances as well as human healthcare professionals (63%).

Those with experience of virtual assistants in healthcare are more likely than those without to report concerns around the technology being more inaccurate than humans. Concerns include: suggesting diagnosis and treatment options; the difficulty of assigning who is accountable when the technology makes mistakes; and the technology being less effective for some members of society.

However, those with experience of these technologies are also more likely to report benefits relating to accessibility, helping the health system save money, personal information being secure and the technology being less likely than healthcare professionals to discriminate against some groups of people in society.

4.3.5. Targeted online advertising

While discovery of new and relevant content is the most mentioned benefit for the use of consumer or political targeted online advertising, the public identify invasions of privacy and personal information being shared with third parties as the most prevalent concerns, highlighting a tension between personalisation of content and privacy.

Half of the public (50%) chose ‘it will help people discover new products that might be of interest to them’ as a benefit in relation to targeted online consumer advertisement, while only one third (33%) select this as a benefit for targeted online political advertisement (‘It will help people discover new political representatives who might be of interest to them’). Similar proportions for both technologies mention the relevance of ads as a benefit for consumer targeted advertising (53%) and for political ads (32%).

However, as seen in previous sections, people are highly concerned about these uses of AI.

Over two thirds of people (69%) identify invading privacy as a concern for targeted online consumer advertisements, while 51% identify this for political advertisements.

Similarly, 68% selected ‘the technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties’ as a concern for consumer adverts while 48% selected this concern for political adverts.

This suggests that while the public might find social media advertising more helpful in discovering relevant content, especially for consumer adverts, they are also less trusting of what is done with their personal information.

This resonates with the findings from an online study on online advertising in the UK and France which found that most participants were concerned about how their browsing activity was being used even when they saw some of the benefits related to discovery. The study concluded that participants wanted their data, and their ability to choose how it is used, to be respected and to be able to ‘practically, meaningfully, and simply curate their own advertising experience’.[35]

4.3.6. Simulations

We asked about two uses of AI simulations for advancing knowledge, one relating to the use of AI for climate change research and another around the use of virtual reality for educational purposes.

The public see the main benefits of simulations for science and education as making it faster and easier to enhance knowledge and understanding, as well as enabling a greater number of people to learn or benefit from research. However, the public are concerned about inequalities in access to the technology, meaning not everyone will benefit.

When asked about the use of new simulation technologies to advance climate change research, around two thirds of people said: that they would ‘make it faster and easier for scientists and governments to predict climate change effects’ (64%); that it would ‘predict issues across a wider range of regions and countries, meaning more people will experience the benefits of climate research’ (64%); and that it would ‘allow more people to understand the possible effects of climate change’ (63%).

In relation to the use of simulation technologies like virtual reality for education, the potential to ‘increase the quality of education by providing more immersive experiences’ (66%), and its potential to ‘allow more people to learn about history and culture’ (60%) are the most selected benefits (Table 11).

Overall, the public choose few concerns in relation to AI for climate change research.

People don’t express many specific concerns about the use of simulation technologies for advancing climate change research. Over one third (36%) selected the risk that ‘the technology will predict issues in some regions better than others, meaning that some people do not experience the benefits of these technologies’. After this concern, however, the most selected answer is ‘None of these’ (26%), followed by 21% who selected inaccuracy as a concern.

The public are most concerned about inequalities in access and control over narratives in education in relation to the development of virtual reality for education.

Over half (51%) of British adults are concerned that ‘some people will not be able to learn about history and culture in this way as they will not have access to the technology’ in the development of virtual reality for education. This concern is followed by giving control over to technology developers on ‘what people learn about history or culture’ which is selected by 46% of people.

4.4. Governance and explainability

4.4.1. Explainability

To understand how explainable the British public think a decision made by an AI system should be when explainability trades off with accuracy, we first informed participants that: ‘Many AI systems are used with the aim of making decisions faster and more accurately than is possible for a human. However, it may not always be possible to explain to a person how an AI system made a decision.’ We then asked people which of the following statements best reflects their personal opinion:

  • Making the most accurate AI decision is more important than providing an explanation.
  • In some circumstances an explanation should be given, even if that makes the AI decision less accurate.
  • An explanation should always be given, even if that makes all AI decisions less accurate.
  • Humans, not computers, should always make the decisions and be able to explain them to the people affected.

When there are trade-offs between the explainability and accuracy of AI technologies, the British public value the former over the latter: it is important for people to understand how decisions driven by AI are made.

Figure 6 shows that only 10% of the public feel that ‘making the most accurate AI decision is more important than providing an explanation’, whereas a majority choose options that reflect a need for explaining decisions. Specifically, almost one third (31%) indicate that humans should always make the decisions (and be able to explain them), followed by 26% who think that ‘sometimes an explanation should be given, even if it reduces accuracy’ and another 22% who choose ‘an explanation should always be given, even if it reduces accuracy’.

People’s preferences for explainable AI decisions dovetail with the importance of transparency and accountability demonstrated by people’s specific concerns about each technology (described in Section 4.3). Here, for all technologies[36] (except for driverless cars and virtual health assistants) the proportion of concerns mentioning ‘it is unclear how decisions are made’ is higher than mentions of ‘inaccuracy’.

 

People’s preferences for explainability over accuracy change across age groups.

Older people choose explainability and human involvement over accuracy to a greater extent than younger people. For those aged 18–44, ‘sometimes an explanation should be given even if it reduces accuracy’ was the most popular response (Figure 7). At the youngest end of the age spectrum (18–24) ‘humans should always make the decisions and be able to explain them’ is the least popular response, whereas this becomes the first choice from 45+ and above and the highest for respondents aged 65+.

4.4.2. Governance and regulation

To find out about people’s views on the regulation of AI, we asked people to indicate what (if anything) would make them more comfortable with AI technologies being used. Participants could select as many they felt applied from a list of seven possible options.

Public attitudes suggest a need for regulation that involves redress and the ability to contest AI-powered decisions.

People most commonly indicated that ‘laws and regulations that prohibit certain uses of technologies and guide the use of all AI technologies’ would increase their comfort with the use of AI, with 62% in favour. People are also largely supportive of ‘clear procedures for appealing to a human against an AI decision’ (selected by 59%). Adding to the concerns expressed about data security and accountability, 56% of the public want to make sure that ‘personal information is kept safe and secure’ and 54% want ‘clear explanations of how AI works’.

Figure 8 shows the proportion of people selecting each option when asked what, if anything, would make them more comfortable with AI technologies being used.

We also asked participants who they think should be most responsible for ensuring AI is used safely from a list of seven potential actors. People could select up to two options.

The British public want regulation of AI technologies. ‘An independent regulator’ is the most popular choice for governance of AI.

Figure 9 shows 41% of people feel that ‘An independent regulator’ should be responsible for the governance of AI, the most popular choice of the seven presented. Patterns of preferred governance do not change notably depending on whether people feel well informed about new technologies or not.

Results add to a PublicFirst poll conducted in March 2023 with 2,000 UK adult respondents which found that 62% of respondents supported the creation of a new government regulatory agency, similar to the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), to regulate the use of new AI models.[37]

People’s preferences for the governance of AI changes across age groups.

While people overall most commonly select ‘an independent regulator’, Figure 10 shows 43% of 18–24-year-olds think that the ‘companies developing the technology’ should be most responsible for ensuring AI is used safely. In contrast, only 17% of people over 55 select this option.

This could reflect more in-depth experiences by young people with different technologies and associated risks, and therefore demands for more responsibility on developers. Especially since young people also report the highest exposure to technology driven problems such as online harms’.[38] That 18–24-year-olds most commonly say that the companies developing the technologies should be responsible for ensuring AI is used safely raises questions about private companies’ corporate responsibility alongside regulation.

To understand people’s concerns about who develops AI technologies, we asked people how concerned, if at all, they feel about different actors producing AI technologies. We asked this in the context of hospitals asking an outside organisation to produce AI technologies that predict the risk of developing cancer from a scan, and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) asking an outside organisation to produce AI technologies for assessing eligibility for welfare benefits.

We asked people how concerned they are about each of the following groups producing AI in each context:

  • private companies
  • not-for-profit organisations (e.g. charities)
  • another governmental body or department
  • universities/academic researchers.

For both the use of AI in predicting cancer from a scan, and assessing eligibility for welfare benefits, the British public are most concerned by private companies developing the technologies and least concerned by universities and academic researchers developing the technologies

For the development of AI which may be used to assist the Department for Work and Pensions in assessing eligibility for welfare benefits, the public are most concerned about private companies developing the technology, with 66% being somewhat or very concerned. Just over half, 51%, of people are somewhat or very concerned about another governmental body or department developing the technology, and 46% somewhat or very concerned about not-for-profit organisations developing the technology.

People are generally least concerned about universities or academic researchers developing this technology, with 43% being somewhat or very concerned. While this is the lowest percentage of concern compared to other stakeholders, this is still a sizable proportion of people expressing concern, which suggests the need for more trusted stakeholders to also be transparent about their role and approach to developing technologies.

Regarding the development of AI that may help healthcare professionals predict the risk of cancer from a scan, there is a very similar pattern of concerns over who develops the technology. People are most concerned with private companies developing the technology with 61% being somewhat or very concerned, followed by a governmental body (44%). People are less concerned with not-for-profit organisations and universities or academic researchers developing the technology. Overall level of concern about developers was lower for technologies that predict risk of cancer than technologies which help assess eligibility for welfare.

Figure 11 shows the extent to which people feel concerned by the following actors developing new technologies to assess eligibility for welfare benefits and predict the risk of developing cancer: private companies, governmental bodies, not-for-profit organisations and universities/academic researchers.

While we asked about concerns over the development of a specific technology rather than overall trust, our findings resonate with results from the second wave of a CDEI survey on public attitudes towards AI, which found that on average, respondents most trusted the NHS and academic researchers to use data safely, while trust in government, big tech companies and social media companies was lower.[39]

5. Conclusion

This report provides new insights into the British public’s attitudes towards different AI-powered technologies and AI governance. It comes at a time when governments, private companies, civil society and the public are grappling with the rapid pace of development of AI and its potential impacts across many areas of life.

A key contribution of this survey is that it highlights complex and nuanced views from the public across different AI applications and uses. People identify specific concerns about technologies even when they see them as overall more beneficial than concerning, and acknowledge potential benefits about particular technologies even when they also express concern.

The public are aware of the use of AI in many visible, commonplace technologies, such as the use of facial recognition for unlocking phones, or the use of targeted advertising in social media. However, awareness of AI technologies used in public services with potential high impact on people, like the use of AI for welfare benefits eligibility, is low.

The public typically see advantages of several uses of AI as improving efficiency, and accessibility. However, people worry about the security of their personal data, the replacement of professional human judgements, and the implications for accountability and transparency in decision-making. While applications of AI in health, science, education and security are overall perceived positively, applications in advanced robotics and targeted advertising online are viewed as more concerning.

There is a strong desire among the public for independent regulation, more information on how AI systems make decisions, and the ability to challenge decisions made by AI. Younger adults also tend to place responsibility on the companies developing AI to ensure that the technologies are used safely.

Future work will benefit from understanding how different groups of people in society are impacted differently by various uses of AI. However, this study highlights important considerations for policymakers and developers of AI technologies and how they can help ensure AI technologies work for people and society:

  • Policymakers and developers of AI systems must work to support public awareness and enhance transparency surrounding the use of less visible applications of AI used in the public domain. This is particularly true for areas that have significant impacts on people’s lives, such as in assessments for benefits, financial support or employment.
  • The findings show that the public expect many AI technologies to bring improvements to their lives, particularly around speed, efficiency and accessibility. It is important for policymakers and developers of these technologies to meet public expectations, work to strengthen public trust in AI further, and therefore help to maximise the benefits that AI has the potential to bring.
  • While people are positive about some of the perceived benefits of AI, they also express concerns, particularly around transparency, accountability, and loss of human judgement. As people’s interaction with AI increases across many areas of life, it is crucial for policymakers and developers of AI to listen to public concerns and work towards solutions for alleviating them.
  • People call for regulation of AI and would like to see an independent regulator in place, along with clear procedures for appealing against AI decisions. Policymakers working on AI regulatory regimes should consider the establishment of an independent regulatory body of AI technologies and ensure that the public have opportunities to seek redress if AI systems fail or make a mistake.
  • People in older age groups are particularly concerned about the explainability of AI decisions and lack of human involvement in decision-making. It is important for policymakers and civil society organisations to work to ensure older members of society in particular do not feel alienated by the increasing use of AI in many decision-making processes.
  • Lastly, policymakers must acknowledge that the public have complex and nuanced views about uses of AI, depending on what the technology is used for. Debates or policies will need to go beyond general assumptions or one-size-fits-all approaches to meet the demands and expectations from the public.

6. Appendix

6.1. Descriptions for each technology use case

The following definitions were provided to survey respondents:

Facial recognition

Facial recognition technologies are AI technologies that can compare and match human faces from digital images or videos against those stored elsewhere.

The technology works by first being trained on many images, learning to pick out distinctive details about people’s faces.

These details, such as distance between the eyes or shape of the chin, are converted into a face-print, similar to a fingerprint.

  • Mobile phone

One use of facial recognition technology is for unlocking mobile phones and other personal devices.

Such devices use this technology by scanning the face of the person attempting to unlock the phone through the camera, then comparing it against a saved face-print of the phone’s owner.

  • Border control

Another use of facial recognition technology is to assist with border control.

‘eGates’ at many international airports use facial recognition technologies to attempt to automatically verify travellers’ identities by comparing the image on their passport with an image of their face taken by a camera at the gate.

If the technology verifies the person’s identity, the eGate will open and let them through, otherwise they will be sent to a human border control officer.

  • Police surveillance

Another use of facial recognition technology is in policing and surveillance.

Some police forces in Britain and elsewhere use this technology to compare video footage from CCTV cameras against face databases of people of interest, such as criminal suspects, missing persons, victims of crime or possible witnesses.

Eligibility

Some organisations use AI technologies to help them decide whether someone is eligible for the programmes or services they offer.

These AI technologies draw on data from previous eligibility decisions to assess the eligibility of a new applicant.

The recommendations of the technology are then used by the organisation to make the decision.

  • Welfare eligibility

AI technologies that assess eligibility are sometimes used to determine a person’s eligibility for welfare benefits, such as Universal Credit, Jobseeker’s Allowance or Disability Living Allowance.

Here, AI technologies are trained on lots of data about previous applicants for similar benefits, such as their employment history and disability status, learning patterns about which features are associated with particular decisions.

Many applications will only be considered for the benefit once the computer has marked them as eligible.

  • Job eligibility

One use of AI technologies for assessing eligibility is for reviewing people’s job applications. The technology will look at a person’s job application or CV and automatically determine if they are eligible for a job.

Here, AI technologies are trained on lots of data from decisions about previous applicants for similar roles, learning patterns about which features are associated with particular hiring outcomes.

Many employers who use this technology will only read the applications that the computer has marked as an eligible match for the role.

Risk

AI technologies may be used by organisations to predict the risk of something happening.

When predicting the risk, these AI technologies draw on a wide range of data about the outcomes of many people to calculate the risk for an individual.

The recommendations these technologies make are then used by organisations to make decisions.

  • Cancer risk

One use of AI technologies for calculating risk is for assessing a medical scan to identify a person’s risk of developing some types of cancer.

Here, AI technologies are trained on many scans from past patients, learning patterns about which features are associated with particular diagnoses and health outcomes.

The technology can then give a doctor a prediction of the likelihood that a new patient will develop a particular cancer based on their scan.

  • Loan repayment risk

One use of AI technologies for calculating risk is to assess how likely a person is to repay a loan, including a mortgage.

Here, AI technologies are trained on data about how well past customers have kept up with repayments, learning which characteristics make them likely or unlikely to repay.

When a new customer applies for a loan, the technology will assess a range of information about that person and compare it to the information it has been trained on. It will then make a prediction to the bank about how likely the new customer will be able to repay the loan.

Targeted online advertising

Targeted advertising on the internet tailors adverts to a specific user. These kinds of ads are commonly found on social media, online news sites, and video and music streaming platforms.

The technology uses lots of data generated by tracking people’s activities online to learn about people’s characteristics, attitudes and interests.

The technology then uses this data to generate adverts tailored to each user.

  • Targeted social media advertising for consumer products

Targeted adverts on social media are sometimes used by companies to suggest consumer products such as clothes, gadgets and food.

These ads are targeted at people according to their personal characteristics and previous behaviour on social media. They are intended to encourage people to buy particular products.

  • Targeted social media advertising for political parties

Targeted adverts on social media are sometimes used by political parties to suggest political content to users.

These ads are targeted at people according to their personal characteristics and previous behaviour on social media. They are intended to encourage people to support a specific political party.

Virtual assistant technologies

Virtual assistant technologies are devices or software that are designed to assist people with tasks like finding information online or helping to arrange appointments. The technologies can often respond to voice or text commands from a human.

The technologies work by being ‘trained’ on lots of information about how people communicate through language, learning to match certain words and phrases to actions that they have been designed to carry out.

  • Virtual assistant smart speakers

One example of a virtual assistant technology is a smart speaker.

These technologies are small computers that are connected to the internet and which can respond to voice commands to do things such as, turn appliances in the home on and off, answer questions about any topic, set reminders, or play music.

  • Virtual assistants in healthcare

One example of a virtual assistant is for assessing information about a person’s health.

These AI technologies aim to respond to healthcare queries online, including about appointments or current symptoms.

The technologies are able to automatically suggest a possible diagnosis or advise treatment. For more serious illnesses, the technologies may suggest a person seeks further medical advice, for example by booking a GP appointment or by going to hospital.

Robotics

Robotic technologies are computer-assisted machines which can interact with the physical world automatically, sometimes without the need for a human operator.

These technologies use large amounts of data generated by machines, humans and sensors in the physical world to ‘learn to’ carry out tasks that would previously have been carried out by humans.

  • Robotic vacuum cleaners

One example of robotic technologies are robotic vacuum cleaners, sometimes called a ‘smart’ vacuum cleaner.

This is a vacuum cleaner that can clean floors independently, without any human involvement.

Robotic vacuum cleaners use sensors and motors to automatically move around a room while being able to detect obstacles, stairs and walls.

  • Robotic care assistants

One example of robotic technologies are robotic care assistants. These technologies are being developed to help carry out physical tasks in care settings such as hospitals and nursing homes.

Robotic care assistants are designed to support specific tasks, such as helping patients with mobility issues to get in and out of bed, to pick up objects, or with personal tasks such as washing and dressing.

When these technologies are used, a human care assistant will be on-call if needed.

  • Driverless cars

Another use of robotic technologies is for driverless cars. These are vehicles that are designed to travel on roads with other cars, lorries and vans, but which drive themselves automatically without needing a human driver.

Driverless cars can detect obstacles, pedestrians, other drivers and road layouts by assessing their physical surroundings using sensors and comparing this information to large amounts of data about different driving environments.

  • Autonomous weapons

Another use of robotic technologies is for autonomous weapon systems used by the military.

These include missile systems, drones and submarines that, once launched, can automatically identify, select or attack targets without further human intervention.

These technologies decide when to act by assessing their physical surroundings using sensors and comparing this information to large amounts of data about different combat environments.

Advancing knowledge through simulations

New computer technologies are being developed to advance human knowledge about the past and the future.

These technologies work by taking large amounts of data that we already have, and using this to create realistic simulations about how things were in the past, or how they might be in the future.

These ‘simulation technologies’ aim to allow people to study and learn about places and events that would otherwise be impossible or difficult to directly experience.

  • Climate change research

One example of using new simulation technologies for advancing knowledge is for research about climate change.

New simulation technologies can analyse large amounts of past data in order to simulate the future impacts of climate change in particular areas. This data could come from weather and environmental data, pollution data, and data on energy usage from individual homes.

For example, these technologies can help scientists and governments to predict the likelihood of a significant flood occurring in a particular region over the next 10 years, along with how the flood may impact agriculture and health.

  • Virtual reality for culture and education

One example of using new simulation technologies for advancing knowledge is the development of virtual reality for education.

Here, a person can wear a virtual reality headset at home or school that will show them a three-dimensional simulation of a museum or historical site, using a range of data about the museum or historical site.

These technologies are designed to allow people to learn more about history or culture through games, videos and other immersive experiences.

6.2. Limitations

While this study benefits from including a large, random probability sample representative of the population of Great Britain, the work is limited by several features which we address here. As discussed in the methodology, the sample size of our survey is not sufficiently large to provide robust estimates for different minority ethnic groups. We also do not have representation from Northern Ireland in our survey, meaning findings from this report cannot be generalised to the United Kingdom.

We recognise the complexity of AI as a subject matter of our survey, and although we contextualised all the uses of AI we included in the survey, we were still not able to capture the granularity of some of these uses. For example, we asked about autonomous weapons in the broad sense, but acknowledge that attitudes may vary depending on whether they are framed as in use by participant’s own nation or other nations, or whether the system is for defensive or offensive uses.

We also asked respondents about awareness and experience with uses of AI, but cannot gather from the survey alone what type of experience they have had with each technology. For example, in the case of AI to assess job eligibility, we do not know whether experience relates to using these services to recruit or to using these services when applying for a job.

The list of concerns and benefits we presented respondents with, though grounded in literature surrounding AI, is also not exhaustive. While we left an open-text option for all benefit and concerns questions, very few respondents filled these in. It was important to keep these questions short due to time restrictions for the survey overall, and therefore the benefits and concerns presented in this report are not definitive across the uses of AI we surveyed.

We asked generally about feelings towards the governance and regulation of AI technologies as a whole rather than for specific uses of AI. As discussed in the report, AI is complex and difficult to define, and our findings show that attitudes towards AI are nuanced and vary depending on the application of AI. Future research should look at public attitudes to regulating specific technologies.

Finally, although we used both online and offline methods, we recognise that we still may not have reached those that are truly digitally excluded in Great Britain, those with restrictions on their leisure time, and those with additional requirements that may have made participating in this survey challenging. Therefore the ability to generalise our findings is limited.

Overall, we acknowledge that a survey alone cannot be a perfect representation of public attitudes. Attitudes may change depending on time and context and include trade-offs across different groups in the population and across different technologies that are difficult to explore using this method.

This survey was designed and in the field in November 2022, just before generative AI and large language models like ChatGPT became a widely covered media topic. It is probable that these advances have already impacted public discourse towards some AI technologies since our survey. Therefore there is a need for rich qualitative research to follow up the insights we have presented here.

6.3. Analysis and additional tables

In this section we provide more detail on the analysis conducted to understand in which cases perceived benefits of each AI use outweighed concerns and vice versa (Section 6.3.1.), and the regression analysis conducted to understand differences on the extent to which different groups are more likely to see technologies as more or less beneficial (Section 6.3.2.).

Section 6.3.3. includes detail on the type of analysis conducted to derive some of the attitudinal variables used. Section 6.3.4. provides tables with the full list of specific benefits and concerns, and the percentage of respondents selecting these, for all 17 of the technologies included in the survey.

6.3.1. Net benefit analysis

A mean net benefit score was calculated for each technology by subtracting the benefit score from the concern score. When net benefit scores were negative, concern outweighed benefit. When scores were positive, benefit outweighed concern. Scores of zero indicated equal concern and benefit.

The benefit and concern variables were coded in the following ways:

To what extent do you think that the use of [AI technology] will be beneficial?

  • ‘Very beneficial’ was re-coded as 3
  • ‘Fairly beneficial’ was 2
  • ‘Not very beneficial’ was 1
  • ‘Not at all beneficial’ was 0.

To what extent are you concerned about the use of [AI technology]?

  • ‘Very concerned’ was re-coded as 3
  • ‘Somewhat concerned’ was 2
  • ‘Not very concerned’ was 1
  • ‘Not at all concerned’ was 0.

‘Prefer not to say’ and ‘don’t know’ options were re-coded as missing values.

6.3.2. Regression analysis

To understand how demographics and attitudinal variables are related to the perceived net benefits of AI, we fitted linear regression models for each individual AI technology using the same set of predictor variables. The dependent variable in each model is ‘net benefit’, calculated as described above. The independent variables in the models were:

  • Age (65 and older compared to younger than 65), this coding is chosen because it represents the main age difference across AI uses)
  • Sex (male compared to female)
  • Education (having a degree compared to not having a degree)
  • Social class (NS-SEC 1-3 compared to NS-SEC 4-7)
  • Awareness of the technology (aware compared to not aware)
  • Experience with using the technology (experience compared to no experience)
  • Tech interested (self-reported interest in technology)
  • Tech informed (self-reported informedness about technology)
  • Digital literacy (high compared to low)
  • Comfort with technology (high compared to low)

Figure 12 presents the results for all 17 regressions in a single plot. Each square in the plot represents the expected change in net benefit for a unit increase in the corresponding independent variable on the vertical axis, controlling for all other variables included in the model.

Statistically significant coefficients (p < 0.05) are shown in pink, while green coefficients denote non-significant coefficients. Coefficient estimates higher than 0 indicate a higher net benefit and conversely coefficients lower than 0 are associated with lower net benefit (or higher concern) on a particular variable.

Taking the age variable as an example, people aged over 65 are significantly more likely to see simulation in climate change, predicting cancer risk, all three facial recognition technologies and autonomous weapons as net beneficial. On the other hand, this age group is significantly more likely to see consumer and political social media advertising, job eligibility and driverless cars as net concerning. There are no significant differences between age groups for the remaining AI uses.

Figure 12 illustrates how patterns of perceived net benefit vary substantially across demographic groups and attitudinal indicators. Only ‘comfort with technology’ shows a consistent relationship, with people who are more comfortable with technology significantly more likely to see net benefits across all 17 AI uses.

Being a graduate, on the other hand, is associated with expressing net concerns on most AI uses, although several are non-significant and one is in the opposite direction (graduates are more likely to see autonomous weapons as net beneficial). Sex shows a near equal mix of positive, negative and non-significant associations across use cases. These results reinforce the conclusion from the descriptive analyses; public perceptions of AI are complex and highly nuanced, varying according to the specific technology and the context in which it is used.

Figure 12: Predictors* of net benefit score for each technology

6.3.3. Principal component analysis

The independent variables ‘digital literacy’ and ‘comfort with technology’ are summary measures of multiple items produced using principal component analysis. The ‘digital literacy’ measure is based on eight survey questions each covering the level of confidence in different information technology skills, ranging from using the internet for finding information to setting up an online account to buy goods (see Table 13).

‘Comfort with technology’ is a measure derived from seven questions which cover attitudes towards new technologies and their impact on society, for example, whether the respondent finds it easy to keep up with new technologies or whether AI is making society better (see Table 14). The summary score for each measure is taken as the first principal component in a principal component analysis. Tables 15 and 16 include the factor loadings for each measure from the principal component analysis.

Table 13: Digital literacy scale (response options 1-4 recoded from least to most confident)

Variable name Question wording
DIG_LIT_1 Use the internet to find information that helps you solve problems
DIG_LIT_2 Attach documents to an email and share it
DIG_LIT_3 Create documents using word processing applications (e.g. a CV or a letter)
DIG_LIT_4 Set up an email account
DIG_LIT_5 Organise information and content using files and folders (either on a device, across multiple devices, or on the Cloud)
DIG_LIT_6 Recognise and avoid suspicious links in emails, websites, social media messages and pop-ups
DIG_LIT_7 Pay for things online
DIG_LIT_8 Set up an online account that enables you to buy goods and services (e.g. Amazon account, eBay, John Lewis)

Table 14: ‘Comfort with technology’ scale (response options scale 1-11, using a slider question approach)

Variable name Question wording
TECHSELF_1 TECHSELF. Do not seek out new technologies or gadgets…When new technologies or gadgets are introduced, like to try them’
TECHSELF_2 TECHSELF. Overall, new technologies make quality of life worse…Overall, new technologies improve quality of life’
TECHSELF_3 TECHSELF. Find it difficult to keep up to date with new technologies…Find it easy to keep up to date with new technologies
TECHSELF_4 TECHSELF. Do not like my online activity being tracked…Fine with my online activity being tracked
TECHSELF_5 TECHSELF. So long as the technology works, don’t need to know how it works…Knowing how new technologies work is important
TECHSOCIAL_1 Are changing society too quickly…Are changing society at a good pace
TECHSOCIAL_2 Are making society worse…Are making society better

Table 15: Digital literacy: Principal Component Analysis

Factor Loadings
Variable name Component 1 Component 2
DIG_LIT_1 0.7861 0.2621
DIG_LIT_2 0.8691 -0.1814
DIG_LIT_3 0.8126 -0.4233
DIG_LIT_4 0.8343 -0.0224
DIG_LIT_5 0.8112 -0.3837
DIG_LIT_6 0.7034 0.2331
DIG_LIT_7 0.8126 0.3514
DIG_LIT_8 0.8609 0.2043

 

Table 16: Comfort with technology: Principal Component Analysis

Factor Loadings
Variable name Component 1 Component 2
TECHSELF_1 0.8297 0.3404
TECHSELF_2 0.8210 0.0611
TECHSELF_3 0.8357 0.3023
TECHSELF_4 0.5226 -0.4599
TECHSELF_5 0.6570 0.4723
TECHSOCIAL_1 0.7584 -0.4245
TECHSOCIAL_2 0.7234 -0.4607

6.3.4. Full list of specific benefits and concerns chosen for each technology

Table 17: Full list of specific benefits and percentage of respondents selecting for all 17 technologies

Technology Benefit option Percentage selecting
Cancer risk prediction The technology will enable earlier detection of cancer, allowing earlier monitoring or treatment 82%
  There will be less human error when predicting people’s risk of developing cancer 53%
  The technology will be more accurate than a human doctor at predicting the risk of developing cancer 42%
  The technology will reduce discrimination in healthcare 32%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 11%
  Something else (please specify) 2%
  None of these 3%
  Don’t know 6%
Job eligibility Reviewing applications will be faster and easier for employers and recruiters 49%
  The technology will be more accurate than employers and recruiters at reviewing  applications 13%
  There will be less human error in determining eligibility for a job 22%
  The technology will be less likely than employers and recruiters to discriminate against some groups of people in society 41%
  The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 32%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 10%
  Something else (please specify) 1%
  None of these 13%
  Don’t know 10%
Loan repayment risk Applying for a loan will be faster and easier 52%
  The technology will be more accurate than banking professionals at predicting the risk of repaying a loan 29%
  There will be less human error in  decisions 37%
  The technology will be less likely than banking professionals to discriminate against some groups of people in society 39%
  The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 31%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 11%
  Something else (please specify) 0%
  None of these 8%
  Don’t know 12%
  Prefer not to say 0%
Welfare eligibility Determining eligibility for benefits will be faster and easier 43%
  The technology will be more accurate than fare officers at determining eligibility for benefits 22%
  There will be less human error in determining eligibility for benefits 38%
  The technology will be less likely than fare officers to discriminate against some groups of people in society 37%
  The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 35%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 14%
  Something else (please specify) 0%
  None of these 12%
  Don’t know 14%
Facial recognition at border control Processing people at border control will be faster 70%
  People will not have to answer personal questions sometimes asked by border control officers 32%
  The technology will be more accurate than border control officers at detecting people who do not have the right to enter 50%
  The technology will be less likely than border control officers to discriminate against some groups of people in society 40%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 18%
  The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 42%
  Something else (please specify) 1%
  None of these 4%
  Don’t know 3%
Facial recognition  for mobile phone unlocking It is faster to unlock a phone or personal device 61%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 53%
  Something else (please specify) 1%
  None of these 8%
  Don’t know 6%
Facial recognition for policing and surveillance The technology will make it faster and easier to identify wanted criminals and missing persons 77%
  The technology will be more accurate than police officers and staff at identifying wanted criminals and missing persons 55%
  The technology will be less likely than police officers and staff to discriminate against some groups of people when identifying criminal suspects 41%
  The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 46%
  People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 11%
  Something else (please specify) 0%
  None of these 3%
  Don’t know 4%
Autonomous weapons The technologies will enable faster military response to threats 50%
  The technologies will preserve the lives of some soldiers 54%
  The technologies will be more accurate than human soldiers at identifying targets 34%
  The technologies will be less likely than human soldiers to target people based on particular characteristics 26%
  The technologies will lead to fewer civilians being harmed or killed 36%
  The technology with save money usually spent on human resources 22%
  Something else (please specify) 1%
  None of these 9%
  Don’t know 15%
  Prefer not to say 0%
Driverless cars It will make travel by car easier 30%
   It will free up time to do other things while driving like working, sleeping or watching a movie 30%
   Driverless cars will drive with more accuracy and precision than human drivers 32%
   Driverless cars will be less likely to cause accidents than human drivers 32%
   It will make travel by car easier for disabled people or for people who have difficulty driving 63%
   The technology will save money usually spent on human drivers 19%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 17%
   Don’t know 6%
Robotic care assistant  The technology will make caregiving tasks easier and faster 47%
   The technology will be able to do tasks such as lifting patients out of bed more accurately than caregiving professionals 45%
   The technology will be less likely than caregiving professionals to discriminate against some grou of people in society 37%
   The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 34%
   Something else (please specify) 0%
   None of these 12%
   Don’t know 11%
   Will benefit the care workers 0%
Robotic vacuum cleaner  The technology will do the vacuuming, saving people time 68%
   The technology will be more accurate than a human at vacuuming 12%
   It will make vacuuming possible for people who have difficulty doing manual tasks 84%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 3%
   Don’t know 3%
Smart speaker  The technology will allow people to carry out tasks faster and more easily 60%
   The technology will allow people with difficulty using devices to access features more easily 71%
   People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 5%
   People will be able to find information more accurately 39%
   Something else (please specify) 0%
   None of these 7%
   Don’t know 6%
Virtual healthcare assistant  It is a faster way for people to get help for their health and symptoms than speaking to a healthcare professional 50%
   The technology will be more accurate than a healthcare professional at suggesting a diagnosis and treatment options 13%
   The technology will be less likely than healthcare professionals to discriminate against some groups of people in society 31%
   The technology will be easier for some groups of people in society to use, such as those who have difficulty leaving their home 53%
   The technology will save money usually spent on human resources 35%
   People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 8%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 9%
   Don’t know 9%
Targeted online consumer ads  People will be able to find products online faster and more easily 39%
  The adverts people see online will be more relevant to them than adverts that are not targeted 53%
   It will help people discover new products that might be of interest to them 50%
   Something else (please specify) 0%
   None of these 17%
   Don’t know 3%
Targeted online political ads  People will be able to find political information online faster and more easily 35%
   The political adverts that people see online will be more relevant to them than political adverts that are not targeted 32%
   It will help people discover new political representatives who might be of interest to them 33%
   It will increase the diversity of political perspectives that people engage with 22%
   Something else (please specify) 0%
   None of these 22%
   Don’t know 12%
Simulations for climate change research  The technology will be more accurate than scientists and government researchers alone at predicting climate change effects 41%
   The technology will make it faster and easier for scientists and governments to predict climate change effects 64%
   The technology will predict issues across a wider range of regions and countries, meaning more people will experience the benefits of climate research 64%
   This technology will allow more people to understand the possible effects of climate change 63%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 6%
   Don’t know 12%
Simulations for education  People will gain a more accurate understanding of historical events and how people lived in the past 57%
   The technology will make it easier and faster to learn about history and culture 58%
  The technology will increase the quality of education by providing more immersive experiences 66%
   The technology will allow more people to learn about history and culture 60%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 6%
   Don’t know 10%
   Prefer not to say 0%

Table 18:  Full list of specific concerns and percentage of respondents selecting for all 17 technologies

Technology Concern option Percentage selecting
Cancer risk prediction  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to predicting a risk of cancer 17%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 24%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 13%
   The technology will not be as accurate as a human doctor at predicting the risk of developing cancer 19%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others, leading to more discrimination in healthcare 17%
   Doctors will rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 56%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 47%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions about potential health outcomes are reached 32%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 10%
   Don’t know 7%
Job eligibility  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to assessing job applications 19%
   The technology will not be as accurate as employers and recruiters at reviewing job applications 39%
   The technology will be less able than employers and recruiters to take account of individual circumstances 61%
   The technology will be more likely than employers and recruiters to discriminate against some groups of people in society 19%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 32%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 19%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained recruitment staff 34%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 40%
   Employers and recruiters will rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 64%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions about job application assessments are reached 52%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 3%
   Don’t know 7%
Loan repayment risk  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to assessing loan applications 18%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 37%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 21%
   Banking professionals may rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 51%
   The technology will not be as accurate as banking professionals at predicting the risk of repaying a loan 21%
   The technology will be more likely than banking professionals to discriminate against some groups of people in society 16%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions about loan applications are reached 49%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 43%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained banking professionals 33%
   The technology will be less able than banking professionals to take account of individual circumstances 52%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 4%
   Don’t know 8%
   Prefer not to say 0%
Welfare eligibility  The technology will be unreliable and will cause delays to allocating benefits 24%
   The technology will not be as accurate as welfare officers at determining eligibility for benefits 29%
   The technology will be more likely than welfare officers to discriminate against some groups of people in society 13%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 32%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 19%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained welfare officers 35%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions about allocating benefits are reached 45%
   Welfare officers will rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 47%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 47%
   The technology will be less able than welfare officers to take account of individual circumstances 55%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 5%
   Don’t know 10%
   Prefer not to say 0%
Facial recognition at border control  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays when it breaks down 44%
   The technology will not be as accurate as border control officers at detecting people who do not have the right to enter 20%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 29%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 15%
   The technology will be more likely than border control officers to discriminate against some groups of people in society 10%
   Border control officers will rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 41%
   Some people might find it difficult to use the technology 42%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained border control officers 47%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 47%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions are reached 26%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 6%
   Don’t know 4%
Facial recognition for mobile phone unlocking  The technology will be unreliable, making it take longer to unlock your phone or personal device 21%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 40%
   The technology will make it easier for other people to unlock your phone or personal device 23%
   People’s personal information will be more safe and secure 19%
   Some people may find it difficult to use the technology 41%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 33%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 12%
   Don’t know 3%
Facial recognition for policing and surveillance The technology will be unreliable and will cause delays identifying wanted criminals and missing persons 15%
  The technology will not be as accurate as police officers and staff at identifying wanted criminals and missing persons 13%
   If the technology makes a mistake it will lead to innocent people being wrongly accused 54%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 48%
   The technology will be more likely than police officers and staff to discriminate against some groups of people in society 15%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 38%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 21%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained police officers and staff 30%
   Police officers and staff will rely too heavily on the technology rather than their professional judgements 46%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 8%
   Don’t know 4%
Autonomous weapons  The technologies will be unreliable and may miss or not fire at targets 41%
   The technologies will lead to more civilians being harmed or killed 33%
   The technologies will not be as accurate at identifying targets as human soldiers 29%
   The technologies will be more likely than human soldiers to target people based on particular characteristics 22%
   Defence staff will rely too heavily on the technologies rather than their professional judgements 54%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained defence staff 25%
   If the technologies make a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 53%
   It is more difficult to understand how military decisions are reached 39%
   The technologies will lead to more soldiers being harmed or killed 21%
   Something else (please specify) 2%
   None of these 5%
   Don’t know 11%
   Prefer not to say 0%
Driverless cars  The technology will not always work, making the cars unreliable 62%
   Getting to places will take longer as the cars will be overly cautious 25%
   Driverless cars will not be as accurate or precise as humans are at driving 38%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 22%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 26%
   Some people may find it difficult to use the technology 46%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for truck drivers, taxi drivers, delivery drivers 44%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 59%
   It will be more difficult to understand how the car makes decisions compared to a human driver 51%
   Driverless cars will be more likely to cause accidents than human drivers 36%
   Something else (please specify) 2%
   None of these 4%
   Don’t know 2%
   Prefer not to say 0%
Robotic care assistant  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to urgent caregiving tasks 34%
   The technology will not be able do tasks such as lifting patients out of bed as accurately as caregiving professionals 37%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 33%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained caregiving professionals 46%
   The technology will not be safe, it could hurt people 41%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 45%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 20%
   Patients will miss out on the human interaction they would otherwise get from human carers 78%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 3%
   Don’t know 7%
   Prefer not to say 0%
   Technology may miss subtle signs when assisting patients 1%
Robotic vacuum cleaner  The technology will be unreliable and not always work, for example, the motion sensors will not detect steps or surface change 45%
   The technology will not be as accurate as a human at vacuuming 42%
   The technology will be a safety hazard, you might trip on them 40%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 12%
   People’s personal data will be less safe and secure 9%
   Some people may find it difficult to use the technology 39%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 18%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 14%
   Don’t know 5%
Smart speaker  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to doing tasks 18%
   The technology will not always give accurate responses 51%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 32%
   Some people may find it difficult to use the technology 44%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 57%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 41%
   Something else (please specify) 0%
   None of these 7%
   Don’t know 6%
Virtual healthcare assistant  The technology will be unreliable and cause delays to getting help 31%
   The technology will not be as accurate as a healthcare professional at suggesting a diagnosis and treatment options 51%
   The technology will be less able than healthcare professionals to take account of individual circumstances 63%
   The technology will be less effective for some groups of people in society than others 38%
   Some people may find it difficult to use the technology 64%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 35%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 24%
   It will lead to job cuts. For example, for trained healthcare professionals 38%
   If the technology makes a mistake, it will be difficult to know who is responsible for what went wrong 49%
   It will be more difficult to understand how decisions about diagnoses and treatments are reached 47%
   Something else (please specify) 2%
   None of these 2%
   Don’t know 6%
Targeted online consumer ads  The technology will be inaccurate and will show people adverts that are not relevant to them 29%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 68%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 50%
   The technology invades people’s privacy 69%
   Something else (please specify) 2%
   None of these 6%
   Don’t know 4%
Targeted online political ads The technology will be inaccurate and will show people political adverts that are not relevant to them 33%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 48%
   People’s personal information will be less safe and secure 29%
   It will reduce the diversity of political perspectives that people engage with 46%
   The technology invades people’s privacy 51%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 5%
   Don’t know 9%
Simulations for climate change research  The technology will be unreliable, making it harder to predict the impacts of climate change and extreme weather 17%
   The technology will not be as accurate as scientists and government researchers alone at predicting climate change events 21%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 13%
   The technology will predict issues in some regions better than others, meaning that some people do not experience the benefits of these technologies 36%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 26%
   Don’t know 18%
Simulations for education research  Some people will not be able to learn about history and culture in this way as they will not have access to the technology 51%
   People will gain a less accurate understanding of historical events and how people lived in the past 17%
   The technology will gather personal information which could be shared with third parties 18%
   The technology will be unreliable, making it harder to learn about history and culture 11%
   The technology will allow those developing the technology to control what people learn about history or culture 46%
   Something else (please specify) 1%
   None of these 15%
   Don’t know 11%
   Prefer not to say 0%

6.4. Sample sizes

Table 19: Weighted and unweighted sample size of respondents for each technology 

Technology Unweighted sample size Weighted sample size
Facial recognition – Unlocking mobile phones 4,010 4,002
Facial recognition – Police surveillance 1,993 1,987
Facial recognition – Border control 2,017 2,015
Risk and eligibility – Welfare 2,015 2,012
Risk and eligibility – Loan repayment 1,999 1,991
Risk and eligibility – Job eligibility 1,995 1,990
Risk and eligibility – Cancer risk 2,011 2,011
Smart speaker – Virtual assistant 2,028 2,011
Smart speaker – Virtual healthcare assistant 1,982 1,991
Robotics – Robotic care assistant 1,985 1,973
Robotics – Robotic vacuum cleaner 2,025 2,029
Robotics – Driverless cars 1,992 2,021
Robotics – Autonomous weapons 2,018 1,981
Social media targeted advertising – Consumer ads 2,010 2,002
Social media targeted advertising – Political ads 2,000 2,000
Simulations – Climate change 2,036 2,015
Simulations – Education 1,974 1,987

Table 20: Weighted and unweighted sample size of respondents by various socio-demographic variables

Demographic Unweighted sample size Weighted sample size
Survey format Online 3,757 3,647
Telephone 253 355
Region England 3,520 3,461
Scotland 303 345
Wales 187 196
Age band 18–24 years 341 408
25–34 years 709 682
35–44 years 741 654
45–54 years 692 666
55–64 years 696 645
65–74 years 513 517
75+ years 318 431
Socio-economic status SEC1, 2 1,642 1,477
SEC3 555 494
SEC4 262 298
SEC5 165 173
SEC6, 7 634 664
SEC8 122 145
Students 201 209
NA 429 543
Education level Degree level qualification(s) 1,562 1,407
No academic or vocational qualifications 283 443
Non-degree level qualifications 2,155 2,139
NA 10 13
Ethnic group Asian or Asian British 261 296
Black British, Caribbean or African 90 103
White 3,544 3,476
Any other ethnic group 103 116
NA 12 12
Sex Female 2,096 2,037
Male 1,911 1,961
NA 3 4.4

Partner information and acknowledgements

This report was co-authored by The Alan Turing Institute (Professor Helen Margetts, Dr Florence Enock, Miranda Cross) and the Ada Lovelace Institute (Aidan Peppin, Roshni Modhvadia, Anna Colom, Andrew Strait, Octavia Reeve) with substantial input from LSE’s Methodology Department (Professor Patrick Sturgis, Katya Kostadintcheva, Oriol Bosch-Jover).

We’d like to also thank Kantar for their contributions in designing the survey and collecting the data. This project was made possible by a grant from The Alan Turing Institute and the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC).

About The Alan Turing Institute

The Alan Turing Institute is the national institute for data science and artificial intelligence (AI). Established in 2015, we are named in honour of Alan Turing, whose pioneering work in theoretical and applied mathematics, engineering and computing laid the foundations for the modern-day fields of data science and AI. Headquartered at the British Library in London, we partner with organisations across government, industry, academia and the third sector to undertake world-class research that benefits society.


Footnotes

[1] Kantar, ‘Technical Report: How Do People Feel about AI?’ (GitHub, Ada Lovelace Institute 2023) <https://github.com/AdaLovelaceInstitute>

[2] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, ‘Public Attitudes to Data and AI: Tracker Survey (Wave 2)’  (2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-attitudes-to-data-and-ai-tracker-survey-wave-2>

[3] The Royal Society and Ipsos MORI, ‘Public Views of Machine Learning’ (2017) <https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/machine-learning>

[4] ibid.

[5] BEIS, ‘Public Attitudes to Science’ (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy/Kantar Public 2019) <https://www.kantar.com/uk-public-attitudes-to-science>

[6] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (n 1).

[7] Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘Beyond Face Value: Public Attitudes to Facial Recognition Technology’ (2019) <https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/beyond-face-value-public-attitudes-to-facial-recognition-technology>

[8] Baobao Zhang, ‘Public Opinion Toward Artificial Intelligence’ (Open Science Framework, 2021) preprint <https://osf.io/284sm>.

[9] European Commission. Directorate General for Communication. Citizens’ Knowledge, Perceptions, Values and Expectations of Science. (2021) <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2775/071577>.

[10] BEIS (n 5).

[11] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (n 2) 2; The Royal Society and Ipsos MORI (n 3).

[12] Lee Rainie and others, ‘AI and Human Enhancement: Americans´Openness Is Tempered by a Range of Concerns’ (Pew Research Center, 2022) <https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2022/03/17/how-americans-think-about-artificial-intelligence>

[13] BEIS (n 5).

[14] Sabine N van der Veer and others, ‘Trading off Accuracy and Explainability in AI Decision-Making: Findings from 2 Citizens’ Juries’ (2021) 28 Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association 2128 <https://academic.oup.com/jamia/article/28/10/2128/6333351>

[15] The Alan Turing Institute, ‘Project ExplAIN’ (2023) <https://www.turing.ac.uk/news/project-explain>.

[16] Kantar (n 1).

[17] ibid.

[18] Kantar, ‘Public Voice’ (2022) <https://www.kantar.com/uki/expertise/policy-society/public-evidence/public-voice>.

[19] The technical report specifies a total of 4,012 but one 16-year-old was removed from the dataset as the survey was for adults aged 18+, while another provided their sex as ‘other’ so was removed on account of being the only participant identifying in this way and therefore having a very large weighting. Further information available in the limitations section.

[20] While participants indicated more specific ethnic identities at the time of recruitment to the Public Voice panel, we combine them into these broader categories for providing an overview of the sample.

[21] Kantar (n 1).

[22] Ada Lovelace Institute (n 1).

[23] Ada Lovelace Institute (n 1).

[24] Lina Dencik and others, ‘Data Scores as Governance: Investigating Uses of Citizen Scoring in Public Services’ (Data Justice Lab, 2018) https://datajusticelab.org/data-scores-as-governance.

[25] Britain Thinks and CDEI, ‘AI Governance’ (2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/cdei-publishes-research-on-ai-governance>.

[26] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (n 2).

[27] The Royal Society and Ipsos MORI (n 3).

[28] BEIS, ‘BEIS Public Attitudes Tracker: Artificial Intelligence Summer 2022, UK’ (Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy 2022) <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/beis-public-attitudes-tracker-summer-2022>.

[29] Ada Lovelace Institute (n 7).

[30] Ada Lovelace Institute, ‘Who Cares What the Public Think?’ (2022) <https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/evidence-review/public-attitudes-data-regulation/> accessed 12 December 2022.

[31] Britain Thinks and CDEI (n 25).

[32] Ada Lovelace Institute (n 7).

[33] BEIS (n 5).

[34] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (n 2).

[35] European Interactive Digital Advertising Alliance, ‘Your Online Voices’ (2022) <https://edaa.eu/your-online-voices-your-voice-your-choice>

[36] For which both ‘inaccuracy; and ‘unclear how decisions are made’ were potential given concerns to choose from.

[37] Jonathan Dupont, Seb Wride and Vinous Ali, ‘What Does the Public Think about AI?’ (Public First 2023) <https://publicfirst.co.uk/ai/>

[38] Florence Enock and others, ‘Tracking Experiences of Online Harms and Attitudes Towards Online Safety Interventions: Findings from a Large-Scale, Nationally Representative Survey of the British Public’ (2023)] SSRN Electronic Journal <https://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4416355>

[39] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (n 2).

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  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
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  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
  16. Ofcom. (2020). The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (with the Cross-promotion Code and the On Demand Programme Service Rules). Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code
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  23. The 12th Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty, the regulatory framework for public service and commercial broadcasting across Germany’s federal states, introduced a three-step test for assessing whether online services offered by public service broadcasters met their public service remit. Under the three-step test, the broadcaster needs to assess: first, whether a new or significantly amended digital service satisfies the democratic, social and cultural needs of society; second, whether it contributes to media competition from a qualitative point of view and; third, the associated financial cost. See: Institute for Media and Communication Policy. (2009). Drei-Stufen-Test. Available at: http://medienpolitik.eu/drei-stufen-test/
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  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
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  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
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  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
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  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
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Letter from the working group co-chairs

 

This project by an international and interdisciplinary working group of experts from academia, policy, law, technology and civil society, invited by the Ada Lovelace Institute, had a big ambition: to imagine rules and institutions that can shift power over data and make it benefit people and society.

 

We began this work in 2020, only a few months into the pandemic, at a time when public discourse was immersed in discussions about how technologies – like contact tracing apps – could be harnessed to help address this urgent and unprecedented global health crisis.

 

The potential power of data to affect positive change – to underpin public health policy, to support isolation, to assess infection risk – was perhaps more immediate than at any other time in our lives. At the same time, concerns such as data injustice and privacy remained.

 

It was in this climate that our working group sought to explore the relationship people have with data and technology, and to look towards a positive future that would centre governance, regulation and use of data on the needs of people and society, and contest the increasingly entrenched systems of digital power.

 

The working group discussions centred on questions about power over both data infrastructures, and over data itself. Where does power reside in the digital ecosystem, and what are the sources of this power? What are the most promising approaches and interventions that might distribute power more widely, and what might that rebalancing accomplish?

 

The group considered interventions ranging from developing public-service infrastructure to alternative business models, from fiduciary duties for data infrastructures to a new regime for data under a public-interest approach. Many were conceptually interesting but required more detailed thought to be put into practice.

 

Through a process of analysis and distillation, that broad landscape narrowed to four areas for change: infrastructure, governance, institutions and democratic participation in decisions over data processing, collection and use. We are happy that the group has endorsed a pathway towards transformation, identifying a shared vision and practical interventions to begin the work of changing the digital ecosystem.

 

Throughout this process, we wanted to free ourselves from the constraints of currently perceived models and norms, and go beyond existing debates around data policy. We did this intentionally, to extend the scope of what is politically thought to be possible, and to create space for big ideas to flourish and be discussed.

 

We see this work as part of one of the most challenging efforts we have to make as humans and as societies. Its ambitious aim is to bring to the table a richer set of possibilities of our digital future. We uphold that we need new imaginaries if we are to create a world where digital power is distributed among many and serves the public good, as defined in democracies.

 

We hope this report will serve as both a provocation and a way to generate constructive criticism and mature ideas on how to transform digital ecosystems, but also a call to action for those of you – our readers – who hold the power to make the interventions we describe into political and business realities.

 

Diane Coyle

Bennett Professor of Public Policy, University of Cambridge

 

Paul Nemitz

Principal Adviser on Justice Policy, European Commission and visiting Professor of Law at College of Europe

 

Co-chairs

Rethinking data working group

A call for a new vision

In 2020, the Ada Lovelace Institute characterised the digital ecosystem as:

  • Exploitative: Data practices are exploitative, and they fail to produce the potential social value of data, protect individual rights and serve communities.
  • Shortsighted: Political and administrative institutions have struggled to govern data in a way that enables effective enforcement and acknowledges its central role in the data-driven systems.
  • Disempowering: Individuals lack agency over how their data is generated and used, and there are stark power imbalances between people, corporations and states.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2020). Rethinking Data – Prospectus. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/Rethinking-Data-Prospectus-Ada-Lovelace-Institute-January-2019.pdf[/footnote]

We recognised an urgent need for a comprehensive and transformative vision for data that can serve as a ‘North Star’, directing our efforts and encouraging us to think bigger and move further.

Our work to ‘rethink data’ began with a forward-looking question:

‘What is a more ambitious vision for data use and regulation that can deliver a positive shift in the digital ecosystem towards people and society?’

This drove the establishment of an expert working group, bringing together leading thinkers in privacy and data protection, public policy, law and economics from the technology sector, policy, academia and civil society across the UK, Europe, USA, Canada and Hong Kong.

This disciplinarily diverse group brought their perspectives and expertise to understand the current data ecosystem and make sense of the complexity that characterises data governance in the UK, across Europe and internationally. Their reflection on the challenges informed a holistic approach to the changes needed, which is highly relevant to the jurisdictions mentioned above, and which we hope will be of foundational interest to related work in other territories.

Understanding that shortsightedness limits creative thinking, we deliberately set the field of vision to the medium term, 2030 and beyond. We intended to escape the ‘policy weeds’ of unfolding developments in data and technology policy in the UK, EU or USA, and set our sights on the next generation of institutions, governance, infrastructure and regulations.

Using discussions, debates, commissioned pieces, futures-thinking workshops, speculative scenario building and horizon scanning, we have distilled a multitude of ideas, propositions and models. (For full details about our methodology, see ‘Final notes’.)

These processes and methods moved the scope of enquiry on from the original premise – to articulate a positive ambition for the use and regulation of data that recognised asymmetries of power and enabled social value – to seeking the most promising interventions that address the significant power imbalances that exist between large private platforms, and groups of people and individuals.

This report highlights and contextualises four cross-cutting interventions with a strong potential to reshape the digital ecosystem:

  1. Transforming infrastructure into open and interoperable ecosystems.
  2. Reclaiming control of data from dominant companies.
  3. Rebalancing the centres of power with new (non-commercial) institutions.
  4. Ensuring public participation as an essential component of technology policymaking.

The interventions are multidisciplinary and they integrate legal, technological, market and governance solutions. They offer a path towards addressing present digital challenges and the possibility for a new, healthy digital ecosystem to emerge.

What do we mean by a healthy digital ecosystem? One that privileges people over profit, communities over corporations, society over shareholders. And, most importantly, one where power is not held by a few large corporations, but is distributed among different and diverse  models, alongside people who are represented in, and affected by the data used by those new models.

The digital ecosystem we propose is balanced, accountable and sustainable, and imagines new types of infrastructure, new institutions and new governance models that can make data work for people and society.

Some of these interventions can be located within (or built from) emerging or recently adopted policy initiatives, while others require the wholesale overhaul of regulatory regimes and markets. They are designed to spark ideas that political thinkers, forward-looking policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations, funders and ethical innovators in the private sector consider and respond to when designing future regulations, policies or initiatives around data use and governance.

This report also acknowledges the need to prepare the ground for the more ambitious transformation of power relations in the digital ecosystem. Even a well-targeted intervention won’t change the system unless it is supported by relevant institutions and behavioural change.

In addition to targeted interventions, the report explains the preconditions that can support change:

  1. Effective regulatory enforcement.
  2. Legal action and representation.
  3. Removal of industry dependencies.

Reconceptualising the digital ecosystem will require sustained, collective and thorough efforts, and an understanding that elaborating on strategies for the future involves constant experimentation, adaptation and recalibration.

Through discussion of each intervention, the report brings an initial set of provocative ideas and concepts, to inspire a thoughtful debate about the transformative changes needed for the digital ecosystem to start evolving towards a people and society-focused vision. These can help us think about potential ways forward, open up questions for debate instead of rushing to provide answers, and offer a starting point from which more fully fledged solutions for change are able to grow.

We hope that policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations, funders and ethical industry innovators will engage with – and, crucially, iterate on – these propositions in a collective effort to find solutions that lead to lasting change in data practices and policies.

Making data work for people and society

 

The building blocks for a people-first digital ecosystem start from repurposing data to respect individual agency and deliver societal benefits, and from addressing abuses that are well defined and understood today, and are likely to continue if they are not dealt with in a systemic way.

 

Making data work for people means protecting individuals and society from abuses caused by corporations’ or governments’ use of data and algorithms. This means fundamental rights such as privacy, data protection and non-discrimination are both protected in law and reflected in the design of computational processes that generate and capture personal data.

 

The requirement to protect people from harm does not only operate in the present, there is also a need to prevent harms from happening in the future, and to create resilient institutions that will operate effectively against future threats and potential impact that can’t be fully anticipated.

 

To produce long-lasting change, we will need to break structural dependencies and address the sources of power of big technology companies. To do this, one goal must be to create data governance models and new institutions that will balance power asymmetries. Another goal is to restructure economic, technical and legal tools and incentives, to move infrastructure control away from unaccountable organisations.

 

Finally, positive goals for society can emerge from data infrastructures and algorithmic models developed by private and/or public actors, if data serves both individual and societal goals, rather than just the interests of commerce or undemocratic regimes.

How to use this report

The report is written to be of particular use to policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations, funders and those working in data-governance. To understand how and where you can take the ideas explored here forward, we recommend these approaches:

  • If you work on data policy decision-making, go through a brief overview of the sources of power in today’s digital ecosystem in Chapter 1, focus on ‘The vision’ subsections in and answer the call to action in Chapter 3 by considering ways to translate the proposed interventions into policy action and help build the pathway towards a comprehensive and transformative vision for data.
  • If you are a researcher, focus on the ‘How to get from here to there’ and ‘Further considerations and provocative concepts’ subsections in Chapter 2 and answer the call to action in Chapter 3 by reflecting critically on the provocative concepts and help develop the propositions into more concrete solutions for change.
  • If you are a civil society organisation, focus on ‘How to get from here to there’ subsections in Chapter 2 and answer the call to action in Chapter 3 by engaging with the suggested transformations and build momentum to help visualise a positive future for data and society.
  • If you are a funder, go through an overview of the sources of power in today’s digital ecosystem in Chapter 1, focus on ‘The vision’ subsections in Chapter 2 and answer the Call to action in Chapter 3 by supporting the development of a proactive policy agenda by civil society.
  • If you are working on data governance in industry, focus on sections 1 and 2 in Chapter 2, help design mechanisms for responsible generation and use of data, and answer the call to action in Chapter 3 by supporting the development of standards for open and rights enhancing systems.

Chapter 1: Understanding power in data-intensive digital ecosystems

1. Context setting

To understand why  a transformation is needed in the way our digital ecosystem operates, it’s necessary to understand the dynamics and different facets of today’s data-intensive ecosystem.

In the last decade, there has been an exponential increase in the generation, collection and use of data. This upsurge is driven by an increasing datafication of everyday parts of our lives,[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2020). The data will see you now. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/the-data-will-see-you-now/[/footnote] from work to social interactions and, to the provision of public services. The backbone of this change is the growth of digitally connected devices, data infrastructures and platforms, which enable new forms of data generation and extraction at an unprecedented scale. 

Estimates put the volume of data created and consumed from two zettabytes in 2010 to 64.2 zettabytes in 2020 (one zettabyte is a trillion gigabytes) and project that it will grow to more than 180 zettabytes up to 2025.[footnote]Statista Research Department. (2022). Volume of data/information created, captured, copied, and consumed worldwide from 2010 to 2025. Available at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/871513/worldwide-data-created/[/footnote] These oft-cited figures disguise a range of further dynamics (such as the wider societal phenomena of discrimination and inequality that are captured and represented in these datasets), and the textured landscape of who and what is included in the datasets, what data quality means in practice, and whose objectives are represented in data processes and met through outcomes from data use.

Data is often promised to be transformative, but there remains debate as to exactly what it transforms. On one hand, data is recognised as an important economic opportunity, and policy focus across the globe and is believed to deliver significant societal benefits. On the other hand, increased datification and calculability of human interactions can lead to human rights abuses and illegitimate public or private control. In between these opposing views are a variety of observations that reflect the myriad ways data and society interact, broadly considering the ways such practices reconfigure activities, structures and relationships.[footnote]Balayn, A. and GĂźrses, S. (2021). Beyond Debiasing, Regulating AI and its inequalities. European Digital Rights (EDRi). Available at: https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EDRi_Beyond-Debiasing-Report_Online.pdf[/footnote]

According to scholars of surveillance and informational capitalism, today’s digital economy is built on deeply rooted, exploitative and extractive data practices.[footnote]Zuboff, S. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: the fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. New York: PublicAffairs and Cohen, J. E. (2019). Between truth and power: the legal constructions of informational capitalism. New York: Oxford University Press.[/footnote] These result in the accrual of immense surpluses of value to dominant technology corporations, and a role for the human participants enlisted in value creation for these big technology companies that has been described as a form of ‘data rentiership’.[footnote]Birch, K., Chiappetta, M. and Artyushina, A. (2020). ‘The problem of innovation in technoscientific capitalism: data rentiership and the policy implications of turning personal digital data into a private asset’. Policy Studies, 41(5), pp. 468–487. doi: 10.1080/01442872.2020.1748264[/footnote]

Commentators differ, however, on the real source of the value that is being extracted. Some consider that value comes from data’s predictive potential, while others emphasise that the economic arrangements in the data economy allow for huge profits to be made (largely through the advertising-based business model) even if predictions are much less effective than technology giants claim.[footnote]Hwang, T. (2020). Subprime attention crisis: advertising and the time bomb at the heart of the Internet. New York: FSG Originals.[/footnote]

In practice, only a few large technology corporations – Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, Meta Platforms (Facebook) and Microsoft – have the data, processing abilities, engineering capacity, financial resources, user base and convenience appeal to provide a range of services that are both necessary to smaller players and desired by a wide base of individual users.

These corporations extract value from their large volumes of interactions and transactions, and process massive amounts of personal and non-personal data in order to optimise the service and experience of each business or individual user. Some platforms have the ability to simultaneously coordinate and orchestrate multiple sensors or computers in the network, like smartphones or connected objects. This drives the platform’s ability to innovate and offer services that seem either indispensable or unrivalled.

While there is still substantial innovation outside these closed ecosystems, the financial power of the platforms means that in practice they are able to either acquire or imitate (and further improve) innovations in the digital economy. Their efficiency in using this capacity enables them to leverage their dominance into new markets. The acquisition of open-source code platforms like GitHub by Microsoft in 2018 and RedHat by IBM in 2019 also points to a possibility that incumbents intend to extend their dominance to open-source software. The difficulty new players face to compete makes the largest technological players seem unmovable and unchangeable.

Over time, access to large pools of personal data has allowed platforms to develop services that now represent and influence the infrastructure or underlying basis for many public and private services. Creating ever-more dependencies in both public and private spheres, large technology companies are extending their services to societally sensitive areas such as education and health.

This influence has become more obvious during the COVID-19 pandemic, when large companies formed contested public-private partnerships with public health authorities.[footnote]Fitzgerald M. and Crider C. (2020). ‘Under pressure, UK government releases NHS COVID data deals with big tech’. openDemocracy. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ournhs/under-pressure-uk-government-releases-nhs-covid-data-deals-big-tech/[/footnote] They also partnered among themselves to influence contact tracing in the pandemic response, by facilitating contact tracing technologies in ways that were favourable or unfavourable to particular nation states. This revealed the difficulty, even at state level, of engaging in advanced use of data without the cooperation of the corporations that control the software and hardware infrastructure. 

Focusing on data alone is insufficient to understand power in data-intensive digital systems. A vast number of interrelated factors consolidate both economic and societal power of particular digital platforms.[footnote]European Commission – Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy. (2021). Uncovering blindspots in the policy debate on platform power. Available at: https://www.sipotra.it/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Uncovering-blindspots-in-the-policy-debate-on-platform-power.pdf[/footnote] These factors go beyond market power and consumer behaviour, and extend to societal and democratic influence (for example through algorithmic curation and controlling how human rights can be exercised).[footnote]European Commission – Expert Group for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy. (2021).[/footnote]

Theorists of platform governance highlight the complex ways in which vertically integrated platforms make users interacting with them legible to computers, and extract value by intermediating access to them.[footnote]Cohen, J.E. (2019). Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.[/footnote]

This makes it hard to understand power from data without understanding complex technological interactions up and down the whole technology ‘stack’, from the basic protocols and connectivity that underpin technologies, through hardware, and the software and cloud services that are built on them.[footnote]Andersdotter, A. and Stasi, I. Framework for studying technologies, competition and human rights. Available at: https://amelia.andersdotter.cc/framework_for_competition_technology_and_human_rights.html[/footnote]

Large platforms have become – as a result of laissez-faire policies (minimal government intervention in market and economic affairs) rather than by deliberate, democratic design – one of the building blocks for data governance in the real world, unilaterally defining the user experience and consumer rights. They have used a mix of law, technology and economic influence to place themselves in a position of power over users, governments, legislators and private-sector developers, and this has proved difficult to dislodge or alter.[footnote]Cohen, J. E. (2017). ‘Law for the Platform Economy’. U.C. Davis Law Review, 51, pp. 133–204. Available at: https://perma.cc/AW7P-EVLC[/footnote] 

2. Rethinking regulatory approaches in digital markets

There is a recent, growing appetite to regulate both data and platforms using a variety of legal approaches to regulate market concentration, platforms as public spheres, and data and AI governance. The year 2021 alone marked a significant global uptick in proposals for the regulation of AI technologies, online markets, social media platforms and other digital technologies, with more still to come in 2022.[footnote]Mozur, P., Kang, C., Satariano, A. and McCabe, D. (2021). ‘A Global Tipping Point for Reining In Tech Has Arrived’. New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/20/technology/global-tipping-point-tech.html[/footnote]

A range of jurisdictions are reconsidering the regulation of digital platforms both as marketplaces and places of public speech and opinion building (‘public spheres’). Liability obligations are being reanalysed, including in bills around ‘online harms’ and content moderation. The Online Safety Act in Australia,[footnote]Australia’s Online Safety Act (2021). Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2021A00076[/footnote] India’s Information Technology Rules,[footnote]Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology. (2021). The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Available at: https://prsindia.org/billtrack/the-information-technology-intermediary-guidelines-and-digital-media-ethics-code-rules-2021[/footnote] the EU’s Digital Services Act[footnote]European Parliament. (2022). Legislative resolution of 5 July 2022 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market For Digital Services (Digital Services Act). Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0269_EN.html[/footnote] and the UK’s draft Online Safety Bill[footnote]Online Safety Bill. (2022-23). Parliament: House of Commons. Bill no. 121. London: Published by the authority of the House of Commons. Available at https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3137[/footnote] are all pieces of legislation that seek to regulate more rigorously the content and practices of online social media and messaging platforms.

Steps are also being made to rethink the relationship between competition, data and platforms, and jurisdictions are using different approaches. In the UK, the Competition and Markets Authority launched the Digital Markets Unit, focusing on a more flexible approach, with targeted interventions in competition in digital markets and codes of conduct.[footnote]While statutory legislation will not be introduced in the 2022–23 Parliamentary session, the UK Government reconfirmed its intention to establish the Digital Market Unit’s statutory regime in legislation as soon as Parliamentary time allows. See: Hayter, W. (2022). ‘Digital markets and the new pro-competition regime’. Competition and Markets Authority. Available at: https://competitionandmarkets.blog.gov.uk/2022/05/10/digital-markets-and-the-new-pro-competition-regime/ and UK Government. (2021). ‘Digital Markets Unit’. Gov.uk. Available at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/digital-markets-unit[/footnote] In the EU, the Digital Markets Act (DMA) takes a top-down approach and establishes general rules for large companies that prohibit certain practices up front, such as combining or cross-using personal data across services without users’ consent, or giving preference to their own services and products in rankings.[footnote]Replace: European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Regulation (EU) 2022/1925 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2022 on contestable and fair markets in the digital sector and amending Directives (EU) 2019/1937 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Digital Markets Act), Article 5 (2) and Article 6 (5). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote] India is also responding to domestic market capture and increased influence from large technology companies with initiatives such as the Open Network for Digital Commerce, which aims to create a decentralised and interoperable platform for direct exchange between buyers and sellers without intermediary services such as Amazon.[footnote]Ansari, A. A. (2022), ‘E-commerce is the latest target in India’s push for an open digital economy’. Atlantic Council. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/southasiasource/e-commerce-is-the-latest-target-in-indias-push-for-an-open-digital-economy/[/footnote] At the same time, while the draft 2019 Indian Data Protection Bill is being withdrawn, a more comprehensive legal framework is expected in 2022 covering – alongside privacy and data protection – broader issues such as non-personal data, regulation of hardware and devices, data localisation requirements and rules to seek approval for international data transfers.[footnote] Aryan, A., Pinnu, S. and Agarwal, S. (2022). ‘Govt looks to table data bill soon, draft at advanced stage’. Economic Times. Available at: https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/govt-looks-to-table-data-bill-soon-draft-at-advanced-stage/93358857 and Raj, R. (2022). ‘Data protection: Four key clauses may go in new bill’. Financial Express. Available at: https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/technology/data-protection-four-key-clauses-may-go-in-new-bill/2618148/[/footnote] 

Developments in data and AI policy

Around 145 countries now have some form of data privacy law, and many new additions or revisions are heavily influenced by legislative standards including the Council of Europe’s Convention 108 + and the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).[footnote]Greenleaf, G. (2021). ‘Global Data Privacy Laws 2021: Despite COVID Delays, 145 Laws Show GDPR Dominance’. Privacy Laws & Business International Report, 1, pp. 3–5.[/footnote]

The GDPR is a prime example of legislation aimed at curbing the worst excesses of exploitative data practices, and many of its foundational elements are still being developed and tested in the real world. Lessons learned from the GDPR show how vital it is to consider power within attempts to create more responsible data practices. This is because regulation is not just the result of legal design in isolation, but is also shaped by immense corporate lobbying,[footnote]Corporate Europe Observatory. (2021). The Lobby Network: Big Tech’s Web of Influence in the EU. Available at: https://corporateeurope.org/en/2021/08/lobby-network-big-techs-web-influence-eu[/footnote] applied within organisations via their internal culture and enforced in a legal environment that gives major corporations tools to stall or create disincentives to enforcement. 

In the United States, there have been multiple attempts at proposing privacy legislation,[footnote]Rich, J. (2021). ‘After 20 years of debate, it’s time for Congress to finally pass a baseline privacy law’. Brookings. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2021/01/14/after-20-years-of-debate-its-time-for-congress-to-finally-pass-a-baseline-privacy-law/ and Levine, A. S. (2021). ‘A U.S. privacy law seemed possible this Congress. Now, prospects are fading fast’. Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.com/news/2021/06/01/washington-plan-protect-american-data-silicon-valley-491405[/footnote] and there is growing momentum with privacy laws being adopted at the state level.[footnote]Zanfir-Fortuna, G. (2020). ‘America’s “privacy renaissance”: What to expect under a new presidency and Congress’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/americas-privacy-renaissance/[/footnote] A recent bipartisan privacy bill proposed in June 2022[footnote]American Data Privacy and Protection Act, discussion draft, 117th Cong. (2021). Available at: https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/6CB3B500-3DB4-4FCC-BB15-9E6A52738B6C[/footnote] includes broad privacy provisions, with a focus on data minimisation, privacy by design and by default, loyalty duties to individuals and the introduction of a private right to action against companies. So far, the US regulatory approach to new market dynamics has been a suite of consumer protection, antitrust and privacy laws enforced under the umbrella of a single body, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which has a broad range of powers to protect consumers and investigate unethical business practices.[footnote]Hoofnagle, C. J., Hartzog, W. and Solove, D. J. (2019). ‘The FTC can rise to the privacy challenge, but not without help from Congress’. Brookings. Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/08/the-ftc-can-rise-to-the-privacy-challenge-but-not-without-help-from-congress/[/footnote]

Since the 1990s, with very few exceptions, the US technology and digital markets have been dominated by a minimal approach to antitrust intervention[footnote] Bietti, E. (2021). ‘Is the goal of antitrust enforcement a competitive digital economy or a different digital ecosystem?’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/antitrust-enforcement-competitive-digital-economy-digital-ecosystem/[/footnote] (which is designed to promote competition and increase consumer welfare). Only recently has there been a revival of antitrust interventions in the US with a report on competition in the digital economy[footnote]House Judiciary Committee’s Antitrust Subcommittee. (2020). Investigation of Competition in the Digital Marketplace: Majority Staff Report and Recommendations. Available at: https://judiciary.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=3429[/footnote] and cases launched against Facebook and Google.[footnote]In the case of Facebook, see the Federal Trade Commission and the State Advocate General cases: https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/191-0134/facebook-inc-ftc-v and https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/facebook_complaint_12.9.2020.pdf. In the case of Google, see the Department of Justice and the State Advocate General cases: https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-sues-monopolist-google-violating-antitrust-laws and https://coag.gov/app/uploads/2020/12/Colorado-et-al.-v.-Google-PUBLIC-REDACTED-Complaint.pdf[/footnote]

In the UK, a consultation launched in September 2021 proposed a number of routes to reform the Data Protection Act and the UK GDPR.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). ‘Ada Lovelace Institute hosts “Taking back control of data: scrutinising the UK’s plans to reform the GDPR”‘. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/news/data-uk-reform-gdpr/[/footnote] Political motivations to create a ‘post-Brexit’ approach to data protection may test ‘equivalence’ with the European Union, to the detriment of the benefits of coherence and seamless convergence of data rights and practices across borders.

There is also the risk that the UK lowers levels of data protection to try to increase investment, including by large technology companies operating in the UK, therefore reinforcing their market power. Recently released policy documents containing significant changes are the National Data and AI Strategies,[footnote]See: UK Government. (2021). National AI Strategy. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy and UK Government. (2020). National Data Strategy. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-national-data-strategy/national-data-strategy[/footnote] and the Government’s response to the consultation on the reforms to the data protection framework,[footnote]UK Government. (2022). Data: a new direction – Government response to consultation. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/data-a-new-direction/outcome/data-a-new-direction-government-response-to-consultation[/footnote] followed by a draft bill published in July 2022.[footnote]Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. (2022-23). Parliament: House of Commons. Bill no. 143. London: Published by the authority of the House of Commons. Available at: https://bills.parliament.uk/bills/3322/publications[/footnote]

Joining the countries that have developed AI policies and national strategies,[footnote] Stanford University. (2021). Artificial Intelligence Index 2021, chapter 7. Available at https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-AI-Index-Report-_Chapter-7.pdf and OECD/European Commission. (2021). AI Policy Observatory. Available at: https://oecd.ai/en/dashboard[/footnote] Brazil,[footnote]Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e Inovações. (2021). Estratégia Brasileira de Inteligência Artificial. Available at: https://www.gov.br/mcti/pt-br/acompanhe-o-mcti/transformacaodigital/inteligencia-artificial[/footnote] the USA[footnote]See: National Artificial Intelligence Initiative Act, 116th Cong. (2020). Available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6216 and the establishment of the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force: The White House. (2021). ‘The Biden Administration Launches the National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource Task Force’. Available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/06/10/the-biden-administration-launches-the-national-artificial-intelligence-research-resource-task-force/[/footnote] and the UK[footnote]UK Government. (2021). National AI Strategy. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy[/footnote] launched their own initiatives, with regulatory intentions ranging from developing ethical principles and guidelines for responsible use, to boosting research and innovation, to becoming a world leader, an ‘AI superpower’ and a global data hub. Many of these initiatives are industrial policy rather than regulatory frameworks, and focus on creating an enabling environment for the rapid development of AI markets, rather than mitigating risk and harms.[footnote]For concerns raised by the US National Artificial Intelligence Research Resource (NAIRR) see: AI Now and Data & Society’s joint comment. Available at https://ainowinstitute.org/AINow-DS-NAIRR-comment.pdf[/footnote]

In August 2021, China adopted its comprehensive data protection framework consisting of the Personal Information Protection Law,[footnote]For a detailed analysis, see: Dorwart, H., Zanfir-Fortuna, G. and Girot, C. (2021). ‘China’s New Comprehensive Data Protection Law: Context, Stated Objectives, Key Provisions’. Future of Privacy Forum. Available at https://fpf.org/blog/chinas-new-comprehensive-data-protection-law-context-stated-objectives-key-provisions/[/footnote] which is modelled on the GDPR, and the Data Security Law, which focuses on harm to national security and public interest from data-driven technologies.[footnote]Creemers, R. (2021). ‘China’s Emerging Data Protection Framework’. Social Science Research Network. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3964684[/footnote] Researchers argue that understanding this unique regulatory approach should not start from a comparative analysis (for example to jurisdictions such as the EU, which focus on fundamental rights). They trace its roots to the Chinese understanding of cybersecurity, which aims to protect national polity, economy and society from data-enabled harms and defend against vulnerabilities.[footnote]Creemers, R. (2021).[/footnote]

While some of these recent initiatives have the potential to transform market dynamics towards less centralised and less exploitative practices, none of them meaningfully contest the dominant business model of online platforms or promote ethical alternatives. Legislators seem to choose to regulate through large actors as intermediaries, rather than by reimagining how regulation could support a more equal distribution of power. In particular, attention must be paid to the way many proposed solutions tacitly require ‘Big Tech’ to stay big.[footnote]Owen, T. (2020). ‘Doctorow versus Zuboff’. Centre for International Governance Innovation. Available at https://www.cigionline.org/articles/doctorow-versus-zuboff/[/footnote]

The EU’s approach to platform, data and AI regulation

 

In the EU, the Digital Services Act (DSA) and the Digital Markets Act (DMA) bring a proactive approach to platform regulation, by prohibiting certain practices up front and introducing a comprehensive package of obligations for online platforms.

 

The DSA sets clear obligations for online platforms against illegal content and disinformation and prohibits some of the most harmful practices used by online platforms (such as using manipulative design techniques and targeted advertising based on exploiting sensitive data).

 

It mandates increased transparency and accountability for key platform services (such as providing the main parameters used by recommendation systems) and includes an obligation for large companies to perform systemic risk assessments. This is complemented with a mechanism for independent auditors and researchers to access the data underpinning the company’s risk assessment conclusions and scrutinise the companies’ mitigation decisions.

 

While this is undoubtedly a positive shift, the impact of this legislation will depend substantially on online platforms’ readiness to comply with legal obligations, their interpretation of new legal obligations and effective enforcement (which has proved challenging in the past, for example with the GDPR).

 

The DMA addresses anticompetitive behaviour and unfair market practices of platforms that – according to this legislation – qualify as ‘gatekeepers’. Next to a number of prohibitions (such as combining or cross-using personal data without user consent), which are aimed at preventing the gatekeepers’ exploitative behaviour, the DMA contains obligations that – if enforced properly – will lead to more user choice and competition in the market for digital services.

 

These include basic interoperability requirements for instant messaging services, as well as interoperability with the gatekeepers’ operating system, hardware and software when the gatekeeper is providing complementary or supporting services.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Digital Markets Act, Article 7, Article 6 and Recital 57. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote] Another is the right for business users of the gatekeepers’ services to obtain free-of-charge, high quality, continuous and real-time access to data (including personal data) provided or generated in connection with their use of the gatekeepers’ core service.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Article 6 (10).[/footnote] End users will also have the right to exercise the portability of their data, both provided as well as generated through their activity on core services such as marketplaces, app stores, search and social media.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Digital Markets Act, Article 6 (9). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote]

 

The DMA and DSA do not go far enough in terms of addressing deeply rooted challenges, such as supporting alternative business models that are not premised on data exploitation or speaking to users’ expectations to be able to control algorithmic interfaces (such as the interface for content filtering/generating recommendations). Nor does it create a level playing field for new market players who would like to develop services that compete with the gatekeepers’ core services.

 

New approaches to data access and sharing are also seen with the adopted Data Governance Act (DGA)[footnote]Replace: European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Regulation (EU) 2022/868 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2022 on European data governance and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 (Data Governance Act). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0868&qid=1657887017015[/footnote] and the draft Data Act.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A68%3AFIN[/footnote] The DGA introduces the concept of ‘data altruism’ (the possibility for individuals or companies to voluntarily share data for the public good), facilitates the re-use of data from public and private bodies, and creates rules for data intermediaries (providers of data sharing services that are free of conflicts of interests relating to the data they share).

 

Complementing this approach, the proposed Data Act aims at securing end users’ right to obtain all data (personal, non-personal, observed or provided) generated by their use of products such as wearable devices and related services. It also aims to develop a framework for interoperability and portability of data between cloud services, including requirements and technical standards enabling common European data spaces.

 

There is also an increased focus on regulating the design and use of data-driven technologies, such as those that use artificial intelligence (machine learning algorithms). The draft Artificial Intelligence Act (AI Act) follows a risk-based approach that is limited to regulating ‘unacceptable’ and high-risk AI systems, such as prohibiting AI uses that pose a risk to fundamental rights or imposing ex ante design obligations on providers of high-risk AI systems.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation laying down harmonised rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206[/footnote]

 

Perhaps surprisingly, the AI Act, as proposed by the European Commission, does not impose any transparency or accountability requirements on systems that pose less than high risk (with the exception of AI system that may deceive or confuse consumers), which include the dominant commercial business-to-consumer (B2C) services (e.g. search engines, social media, some recommendation systems, health monitoring apps, insurance and payment services).

 

Regardless of the type of risk (high-risk or limited-risk), this approach leaves a significant gap in accountability requirements for both large and small players that could be responsible for creating unfair AI systems. Responsibility measures should aim both at regulating the infrastructural power of large technology companies that supply most of the tools for ‘building AI’ (such as large language models, cloud computing power, text and speech generation and translation), as well as at creating responsibility requirements for smaller downstream providers who make use of these tools to construct their underlying services.

 

3. Weak enforcement response in digital markets

Large platforms are by their nature multi-sided, multi-sectoral and operate globally. The regulation of their commercial practices cuts across many sectors, and they are overseen by multiple bodies in different jurisdictions with varying degrees of expertise and in-house knowledge about how platforms operate. These include consumer protection authorities, data protection and competition authorities, non-discrimination and equal opportunities bodies, and financial markets, telecom regulators, media regulators, etc.).

It is well known that these regulatory bodies are frequently under-equipped for the task they are charged with, and there is an asymmetry between the resources available to them compared to the resources large corporations invest in neutralising enforcement efforts. For example, in the EU there is an acute lack of resources and institutional capacity: half the data protection authorities in the EU have an annual budget of €5 million or less, and 21 of the data protection authorities declare that their existing resources are not enough to operate effectively.[footnote]Ryan, J. and Toner, A. (2020). ‘Europe’s governments are failing the GDPR’. brave.com. Available at: https://brave.com/static-assets/files/Brave-2020-DPA-Report.pdf and European Data Protection Board (2020). Contribution of the EDPB to the evaluation of the GDPR under Article 97. Available at: https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/default/files/files/file1/edpb_contributiongdprevaluation_20200218.pdf[/footnote] 

A bigger problem is the lack of regulatory response in general, and recent lessons learned from insufficient data-protection enforcement responses show there needs to be a shift towards a stronger response from regulators, and a more proactive, collaborative approach to curbing exploitative and harmful activities, and bringing down illegal practices.

For example, in 2018 the first complaints against the invasive practices of the online advertising industry (such as real-time bidding, an online ad auctioning system that broadcasts personal data to thousands of companies)[footnote]More details at Irish Council for Civil Liberties. See: https://www.iccl.ie/rtb-june-2021/[/footnote] were filed with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (Irish DPC) and with the UK’s Information Commissioner Office (ICO),[footnote]Irish Council for Civil Liberties. (2018). Regulatory complaint concerning massive, web-wide data breach by Google and other ‘ad tech’ companies under Europe’s GDPR. Available at: https://www.iccl.ie/digital-data/regulatory-complaint-concerning-massive-web-wide-data-breach-by-google-and-other-ad-tech-companies-under-europes-gdpr/[/footnote] two of the more resourceful – but still not sufficiently funded – authorities. Similar complaints followed across the EU.

After three years of inaction, civil society groups initiated court cases against the two regulators for lack of enforcement, as well as a lawsuit against major advertising and tracking companies.[footnote]See: Irish Council for Civil Liberties. (2022). ‘ICCL sues DPC over failure to act on massive Google data breach’. Available at: https://www.iccl.ie/news/iccl-sues-dpc-over-failure-to-act-on-massive-google-data-breach/; Irish Council for Civil Liberties. (2021). ‘ICCL lawsuit takes aim at Google, Facebook, Amazon, Twitter and the entire online advertising industry’. Available at: https://www.iccl.ie/news/press-announcement-rtb-lawsuit/; and Open Rights Group. Ending illegal online advertising. Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/campaign/ending-adtech-abuse/[/footnote] It was a relatively small regulator, the Belgian Data Protection Authority, that confirmed in its 2022 decision that those ad tech practices are illegal, showing that the lack of resources is not the sole cause for regulatory inertia.[footnote]Belgian Data Protection Authority. (2022). ‘The BE DPA to restore order to the online advertising industry: IAB Europe held responsible for a mechanism that infringes the GDPR’. Available at: https://www.dataprotectionauthority.be/citizen/iab-europe-held-responsible-for-a-mechanism-that-infringes-the-gdpr[/footnote]

Some EU data protection authorities have been criticised for their reluctance to intervene in the technology sector. For example, it took three years from launching the investigation for the Irish regulator to issue a relatively small fine against WhatsApp for failure to meet transparency requirements under the GDPR.[footnote]Data Protection Commission. (2021). ‘Data Protection Commission announces decision in WhatsApp inquiry’. Available at: https://www.dataprotection.ie/en/news-media/press-releases/data-protection-commission-announces-decision-whatsapp-inquiry[/footnote] The authority is perceived as a key ‘bottleneck’ to enforcement because of its delays in delivering enforcement decisions,[footnote]The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE Committee) also issued a draft motion in 2021 in relation to how the Irish DPC was handling the ‘Schrems II’ case and recommended the European Commission to start the infringement procedures against Ireland for not properly enforcing the GDPR.[/footnote] as many of the large US technology companies are established in Dublin.[footnote]Espinoza, J. (2021). ‘Fighting in Brussels bogs down plans to regulate Big Tech’. Financial Times.. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/7e8391c1-329e-4944-98a4-b72c4e6428d0[/footnote]

Some have suggested that ‘reform to centralise enforcement of the GDPR could help rein in powerful technology companies’.[footnote]Manancourt, V. (2021). ‘EU privacy law’s chief architect calls for its overhaul’. Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-privacy-laws-chief-architect-calls-for-its-overhaul/[/footnote]

The Digital Markets Act (DMA) awards the European Commission the role of a sole enforcer against certain data-related practices performed by ‘gatekeeper’ companies (for example the prohibition of combining and cross-using personal data from different services without consent). The enforcement mechanism of the DMA gives powers to the European Commission to target selected data practices that may also infringe rules typically governed by the GDPR.

In the UK, the ICO has been subject to criticism for its preference for dialogue with stakeholders over formal enforcement of the law. Members of Parliament as well as civil society organisations have increasingly voiced their disquiet over this approach,[footnote]Burgess, M. (2020). ‘MPs slam UK data regulator for failing to protect people’s rights’. Wired UK. Available at: https://www.wired.co.uk/article/ico-data-protection-gdpr-enforcement; Open Rights Group (2021). ‘Open Rights Group calls on the ICO to do its job and enforce the law’. Available at: https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press-releases/open-rights-group-calls-on-the-ico-to-do-its-job-and-enforce-the-law/[/footnote] while academics have queried how the ICO might be held accountable for its selective and discretionary application of the law.[footnote]Erdos, D. (2020). ‘Accountability and the UK Data Protection Authority: From Cause for Data Subject Complaint to a Model for Europe?’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3521372[/footnote]

The 2021 public consultation led by the UK Government – Data: A New Direction – will do little to reassure those concerned, given the significant incursions into the ICO’s regulatory independence mooted.[footnote]Lynskey, O. (2021). ‘EU-UK Data Flows: Does the “New Direction” lead to “Essentially Equivalent” Protection?’. The Brexit Institute. Available at https://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2021/09/eu-uk-data-new-direction/[/footnote] It remains to be seen whether subsequent consultations initiated by the ICO regarding its regulatory approach signal a shift from selective and discretionary application of law towards formal enforcement action.[footnote]Erdos, D. (2022). ‘What Way Forward on Information Rights Regulation? The UK Information Commissioner’s Office Launches a Major Consultation’. Inforrm. Available at https://inforrm.org/2022/01/21/what-way-forward-on-information-rights-regulation-the-uk-information-commissioners-office-launches-a-major-consultation-david-erdos/[/footnote]

The measures proposed for consultation go even further towards removing some of the important requirements and guardrails against data abuses, which in effect will legitimise practices that have been declared illegal in the EU.[footnote]Delli Santi, M. (2022). ‘A day of reckoning for IAB and Adtech’. Open Rights Group. Available at https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/a-day-of-reckoning-for-iab-and-adtech/[/footnote]

Recognising the need for cooperation among different regulators

Examinations of abuses, market failure, concentration tendencies in the digital economy and market power of large platforms are more prominent. Extensive reports were commissioned by governments in the UK,[footnote]Digital Competition Expert Panel. (2019). Unlocking digital competition. UK Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf[/footnote] Germany,[footnote]Schweitzer, H., Haucap, J., Kerber, W. and Welker, R. (2018). Modernisierung der Missbrauchsaufsicht für marktmächtige Unternehmen. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Available at https://www.bmwk.de/Redaktion/DE/Publikationen/Wirtschaft/modernisierung-der-missbrauchsaufsicht-fuer-marktmaechtige-unternehmen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=15. An executive summary in English is available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3250742[/footnote], the European Union,[footnote]Crémer, J., de Montjoye, Y-A. and Schweitzer, H. (2019) Competition policy for the digital era. European Commission. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd0419345enn.pdf[/footnote] Australia[footnote]Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). (2019). Digital Platforms Inquiry – Final Report. Available at: https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Digital%20platforms%20inquiry%20-%20final%20report.pdf[/footnote] and beyond, asking what transformations are necessary in competition policy, to address the challenges of the digital economy.

A comparison of these four reports highlights the problem of under-enforcement in competition policy and recommends a more active enforcement response.[footnote]Kerber, W. (2019). ‘Updating Competition Policy for the Digital Economy? An Analysis of Recent Reports in Germany, UK, EU, and Australia’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3469624[/footnote] It also underlines that all the reports analyse the important interplay between competition policy and other policies such as data protection and consumer protection law.

The Furman report in the UK recommended the creation of a new Digital Markets Unit that collaborates on enforcement with regulators in different sectors and draws on their experience to form a more robust approach to regulating digital markets.[footnote]Digital Competition Expert Panel. (2019). Unlocking digital competition. UK Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_competition_furman_review_web.pdf[/footnote] In 2020, the UK Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (DRCF) was established to enhance cooperation between the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), the Office of Communications (Ofcom) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and support a more coordinated regulatory approach.[footnote]Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum. Plan of work for 2021 to 2022. Ofcom. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/215531/drcf-workplan.pdf[/footnote]

The need for more collaboration and joined-up thinking among regulators was highlighted by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) in 2014.[footnote] European Data Protection Supervisor. (2014). Privacy and Competitiveness in the Age of Big Data. The Interplay between data Protection, Competition Law and Consumer Protection in the Digital Economy, Preliminary Opinion. Available at: https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/14-03-26_competitition_law_big_data_en.pdf[/footnote] In 2016, the EDPS launched the Digital Clearinghouse initiative, an international voluntary network of enforcement bodies in different fields,[footnote]See: European Data Protection Supervisor 2016 initiative to create a network of data protection, consumer and competition regulators. Available at: https://www.digitalclearinghouse.org/[/footnote] however its activity has been limited.

Today there is still limited collaboration between regulators across sectors and borders because of a lack of legal basis for effective cooperation and exchange of information, including compelled and confidential information. Support for a more proactive and coherent regulatory enforcement must increase substantially to make a significant impact in terms of limiting the overwhelming power of large technology corporations in markets, over people and in democracy.

Chapter 2: Making data work for people and society

This chapter explores four cross-cutting interventions that have the potential to shift power in the digital ecosystem, especially if implemented in coordination with each other. These provocative ideas are offered with the aim to push forward the thinking around existing data policy and practice.

Each intervention is capable of integrating legal, technological, market and governance solutions that could help transition the digital ecosystem towards a people-first vision. While there are many potential approaches, for the purposes of this report – for clarity and ease of understanding –one type of potential solution or remedy is focused on under each intervention.

Each intervention is woven and connected to the others in a way that sets out a cross-cutting vision of an alternative data future, and which can frame forward-looking debates about data policy and practice. The vision these interventions offer will require social and political standing. Behind each intervention there is a promise of a positive change that needs the support and collaboration of policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations and industry practitioners to make them into a reality.

1. Transforming infrastructure through open ecosystems

The vision

Imagine a world in which digital systems have been transformed, and control over technology infrastructure and algorithms no longer lies in the hands of a few large corporations.

Transforming infrastructure means what was once a closed system of structural dependencies, which enabled large corporations to concentrate power, has been replaced by an open ecosystem where power imbalances are reduced and people can shape the digital experiences they want.

No single company or subset of companies controls the full technological stack of digital infrastructures and services. Users can exert meaningful control over the ways an operating system functions on phones and computers, and actions performed by web browsers and apps.

The incentive structures that drove technology companies to entrench power have been dismantled, and new business models are more clearly aligned with user interests and societal benefits. This means there are no more ‘lock in’ models, in which users find it burdensome to switch to another digital service provider, and fewer algorithmic systems that are optimised to attract clicks, prioritising advertising revenue over people’s needs and interests.

Instead, there is competition and diversity of digital services for users to choose from, and these services use interoperable architectures that enable users to switch easily to other providers and mix-and-match services of their choice within the same platform. For example, third-party providers create products that enable users to seamlessly communicate  on social media channels from a standalone app. Large platforms allow their users to change the default content curation algorithm to the one of their choice.

Thanks to full horizontal and vertical interoperability, people using digital services are empowered to choose their favourite or trusted provider of infrastructure, content and interface. Rather than platforms setting rules and objectives that determine what information is surfaced by their recommender system, third-party providers, including reputable news organisations and non-profits, can build customised filters (operating on the top of default recommender systems to modify the newsfeed) or design alternative recommender systems.

All digital platforms and service providers operate within high standards of security and protection, which are audited and enforced by national regulators. Following new regulatory requirements, large platforms operate under standard protocols that are designed to respect choices made by their users, including strict limitations on the use of their personal data.

How to get from here to there

In today’s digital markets, there is unprecedented consolidation of power in the hands of a few, large US and Chinese digital companies. This tendency towards centralised power is supported by the current abilities of platforms to:

  • process substantial quantities of personal and non-personal data, to optimise their services and the experience of each business or individual user
  • extract market-dominating value from large-volume interactions and transactions
  • use their financial power to either acquire or imitate (and further improve) innovations in the digital economy
  • use this capacity to leverage dominance into new markets
  • use financial power to influence legislation and stall enforcement through litigation.

The table below takes a more detailed look at some of the sources of power and possible remedies.

These dynamics reduce the possibility for new alternative services to be introduced and contribute to users’ inability to switch services and to make value-based decisions (for example, to choose a privacy-optimised social media application, or to determine what type of content is prioritised on their devices).[footnote]Brown, I. (2021). ‘From ‘walled gardens’ to open meadows’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/walled-gardens-open-meadows/[/footnote] Instead, a few digital platforms have the ability to capture a large user base and extract value from attention-maximising algorithms and ‘dark patterns’ – deceptive design practices that influence users’ choices and encourage them to take actions that result in more profit for the corporation, often at the expense of the user’s rights and digital wellbeing.[footnote]See: Brown, I. (2021) and Norwegian Consumer Council. (2018). Deceived by Design. Available at: https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/no-undersokelsekategori/deceived-by-design/[/footnote]

As discussed in Chapter 1, there is still much to explore when considering possible regulatory solutions, and there are many possible approaches to reducing concentration and market dominance. Conceptual discussions about regulating digital platforms that have been promoted in policy and academia range from ‘breaking up big tech’,[footnote]Warren, E. (2020). Break Up Big Tech. Available at: https://2020.elizabethwarren.com/toolkit/break-up-big-tech[/footnote] by separating the different services and products they control into separate companies, to nationalising and transforming platforms into public utilities or conceiving of them as universal digital services.[footnote]Muldoon, J. (2020). ‘Don’t Break Up Facebook — Make It a Public Utility’. Jacobin. Available at: https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/12/facebook-big-tech-antitrust-social-network-data[/footnote] Alternative proposals suggest limiting the number of data-processing activities a company can perform concurrently, for example separating search activities from targeted advertising that exploits personal profiles.

There is a need to go further. The imaginary picture painted at the start of this section points towards an environment where there is competition and meaningful choice in the digital ecosystem, where rights are more rigorously upheld and where power over infrastructure is less centralised. This change in power dynamics would require, as one of the first steps, that digital infrastructure is transformed with full vertical and horizontal interoperability. The imagined ecosystem includes large online platforms, but in this scenario they find it much more difficult to maintain a position of dominance, thanks to real-time data portability, user mobility and requirements for interoperability stimulating real competition in digital services.

What is interoperability?

Interoperability is the ability of two or more systems to communicate and exchange information. It gives end users the ability to move data between services (data portability), and to access services across multiple providers.

 

How can interoperability be enabled?

Interoperability can be enabled by developing (formal or informal) standards that define a set of rules and specifications that, when implemented, allow different systems to communicate and work together. Open standards are created through the consensus of a group of interested parties and are openly accessible and usable by anyone.

This section explores a range of interoperability measures that can be introduced by national or European policy makers, and discusses further considerations to transform the current, closed platform infrastructure into an open ecosystem.

Introducing platform interoperability

Drawing from examples of other sectors that historically have operated in silos,  mandatory interoperability measures are a potential tool that merit further exploration, to create new opportunities for both companies and users.

Interoperability is a longstanding policy tool in EU legislation and more recent digital competition reviews suggest it as a measure against highly concentrated digital markets.[footnote]Brown, I. (2020). ‘Interoperability as a tool for competition’. CyberBRICS. Available at: https://cyberbrics.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Interoperability-as-a-tool-for-competition-regulation.pdf and Brown, I. (2021). ‘From ‘walled gardens’ to open meadows’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/walled-gardens-open-meadows/[/footnote] 

In telecommunications, interoperability measures make it possible to port phone numbers from one provider to another, and enable customers of one phone network to call and message customers on other networks, improving choice for consumers. In the banking sector, interoperability rules made it possible for third parties to facilitate account transfers from one bank to another, and to access data about account transactions to build new services. This opened up the banking market for new competitors and delivered new types of financial services for customers.

In the case of large digital platforms, introducing mandatory interoperability measures is one way to allow more choice of service (preventing both individual and business users from being trapped in one company’s products and services), and to re-establish the conditions to enable a competitive market for start-ups and small and medium-sized enterprises to thrive.[footnote]Brown, I. (2021).[/footnote]

While some elements of interoperability are present in existing or proposed EU legislation, this section explores a much wider scope of interoperability measures than those that have already been adopted. (For a more detailed discussion on ‘Possible interoperability mandates and their practical implications’, see the text box below.)

Some of these elements of interoperability in existing or proposed EU legislation are:[footnote]For a more comprehensive list, see: Brown, I. (2020). ‘Interoperability as a tool for competition’. CyberBRICS. Available at: https://cyberbrics.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Interoperability-as-a-tool-for-competition-regulation.pdf[/footnote]

  • The Digital Markets Act enables interoperability requirements between instant messaging services, as well as with the gatekeepers’ operating system, hardware and software (when the gatekeeper is providing complementary or supporting services), and strengthens data portability rights.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Digital Markets Act, Recital 64, Article 6 (7), Recital 57, and Article 6 (9) and Recital 59. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote]
  • The Data Act proposal aims to enable switching between cloud providers.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act). Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A68%3AFIN[/footnote]
  • Regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services (‘platform-to-business regulation’) gives business users the right to access data generated through the provision of online intermediation services.[footnote]European Parliament and European Council. Regulation 2019/1150 on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32019R1150[/footnote]

These legislative measures address some aspects of interoperability, but place limited requirements on services other than instant messaging services, cloud providers and operating systems in certain situations.[footnote]Gatekeepers designated under the Digital Markets Act need to provide interoperability to their operating system, hardware or software features that are available or used by the gatekeeper in the provision of its own complementary or supporting services or hardware. See: European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Digital Markets Act, Recital 57. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote] They also do not articulate a process for creating technical standards around open protocols for other services. This is why there is a need to test more radical ideas, such as mandatory interoperability for large online platforms covering both access to data and platform functionality.

 

Possible interoperability mandates and their practical implications

Ian Brown

 

Interoperability in digital markets requires some combination of access to data and platform functionality.

 

Data interoperability

Data portability (Article 20 of the EU GDPR) is the right of a user to move their personal data from one company to another. (The Data Transfer Project developed by large technology companies is slowly developing technical tools to support this.[footnote]The Data Transfer Project is a collaboration launched in 2017 between large companies such as Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, Apple to build a common framework with open-source code for data portability and interoperability between platforms. More information is available at: https://datatransferproject.dev/[/footnote]) This should help an individual switch from one company to another, including by giving price comparison tools access to previous customer bills. 

 

However, a wider range of uses could be enabled by real-time data mobility[footnote]Digital Competition Expert Panel. (2019). Unlocking digital competition. UK Government. Available at: https://assets. publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/785547/unlocking_digital_ competition_furman_review_web.pdf[/footnote] or interoperability,[footnote]Kerber, W. and Schweitzer, H. (2017). ‘Interoperability in the Digital Economy’. JIPITEC, 8(1). Available at: https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-8-1-2017/4531[/footnote] implying that an individual can give one company permission to access their data held by another, and meaning it can be updated whenever they use the second service. These remedies can stand alone, where the main objective is to enable individuals to give access to their personal data held by an incumbent firm to competitors.

 

Scholars make an additional distinction between syntactic or technical interoperability, the ability for systems to connect and exchange data (often via Application Programming Interfaces or ‘APIs’) and semantic interoperability, that connected systems share a common understanding of the meaning of data they exchange.[footnote]Kerber, W. and Schweitzer, H. (2017).[/footnote]

 

An important element of making both types of data-focused interoperability work is developing more data standardisation to require datasets to be structured, organised, stored and transmitted in more consistent ways across different devices, services and systems. Data standardisation creates common ontologies, or classifications, that specify the meaning of data.[footnote]Gal, M.S. and Rubinfeld, D. L. (2019), ‘Data Standardization’. NYU Law Review, 94, no. (4). Available at: https://www.nyulawreview.org/issues/volume-94-number-4/data-standardization/[/footnote]

 

For example, two different instant messaging services would benefit from a shared internal mapping of core concepts such as identity (phone number, nickname, email), rooms (public or private group chats, private messaging), reactions, attachments, etc. – these are concepts and categories that could be represented in a common ontology, to bridge functionality and transfer data across these services.[footnote]Matrix.org is a recent design of an open protocol for instant messaging service interoperability.[/footnote]

 

Data standardisation is an essential underpinning for all types of portability and interoperability and, just like the development of technical standards for protocols, it needs both industry collaboration and measures to ensure powerful companies do not hijack standards to their own benefit.

 

An optional interoperability function is to require companies to support personal data stores (PDS), where users store and control data about them using a third-party provider and can make decisions about how it is used (e.g. the MyData model[footnote]Kuikkaniemi, K., Poikola, A. and Honko, H. (2015). MyData – A Nordic Model for Human-Centered Personal Data Management and Processing’. Ministry of Transport and Communications. Available at: https://julkaisut.valtioneuvosto.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/78439/MyData-nordic-model.pdf[/footnote] and Web inventor Tim Berners-Lee’s Solid project). 

 

The data, or consent to access it, could be managed by regulated aggregators (major Indian banks are developing a model where licensed entities aggregate account data with users’ consent and therefore act as an interoperability bridge between multiple financial services),[footnote]Singh, M. (2021) ‘India’s Account Aggregator Aims to Bring Financial Services to Millions’. TechCrunch. Available at: https://social.techcrunch.com/2021/09/02/india-launches-account-aggregator-system-to-extend-financial-services-to-millions/[/footnote] or facilitated by user software through an open set of standards adopted by all service providers (as in the UK’s Open Banking). It is also possible for service providers to send privacy-protective queries or code to run on personal data stores inside a protected sandbox, limiting the service provider’s access to data (e.g. a mortgage provider could send code, checking an applicant’s monthly income was above a certain level, to their PDS or current account provider, without gaining access to all of their transaction data).[footnote]Yuchen, Z., Haddadi, H., Skillman, S., Enshaeifar, S., and Barnaghi, P. (2020) ‘Privacy-Preserving Activity and Health Monitoring on Databox’. EdgeSys ’20: Proceedings of the Third ACM International Workshop on Edge Systems, Analytics and Networking, pp. 49–54. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3378679.3394529[/footnote]

 

The largest companies currently have a significant advantage in their access to very large quantities of user data, particularly when it comes to training machine learning systems. Requiring access to statistical summaries of the data (e.g. popularity of specific social media content and related parameters) may be sufficient, while limiting the privacy problems caused. Finally, firms could be required to share the (highly complex) details of machine learning models, or provide regulators and third-parties access to them to answer specific questions (such as the likelihood a given piece of social-media content is hate speech).

 

The interoperability measures described above would enable a smoother transfer of data between digital services, and enable users to exert more control over what kind of data is shared and in what circumstances. This would make for a ‘cleaner’ data ecosystem, in which platforms and services are no longer incentivised to gather as much data as possible on every user.

 

Rather, users would have more power to determine how their data is collected and shared, and smaller services wouldn’t need to engage in extractive data practices to ‘catch up’ with larger platforms, as barriers to data access and transfer would be reduced. The overall impact on innovation would depend on whether increased competition resulting from data sharing at least counterbalanced these reduced incentives.

 

Functionality-oriented interoperability

Another form of interoperability relates to enabling digital services and platforms to work cross-functionally, which could improve user choice in the services they use and reduce the risk of ‘lock in’ to a particular service. Examples of functionality-oriented interoperability (sometimes referred to as protocol interoperability,[footnote]Crémer, J., de Montjoye, Y-A., and Schweitzer, H. (2019). Competition Policy for the Digital Era. European Commission. Available at https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2763/407537[/footnote] or in telecoms regulation, interconnection of networks) include:

  • the ability for a user of one instant-messaging service to send a message to a user or group on a competing service
  • the user of one social media service can ‘follow’ a user on another service, and ‘like’ their shared content
  • the ability of a user of a financial services tool to initiate a payment from an account held with a second company
  • the user of one editing tool can collaboratively edit a document or media file with the user of a different tool, hosted on a third platform.

 

Services communicate with each other using open/publicly accessible APIs and/or standardised protocols. In Internet services, this generally looks like the ‘decentralised’ network architectures shown below:

The UK’s Open Banking Standard recommended: ‘The Open Banking API should be built as an open, federated and networked solution, as opposed to a centralised/hub-like approach. This echoes the design of the Web itself and enables far greater scope for innovation.’[footnote]Open Data Institute. (2016). The Open Banking Standard. Available at: http://theodi.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/298569302-The-Open-Banking-Standard-1.pdf[/footnote]

 

An extended version of functional interoperability would allow users to exercise other forms of control over the products and services they use, including:

  • signalling their preferences to platforms on profiling – the recording of data to assess or predict their preferences – using a tool such as the Global Privacy Control, or expressing their preferred default services such as search
  • replacing core platform functionality, such as a timeline ranking algorithm or an operating system default mail client, with a preferred version from a competitor (known as modularity)[footnote]Farrell, J., and Weiser, P. (2003). ‘Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age’. Harvard Journal of Law and Technology, 17(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.452220[/footnote]
  • using their own choice of software to interact with the platform.

 

Noted competition economist Cristina Caffarra has concluded: ‘We need wall-to-wall [i.e. near-universal] interoperability obligations at each pinch point and bottleneck: only if new entrants can connect and leverage existing platforms and user bases can they possibly stand a chance to develop critical mass.’[footnote]Caffarra, C. (2021). ‘What Are We Regulating For?’. VOX EU. Available at: https://cepr.org/voxeu/blogs-and-reviews/what-are-we-regulating[/footnote] Data portability alone is a marginal solution (and a limited remedy for GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook (now Meta Platforms), Amazon, Microsoft) when those companies want to flag their good intentions.[footnote]Caffarra, C. (2021).[/footnote] A review of portability in the Internet of Things sector came to a similar conclusion.[footnote]Turner, S., Quintero, J. G., Turner, S., Lis, J. and Tanczer, L. M. (2020). ‘The Exercisability of the Right to Data Portability in the Emerging Internet of Things (IoT) Environment’. New Media & Society. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820934033[/footnote]

 

Further considerations and provocative concepts

Mandatory interoperability measures have the potential to transform digital infrastructure, and to enable innovative services and new experiences for users. However, they need to be supported by carefully considered additional regulatory measures, such as cybersecurity, data protection and related accountability frameworks. (See text box below on ‘How to address sources of platform power? Possible remedies’ for an overview of interoperability and data protection measures that could tackle some of the sources of power for platforms.)

Also, the development of technical standards for protocols and classification systems or ontologies specifying the meaning of data (see text box above on ‘Possible interoperability mandates and their practical implications’) is foundational to data and platform interoperability. However, careful consideration must be placed on designing new types of infrastructure, in order to prevent platforms from consolidating control. Examples from practice show that developing open standards and protocols are not enough on their own.

Connected to the example above on signalling preferences to platforms, open protocols such as the ‘Do Not Track’ header were meant to help users more easily exercise their data rights by signalling an opt-out preference from website tracking.[footnote]Efforts to standardise the ‘Do Not Track’ header ended in 2019 and expressing tracking preferences at browser level is not currently a widely adopted practice. More information is available here: https://www.w3.org/TR/tracking-dnt/[/footnote] In this case, the standardisation efforts stopped due to insufficient deployment,[footnote]See here: https://github.com/w3c/dnt/commit/5d85d6c3d116b5eb29fddc69352a77d87dfd2310[/footnote] demonstrating the significant challenge in obliging platforms to  facilitate the use of standards in the services they deploy. 

A final point relates to creating interoperable systems that do not overload users with too many choices. Already today it is difficult for users to manage all the permissions they give across all the services and platforms they use. Interoperability may offer solutions for users to share their preferences and permissions for how their data should be collected and used by platforms, without requiring recurring ‘cookie notice’-type requests to a user when using each service.

How to address sources of platform power? Possible remedies

Ian Brown

 

Interoperability and related remedies have the potential to address not only problems resulting from market dominance of a few large firms, but – more importantly – some of the sources of their market power. However, every deep transformation needs to be carefully designed to prevent unwanted effects. The challenges associated with designing market interventions based on interoperability mandates need to be identified early in the policy- making process so that problems can either be solved or accounted for.

 

The table below presents specific interoperability measures, classified by their potential to address various sources of large platforms’ power, next to problems that are likely to result from their implementation.

 

While much of the policy debate so far on interoperability remedies has taken place within a competition-law framework (including telecoms and banking competition), there are equally important issues to consider under data and consumer protection law, as well as useful ideas from media regulation. Competition-focused measures are generally applied only to the largest companies, while other measures can be more widely applied. In some circumstances these measures can be imposed under existing competition-law regimes on dominant companies in a market, although this approach can be extremely slow and resource-intensive for enforcement agencies.

 

The EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), and US proposals (such as the ACCESS Act and related bills), impose some of these measures up-front on the very largest ‘gatekeeper’ companies (as defined by the DMA). The European Commission has also introduced a Data Act that includes some of the access to data provisions below.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act). Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A68%3AFIN[/footnote] Under these measures, smaller companies are free to decide whether to make use of interoperability features that their largest competitors may be obliged to support.

Sources of market power for large firms/platforms   Proposed interoperability or related remedies Potential problems
Access to individual customer data (including cross-use of data from multiple services) Real-time and continuous user-controlled data portability/data interoperability

Requirement to support user data stores

(Much) stricter enforcement of data minimisation and purpose limitation requirements under data protection law, alongside meaningful transparency about reasons for data collection (or prohibiting certain data uses cross-platform)

Need for multiple accounts with all services, and take-it-or-leave-it contract terms

Incentive for mass collection, processing and sharing of data, including profiling

Access to large-scale raw customer data for analytics/product improvement Mandated competitor access to statistical data[footnote]For example, search query and clickstream data.[/footnote]

*Mandated competitor access to raw data is dismissed because of significant data protection issues

Reduced incentives for data collection
Access to large-scale aggregate/statistical customer data Mandated competitor access to models, or specific functionality of models via APIs Reduced incentives for data collection and model training
Ability to restrict competitor interaction with customers Requirement to support open/publicly accessible APIs or standardised communications protocols Complexity of designing APIs/standards, while preventing anticompetitive exclusion
Availability and use of own core platform services to increase ‘stickiness’ Government coordination and funding for development of open infrastructural standards and components

Requirement for platforms to support/integrate these standard components

Technical complexity of full integration of standard/competitor components into services/design of APIs while preventing anticompetitive exclusion

Potential pressure for incorporation of government surveillance functionality in standards

Ability to fully control user interface, such as advertising, content recommendation, specific settings, or self-preferencing own services Requirement to support competitors’ monetisation and filtering/recommendation services via open APIs[footnote]Similar to ‘must carry’ obligations in media law, requiring, for example, a cable or satellite TV distributor to carry public service broadcasting channels.[/footnote]

Requirement to present competitors’ services to users on an equal basis[footnote]Requiring, for example, a cable or satellite TV distributor to show competitors’ channels equally prominently in Electronic Programme Guides as their own.[/footnote]

Requirement to recognise specific user signals

Open APIs to enable alternative software clients

Technical complexity of full integration of competitor components into services/design of APIs while preventing anticompetitive exclusion

Food for thought

In the previous section strong data protection and security provisions were emphasised as essential for building an open ecosystem that enables more choice for users, respects individual rights and facilitates competition.

Going a step further, there is a discussion to be had about boundaries of system transformation that seem achievable with interoperability. What are the ‘border’ cases, where the cost of transformation outweighs its benefits? What immediate technical, societal and economic challenges can be identified, when imagining more radical implementations of interoperability than those that have already been tested or are being proposed in EU policy?

In order to trigger further discussion, a set of problems and questions are offered as provocations:

  1. Going further, imagine a fully interoperable ecosystem, where different platforms can talk to each other. What would it mean to apply a full interoperability mandate across different digital services and what opportunities would it bring? For example, provided that technical challenges are overcome, what new dynamics would emerge if a Meta Platforms (Facebook) user could exchange messages with Twitter, Reddit or TikTok users without leaving the platform?
  2. More modular and customisable platform functionalities may change dynamics between users and platforms and lead to new types of ecosystems. How would the data ecosystem evolve if core platform functionalities were opened up? For example, if users could choose to replace core functionalities such as content moderation or news feed curation algorithms with alternatives offered by independent service providers, would this bring more value for individual users and/or societal benefit, or further entrench the power of large platforms (becoming indispensable infrastructure)? What other policy measures or economic incentives can complement this approach in order to maximise its transformative potential and prevent harms?
  3. Interoperability measures have produced important effects in other sectors and present a great potential for digital markets. What lessons can be learned from introducing mandatory interoperability in the telecommunications and banking sectors? Is there a recipe for how to open up ecosystems with a ‘people-first’ approach that enables choice while preserving data privacy and security, and provides new opportunities and innovative services that benefit all?
  4. Interoperability rules need to be complemented and supported by measures that take into account inequalities and make sure that the more diverse portfolio of services that is created through interoperability is accessible to the less advantaged. Assuming more choice for consumers has already been achieved through interoperability mandates, what other measures need to be in place to reduce structural inequalities that are likely to keep less privileged consumers locked in the default service? Experience from the UK energy sector shows that it is often the consumers/users with the fewest resources who are least likely to switch services and benefit from the opportunity of choice (the ‘poverty premium’).[footnote]Davies, S. and Trend, L. (2020). The Poverty Premium: A Customer Perspective. University of Bristol Personal Finance Research Centre. Available at https://fairbydesign.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/The-poverty-premium-A-Customer-Perspective-Report.pdf[/footnote]

2. Reclaiming control of data from dominant companies

The vision

In this world, the primary purpose of generating, collecting, using, sharing and governing data is to create value for people and society. The power to make decisions about data has been removed from the few large technology companies who controlled the data ecosystem in the early twenty-first century, and is instead delegated to public institutions with civic engagement at a local and national level.

To ensure that data creates value for people and society, researchers and public-interest bodies oversee how data is generated, and are able to access and repurpose data that traditionally has been collected and held by private companies. This data can be used to shape economic and social policy, or to undertake research into social inequalities at the local and national level. Decisions around how this data is collected, shared and governed are overseen by independent data access boards.

The use of this data for societally beneficial purposes is also carefully monitored by regulators, who provide checks and balances on both private companies to share this data under high standards of security and privacy, and on public agencies and researchers to use that data responsibly.

In this world, positive results are being noticed from practices that have become the norm, such as developers of data-driven systems making their systems more auditable and accessible to researchers and independent evaluators. Platforms are now fully transparent about their decisions around how their services are designed and used. Designers of recommendation systems  publish essential information, such as the input variables and optimisation criteria used by algorithms and results of their impact assessments, which supports public scrutiny. Regulators, legislators, researchers, journalists and civil society organisations  easily interrogate algorithmic systems, and have a straightforward  understanding over what decisions systems may be rendering and how those decisions impact people and society.

Finally, national governments have launched ‘public-interest data companies’, which collect and use data under strict requirements for objectives that are in the public interest. Determining ‘public interest’ is a question these organisations routinely return to through participatory exercises that empower different members of society

The importance of data in the digital market triggers the question how control over data and algorithms can be shifted away from dominant platforms, to allow individuals and communities to be involved in decisions about how their data is used. The imaginary scenario above builds a picture of a world where data is used for public good, and not (only) for corporate gain.

Current exploitative data practices are based on access to large pools of personal and non-personal data and the capacity to efficiently use data to extract value by means of advanced analytics.[footnote]Ezrachi, A. and Reyna, A. (2019). ‘The role of competition policy in protecting consumers’ well-being in the digital era’. BEUC. Available at: https://www.beuc.eu/publications/beuc-x-2019-054_competition_policy_in_digital_markets.pdf[/footnote]

The insights into social patterns and trends that are gained by large companies through analysing vast datasets currently remain closed off and are used for extracting and maximising commercial gains, where they could have considerable social value.

Determining what constitutes uses of data for ‘societal benefit’ and ‘public interest’ is a political project that must be undertaken with due regard for transparency and accountability. Greater mandates to access and share data must be accompanied by strict regulatory oversight and community engagement to ensure these uses deliver actual benefit to individuals impacted by the use of this data.

The previous section discussed the need to transform infrastructure in order to rebalance power in the digital ecosystem. Another and interrelated foundational area where more profound legal and institutional change is needed is in control over data.

Why reclaim control over data?

 

For the purposes of this proposition, reflecting the focus on creating more societal benefit, the first goal of reclaiming control over data is to open up access to data and resources from companies and repurposing them for public-interest goals, such as developing public policies that take into consideration insights and patterns from large-scale datasets. A second purpose is to open up access to data and to machine-learning algorithms, in order to increase scrutiny, accountability and oversight over how proprietary algorithms function and to understand their impact at the individual, collective and societal level.

How to get from here to there

Proprietary siloing of data is currently one of the core obstacles to using data in societally beneficial ways. But simply making data more shareable, without specific purposes and strong oversight can lead to greater abuses rather than benefits. To counter this, there is a need for:

  • legal mandates that private companies make data and resources available for public interest purposes
  • regulatory safeguards to ensure this data is shared securely and with independent oversight.

Mandating companies share data and resources in the public interest

One way to reclaim control over data and repurpose it for societal benefits is to create legal mandates requiring companies to share data and resources that could be used in the public interest. For example:

  • Mandating the release from private companies of personal and non-personal aggregate data for public use (where aggregate data means a combination of individual data, which is anonymised through eliminating personal information).[footnote]While there is an emerging field around ‘structured transparency’ that seeks to use privacy-preserving techniques to provide access to personal data without a privacy trade-off, these methods have not yet been proven in practice. For a discussion around structured transparency, see: Trask, A., Bluemke, E., Garfinkel, B., Cuervas-Mons, C. G. and Dafoe, A. (2020). ‘Beyond Privacy Trade-offs with Structured Transparency’. arXiv, Available at https://arxiv.org/pdf/2012.08347.pdf[/footnote] These datasets would be used to inform public policies (e.g. use mobility patterns from a ride-sharing platform to develop better road infrastructure and traffic management).[footnote]In 2017, Uber launched the Uber Movement initiative, which releases free-of-charge aggregate datasets to help cities better understand traffic patterns and address transportation and infrastructure problems. See: https://movement.uber.com/[/footnote]
  • Requiring companies to create interfaces for running data queries on issues of public interest (for example public health, climate, pollution, etc). This model relies on using the increased processing and analytics capabilities inside a company, instead of asking for access to large ‘data dumps’, which might prove difficult and resource intensive for public authorities and researchers to process. Conditions need to be in place around what types of queries are allowed, who can run these and what are the company’s obligations around providing responses.
  • Providing access for external researchers and regulators to machine learning models and core technical parameters of AI systems, which could enable evaluation of an AI system’s performance and real optimisation goals (for example checking the accuracy and performance of content moderation algorithms for hate speech).

Some regulatory mechanisms are emerging at national and regional level in support of data access mandates. For example, in France, the 2016 Law for a Digital Republic (Loi pour une République numérique) introduces the notion of ‘data of general interest’ which includes access to data from private entities that have been delegated to run a public service (e.g. utility or transportation), access to data from entities whose activities are subsidised by public authorities, and access to certain private databases for the statistical purposes.[footnote]See: LOI n° 2016-1321 du 7 octobre 2016 pour une République numérique (1). Available at: https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/jorf/id/JORFTEXT000033202746/[/footnote]

In Germany, the 2019 leader of the Social Democratic Party championed a ‘data for all’ law that advocated for a ‘data commons’ approach and breaking-up data monopolies through a data-sharing obligation for market-dominant companies.[footnote]Nahles, A. (2019). ‘Digital progress through a data-for-all law’. Social Democratic Party. Available at: https://www.spd.de/aktuelles/daten-fuer-alle-gesetz/[/footnote] In the UK, the Digital Economy Act provides a legal framework for the Office for National Statistics (ONS) to access data held within the public and private sectors in support of statutory functions to produce official statistics and statistical research.[footnote]See: Chapter 7 of Part 5 of the Digital Economy Act and UK Statistics Authority. ‘Digital Economy Act: Research and Statistics Powers’. Available at: https://uksa.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/digitaleconomyact-research-statistics/[/footnote]

The EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA) includes a provision on data access for independent researchers.[footnote]European Parliament. (2022). Digital Services Act, Article 31. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0269_EN.html[/footnote]

Under the DSA, large companies will need to comply with a number of transparency obligations, such as creating a public database of targeted advertisement and providing more transparency around how recommender systems work. It also includes an obligation for large companies to perform systemic risk assessments and to implement steps to mitigate risk.

In order to ensure compliance with the transparency provisions in the regulation, the DSA mandates independent auditors and vetted researchers with access to the data that led to the company’s risk assessment conclusions and mitigation decisions. This provision ensures oversight over the self-assessment (and over the independent audit) that companies are required to carry out, as well as scrutiny over the choices large companies make around their systems.

Other dimensions of access to data mandates can be found in the EU’s Data Act proposal, which introduces compulsory access to company data for public-sector bodies in exceptional situations (such as public emergencies or where it is needed to support public policies and services).[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act). Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A68%3AFIN[/footnote] The Data Act also provides for various data access rights, such as a right for individuals and businesses to access the data generated from the products or related service they use and share the data with a third party continuously and in real-time[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Articles 4 and 5.[/footnote] (companies which fall under the category of ‘gatekeepers’ are not eligible to receive this data).[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation on harmonised rules on fair access to and use of data (Data Act), Article 5 (2). Available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=COM%3A2022%3A68%3AFIN[/footnote]

This forms part of the EU general governance framework for data sharing in business-to-consumer, business-to-business and business-to-government relationships created by the Data Act. It complements the recently adopted Data Governance Act (focusing on voluntary data sharing by individuals and businesses and creating common ‘data spaces’) and the Digital Markets Act (which strengthens access by individual and business users to data provided or generated through the use of core platform services such as marketplaces, app stores, search, social media, etc.).[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Digital Markets Act, Article 6 (9) and (10). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2022.265.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ%3AL%3A2022%3A265%3ATOC[/footnote]

Independent scrutiny of data sharing and AI systems

Sharing data for the ‘public interest’ will require novel forms of independent scrutiny and evaluation, to ensure such sharing is legitimate, safe, and has positive societal impact. In cases where access to data is involved, concerns around privacy and data security need to be acknowledged and accounted for.

In order to mitigate some of these risks, one recent model proposes a system of governance in which a new independent entity would assess the researchers’ skills and capacity to conduct research within ethical and privacy standards.[footnote]Benesch, S. (2021). ‘Nobody Can See Into Facebook’. The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/facebook-oversight-data-independent-research/620557/[/footnote] In this model, an independent ethics board would review the project proposal and data protection practices for both the datasets and the people affected by the research. Companies would be required to ‘grant access to data, people, and relevant software code in the form researchers need’ and refrain from influencing the outcomes of research or suppressing findings.[footnote]Benesch, S. (2021).[/footnote]

An existing model for gaining access to platform data is Harvard’s SocialScienceOne project,[footnote]See: Harvard University. Social Science One. Available at: https://socialscience.one/[/footnote] which partnered with Meta Platforms (Facebook) in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal to control access to a dataset containing public URLs shared and clicked by Facebook users globally, along with metadata including Facebook likes. Researchers requests for access to the dataset go to an academic advisory board that is independent from Facebook, and which reviews and approves applications.

While initiatives like SocialScienceOne are promising, it has faced its share of criticism for failing to provide timely access to requests,[footnote]Silverman, C. (2019). ‘Exclusive: Funders Have Given Facebook A Deadline To Share Data With Researchers Or They’re Pulling Out’. BuzzFeed. Available at: https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/craigsilverman/funders-are-ready-to-pull-out-of-facebooks-academic-data[/footnote] and concerns that the dataset Meta Platforms (Facebook) shared has significant gaps.[footnote]Timberg, C. (2021). ‘Facebook made big mistake in data it provided to researchers, undermining academic work’. Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/09/10/facebook-error-data-social-scientists/[/footnote]

The programme also relies on the continued voluntary action of Meta Platforms (Facebook), and therefore lacks any guarantees that the corporation (or others like it) will provide this data in years to come. Future regulatory proposals should explore ways to create incentives for firms to share data in a privacy-preserving way, but not use them as shields and excuses to prevent algorithm inspection.

A related challenge is developing novel methods for ensuring external oversight and evaluation of AI systems and models that are trained on data shared in this way. Two approaches to holding platforms and digital services accountable to the users and communities they serve are algorithmic impact assessments, and algorithm auditing.

Algorithmic impact assessments look at how to identify possible societal impacts of a system before it is in use, and ongoing once it is. They have been proposed primarily in the public sector,[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Algorithmic accountability for the public sector. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector/[/footnote] with a focus on public participation in the identification of harms and publication of findings. Recent work has seen them explored in a data access context, making them a condition of access.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). Algorithmic impact assessment: a case study in healthcare. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/algorithmic-impact-assessment-case-study-healthcare/[/footnote]

Algorithm auditing involves looking at the behaviour of an algorithmic system (usually by examining inputs and outputs) to identify whether risks and potential harms are occurring, such as discriminatory outcomes,[footnote]A famous example is ProPublica’s bias audit of a criminal risk assessment algorithm. See: Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias – There’s software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it’s biased against blacks’. ProPublica. Available at https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing[/footnote] or the prevalence of certain types of content.[footnote]A recent audit of Twitter looked at how its algorithm amplifies certain political opinions. See: HuszĂĄr, F., Ktena, S. I., O’Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., and Hardt, M. (2021). ‘Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119(1). Available at: https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2025334119[/footnote]

The Ada Lovelace Institute’s work identified six technical inspection methods that could be applied in scrutinising social media platforms, each with its own limitations and challenges.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems in social media platforms. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/[/footnote] Depending on the method used, access to data is not always necessary, however important elements for enabling auditing are: access to documentation about the dataset’s structure and purpose, the system’s design and functionality, and access to interviews with developers of that system. 

In recent years, a number of academic and civil society initiatives to conduct third-party audits of platforms have been blocked because of barriers to accessing data held by private developers. This has led to repeated calls for increased transparency and access to the data that platforms hold.[footnote]Kayser-Bril, N. (2020). ‘AlgorithmWatch forced to shut down Instagram monitoring project after threats from Facebook’. AlgorithmWatch. Available at: https://algorithmwatch.org/en/instagram-research-shut-down-by-facebook/ and Albert, J., Michot, S., Mollen, A. and Müller, A. (2022). ‘Policy Brief: Our recommendations for strengthening data access for public interest research’. AlgorithmWatch. Available at: https://algorithmwatch.org/en/policy-brief-platforms-data-access/[/footnote] [footnote]Benesch, S. (2021). ‘Nobody Can See Into Facebook’. The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/10/facebook-oversight-data-independent-research/620557/[/footnote]

There is also growing interest in the role of regulators, who, in a number of jurisdictions, will be equipped with new inspection and information-gathering powers over social media and search platforms, which could overcome access challenges experienced by research communities.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and Reset. (2021). Inspecting algorithms in social media platforms. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Inspecting-algorithms-in-social-media-platforms.pdf[/footnote] One way forward may be for regulators to have the power to issue ‘access to platform data’ mandates for independent researchers, who can collect and analyse data about potential harms or societal trends under strict data protection and security conditions, for example minimising the type of data collected and with a clear data retention policy.

Further considerations and provocative concepts

Beyond access to data: grappling with fundamental issues

Jathan Sadowski

 

To reclaim resources and rights currently controlled by corporate platforms and manage them in the public’s interests and for societally beneficial purposes, ‘a key enabler would be a legal framework mandating private companies to grant access to data of public interest to public actors under conditions specified in the law.’[footnote]Micheli, M., Ponti, M., Craglia, M. and Suman A.B. (2020). ‘Emerging models of data governance in the age of datafication’. Big Data & Society. doi: 10.1177/2053951720948087[/footnote]

 

One aspect that needs to be considered is whether this law should establish requirements around data collected by large companies to become part of the public domain after a reasonable number of years.

 

Another proposal suggested the possibility of allowing companies to use the data that they gather only for a limited period (e.g. five years), after which it is reverted to a ‘national charitable corporation that provides access to certified researchers, who would both be held to account and be subject to scrutiny to ensure the data is used for the common good’. [footnote]Shah, H. (2018) ‘Use our personal data for the common good’. Nature, 556(7699). doi: 10.1038/d41586-018-03912-z[/footnote]

 

These ideas will have to consider various issues, such as the need to ensure that individual’s data is not released into the public domain, and the fact that commercial competitors might not see any benefit in using ‘old’ data. Nevertheless, we should draw inspiration from these efforts and seek to expand their purview.

 

To that point, policies aimed at making data held by private companies into a common resource should go further than simply allowing other companies to access data and build their own for-profit products from it.

To rein in the largely unaccountable power of big technology companies who wield enormous, and often black-boxed, influence over people’s lives,[footnote]Martinez, M. and Kirchner, L. (2021). ‘The Secret Bias Hidden in Mortgage-Approval Algorithms’. The Markup. Available at https://themarkup.org/denied/2021/08/25/the-secret-bias-hidden-in-mortgage-approval-algorithms[/footnote] these policies must grapple with fundamental issues related to who gets to determine how data is made, what it means, and why it is used. 

 

Furthermore, the same policies should extend their target beyond monopolistic digital platforms. Data created and controlled by, for example, transportation services, energy utilities and credit rating agencies ought also to be subjected to public scrutiny and democratic decisions about the most societally beneficial ways to use it or discard it.

Further to these considerations, in this section provocative concepts are shared, which show different implementation models that can be set up in practice to re-channel the use of data and resources from companies towards societal good.

Public interest divisions with public oversight

Building on the Uber Movement model, which releases aggregate datasets on a restricted, non-commercial basis to help cities with urban planning,[footnote]See: Uber Movement initiative. Available at: https://movement.uber.com[/footnote]

relevant companies could be obliged to form a well-resourced public interest division, running as part of the core organisational structure with full access to the company’s capabilities (such as computational infrastructure and machine learning models).

This division would be in charge of building aggregate datasets to support important public value. Key regulators could issue ‘data-sharing mandates’, to identify which types of datasets would be most valuable and run queries against them. Through this route, the computational resources and the highly skilled human resources of the company would be used for achieving societal benefits and informing public policy.

The aggregate datasets could be used to inform policymaking and public service innovation. Potential examples could include food delivery apps informing health nutrition policies, or ride-sharing apps informing street planning, traffic congestion, housing and environmental policies. There would be limitations to use: for example insights from social media companies could be used for identifying the most pressing social issues in one area, and this information should not be used by the political class in the electoral cycle or for winning popularity by gaining political insight and using it in political campaigns.

Publicly run corporations (the ‘BBC for data’)

Another promising avenue for repurposing data in the public interest and increasing accountability is to introduce a publicly run competitor to specific digital platforms (e.g. social media). This model could be established by mandating the sharing of data from particular companies operating in a given jurisdiction to a public entity, which uses the data for projects that are in service of the public good.[footnote]Coyle, D. (2022). ‘The Public Option’. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 91, pp. 39–52. doi:10.1017/S1358246121000394[/footnote]

The value proposition behind such an intervention in the digital market would be similar to the effect of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in the UK broadcast market, where it competes with other broadcasters. The introduction of the BBC supported competition in dimensions other than audience numbers, and provided a platform for more types of content providers (for example music and independent production) that otherwise may not have existed, or not at a scale enabling them to address global markets.

Operating as a publicly run corporation has the benefit of establishing a different type of incentive structure, one that is not narrowly focused on profit-making. This could avoid the more extractive, commercially oriented business models and practices that result from the need to generate profits for shareholders and demonstrate continuous growth.

One business model that dominates the digital ecosystem, and is the primary incentive for many of the largest technology companies, is online advertising. This model has underpinned the development of mature, developed platforms, which means that, while individuals may support the concept of a business model that does not rely on extractive practices, in practice it may be difficult to get users to switch to services that do not offer equivalent levels of convenience and functionality. The success of this model is dependent on the ‘BBC for data’ competitor offering broad appeal and well-designed, functional services, so it can scale to operate at a significant level in the market.

The introduction of a democratically accountable competitor alone would not be enough to shape new practices, or to establish political and public support. It would need committed investment in the performance of its services and in attracting users. Citizens should be engaged in shaping the practices of the new public competitor, and these should reflect – in market terms – what choices, services and approaches they expect.

Food for thought

As argued above, reclaiming control over data and resources to public authorities, researchers, civil society organisations and other bodies that work in the public interest has a transformative potential. The premise of this belief is simple: if data is power, making data accessible to new actors, with non-commercial goals and agendas, will shift the power balance and change the dynamic within the data ecosystem. However, without deeper questioning, the array of practical problems and structural inequalities will not disappear with the arrival of new actors and their powers to access data.

Enabling data sharing is no simple feat – it will require extensive consideration of privacy and security issues, and oversight from regulators to prevent the misuse, abuse or concealing of data. The introduction of new actors and powers to access and use data will, inevitably, trigger other externalities and further considerations that are worthy of greater attention from civil society, policymakers and practitioners.

In order to trigger further discussion, a set of problems and questions are offered as provocations:

  1. Discussions around ‘public good’ need mechanisms to address questions of legitimacy and accountability in a participatory and inclusive way. Who should decide what uses of data serve the public good and how these decisions should be reached in order to maintain their legitimacy as well as social accountability? Who decides what constitutes ‘public good’ or ‘societal benefit,’ and how can such decisions be made justly?
  2. Enabling data sharing and access needs to be accompanied by robust privacy and security measures. What legal requirements and conditions need to be designed for issuing ‘data sharing’ mandates from companies?
  3. Data sharing and data access mandates imply that the position of large corporations is still a strong one, and they are still playing a substantial role in the ecosystem. In what ways might data-sharing mandates entrench the power of large technology platforms, or exacerbate different kinds of harm? What externalities are likely to arise with mandating data sharing for public interest goals from private companies?
  4. The notion of ‘public good’ opens important questions about what type of ‘public’ is involved in discussions and who gets left out. How can determinations of public good be navigated in inclusive ways across different jurisdictions, and accounting for structural inequalities?

3. Rebalancing the centres of digital power with new (non-commercial) institutions

The vision

In this world, new forms of data governance institutions made up of collectives of citizens control how data is generated, collected, used and governed. These intermediaries, such as data trusts and data cooperatives, empower ‘stewards’ of data to collect and use data in ways that support their beneficiaries (those represented in and affected by that data).

These models of data governance have become commonplace, enabling people to be more aware and exert more control over who has access to their data, and engendering a greater sense of security and trust that their data will only be used for purposes that they approve.

Harmful uses of data are more easily identifiable and transparent, and efficient forms of legal redress are available in cases where a data intermediary acts against the interests of their beneficiary.

The increased power of data collectives balances the power of dominant platforms, and new governance architectures offer space for civil society organisations to hold to account any ungoverned or unregulated, private or public exercises of power.

There is a clear supervision and monitoring regime ensuring ‘alignment’ to the mandate that data intermediaries have been granted by their beneficiaries. Data intermediaries are discouraged and prevented from monetising data. Data markets have been prohibited by law, understanding that the commodification of data creates room for abuse and exploitation.

The creation and conceptualisation of new institutions that manage data for non-commercial purposes is necessary to reduce power and information asymmetries.

Large platforms and data brokers currently collect and store large pools of data, which they are incentivised to use for corporate rather than societal benefit. Decentring and redistributing the concentration of power away from large technology corporations and towards individuals and collectives requires explorations around new ways of governing and organising data (see the text box on ‘Alternative data governance models’ below).

Alternative data governance models could offer a promising pathway for ensuring data subjects have rights and preferences over how their data is used are enforced. If designed properly, these governance methods could also help to address structural power imbalances.

However, until power is shifted away from large companies, and market dynamics are redressed to allow more competition and choice, there is a high risk of data intermediaries being captured.

New vehicles representing collective power, such as data unions, data trusts, data cooperatives or data-sharing initiatives based on corporate or contractual mechanisms, could help individuals and organisations position themselves better in relation to more powerful private or public organisations, offering new possibilities for enabling choices related to how data is being used.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Exploring lLegal Mechanisms mechanisms for Data data Stewardshipstewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/legal-mechanisms-data-stewardship/[/footnote]

There are many ways in which these models can be set up. For example, some models put more emphasis on individual gains, such as a ‘data union’ or a data cooperative that works in the individual interest of its members (providing income streams for individuals who pool their personal data, which is generated through the services they use or available on their devices).

These structures can also work towards wider societal aspirations, when members see this as their priority. Another option might be for members to contribute device-generated data to a central database, with ethically minded entrepreneurs invited to build businesses on top of these databases, owned collectively by the ‘data commons’ and feeding its revenues back into the community, instead of to the individual members.

A detailed discussion on alternative data governance models is presented in the Ada Lovelace Institute report Exploring legal mechanisms for data stewardship, which discusses three legal mechanisms – data trusts, data cooperatives, and corporate and contractual mechanisms – that could help facilitate the responsible generation, collection, use and governance of data in a participatory and rights-preserving way.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021).[/footnote]

Alternative data governance models
  • Data trusts: stemming from the concept of UK trust law, individuals pool data rights (such as those provided by the GDPR) into an organisation – a trust – where the data trustees are tasked with exercising data rights under fiduciary obligations.
  • Data cooperatives: individuals voluntarily pool data together, and the benefits are shared by members of the cooperative. A data cooperative is distinct from a ‘data commons’ because a data cooperative grows or shrinks as resources are brought in or out (as members join or leave), whereas a ‘data commons’ implies a body of data whose growth or decline is independent of the membership base.
  • Corporate and contractual agreements: legally binding agreements between different organisations that facilitate data sharing for a defined set of aims or an agreed purpose.

Many of the proposed models for data intermediaries need to be tested and further explored to refine their practical implementation, and the considerations below offer a more critical perspective highlighting how the different transformations of the data ecosystem discussed in this chapter are interconnected, and how one institutional change (or failure) determines the conditions for a change in another area.

Decentralised intermediaries need adequate political, economic, and infrastructural support, to fulfil their transformative function and deliver the value expected from them. The text box below, by exploring the shortcomings of existing data intermediaries, gives an idea of the economic and political conditions that would provide a more enabling environment.

Critical overview of existing data intermediaries models

Jathan Sadowski

 

There are now a number of emerging proposals for alternative data intermediaries that seek to move away from the presently dominant, profit-driven model and towards varying degrees of individual ownership, legal oversight or social stewardship of data.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Exploring legal mechanisms for data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/legal-mechanisms-data-stewardship/ and Micheli, M., Ponti, M., Craglia, M. and Suman, A. B. (2020). ‘Emerging models of data governance in the age of datafication’. Big Data & Society. doi: 10.1177/2053951720948087[/footnote]

 

These proposals include relatively minor reforms to the status quo, such as legally requiring companies to act as ‘information fiduciaries’ and consider the interests of stakeholders who are affected by the company, alongside the interests of shareholders who have ownership in the company.

 

In a recent Harvard Law Review article, David Pozen and Lina Khan[footnote]Pozen, D. and Khan, L. (2019). ‘A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries’. Harvard Law Review, 133, pp. 497–541. Available at: https://harvardlawreview.org/2019/12/a-skeptical-view-of-information-fiduciaries/[/footnote] provide detailed arguments for why designating a company like Meta Platforms (Facebook) – ‘a loyal caretaker for the personal data of millions’ does not actually pose a serious challenge to the underlying business model or corporate practices. In fact, such reforms may even entrench the company’s position atop the economy. ‘Facebook-as-fiduciary is no longer a public problem to be solved, potentially through radical reform. It is a nexus of sensitive private relationships to be managed, nurtured, and sustained [by the government]’.[footnote]Pozen, D. and Khan, L. (2019).[/footnote]

 

Attempts to tweak monopolistic platforms, without fundamentally restructuring the institutions and distributions of economic power, are unlikely to produce – and may even impede – the meaningful changes needed.

 

Other models take a more decentralised solution in the form of ‘data-sharing pools’[footnote]Shkabatur, J. (2018). ‘The Global Commons of Data’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3263466[/footnote] and ‘data cooperatives’[footnote]Miller, K. (2021). ‘Radical Proposal: Data Cooperatives Could Give Us More Power Over Our Data’. Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence (HAI), Stanford University. Available at: https://hai.stanford.edu/news/radical-proposal-data-cooperatives-could-give-us-more-power-over-our-data[/footnote] that would create a vast new ecosystem of minor intermediaries for data subjects to choose from. As a different way of organising the data economy, this would be, in principle, a preferable democratic alternative to the extant arrangement.

 

However, in practical terms, this approach risks putting the cart before the horse, by acting as if the political, economic and infrastructural support for these decentralised intermediaries already existed. In fact, it does not: with private monopolies sucking all the oxygen out of the economy, there’s no space for an ecosystem of smaller alternatives to blossom. At least, that is, without relying on the permission and largesse of profit-driven giants.

 

Under present market conditions – where competition is low and capital is hoarded by a few – it seems much more likely that start-ups for democratic data governance would either fizzle/fail or be acquired/crushed.

How to get from here to there

Alternative data governance proposals listed above represent novel and unexplored models that require better understanding and testing to demonstrate proof of concept. The success of these alternative data governance models will require (aside from a fundamental re-conceptualisation of market power and political, economic and infrastructural support; see more in the text box on ‘Paving the way for a new ecosystem of decentralised intermediaries’), strong regulations and enforcement mechanisms, to ensure data is stewarded in the interests of their beneficiaries.

The role, responsibilities and standards of practice remain to be fully defined and should include aspects of:

  • enforcing data rights and obligations (e.g. compliance with data protection legislation),
  • achieving a level of maturity of expertise and competence in the administration of a data intermediary, especially if its mission requires it to negotiate with large companies
  • establishing clear management decision-making around delegation and scrutiny, and setting out the overarching governance of the ‘data steward’, which could be a newly established professional role (a data trustee or capable managers and administrators in a data cooperative) or a governing board (for example formed by individuals that have shares in a cooperative based on the data contributed). The data contributed may define the role of an individual in the board and the decision-making power regarding data use.

Supportive regulatory conditions are needed, to ease the process of porting individual and collective data into alternative governance models, such as a cooperative. Today, it is a daunting – if not impossible – task to ask a person to move all their data over to a new body (data access requests can take a long time to be processed, and often the data received needs to be ‘cleaned’ and restructured in order to be used elsewhere).

Legal mechanisms and technical standards must evolve to make that process easier. Ideally, this would produce a process that cooperatives, trusts and data stewardship bodies could undertake on behalf of individuals (the service they provide could include collecting and pooling data; see below on the Data Governance Act). Data portability, as defined by the GDPR, is not sufficient as a legal basis because it covers only data provided by the data subject and relies heavily on individual agency, whereas in the current data ecosystem, the most valuable data is generated about individuals without their knowledge or control.

Alternative data governance models have already made their way into legislation. In particular, the recently adopted EU Data Governance Act (DGA) creates a framework for voluntary data sharing via data intermediation services, and a mechanism for sharing and pooling data for ‘data altruism’ purposes.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Regulation 2022/868 on European data governance (Data Governance Act). Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0868&qid=1657575745441[/footnote] The DGA mentions a specific category of data intermediation services that could support data subjects in exercising their data rights under the GDPR, however this option is only briefly offered in one of the recitals as one of the options, and lacks detail as to the practical implementation.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Recital 30. For a more detailed discussion on the mandatability of data rights, see: Giannopoulou, A., Ausloos, J., Delacroix, S. and Janssen, H. (2022). ‘Mandating Data Rights Exercises’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4061726[/footnote]

The DGA also emphasises the importance of neutral and independent data-sharing intermediaries and sets out the criteria for entities that want to provide data-sharing services (organisations that provide only data intermediation services, and companies that offer data intermediation services in addition to other services, such as data marketplaces).[footnote]European Commission. (2022). Data Governance Act explained. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/data-governance-act-explained[/footnote] One of the criteria is that service providers may not use the data for purposes other than to put it at the disposal of data users, and must separate its data intermediation services structurally from any other value-added services it may provide. At the same time, data intermediaries will bear fiduciary duties towards individuals, to ensure that they act in the best interests of the data holders.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Data Governance Act, Recital 33. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0868&qid=1657575745441[/footnote]

Today there is a basic legal framework for data portability under the GDPR, which has been complemented with new portability rules in legislation, such as in the DMA. More recently, a new framework has been adopted that encourages voluntary data sharing and defines the criteria and conditions for entities that want to serve as a data steward or data intermediary. What are still needed are the legal, technical and interoperability mechanisms for individuals as well as collectives to effectively reclaim their data (including behavioural observations and statistical patterns that not only convey real economic value but can also serve individual and collective empowerment) from private entities (either directly or via trusted intermediaries), and a set of safeguards protecting these individuals and collectives from being, once again, exploited by another powerful agent (i.e. making sure that a data intermediary will remain independent and trustworthy, and is able to perform their mandate effectively in the wider data landscape).

Further considerations and provocative concepts

The risk of amplifying collective harm

Jef Ausloos, Alexandra Giannopoulou and Jill Toh

 

So-called ‘data intermediaries’ have been framed as one practical way through which the collective dimension of data rights could be given shape in practice.[footnote]For example, Workers Info Exchange’s plan to set up a ‘data trust’, to help workers access and gain insight from data collected from them at work. Available at: https://www.workerinfoexchange.org/. See more broadly: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Exploring legal mechanisms for data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/legal-mechanisms-data-stewardship/ and Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatory-data-stewardship/[/footnote] While they show some promise for more effectively empowering people and curbing collective data harms,[footnote]See: MyData. Declaration of MyData Principles, Version 1.0. Available at: https://mydata.org/declaration/[/footnote] their growing popularity in policy circles mainly stems from their assumed economic potential.

 

Indeed, the political discourse at EU level, particularly in relation to the Data Governance Act (DGA) focuses on the economic objectives of data intermediaries, framing them in terms of their supposedly ‘facilitating role in the emergence of new data-driven ecosystems’.[footnote]European Parliament and Council of the European Union. (2022). Data Governance Act, Recital 27. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32022R0868&qid=1657575745441[/footnote] People’s rights, freedoms and interests are only considered to the extent that the data intermediaries empower individual data subjects. 

 

This focus on the (questionable) economic potential of data intermediaries and individual empowerment of data subjects raises significant concerns. Without clear constraints on the type of actors that can perform the role of intermediaries, their model can easily be usurped by the interests of those with (economic and political) power, at the cost of both individual and collective rights, freedoms and interests. Even more, their legal entrenching in EU law, risks amplifying collective data-driven harms. Arguably, for ‘data intermediaries’ to positively contribute to curbing collective harm and constraining power asymmetries, it will be important to move beyond the dominant narrative focusing on the individual and economic potential. Clear legal and organisational support in exercising data rights in a coordinated manner are a vital step in this regard.

To begin charting out the role of data intermediaries in the digital landscape, there is a need to explore questions such as: What are the first steps towards building alternative forms of data governance? How to undermine the power of companies that now enclose and control the data lifecycle? What is the role of the public sector in reclaiming power over data? How to ensure legitimacy of new data governance institutions? The text below offers some food for thought by exploring these important questions.

Paving the way for a new ecosystem of decentralised intermediaries

Jathan Sadowski

 

Efforts to build alternative forms of data governance should focus on changing its political economic foundations. We should focus on advancing two related strategies for reform that would pave the way for a new ecosystem of decentralised intermediaries.

 

The first strategy is to disintermediate the digital economy by limiting private intermediaries’ ability to enclose the data lifecycle – the different phases of data management, including construction, collection, storage, processing, analysis, use, sharing, maintenance, archiving and destruction.

The digital economy is currently hyper-intermediated. We tend to think of the handful of massive monopolistic platforms that have installed themselves as necessary middlemen in production, circulation, and consumption processes. But there is also an overabundance of smaller, yet powerful, companies that insert themselves into every technical, social and economic interaction to extract data and control access.

 

Disintermediation means investigating what kind of policy and regulatory tools can constrain and remove the vast majority of these intermediaries whose main purpose is to capture – often without creating – value.[footnote]Sadowski, J. (2020). ‘The Internet of Landlords: Digital Platforms and New Mechanisms of Rentier Capitalism’. Antipode, 52(2), pp.562–580.[/footnote] For example, disintermediation would require clamping down on the expansive secondary market for data, such as the one for location data,[footnote]Keegan, J. and Ng, A. (2021). ‘There’s a Multibillion-Dollar Market for Your Phone’s Location Data’. The Markup. Available at https://themarkup.org/privacy/2021/09/30/theres-a-multibillion-dollar-market-for-your-phones-location-data[/footnote] which incentivises many companies to engage in the collection and storage of all possible data, for the purposes of selling and sharing with, or servicing, third parties such as advertisers. 

 

Even more fundamental reforms could target the rights of control and access that companies possess over data assets and networked devices, which are designed to shut out regulators and researchers, competitors and consumers from understanding, challenging and governing the power of intermediaries. Establishing such limits is necessary for governing the lifecycle of data, while also making space for different forms of intermediaries designed with different purposes in mind.

 

In a recent example, after many years of fighting against lobbying by technology companies, the US Federal Trade Commission has voted to enforce ‘right to repair’ rules that grant users the ability to fix and modify technologies like smartphones, home appliances and vehicles without going through repairs shops ‘authorised’ by the manufacturers.[footnote]Kavi, A. (2021). ‘The F.T.C. votes to use its leverage to make it easier for consumers to repair their phones’. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/21/us/politics/phones-right-to-repair-FTC.html[/footnote] This represents a crucial transference of rights away from intermediaries and to the public. 

 

The second strategy consists of the construction of new public institutions for democratic governance of data.

 

Achieving radical change requires advocating for forms of large-scale intervention that actively aim to undermine the current conditions of centralised control by corporations.  In addition to pushing to expand the enforcement of data rights and privacy protections, efforts should be directed at policies for reforming government procurement practices and expanding public capacities for data governance.

 

The political and financial resources already exist to create and fund democratic data intermediaries. But funds are currently directed at outsourcing government services to technology companies,  rather than insourcing the development of capacities through new and existing institutions. Corporate executives have been happy to cash the cheques of public investment, and a few large companies have managed to gain a substantial hold on public administration procurement worldwide.

 

Ultimately, strong legal and institutional interventions are needed in order to foundationally transform the existing arrangements of data control and value. Don’t think of alternative data intermediaries  (such as public data trusts in the model advocated for in this article)[footnote]Sadowski, J., Viljoen, S. and Whittaker, M. (2021). ‘Everyone Should Decide How Their Digital Data Are Used — Not Just Tech Companies’. Nature, 595, pp.169–171. Available at https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-01812-3[/footnote] as an endpoint, but instead as the beginning for a new political economy of data – one that will allow and nurture the growth of more decentralised models of data stewardship. 

 

Public data trusts would be well positioned to provide alternative decentralised forms of data intermediaries with the critical resources they need – e.g. digital infrastructure, expert managers, financial backing, regulatory protections and political support – to first be feasible and then to flourish. Only then can we go beyond rethinking and begin rebuilding a political economy of data that works for everybody.[footnote]Sadowski, J. (2022). ‘The political economy of data intermediaries’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/political-economy-data-intermediaries/[/footnote]

Food for thought

In order to trigger further discussion, a set of problems and questions, which arise around alternative data governance institutions and the role they can play in generating transformative power shifts, are offered as provocations:

  1. Alternative data governance models can play a role at multiple levels. They can work both for members that have direct contributions (e.g. members pooling data in a data cooperative and being actively engaged in running the cooperative), as well as for indirect members (e.g. when the scope of a data cooperative is to have wider societal effects). This raises questions such as: How are ‘beneficiaries’ of data identified and determined? Who makes those determinations, and by what method?
  2. Given the challenges of the current landscape, there are questions about what is needed in order for data intermediaries to play an active and meaningful role that leads to responsible data use and management in practice. What would it take for these new governance models to actually increase control around the ways data is used currently (e.g. to forbid certain data uses)? Would organisations have to be mandated to deal with such new structures or adhere to their wishes even for data not pooled inside the model?
  3. In practice, there can be multiple types of data governance structures, potentially with competing interests. For example some of them could be set up to restrict and to protect data, while others could be set up to maximise income streams for members from data use. If potential income streams are dependent on the use of data, what are the implications for privacy and data protection? How can potential conflicts between data intermediaries be addressed and by whom? What kinds of incentives structures might arise and what type of legal underpinnings do these alternative data governance models need to function correctly?
  4. The role of the specific parties involved in managing data intermediaries, their responsibilities and qualifications need to be considered and balanced. Under what decision-making and management models would these structures operate, and how are decisions being made in practice? If things go wrong, who is held responsible, and by what means?
  5. The particularities of different digital environments across the globe lead to questions of applicability in different jurisdictions. Can these models be translated/work in different regions around the world, including the less developed?
What about Web3?

 

Some readers might ask why this report does not discuss ‘Web3’ technologies – a term coined by Gavin Wood in his 2014 essay, which envisions a reconfiguration of the web’s technical, governance and payments/transactions infrastructure that moves away from ‘entrusting our information to arbitrary entities on the internet’.[footnote]Wood, G. (2014) ‘ĐApps: What Web 3.0 Looks Like’. Available at: http://gavwood.com/dappsweb3.html[/footnote]

 

The original vision of Web3 aimed to decentralise parts of the online web experience and remove middlemen and intermediaries. It proposed four core components for a Web 3.0 or a ‘post-Snowden’ web:

  • Content publication: a decentralised, encrypted information publication system that ensures the downloaded information hasn’t been interfered with. This system could be built using principles that have been previously used in technologies such as the Bittorrent[footnote]See: BitTorrent. Available at: https://www.bittorrent.com/[/footnote] protocol for peer-to-peer content distribution and HTTPS for secure communication over a computer network.
  • Messaging: a messaging system that ensures communication is encrypted and traceable information is not revealed (e.g. IP addresses).
  • Trustless transactions: a means of agreeing the rules of interaction within a system and ensuring automatic enforcement of these rules. A consensus algorithm prevents powerful adversaries from derailing the system. Bitcoin is the most popular implementation of this technology and establishes a peer-to-peer system for validating transactions without a centralised authority. While blockchain technology is associated primarily with payment transactions, the emergence of smart contracts has extended the set of use cases to more complex financial arrangements and non-financial interactions such as voting, exchange, notarisation or providing evidence.
  • Integrated user interface: a browser or user interface that provides a similar experience to traditional web browsers, but uses a different technology for name resolution. In today’s internet, the domain name system (DNS) is controlled by the Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and delegated registrars. This would be replaced by a decentralised, consensus-based system which allows users to navigate the internet pseudonymously, securely and trustlessly (an early example of this technology is Namecoin).

 

Most elements of this initial Web3 vision are still in their technological infancy. Projects that focus on decentralised storage (for example BitTorrent, Swarm, IPFS) and computation (e.g. Golem, Ocean) face important challenges on multiple fronts – performance, confidentiality, security, reliability, regulation – and it is doubtful that the current generation of these technologies are able to provide a long-term, feasible alternative to existing centralised solutions for most practical use cases.

 

Bitcoin and subsequent advances in blockchain technology have achieved wider adoption and considerably more media awareness, although the space has been rife with various forms of scams and alarming business practices, due to rapid technological progress and lagging regulatory intervention.

 

Growing interest in blockchain networks has also contributed to the ‘Web3 vision’ being gradually co-opted by venture capital investors, to promote a particular niche of projects.  This has popularised Web3 as an umbrella term for alternative financial infrastructure – such as payments, collectibles (non-fungible tokens or NFTs) and decentralised finance (DeFi) – and encouraged an overly simplistic perception of decentralisation.[footnote]Aramonte, S., Huang, W. and Schrimpf, A. (2021). ‘DeFi risks and the decentralisation illusion.’ Bank for International Settlements. Available at: https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt2112b.pdf[/footnote] It is not often discussed nor widely acknowledged that the complex architecture of these systems can (and often does) lead to centralisation of power re-emerging in the operational, incentive, consensus, network and governance layers.[footnote]Sai, A. R., Buckley, J., Fitzgerald, B., Le Gear, A. (2021). ‘Taxonomy of centralization in public blockchain systems: A systematic literature review’. Information Processing & Management, 58(4). Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0306457321000844?via%3Dihub[/footnote]

 

The promise of Web3 is that decentralisation of infrastructure will necessarily lead to decentralisation of digital power. There is value in this argument and undoubtedly some decentralised technologies, after they reach a certain level of maturity and if used in the right context, can offer benefits over existing centralised alternatives.

 

Acknowledging the current culture and state of development around Web3, at this stage there are few examples in this space where values such as decentralisation and power redistribution are front and centre. It would be interesting to see whether progressive alternatives will deliver on their promise in the near to medium term and take these values to the core.

4. Ensuring public participation in technology policy making

The vision

This is a world in which everybody who wants to participate in decisions about data and its governance can do so – there are mechanisms for engagement to legitimate needs and expectations of those affected by technology. Through a broad range of participatory approaches – from citizens’ councils and juries that directly inform local and national data policy and regulation, to public representation on technology company governance boards – people are better represented, more supported and empowered to make data systems and infrastructures work for them, and policymakers are better informed about what people expect and desire from data, technologies and their uses.

Through these mechanisms for participatory data and technology policymaking and stewardship, individuals who wish to be active citizens can participate directly in data governance and innovation, whereas those who want their interests to be better represented have mechanisms where their voices and needs are represented through members of their community or through organisations.

Policymakers are more empowered through the legitimacy of public voice to act to curb the power of large technology corporations, and equipped with credible evidence to underpin approaches to policy, regulation and governance.

Public participation, engagement and deliberation have emerged in recent years as fundamental components in shaping future approaches to regulation across a broad spectrum of policy domains.[footnote]OECD. (2020). Innovative Citizen Participation and New Democratic Institutions: Catching the Deliberative Wave. doi:10.1787/339306da-en[/footnote] However, despite their promising potential to facilitate more effective policymaking and regulation, the role of public participation in data and technology-related policy and practice remains remarkably underexplored, if compared – for example – to public participation in city planning and urban law. 

There is, however, a growing body of research that aims to understand the theoretical and practical value of public participation approaches for governing the use of data, which is described in our 2021 report, Participatory data stewardship.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatory-data-stewardship/[/footnote]

What is public participation?

Public participation describes a wide range of methods that bring members of the public’s voices, perspectives, experiences and representation to social and policy issues. From citizen panels to deliberative polls, surveys to community co-design, these methods have important benefits, including informing more effective and inclusive policymaking, increasing representation and accountability in decision making, and enabling more trustworthy governance and oversight.[footnote]Gastil, J. (ed.). (2005). The deliberative democracy handbook: strategies for effective civic engagement in the twenty-first century. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley.[/footnote]

 

Participation often involves providing members of the public with information about particular uses of data or technology, including access to experts, and time and space to reflect and develop informed opinions. Different forms of public participation are often described on a spectrum from ‘inform’, ‘consult’ and ‘involve’, through to ‘collaborate’ and ‘empower’.[footnote]IAP2 International Federation. (2018). Spectrum of Participation. Available at: https://www.iap2.org/page/pillars[/footnote] In our report Participatory data stewardship, the Ada Lovelace Institute places this spectrum into the context of responsible data use and management.

How to get from here to there

Public participation, when implemented meaningfully and effectively, ensures that the values, experiences and perspectives of those affected by data-driven technologies are represented and accounted for in policy and practices related to those technologies.

This has multiple positive impacts. Firstly, it offers a more robust evidence base for developing technology policies and practices that meet the needs of people and society, by building a better understanding of people’s lived experiences and helping to better align the development, deployment and oversight of technologies with societal values. Secondly, it provides policy and practice with greater legitimacy and accountability by ensuring those who are affected have their voices and perspectives taken into account.

Taken together, the evidence base and legitimacy offered by public participation can support a more responsible data and technology ecosystem that earns the trust of the public, rather than erodes and undermines it. Possible approaches to this include:

  1. Members of the public could be assigned by democratically representative random lottery to independent governance panels that provide oversight of dominant technology firms and public-interest alternatives. Those public representatives could be supported by a panel of civil society organisations that interact with governing boards and scrutinise the activity of different entities involved in data-driven decision-making processes.
  2. Panels or juries of citizens could be coordinated by specialised civil society organisations to provide input on the audit and assessment of datasets and algorithms that have significant societal impacts and effects.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). Algorithmic impact assessment: a case study in healthcare. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Algorithmic-impact-assessment-a-case-study-in-healthcare.pdf[/footnote]
  3. Political institutions could conduct region-wide public deliberation exercises to gather public input and shape future regulation and enforcement of technology platforms. For example, a national or regional-wide public dialogue exercise could be conducted to consider how a novel technology application might be regulated, or to evaluate the implementation of different legislative proposals.
  4. Participatory co-design or deliberative assemblies could be used to help articulate what public interest data and technology corporations might look like (see the ‘BBC for Data’ above), as alternatives to privatised and multinational companies.

These four suggestions represent just a selection of provocations, and are far from exhaustive. The outcomes of public participation and deliberation can vary, from high-level sets of principles on how data is used, to detailed recommendations that policymakers are expected to implement. But in order to be successful, such initiatives need political will, support and buy-in, to ensure that their outcomes are acknowledged and adopted. Without this, participatory initiatives run the risk of ‘participation washing’, whereby public involvement is merely tokenistic.

Additionally, it is important to note that public participation is not about shifting responsibility back to people and civil society to decide on intricate matters, or to provide the justifications or ‘mandates’ for uses of data and technology that haven’t been ethically, legally or morally scrutinised. Rather it is about the institutions and organisations that develop, govern and regulate data and technology making sure they act in the best interests of the people who are affected by the use of data and technology.

Further considerations and provocative concepts

Marginalised communities in democratic governance

Jef Ausloos, Alexandra Giannopoulou and Jill Toh

 

As Europe and other parts of the world set out plans to regulate AI and other technology services, it is more urgent than ever to reflect critically on the value and practical application of those legally designed mechanisms in protecting social groups and individuals that are affected by high-risk AI systems and other technologies. The question of who has access to decision-making processes, and how these decisions are made, is crucial to address the harms caused by technologies.

 

The #BrusselsSoWhite conversations (a social media hashtag expounding on the lack of racial diversity in EU policy conversations)[footnote]Islam, S. (2021). ‘“Brussels So White” Needs Action, Not Magical Thinking’. EU Observer. Available at: https://euobserver.com/opinion/153343 and Azimy, R. (2020). ‘Why Is Brussels so White?’. Euro Babble. Available at: https://euro-babble.eu/2020/01/22/dlaczego-bruksela-jest-taka-biala/[/footnote] have clearly shown the absence and lack of marginalised people in discussions around European technology policymaking,[footnote]Çetin, R. B. (2021). ‘The Absence of Marginalised People in AI Policymaking’. Who Writes The Rules. Available at: https://www.whowritestherules.online/stories/cetin[/footnote] despite the EU expressing its commitment to anti-racism and inclusion.[footnote]European Commission. (2020). EU Anti-Racism Action Plan 2020-2025. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/combatting-discrimination/racism-and-xenophobia/eu-anti-racism-action-plan-2020-2025_en[/footnote]

Meaningful inclusion requires moving beyond the rhetoric, performativity and tokenisation of marginalised people. It requires looking inwards to assess if the existing work environment, internal practices, hiring and retention requirements are barriers to entry and exclusionary-by-design.[footnote]Çetin, R. B. (2021). ‘The Absence of Marginalised People in AI Policymaking’. Who Writes The Rules. Available at: https://www.whowritestherules.online/stories/cetin[/footnote] Additionally, mere representation is insufficient. This also requires a shift to recognise the value of different types of expertise, and seeing marginalised people’s experiences and knowledge as legitimate, and equal.

 

There are a few essential considerations for achieving this.

 

Firstly, legislators and civil society – particularly those active in the field of ‘technology law’ – should consider a broader ambit of rights, freedoms and interests at stake in order to capture the appropriate social rights and collective values generally left out from market-driven logics. This ought to be done by actively engaging with the communities affected and interfacing more thoroughly with respective pre-existing legal frameworks and value systems.[footnote]Meyer, L. (2021). ‘Nothing About Us, Without Us: Introducing Digital Rights for All’. Digital Freedom Fund. Available at: https://digitalfreedomfund.org/nothing-about-us-without-us-introducing-digital-rights-for-all/; Niklas, J. and Dencik, L. (2021). ‘What rights matter? Examining the place of social rights in the EU’s artificial intelligence policy debate’. Internet Policy Review, 10(3). Available at: https://policyreview.info/articles/analysis/what-rights-matter-examining-place-social-rights-eus-artificial-intelligence; and Taylor, L. and Mukiri-Smith, H. (2021). ‘Human Rights, Technology and Poverty’. Research Handbook on Human Rights and Poverty. Available at: https://www.elgaronline.com/view/edcoll/9781788977500/9781788977500.00049.xml[/footnote]

 

Secondly, the dominant narrative in EU techno-policymaking frames all considered fundamental rights and freedoms from the perspective of protecting ‘the individual’ against ‘big tech’. This should be complemented with a wider concern for the substantial collective and societal harm generated and exacerbated by the development and use of data-driven technologies by private and public actors.

 

Thirdly, in consideration of the flurry of regulatory proposals, there should be more effective rules on lobbying, related to transparency and funding requirements and funding sources for thinktanks and other organisations. The revolving door between European institutions and technology companies continues to remain highly problematic and providing independent oversight with investigative powers is crucial.[footnote]Corporate Europe Observatory. (2021). The Lobby Network: Big Tech’s Web of Influence in the EU. Available at: https://corporateeurope.org/en/2021/08/lobby-network-big-techs-web-influence-eu[/footnote]

 

Lastly, more (law) is not always better. Especially, civil society and academia ought to think more creatively on how legal and non-legal approaches may prove to be productive in tackling the collective hams produced by (the actors controlling) data-driven technologies. Policymakers and enforcement agencies should proactively support such efforts.

Further to these considerations, one approach to embedding public participation into technology policymaking is to facilitate meaningful and diverse deliberation on the principles and values that should guide new legislation and inform technology design.

For example, to facilitate public deliberation on the rules governing how emerging technologies are developed, the governing institutions responsible for overseeing new technologies – be it local, national or supranational government – could establish a citizens’ assembly.[footnote]For more information about citizens’ assemblies see: Involve. (2018). Citizens’ Assembly. Available at: https://www.involve.org.uk/resources/methods/citizens-assembly. For an example of how public deliberation about complex technologies can work in practice, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). The Citizens’ Biometrics Council. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/citizens-biometrics-council/[/footnote]

Citizens’ assemblies can take various forms, from small groups of citizens in a local community discussing a single issue over a few days, to many hundreds of citizens from across regions considering a complex topic across a series of weeks and months.

Citizens’ assemblies must include representation of a demographically diverse cross-section of people in the region. Those citizens should come together in a series of day-long workshops, hosted across a period of several months, and independently facilitated. During those workshops, the facilitators should provide objective and accessible information about the technological issue concerned and the objectives of legislative or technical frameworks.

The assembly must be able to hear from and ask questions to experts on the topic, representing a mix of independent professionals and those holding professional or official roles with associated parties – such as policymakers and technology developers.

At the end of their deliberations, the citizens in the assembly should be supported to develop a set of recommendations – free from influence of any vested parties – with the expectation that these recommendations will be directly addressed or considered in the design of any legislative or technical frameworks. Such citizens’ assemblies can be an important tool, in addition to grassroot engagement in political parties and civil society, for bringing people into work on societal issues.

Food for thought

As policymakers around the world develop and implement novel data and technology regulations, it is essential that public participation forms a core part of this drafting process. At a time when trust in governments and technology companies is reaching record lows in many regions, policymakers must experiment with richer forms of public engagement beyond one-way consultations. By empowering members of the public to co-create the policy that impacts their lives, policymakers can create more representative and more legitimate laws and regulations around data.

In order to trigger further discussion, a set of questions are offered as provocations for thinking about how to implement public participation and deliberation mechanisms in practice:

  1. Public participation requires a mobilisation of resources and new processes throughout the cycle of technology policymaking. What incentives, resources and support do policymakers and governments need, to be able to undertake public engagement and participation in the development of data and AI policy?
  2. Public participation methods need strategic design, and limits need to be taken into consideration. Given the ubiquitous and multi-use nature of data and AI, what discrete topics and cases can be meaningfully engaged with and deliberated on by members of the public?
  3. Inclusive public participation is essential, to ensuring a representative public deliberation process that delivers outcomes for those affected by technology policymaking. Which communities and groups are the most disproportionately harmed or affected by data and AI, and what mechanisms can ensure their experiences and voices are included in dialogue?
  4. It is important to make sure that public participation is not used as a ‘stamp of approval’ and does not become merely a tick-box exercise. To avoid ‘participation washing’, what will encourage governments, industry and other power holders to engage meaningfully with the public, whereby recommendations made by citizens are honoured and addressed?

Chapter 3: Conclusions and open questions

In this report, we started with two questions: What is a more ambitious vision for data use and regulation that can deliver a positive shift in the digital ecosystem? And what are the most promising interventions to create a more balanced system of power and a people-first approach for data?

In Chapter 1, we defined the central problem: that today’s digital economy is built on deep-rooted exploitative and extractive data practices and forms of ‘data rentiership,’ which have resulted in the accrual of vast amounts of power to a handful of large platforms.

We explained how this power imbalance has prevented benefits to people, who are largely unable to control how their data is collected and used, and are increasingly disempowered from engaging in, seeking redress or contesting data-driven decisions that affect their lives.

In Chapter 2 we outlined four cross-cutting interventions concerning infrastructure, data governance, institutions and participation that can help redress that power imbalance in the current digital ecosystem. We recognise that these interventions are not sufficient to solve the problems described above, but we propose them as a realistic first step towards a systemic change.

From interventions, framed as objectives for policy and institutional change, we moved to provocative concepts: more tangible examples of how changing the power balance could work in practice. While we acknowledge that, in the current conditions, these concepts open up more questions than they give answers, we hope other researchers and civil society organisations will join us in an effort to build evidence that validates or establishes limitations to their usefulness.

Before we continue the exploration of specific solutions (legal rules, institutional arrangements, technical standards) that have the potential to transform the current digital ecosystem towards what we have called ‘a people-first approach’, we reiterate how important it is to think about this change in a systemic way.

A systemic vision envisages all four interventions as interconnected, mutually reinforcing and dependent on one another. And requires consideration of external ‘preconditions’ that could prevent or impede this systemic reform. We identify the preconditions for the interventions to deliver results as: the efficiency and values of the enforcement bodies, increasing the possibilities for individual and collective legal action, and reducing the dependency of key political stakeholders on (the infrastructure and expertise of) large technology companies.

In this last chapter we not only acknowledge political, legal and market conditions that determine the possibilities for transformation of the digital ecosystem, but also propose questions to guide further discussion about these – very practical – challenges:

1. Effective regulatory enforcement

Increased regulatory enforcement, in the context of both national and international cooperation, is a necessary precondition to the success of the interventions described above. As described in Chapter 1, resolving the regulatory enforcement problem will help create meaningful safeguards and regulatory guardrails to support change.

An important aspect of regulatory enforcement and cooperation measures includes the ability of one authority to supply timely information to other authorities from different sectors and from different jurisdictions, subject to relevant procedural safeguards. Some models of this kind of regulatory cooperation already exist – in the UK, the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (DRCF) is a cross-regulatory body formed in 2020 by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), and includes the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) and the Office of Communications (Ofcom).[footnote]Information Commissioner’s Office. (2020). ‘Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum’. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/what-we-do/digital-regulation-cooperation-forum/[/footnote]

Where regulatory action is initiated against major platforms and global players, new measures should be considered as part of international regulators’ fora, that will provide the possibility to create ad hoc enforcement task forces across sectors and geographic jurisdictions, and to institutionalise such bodies, where necessary. The possibility of creating multi-sectoral and multi-geographic oversight and enforcement bodies focusing only on the biggest players in the global data and digital economy should be actively considered.

Moreover, it is necessary to create formal channels of communication between enforcement bodies, to be able to share sensitive information that might be needed in investigations. Currently, many enforcement authorities cannot share important information they have obtained in the course of their procedures with enforcement authorities that have a different area of competence or operate in a different jurisdiction. As data and all-purpose technologies are currently used by large platforms, any single enforcement body will not be able to see the full picture of risks and harms, leading to suboptimal enforcement of platforms and data practices. Coherent and holistic enforcement is needed.

 Questions that need to be addressed:

  • What would an integrated approach to regulation and enforcement be constituted in practice, embedding data protection, consumer protection and competition law objectives and mechanisms?
  • How can we uphold procedural rights, such as the right to good administration and to effective judicial remedy, in the context of transnational and trans-sectoral disputes?
  • How can enforcement authorities be made accountable where they fail to enforce the law effectively?
  • How to build more resilient enforcement structures that are less susceptible to corporate capture?
Taking into account collective harm

Jef Ausloos, Alexandra Giannopoulou and Jill Toh

 

Despite efforts to prevent it from being a mere checkbox exercise, GDPR compliance efforts often suffer from a narrow-focused framing, ignoring the multifarious issues that (can) arise in complex data-driven technologies and infrastructures. A meaningful appreciation of the broader context and the evaluation of potential impacts on (groups of) individuals and communities is necessary in order to move from ‘compliance’ narratives to fairer data ecosystems that are continuously evaluated and confronted with the potential individual or collective harms caused by data-driven technologies.

 

Public decision-makers responsible for deploying new technologies should start by questioning critically the very reason for adopting a specific data-driven technology in the first place. These actors should fundamentally be able to first demonstrate the necessity of the system itself, before assessing what data collection and processing the respective system would require. For instance, in the example of the migrant-monitoring system Centaur used in new refugee camps in Greece, authorities should be able to first demonstrate in general terms the necessity of a surveillance system, before assessing the inherent data collection and processing that Centaur would require and what would justify as necessary.

 

This deliberation is a complex exercise. Where the GDPR requires a data protection impact assessment, this deliberation is left to data controllers, before being subject to any type of questioning by relevant authorities.

 

One problem is that data controllers often define the legitimacy of a chosen system by stretching the meaning of GDPR criteria, or by benefitting from the lack of strict compliance processes for principles (such as data minimisation and data protection by design and by default) in order to demonstrate compliance. This can lead to a narrow norm-setting environment, because even if operating under rather flexible concepts (such as the respect of data protection principles as set out in the GDPR), the data controllers’ interpretation remains constricted in practice and neglects to consider new types of harms and impacts on a wider level.

 

While the responsibility to identify and mitigate harms is the responsibility of the data controller, civil society organisations could play an important facilitator role (without placing any formal burden to facilitate this process) in revealing collective harms that complex data-driven technological systems are likely to inflict on specific communities and groups, as well as sector-specific or community-specific interpretations of these harms.[footnote]And formalised through GDPR mechanisms such as codes of conduct (Article 40) and certification mechanisms (Article 42).[/footnote]

 

In practice, accountability measures would then require that the responsible actors need not only demonstrate the consideration of these possible broader collective harms, but also the active measures and steps taken to prevent them from materialising.

 

Put briefly, both data protection authorities and those controlling impactful data-driven technologies, need to recognise they can be held accountable for, and have to address, complex harms and impacts on individuals and communities. For instance, from a legal perspective, and as recognised under the GDPR’s data protection by design and by default requirement,[footnote]Article 25 of the GDPR.[/footnote] this means that compliance ought not to be seen as a one-off effort at the start of any complex data-driven technological system, but rather a continuous exercise considering the broader implications of data infrastructures on everyone involved.

 

Perhaps more importantly, and because not all harms and impacts can be anticipated, robust mechanisms should be in place enabling and empowering affected individuals and communities to challenge (specific parts of) data-driven technologies. While the GDPR may offer some tools for empowering those affected (e.g. data rights), they cannot be seen as goals in themselves, but need to be interpreted and accommodated in light of the context in which, and interests for which, they are invoked.

2. Legal action and representation

Another way to support the proposed interventions in Chapter 2 having their desired effect is to create more avenues for civil society organisations, groups and individuals to hold large platforms accountable for abuses of their data rights, as well as state authorities that do not adequately fulfil their enforcement tasks.

Mandating the exercise of data rights to intermediary entities is being explored as a way to address information and power asymmetries and systemic data-driven injustices at a collective level.[footnote]Giannopoulou, A., Ausloos, J., Delacroix, S and Janssen, H. (2022). ‘Mandating Data Rights Exercises’. Social Science Research Network. Available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=4061726[/footnote] The GDPR does not prevent the exercise of data rights through intermediaries, and rights delegation (as opposed to waiving the right to data protection, which is not possible under EU law since fundamental rights are inalienable), has started to be recognised in data protection legislation globally.

For example, in India[footnote]See: draft Indian Personal Data Protection Bill (2019). Available at: https://prsindia.org/files/bills_acts/bills_parliament/2019/Personal%20Data%20Protection%20Bill,%202019.pdf[/footnote] and Canada,[footnote]See: draft Canadian Digital Charter Implementation Act (2020). Available at: https://www.parl.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/bill/C-11/first-reading[/footnote] draft data protection and privacy bills speak about intermediaries that can exercise the rights conferred by law. In the US, the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)[footnote]See: California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. Available at: https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?division=3.&part=4.&lawCode=CIV&title=1.81.5[/footnote] and the California Privacy Rights Act (CPRA)[footnote]See: California Privacy Rights Act of 2020. Available at: https://iapp.org/resources/article/the-california-privacy-rights-act-of-2020[/footnote] – which amends and expands the CCPA – both mention ‘authorised agents’, and the South Korean Personal Information Protection Act[footnote]See: Article 38 of the South Korean Personal Information Protection Act of 2020. Available in English at: https://elaw.klri.re.kr/kor_service/lawView.do?hseq=53044&lang=ENG[/footnote] also talks about ‘representatives’ who can be authorised by the data subject to exercise rights.

Other legal tools enabling legal action for individuals and collectives are Article 79 of the GDPR, which allows data subjects to bring compliance orders before courts, and Article 80(2) of the GDPR, which allows representative bodies to bring collective actions without the explicit mandate of data subjects. Both these mechanisms are underused and underenforced, receiving little court attention.

One step further would be to strengthen the capacity for civil society to pursue collective legal action for rights violations directly against the large players or against state authorities that do not adequately fulfil their enforcement tasks. The effort of reforming legal action and representation rules in order to make them more accessible for civil society actors and collectives needs to include measures to reduce the high costs for bringing court claims.[footnote]For example, in Lloyd v Google, the respondent is said to have secured £15.5m backing from Therium, a UK litigation funder, to cover legal costs. See: Thompson, B. (2017). ‘Google faces UK suit over alleged snooping on iPhone users’. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/9d8c7136-d506-11e7-8c9a-d9c0a5c8d5c9. Lloyd v Google is a landmark case in the UK seeking collective claims on behalf of several millions of people against Google’s practices of tracking Apple iPhone users and collecting data for commercial purposes without the user’s knowledge or consent. The UK’s Supreme Court verdict was not to allow collective claims, which means that every individual would have to seek legal action independently and prove material damage or distress, bearing the full costs of litigation. The full judgement is available here: https://www.supremecourt.uk/cases/docs/uksc-2019-0213-judgment.pdf[/footnote] Potential solutions could be cost-capping for certain general actions when the claimant cannot afford the case. 

Questions that need to be addressed:

  • How can existing mechanisms for legal action and representation be made more accessible to civil society actors and collectives?
  • What new mechanisms and processes need to be designed for documenting abuses and proving harms, to address systemic data-driven injustices at a collective level?
  • How can cost barriers to legal action be reduced?

3. Removing industry dependencies

Finally, another way to ensure the interventions described above are successful is to lessen dependencies between regulators, civil society organisations and corporate actors. Industry dependencies can take many forms, including the sponsoring of major conferences for academia and civil society, and funding policy-oriented thinktanks that seek to advise regulators.[footnote]Solon, O. and Siddiqui, S. (2017). ‘Forget Wall Street – Silicon Valley is the new political power in Washington’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/sep/03/silicon-valley-politics-lobbying-washington[/footnote] [footnote]Stacey, K. and Gilbert, C. (2022). ‘Big Tech increases funding to US foreign policy think-tanks’. Financial Times. Available at https://www.ft.com/content/4e4ca1d2-2d80-4662-86d0-067a10aad50b[/footnote] While these dependencies do not necessarily lead to direct influence over research outputs or decisions, they do raise a risk of eroding independent critique and evaluation of large digital platforms. 

There are only a small number of specialist university faculties and research institutes working on data, digital and societal impacts that do not operate, in one way or another, with funding from large platforms.[footnote]Clarke, L., Williams, O. and Swindells, K. (2021). ‘How Google quietly funds Europe’s leading tech policy institutes’. The New Statesman. Available at: https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/big-tech/2021/07/how-google-quietly-funds-europe-s-leading-tech-policy-institutes[/footnote] This industry-resource dependency can risk jeopardising academic independence. A recent report highlighted that ‘[b]ig tech’s control over AI resources made universities and other institutions dependent on these companies, creating a web of conflicted relationships that threaten academic freedom and our ability to understand and regulate these corporate technologies.’[footnote]Whittaker, M. (2021). ‘The steep cost of capture’. ACM Interactions. Available at: https://interactions.acm.org/archive/view/november-december-2021/the-steep-cost-of-capture[/footnote]

This points to the need for a more systematic approach to countering corporate dependencies. Civil society, academia and the media play an important role in counterbalancing the narratives and actions of large corporations. Appropriate public funding, statutory rights and protection are necessary for them to be able to fulfil their function as balancing actors, but also as visionaries for alternative and potentially better ecosystems.

Questions that need to be addressed:

  • What would alternative funding models (such as public or philanthropic) that remove dependencies on industry be constituted?
  • Could national research councils (such as UKRI) and public funding play a bigger role in creating dedicated funding streams to support universities, independent media and civil society organisations, to shield them from corporate financing?
  • What type of mechanisms and legal measures need to be put in place, to establish endowment funds for specific purposes, creating sufficient incentives for founding members, but without compromising governance? (For example, donors, including large companies, could benefit from specific tax deductions but wouldn’t have any rights or decision-making power in how an endowment is governed, and capital endowments would be allowed but not recurring operating support, as that creates dependency).

Open invitation and call to action

A complete overturn of the existing data ecosystem cannot happen overnight. In this report, we acknowledge that a multifaceted approach is necessary for such a reform to be effective. Needless to say, there is no single, off-the-shelf solution that – on its own – will change the paradigm. Looking towards ideas that can produce substantial transformations can seem overwhelming, and it is also necessary to acknowledge and factor in the challenges that lie with adopting less revolutionary ideas into practice.

Acknowledging that there are many instruments that remain to be fully tested and understood in existing legislation, in this report we set off to develop the most promising tools for intervention that can take us towards a people-first digital ecosystem that’s fit for the middle of the twenty-first century.

In this intellectual journey, we explored a set of instruments, which carry transformative potential, and divided them into four areas that reflect the biggest obstacles we will face when imagining a deep reform of the digital ecosystem: control over technology infrastructure, power over how data is purposed and governed, balancing asymmetries with new institutions and more social accountability with inclusive participation in policymaking.

We unpacked some of the complexity of these challenges, and asked questions that we deem critical for the success of this complex reform. With this opening, we hope to fuel a collective effort to articulate ambitious aspirations for data use and regulation that work for people and society.

Reinforcing our invitation in 2020 to ‘rethink data’, we call on policymakers, researchers, civil society organisations, funders and industry to build towards more radical transformations, reflecting critically, testing and further developing these proposed concepts for change.

Who What you can do
Policymakers ●      Transpose the proposed interventions into policy action and help build the pathway towards a comprehensive and transformative vision for data

●      Ensure that impediments to effective enforcement of existing regulatory regimes are identified and removed

●      Use evidence of public opinion to proactively develop policy, governance and regulatory mechanisms that work for people and society.

Researchers ●      Reflect critically on the goals, strengths and weaknesses of the proposed concepts for change

●      Build on the proposed concepts for change with further research into potential solutions.

Civil society organisations ●      Analyse the proposed transformations and propose ways to build a proactive (instead of reactive) agenda in policy

●      Be ambitious and bold, visualise a positive future for data and society

●      Advocate for transformative changes in data policy and practice and make novel approaches possible.

Funders ●      Include exploration of the four proposed interventions in your annual funding agenda, or create a new funding stream for a more radical vision for data

●      Support researchers and civil society organisations to remain independent of government and industry

●      Fund efforts that work towards advancing concepts for systemic change.

Industry ●      Support the development and implementation of open standards in a more inclusive way (incorporating diverse perspectives)

●      Contribute to developing mechanisms for the responsible use of data for social benefit

●      Incorporate transparency into practices, including being open about internal processes and insights, and allowing researcher access and independent oversight.

Final notes

Context for our work

One of the core conundrums that motivated the establishment of the Ada Lovelace Institute by the Nuffield Foundation in 2018 was how to construct a system for data use and governance that engendered public trust, enabled the protection of individual rights and facilitated the use of data as a public good.

Even before the Ada Lovelace Institute was fully operational, Ada’s originating Board members (Sir Alan Wilson, Hetan Shah, Professor Helen Margetts, Azeem Azhar, Alix Dunn and Professor Huw Price) had begun work on a prospectus to establish a programme of work, guided by a working group, to look ‘beyond data ownership’ at future possibilities for overhauling data use and management. This programme built on the foundations of the Royal Society and British Academy 2017 report, Data Use and Management, and grew to become Rethinking Data.

Ada set out an ambitious vision for a research programme, to develop a countervailing vision for data, which could make the case for its social value, tackle asymmetries of power and data injustice, and promote and enable responsible and trustworthy use of data. Rethinking Data aimed to examine and reframe the kinds of language and narratives we use when talking about data, define what ‘good’ looks like in practice when data is collected, shared and used, and recommend changes in regulations so that data rights can be effectively exercised, and data responsibilities are clear.

There has been some progress in changing narratives, practices and regulations: popular culture (in the form of documentaries such as The Social Dilemma and Coded Bias), corporate product choices (like Apple’s decision to restrict tracking by default on iPhone apps) and high-profile news stories (such as the Ofqual algorithm fiasco, which saw students take to British streets to protest ‘F**k the algorithm’), have contributed to an evolving and more informed narrative about data.

The potential of data-driven technologies has been front and centre in public health messaging around the pandemic response, and debates around contact tracing apps have revealed a rich and nuanced spectrum of public attitudes to the trade-off between individual privacy and the public interest. The Ada Lovelace Institute’s own public deliberation research during the pandemic showed that the ‘privacy vs the pandemic’ arguments entrenched in media and policy narratives are contested by the public.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2020). No green lights, no red lines – Public perspectives on COVID-19 technologies. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/No-green-lights-no-red-lines-final.pdf and Parker, I. (2020). ‘It’s complicated: what the public thinks about COVID-19 technologies’. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/no-green-lights-no-red-lines/[/footnote]

There is now an emerging discourse around ‘data stewardship’, the responsible and trustworthy management of data in practice, to which the Ada Lovelace Institute has contributed via research which canvasses nascent legal mechanisms and participatory approaches for improving ethical data practices.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Exploring legal mechanisms for data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/legal-mechanisms-data-stewardship/ and Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatory-data-stewardship/[/footnote] The prospect of new institutions and mechanisms for empowering individuals in the governance of their data is gaining ground, and the role of new data intermediaries is being explored in legislative debates in Europe, India and Canada,[footnote]Data Trusts. (2020). International approaches to data trusts: recent policy developments from India, Canada and the EU. Available at: https://datatrusts.uk/blogs/international-policy-developments[/footnote] as well as in the data reform consultation in the UK.[footnote]See: Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS). (2021). Data: A new direction, Section 7. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/data-a-new-direction[/footnote]

Methodology

The underlying research for this project was primarily informed by the range of expert perspectives in the Rethinking data working group. It was supplemented by established and emerging research in this landscape and refined by several research pieces commissioned from leading experts on data policy.

Like most other things, the COVID-19 pandemic made the task of the Rethinking data working group immensely more difficult, not least because we had envisaged the deliberation of the group (which spans three continents) would take place in person. Despite this, the working group persisted and managed 10 meetings over a 12 month period.

To start with, the working group met to identify and analyse themes and tensions in the current data ecosystem. In the first stage of these deliberations, they singled out the key questions and challenges they felt were most important, such as questions around the infrastructure used to collect and store data, emerging regulatory proposals for markets and data-driven technologies, and the market landscape that major technology companies operate in.

Once these challenges were identified, the working group used a horizon-scanning methodology, to explore the underlying assumptions, power dynamics and tensions. To complement the key insights from the working group discussion, a landscape overview on ‘future technologies’ – such as privacy-enhancing techniques, edge computing, and others – was commissioned from the University of Cambridge.

The brief looked at emerging trends that present more pervasive, targeted or potentially intrusive data capture, focusing only on the more notable or growing models. The aim was to identify potential glimpses into how power will operate in new settings created by technology, and how the big business players’ approach to people and data might evolve as a result of these new developments, without the intention to predict or to forecast how trends will play out.

Having identified power and centralisation of large technology companies as two of the major themes for concern, in the second stage of the deliberations, the two major questions the working group considered were: What are the most important manifestations of power? And what are the most promising interventions to enabling an ambitious vision for the future of data use and regulation?

Speculative thinking methodologies, such as speculative scenarios, were used as provocations for the working group, to think beyond the current challenges, allowing different concepts for interventions to be discussed. The three developed scenarios highlighted potential tensions and warned about fallacies that could emerge if a simplistic view around regulation was employed.

In the last stage of our process, the interventions suggested by the working group were mapped into an ecosystem of interventions that could support positive transformations to emerge. Commissioned experts were invited to surface further challenges, problems and open questions associated with different interventions.

Acknowledgements

This report was lead authored by Valentina Pavel, with substantive contributions from Carly Kind, Andrew Strait, Imogen Parker, Octavia Reeve, Aidan Peppin, Katarzyna Szymielewicz, Michael Veale, Raegan MacDonald, Orla Lynskey and Paul Nemitz.

Working group members

Name Affiliation (where appropriate)
Diane Coyle (co-chair) Bennett Professor of Public Policy, University of Cambridge
Paul Nemitz (co-chair) Principal Adviser on Justice Policy, EU Commission, visiting Professor of Law at College of Europe
Amba Kak Director of Global Policy & Programs, AI Now Institute
Amelia Andersdotter Data Protection Technical Expert and Founder, Dataskydd
Anne Cheung Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong
Martin TisnĂŠ Managing Director, Luminate
Michael Veale Lecturer in Digital Rights and Regulation, University College London
Natalie Hyacinth Senior Research Associate, University of Bristol
Natasha McCarthy Head of Policy, Data, The Royal Society
Katarzyna Szymielewicz President, Panoptykon Foundation
Orla Lynskey Associate Professor of Law, London School of Economics
Raegan MacDonald Tech-policy expert
Rashida Richardson Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Northeastern University School of Law & College of Social Sciences and Humanities
Ravi Naik Legal Director, AWO
Steven Croft Founding board member, Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI)
Taylor Owen Associate Professor, McGill University – Max Bell School of Public Policy

Commissioned experts

Name Affiliation (where appropriate)
Ian Brown Leading specialist on internet regulation and pro-competition mechanisms such as interoperability
Jathan Sadowski Senior research fellow, Emerging Technologies Research Lab, Monash University
Jef Ausloos Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam
Jill Toh Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam
Alexandra Giannopoulou Institute for Information Law (IViR), University of Amsterdam

External reviewers

Name Affiliation (where appropriate)
AgustĂ­n Reyna Director, Legal and Economic Affairs, BEUC
Jeni Tennison Executive Director, Connected by data
Theresa Stadler Doctoral assistant, Security and Privacy Engineering Lab, at Ecole Polytechnique FĂŠdĂŠrale de Lausanne (EPFL)
Alek Tarkowski Director of Strategy, Open Future Foundation

Throughout the working group deliberations we also received support from Annabel
Manley, research assistant at the University of Cambridge, and Jovan Powar and Dr Jat
Singh, Compliant & Accountable Systems Group at the University of Cambridge.

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  34. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  35. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  36. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  37. European Commission. (2022). ‘European Media Freedom Act: Commission launches public consultation’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_85
  38. The Economist. (2021). ‘Populists are threatening Europe’s independent public broadcasters’. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/08/populists-are-threatening-europes-independent-public-broadcasters
  39. The Economist. (2021).
  40. The Sutton Trust. (2019). Elitist Britain, pp. 40–42. Available at: https://www.suttontrust.com/our-research/elitist-britain-2019/; Friedman, S. and Laurison, D. (2019). ‘The class pay gap: why it pays to be privileged’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/07/the-class-pay-gap-why-it-pays-to-be-privileged
  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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To make it simpler, we’ve created a grid of important terms and issues that can form a basis for a shared language. This will make it easier for everyone – from technical experts to policymakers to the public – to be able to participate in the conversation on facial recognition. 

Many things come under the umbrella of ‘facial recognition technology’: using your face to unlock your mobile phone, using a shop or a bar’s security camera footage to match against a watchlist of possible shoplifters, checking someone’s age when buying alcohol at self-checkouts, or using an airport e-passport gate. All of these are called facial recognition technology, but there are significant differences in how they work, the data they use, where they happen and who is in control of the system.

These four dimensions help clarify different cases of facial recognition technology, and the issues that surround them:

  1. Task – when people talk about facial recognition technology, they’re usually referring to the use of advanced statistical analysis to do one of a number of tasks
  2. Data – the data on which a facial recognition system operates
  3. Deployment – where and how a facial recognition technology is used in the world
  4. Purpose – by who, and for whom, the technology is used

Task

Facial recognition technology usually refers to using advanced statistical analysis on images of people to do one (or more) of the following tasks:

  • Detection – identifying that there is a face in an image or series of images, and where it is located in the image(s). This is usually the first step of a facial recognition process, to enable matching, identification or classification on only the relevant parts of an image.
  • Clustering – grouping similar faces in a collection of images. For instance, if a system had photographs of people attending a football match, clustering could be used to group together the photos of each unique face at the football match, without having pre-existing data about attendees.
  • Matching – comparing a facial image or images against a pre-existing set of images to see if there’s a match e.g. matching faces from shop surveillance footage against a list of images of barred persons or matching faces from a crowd against images of ‘persons of interest’ in police watchlists.
  • Identification – comparing a face to a specific identity. This could be done for two purposes:
    • Verification – answering the question, ‘Is this person who we think they are?’ e.g. the police checking if the person in an image matches their suspect.
    • Authorisation – answering the question, ‘Is this person who they claim to be?’ e.g. to allow access to something, such as using Face ID to unlock an iPhone.
  • Classifying – identifying a characteristic of a face, such as age, gender or expression. This is sometimes referred to as facial analysis because it’s used to tell us something about the face e.g. at a supermarket checkout to assess whether someone is old enough to buy alcohol.

Apple’s Face ID lets you unlock your phone with your face. This is an example of facial identification for authorisation. This differs from Facewatch, a facial recognition security system for businesses, which does facial matching of CCTV footage against a watchlist of ‘persons of interest’. Facial ‘emotion’ recognition has been in the news after use by Unilever in the UK for job interviewing. This is classification of facial images according to expressions – a smile, a frown – though the claim that this can then be used to identify emotion is highly contested.

Data

Facial recognition systems are biometric systems – they use biometric data, which is sensitive as it’s very personal and based on biological characteristics that are hard for people to change. If someone finds out your password, you can change it. But if someone has a recording or photo of your face, you probably don’t want to change your face. Many people already have photos of themselves on the internet, and it can be hard to spot if you’re recorded by CCTV, making it difficult for people to know when their data might be collected or subject to facial recognition technology.

Probe images are new, unknown images collected to input into a facial recognition system when it’s in use. Here are several ways probe images may differ across facial recognition systems:

  • Personal/private vs public – images can be taken in public places, from government databases, from the internet, or collected privately.
  • Retention and duration – how long data will be stored, what format it will be stored in (e.g. original images, metadata or abstracted representation) and where it will it be stored are relevant, as are opportunities for redress and transparency about retention.
  • Resolution and image quality – resolution and other quality factors such as lighting will make images more or less likely to be accurately recognised by a system.

There are also specific considerations around training data – which is initial data used to develop a machine learning model for facial recognition, often referred to as ‘training’ the model. This is typically a set of images or features already labelled by a human that the model can ‘learn’ from. Additional considerations here include how representative the images are and the risk of bias – if one group of people is over/under represented in the training data, the system might be better/worse at recognising them.

Deployment

Facial recognition systems can be used in different environments or scenarios – such as in airports, bars or out on the streets. This can be called the deployment of the system. Some ways to think about these different deployments are:

  • Live vs after-the-fact – whether images are processed ‘live’, by which we mean near-real time, versus at a later point can change the way outputs can be used, and could have implication for transparency and civil liberties. For instance, ‘live’ facial recognition technology can result in actions being taken immediately, whereas performing facial recognition on historical images, such as yesterday’s CCTV, can raise questions as to whether people are aware of how their image is being processed.
  • Controlled vs uncontrolled – a controlled environment is one where important factors like lighting, background and position can be controlled, e.g. a lab environment, or e-passport gates where parts of the process are standardised. An uncontrolled environment is the real world, where all these things may vary, making facial recognition much more challenging.
  • Transparency – those deploying facial recognition technology may be more or less transparent about the fact it is being used, how it is being used and how it works. That means we may not always be able to identify the characteristics described here for every system.

Purpose

Lastly, it’s important to consider for and by who the technology is being used – whose purpose? In our first research into public attitudes, ‘Beyond Face Value’, we included a range of different purposes. We found 77% of people were uncomfortable with facial recognition technology being used in shops to track customers and 76% were uncomfortable with it being used by HR departments in recruitment, but that people were more comfortable with use in policing or airports.

Sometimes the technology will be used for more than one of these purposes (just as it could do more than one task), and will likely face multiple data considerations. Identifying what those purposes are, however, is important to framing the discussion and pinpointing causes of excitement or concern. A technology or system may be helpful for one group’s purposes, but problematic when used for the purpose of another.

At a glance

Moving forward

We hope these terms are helpful to conversations moving forward. If you’ve used them or have feedback – we’d love to hear about it. You can reach us at hello@adalovelaceinstitute.org. If you’d like to share these terms to help clarify the conversation, we’re on Twitter @adalovelaceinst.

We’ve also put the table of terms and definitions on GitHub and welcome contributions.

Thanks to William Isaac from Google DeepMind for feedback on a draft of this piece.

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  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
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  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
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  23. The 12th Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty, the regulatory framework for public service and commercial broadcasting across Germany’s federal states, introduced a three-step test for assessing whether online services offered by public service broadcasters met their public service remit. Under the three-step test, the broadcaster needs to assess: first, whether a new or significantly amended digital service satisfies the democratic, social and cultural needs of society; second, whether it contributes to media competition from a qualitative point of view and; third, the associated financial cost. See: Institute for Media and Communication Policy. (2009). Drei-Stufen-Test. Available at: http://medienpolitik.eu/drei-stufen-test/
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  36. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  37. European Commission. (2022). ‘European Media Freedom Act: Commission launches public consultation’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_85
  38. The Economist. (2021). ‘Populists are threatening Europe’s independent public broadcasters’. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/08/populists-are-threatening-europes-independent-public-broadcasters
  39. The Economist. (2021).
  40. The Sutton Trust. (2019). Elitist Britain, pp. 40–42. Available at: https://www.suttontrust.com/our-research/elitist-britain-2019/; Friedman, S. and Laurison, D. (2019). ‘The class pay gap: why it pays to be privileged’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/07/the-class-pay-gap-why-it-pays-to-be-privileged
  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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This report sets out the first-known detailed proposal for the use of an algorithmic impact assessment for data access in a healthcare context – the UK National Health Service (NHS)’s proposed National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP).

It proposes a process for AIAs, which aims to ensure that algorithmic uses of public-sector data are evaluated and governed to produce benefits for society, governments, public bodies and technology developers, as well as the people represented in the data and affected by the technologies and their outcomes

This includes actionable steps for the AIA process, alongside more general considerations for the use of AIAs in other public and private-sector contexts.

This report is supported by a sample user guide and template for the process.

  1. User guide (HTML, PDF)
  2. AIA template (HTML)

Glossary of abbreviated terms

 

AIA: Algorithmic impact assessment

DAC: Data Access Committee

NMIP: National Medical Imaging Platform

Executive summary

Governments, public bodies and developers of artificial intelligence (AI) systems are becoming interested in algorithmic impact assessments (referred to throughout this report as ‘AIAs’) as a means to create better understanding of and accountability for potential benefits and harms from AI systems. At the same time – as a rapidly growing area of AI research and application – healthcare is recognised as a domain where AI has the potential to bring significant benefits, albeit with wide-ranging implications for people and society.

This report offers the first-known detailed proposal for the use of an algorithmic impact assessment for data access in a healthcare context – the UK National Health Service (NHS)’s proposed National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP). It includes actionable steps for the AIA process, alongside more general considerations for the use of AIAs in other public
and private-sector contexts.

There are a range of algorithmic accountability mechanisms being used in the public sector, designed to hold the people and institutions that design and deploy AI systems accountable to those affected by them.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute, Open Government Partnership. (2021). Algorithmic accountability for the public sector. Open Government Partnership. Available at: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector/[/footnote] AIAs are an emerging mechanism, proposed as a method for building algorithmic accountability, as they have the potential to help build public
trust, mitigate potential harm and maximise potential benefit of AI systems.

Carrying out an AIA involves assessing possible societal impacts of an AI system before implementation (with ongoing monitoring often advised).[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the black box: tools for assessing AI systems. Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems/[/footnote]

AIAs are not a complete solution for accountability on their own: they are best complemented by other algorithmic accountability initiatives, such as audits or transparency registers.

AIAs are currently largely untested in public-sector contexts. This project synthesises existing literature with new research to propose both a use case for AIA methods and a detailed process for a robust algorithmic impact assessment. This research has been conducted in the context of a specific example of an AIA in a healthcare setting, to explore the potential for this accountability mechanism to help data-driven innovations to fulfil their potential to support new practices in healthcare.

In the UK, the national Department for Health and Social Care and the English National Health Service (NHS) are supporting public and private sector AI research and development, by enabling access for developers and researchers to high-quality medical imaging datasets to train and validate AI systems. However, data-driven healthcare innovations also have the potential to produce harmful outcomes and exacerbate existing health and social inequalities, by undermining patient consent to data use and public trust in AI systems. These impacts can result in serious harm to both individuals and groups who are often ‘left behind’ in provision of health and social care.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). The data divide. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Thedata-divide_25March_final-1.pdf[/footnote]

Because of the risk and scale of harm, it is vital that developers of AI-based healthcare systems go through a process of assessing the potential impacts of their system throughout its lifecycle. This can help mitigate possible risks to patients and the public, reduce legal liabilities for healthcare providers who use their system, and build understanding of how the system can be successfully integrated and used by clinicians.

This report offers a proposal for the use of an algorithmic impact assessment for data access in a healthcare context – the proposed National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP) from the NHS AI Lab. Uniquely, the focus of this research is a context where the public and private sector use of AIAs intersect – a public health body that has created a database of medical imaging records and, as part of the process for granting access, has requested private sector and academic researchers and developers complete an AIA.

This report proposes a seven stage process for algorithmic impact assessments

Building on Ada’s existing work on assessing AI systems,[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www. adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/[/footnote] the project evaluates the literature on AIA methods and identifies a model for their use in a particular context. Through interviews with NHS stakeholders, experts in impact assessments and potential ‘users’ of the NMIP, this report explores how an AIA process can be implemented in practice, addressing three questions:

  1. As an emerging methodology, what does an AIA process involve, and what can it achieve?
  2. What is the current state of thinking around AIAs and their potential to produce accountability, minimise harmful impacts, and serve as a tool for the more equitable design of AI systems?
  3. How could AIAs be conducted in a way that is practical, effective, inclusive and trustworthy?

The report proposes a process for AIAs, which aims to ensure that algorithmic uses of public-sector data are evaluated and governed to produce benefits for society, governments, public bodies and technology developers, as well as the people represented in the data and affected by the technologies and their outcomes.

The report findings include actionable steps to help the NHS AI Lab establish this process, alongside more general considerations for the use of AIAs in other public and private-sector contexts. The proposed process this report recommends the NHS AI Lab adopts
includes seven steps:

  1. AIA reflexive exercise: an impact-identification exercise is completed by the applicant team(s) and submitted to the NMIP Data Access Committee (DAC) as part of the NMIP filtering. This templated exercise prompts teams to detail the purpose, scope and intended use of the proposed system, model or research, and who will be affected. It also provokes reflexive thinking about common ethical concerns, consideration of intended and unintended consequences and possible measures to help mitigate any harms.
  2. Application filtering: an initial process of application filtering is completed by the NMIP DAC to determine which applicants proceed to the next stage of the AIA.
  3. AIA participatory workshop: an interactive workshop is held, which equips participants with a means to pose questions and pass judgement on the harm and benefit scenarios identified in the previous exercise (and possibly uncovering some further impacts), broadening participation in the AIA process.
  4. AIA synthesis: the applicant team integrates the workshop findings into the template.
  5. Data-access decision: the NMIP DAC makes a decision about whether to grant data access. This decision is based on criteria  relating to the potential risks posed by this system and whether the product team has offered satisfactory mitigations to potentially harmful outcomes.
  6. AIA publication: the completed AIAs are published externally in a central, easily accessible location, probably the NMIP website.
  7. AIA iteration: the AIA is revised on an ongoing basis by project teams, and at certain trigger points, such as a process of significant model redevelopment.

Alongside the AIA process detail, this report outlines seven ‘operational questions’ for policymakers, developers and researchers to consider before beginning to develop or implement an AIA:

  1. How to navigate the immaturity of the wider assessment ecosystem?
  2. What groundwork is required prior to the AIA?
  3. Who can conduct the assessment?
  4. How to ensure meaningful participation in defining and identifying impacts?
  5. What is the artefact of the AIA and where can it be published?
  6. Who will act as a decisionmaker about the suitability of the AIA and the acceptability of the impacts it documents?
  7. How will trials be resourced, evaluated and iterated?

The report offers a clear roadmap towards the implementation of an AIA

In conclusion, the report offers a clear roadmap towards the implementation of an AIA. It will be of value to policymakers, public institutions and technology developers interested in algorithmic accountability mechanisms who need a high-level understanding of the process and its specific uses, alongside generalisable findings. It will also be useful for people interested in participatory methods for data governance (following on from our Participatory data stewardship report).[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatorydata-stewardship/[/footnote]

In addition, for technology developers with an AI system that needs to go through an AIA process or data controllers requiring external applicants to complete an AIA as part of data-access process, the report offers a detailed understanding of the process through supporting
documentation.

This documentation includes a step-by-step guide to completing the AIA for applicants to the NMIP, and a sample AIA output template, modelled on the document NMIP applicant teams would submit with a data-access application.

Introduction

This project explores the potential for the use of AIAs in a real-world case study: AI in medical imaging

Rapid innovation in the use of analytics and data-driven technology (including AI) is shaping almost every aspect of our daily lives. The healthcare sector has seen significant growth in applications of data and AI, from automated diagnostics and personalised medicine to the analysis of medical imaging for screening, diagnosis and triage. The healthcare sector has seen a substantial surge in attempts to utilise AI and data-driven techniques to make existing tasks like diagnostic prediction more efficient and reimagine new ways of delivering more personalised forms of healthcare.[footnote]Bohr, A. and Memarzadeh. K. (2020). ‘The rise of artificial intelligence in healthcare applications’. Artificial Intelligence in Healthcare, pp.25-60. Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7325854/[/footnote]

However, while data-driven innovation holds the potential to revolutionise healthcare, it also has the potential to exacerbate health inequalities and increase demand on an already overstretched health and social care system. The risks of deploying AI and data-driven technologies in the health system include, but are not limited to:

  • The perpetuation of ‘algorithmic bias’,[footnote]Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchnir, L. (2016). ‘Machine bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing[/footnote] exacerbating health inequalities by replicating entrenched social biases and racism in existing systems.[footnote]Barocas, S. and Selbst, A. D. (2016). ‘Big data’s disparate impact’. California Law Review, 104, pp. 671- 732. [online] Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899[/footnote]  [footnote]Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender shades: intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, pp.1-15.[online] Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/ buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]Miller, C. (2015). ‘When algorithms discriminate’. The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/upshot/ when-algorithms-discriminate.html[/footnote]
  • Inaccessible language or lack of transparent explanations can make it hard for clinicians, patients and the public to understand the technologies and their uses, undermining public scrutiny and accountability.
  • The collection of personal data, tracking and the normalisation of surveillance, creating risks to individual privacy.

By exploring the applicability of AIAs toward a healthcare case study of medical imaging, we hope to gain a richer understanding of how AIAs should be adopted in practice

This project explores the potential for use of one approach to algorithmic accountability, algorithmic impact assessments or ‘AIAs’ (see: ‘What is an algorithmic impact assessment?’), in a real-world case study: AI in medical imaging. AIAs are an emerging approach for holding the people and institutions that design and deploy AI systems accountable to those who are affected by them, and a way to pre-emptively identify potential impacts arising from the design, development and deployment of algorithms on people and society.

The site of research is unique among existing uses of AIAs, being located in the domain of healthcare, which is significantly regulated with a strong tradition of ethical awareness and the importance of public participation. It is also likely to produce ‘high-risk’ applications.

While many AIA proposals have focused on public-sector uses of AI[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Directive on Automated Decision-Making. Available at: https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng. aspx?id=32592[/footnote]  [footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute, Open Government Partnership.(2021). Algorithmic accountability for the public sector. Open Government Partnership[/footnote] (AIAs have not yet been adopted in the private sector), and there may be a health-related AIA completed under the Canadian AIA framework, this study looks at applications at the intersection of a public and private-sector data-access process. Applications in this context are developed on data originating in the public sector, by a range of mainly private actors, but with some oversight from a public-sector department (the NHS).

This new AIA is proposed as part of a data-access process for a public-sector dataset – the National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP). This is, to our knowledge, unique in AIAs so far. Where other proposals for AIAs have used legislation or independent assessors, this model uses a Data Access Committee (DAC) as a forum for holding developers accountable – to require the completion of the AIA, to evaluate the AIA and to prevent a project proceeding (or at least, proceeding with NHS data) if the findings are not satisfactory.

These properties provide a unique context, and also have implications for the design of this AIA, which should be considered by anyone looking to apply parts of this process in another domain or context. It is expected that elements of this process, such as the AIA template and exercise formats, to prove transferrable.

Some aspects, including using a DAC as the core accountability mechanism, and the centralisation of publication and resourcing for the participatory workshops, will not be directly transferable to all other cases but should form a sound structural basis for thinking about alternative solutions.

The generalisable findings to emerge from this research should be valuable to the regulators, policymakers and healthcare providers like the NHS, who will need to use a variety of tools and approaches to assess the potential and actual impacts of AI systems operating in the healthcare environment. In Examining the Black Box, we surveyed the state of the field in data-driven technologies and identified four notable methodologies under development, including AIAs,[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: tools for assessing algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems/[/footnote] and our study of algorithmic accountability mechanisms for the public sector identifies AIAs as forming part of the typology of other policies currently in use globally, including transparency mechanisms, audits and regulatory inspection, and independent oversight bodies.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute and Open Government Partnership. (2021). Algorithmic accountability for the public sector. Open Government Partnership. Available at: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/algorithmic-accountabilitypublic- sector/[/footnote]

These tools and approaches are still very much in their infancy, with little consensus on how and when to apply them and what their stated aims should be, and few examples of these tools in practice. Most evidence for the usefulness of AIAs at present has come from examples of impact assessments in other sectors, rather than practical implementation. Accordingly, AIAs cannot be assumed to be ready to roll out.

By exploring the applicability of AIAs toward a healthcare case study of medical imaging – namely, the use of AIAs as part of the data release strategy of the forthcoming National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP) from the NHS AI Lab, we hope to gain a richer understanding of how AIAs should be adopted in practice, and how such tools can be translated into meaningful algorithmic accountability and, ultimately, better outcomes for people and society.

AI in medical imaging has the potential to optimise existing processes in clinical pathways, support clinicians with decision-making and allow for better use of clinical data, but some have urged developers to adhere to regulation and governance frameworks to assure safety, quality and security and prioritise patient benefit and clinician support.[footnote]Royal College of Radiologists. Policy priorities: Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://www.rcr.ac.uk/press-and-policy/policypriorities/artificial-intelligence[/footnote]

Understanding algorithmic impact assessments

What is an algorithmic impact assessment?

Algorithmic impact assessments (referred to throughout this report as ‘AIAs’) are a tool for assessing possible societal impacts of an AI system before the system is in use (with ongoing monitoring often advised).[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKindUK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: tools for assessing algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems/[/footnote]

They have been proposed by researchers, policymakers and developers as one algorithmic accountability approach – a way to create greater accountability for the design and deployment of AI systems.[footnote]Knowles, B. and Richards, J. (2021). ‘The sanction of authority: promoting public trust in AI’. Computers and Society. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2102.04221[/footnote] The intention of these approaches is to build public trust in the use of these systems, mitigate their potential to cause harm to people and groups,[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote] and maximise their potential for benefit.[footnote]Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety: A guide for the responsible design and implementation of AI systems in the public sector. The Alan Turing Institute. Available at: https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/ understanding_artificial_intelligence_ethics_and_safety.pdf[/footnote]

AIAs build on the broader methodology of impact assessments, a type of policy assessment with a long history of use in other domains, such as finance, cybersecurity and environmental studies.[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] Other closely related types of impact assessments include data protection impact assessments (DPIAs), which evaluate the impact of a technology or policy on individual data privacy rights, and human rights impact assessments (HRIAs), originating in the development sector but increasingly used to assess the human rights impacts of business practices and technologies.[footnote]Recent examples include Facebook’s ex post HRIA of their platform’s effects on the genocide in Myanmar, and Microsoft’s HRIA of its use of AI. See: Latonero, M. and Agarwal, A. (2021). Human rights impact assessments for AI: learning from Facebook’s failure in Myanmar. CARR Center for Human Rights Policy Harvard Kennedy School. Available at: https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/ cchr/files/210318-facebook-failure-in-myanmar.pdf; Article One. Challenge: From 2017 to 2018, Microsoft partnered with Article One to conduct the first-ever Human Rights Impact Assessment (HRIA) of the human rights risks and opportunities related to artificial intelligence (AI). Available at: https://www.articleoneadvisors.com/case-studies-microsoft[/footnote]

AIAs encourage developers of AI systems to consider the potential impacts of the development and implementation of their system

Conducting an impact assessment provides actors with a way to assess and evaluate the potential economic, social and environmental impacts of a proposed policy or intervention.[footnote]Adelle, C. and Weiland, S. (2012). ‘Policy assessment: the state of the art’. Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal 30.1, pp. 25- 33 Available at: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14615517.2012.663256[/footnote] Some impact assessments are conducted prior to launching a policy or project as a way to foresee potential risks, known as ex ante assessments, while others are launched once the policy or project is already in place, to evaluate how the project went – known as ex post.

Unlike other impact assessments, AIAs specifically encourage developers of AI systems to consider the potential impacts of the development and implementation of their system. Will this system affect certain individuals disproportionately more than others? What kinds of socio-environmental factors – such as stable internet connectivity or a reliance on existing hospital infrastructure – will determine its success or failure? AIAs provide an ex ante assessment of these kinds of impacts and potential mitigations at the earliest stages of an AI system’s development.

Current AIA practice in the public and private sectors

AIAs are currently not widely used in either public or private sector contexts and there is no single accepted standard, or ‘one size fits all’, methodology for their use.

AIAs were first proposed by the AI Now Institute as a detailed framework for underpinning accountability in public sector agencies that engages communities impacted by the use of public sector algorithmic decision-making,[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] building from earlier scholarship that
proposed the use of ‘algorithmic impact statements’ as a way to manage predictive policing technologies.[footnote]Selbst, A.D. (2017). ‘Disparate impact in big data policing’. 52 Georgia Law Review 109, pp.109-195. Available at: https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2819182[/footnote]

Though consensus is growing over the importance of principles for the development and use of AI systems like accountability, transparency and fairness, individual priorities and organisational interpretation of these terms differ. The lack of consistency with these concepts means not all AIAs are designed to achieve the same ends, and the process for conducting AIAs will depend on the specific context in which they are implemented.[footnote]Metcalf, J., Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Ranjit, S. and Elish, M.C. (2021). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments and accountability: the coconstruction of impacts’. Conference on Fairness Accountability, and Transparency [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445935[/footnote]

Recent scholarship from Data & Society identifies 10 ‘constitutive components’ as common to different types of impact assessment, and that are necessary for inclusion in any AIA. These include a ‘source of legitimacy’, the idea that an impact assessment must be legally mandated and enforced through another institutional structure such as a government agency, and a relational dynamic between stakeholders, the accountable actor and an accountability forum that describe how accountability relationships are formed.

In an ‘actor – forum’ relationship, an actor should be able to explain and justify conduct to an external forum, who are able to pass judgement.[footnote]Wieringa, M. (2020). ‘What to account for when accounting for algorithms: a systematic literature review on algorithmic accountability’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.1-18 [online] Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/ doi/10.1145/3351095.3372833[/footnote]
Other components include ‘public consultation’, involving gathering feedback from external perspectives for evaluative purposes, and ‘public access’, which gives members of the public access to crucial material about the AIA, such as its procedural elements, in order to further build accountability.[footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C. and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment- for-the-public-interest/[/footnote]

While varied approaches to AIAs have been proposed in theory, only one current model of AIA exists in practice, authorised by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making,[footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Directive on Automated Decision-Making. Available at: https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng. aspx?id=32592[/footnote] aimed at Canadian civil servants and used to manage public-sector AI delivery and procurement standards. The lack of more practical examples of AIAs is a known deficiency in the literature.

The lack of real-world examples and practical difficulty for institutions implementing AIAs remains a concern for those advocating for their widespread adoption, particularly as part of policy interventions.

An additional consideration is the inclusion of a diverse range of perspectives in the process of its development. Most AIA processes are controlled and determined by decision-makers in the algorithmic process, with less emphasis on the consultation of outside perspectives, including the experiences of those most impacted by the algorithmic deployment. As a result, AIAs are at risk of adopting an incomplete or incoherent view of potential impacts, divorced from these lived experiences.[footnote]Katell, M., Young, M., Dailey, D., Herman, B., Guetler, V., Tam, A., Bintz, C., Raz, D. and Krafft, P. M. (2020). ‘Toward situated interventions for algorithmic equity: lessons from the field’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency pp.44-45 [online] ACM: Barcelona. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3351095.3372874[/footnote] To practically seek and integrate those perspectives into the final AIA output has proven to be a difficult and ill-defined undertaking, with the required guidance being largely unavailable.

Canadian algorithmic impact assessment model

 

At the time of writing, the Canadian AIA is the only known and recorded AIA process implemented in practice. The Canadian AIA is a procurement management tool adopted under the Directive on Automated Decision-Making, aiming to guide policymakers into best practice use and procurement of AI systems that might be used to help govern service delivery at the federal level.

 

The Directive draws from administrative law principles of procedural fairness, accountability, impartiality and rationality,[footnote]Scassa, T. (2020). Administrative law and the governance of automated decision-making: a critical look at Canada’s Directive on Automated Decision-Making. Forthcoming, University of British Columbia Law Review. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3722192[/footnote] and is aimed at all AI systems that are used to make a decision about an individual.[footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Directive on Automated Decision-Making. Available at: https://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/doc-eng. aspx?id=32592[/footnote] One of the architects of the AIA, Noel Corriveau, considers a merit of impact assessments is to facilitate compliance with legal and regulatory requirements.[footnote]Karlin, M. and Corriveau, N. (2018). ‘The Government of Canada’s Algorithmic Impact Assessment: Take Two’. Supergovernance. Available at: https://medium.com/@supergovernance/the-government-of-canadas-algorithmic-impact-assessment-take-two- 8a22a87acf6f[/footnote] 

 

The AIA itself consists of an online questionnaire of eight sections containing 60 questions related to technical attributes of the AI system, the data underpinning it and how the system designates decision-making, and frames ‘impacts’ as the ‘broad range of factors’ that may arise because of a decision made by, or supported by, an AI system. Four categories of ‘impacts’ are utilised in this AIA: the rights of individuals, health and wellbeing of individuals, economic interests of individuals and impacts on the ongoing sustainability of an environmental ecosystem.

 

Identified impacts are ranked according to a sliding scale, from little to no impact to very high impact, and weighted to produce a final impact score. Once complete, the AIA is exported to PDF format and published on the Open Canada website. At the time of writing, there are four completed Canadian AIAs, providing useful starting evidence for how AIAs might be documented and published.

Many scholars and practitioners consider AIAs to hold great promise in assessing the possible impacts of the use of AI systems within the public sector, including applications that range from law enforcement to welfare delivery.[footnote]Margetts, H. and Dorobantu, C. (2019). ‘Rethink government with AI’. Nature. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586- 019-01099-5[/footnote] For instance, the AI Now Institute’s proposed AIA sets out a process intended to build public agency accountability and public trust.[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] 

As we explored in Algorithmic accountability for the public sector, AIAs can be considered part of a wider toolkit of algorithmic accountability policies and approaches adopted globally, including algorithm auditing,[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote] and algorithm transparency registers.[footnote]Transparency registers document and make public the contexts where algorithms and AI systems are in use in local or federal Government, and have been adopted in cities including Helsinki, see: City of Helsinki AI register. What is the AI register? Available at: https://ai.hel.fi/ and Amsterdam, see: Amsterdam Algorithm Register Beta. What is the algorithm register? Available at: https:// algoritmeregister.amsterdam.nl/[/footnote] 

Other initiatives have been devised as ‘soft’ self-assessment frameworks, to be used alongside an organisation or institution’s existing ethics and norms guidelines, or in deference to global standards like the IEEE’s AI Standards or the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. These kinds of initiatives often relay some flexibility on recommendations to suit specific use cases, as seen in the European Commission’s High-level Expert Group on AI’s assessment list for trustworthy AI.[footnote]European Commission. (2020). Assessment List for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ALTAI) for self-assessment. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/assessment-list-trustworthy-artificial-intelligence-altai-self-assessment[/footnote] 

While many proponents of AIAs from civil society and academia see them as a method for improving public accountability,[footnote]Binns, R. (2018). ‘Algorithmic accountability and public reason’. Philosophy & Technology, 31, pp.543-556. [online] Available at: https:// link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-017-0263-5[/footnote] AIAs also have scope for adoption within private-sector institutions, under the condition of regulators and public institutions incentivising their adoption and compelling their use in certain private sector contexts. Conversely, AIAs also help provide a lens for regulators to view, understand and pass judgement on institutional cultures and practices.[footnote]Selbst, A.D. (2021). ‘An institutional view of algorithmic impact assessments’, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (forthcoming). Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3867634[/footnote] The proposed US Algorithm Accountability Act sets out requirements for large private companies to undertake impact assessments in 2019,[footnote]Congress.Gov. (2019). H.R.2231 – Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019. Available at: https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2231#:~:text=Introduced%20in%20House%20(04%2F10%2F2019)&text=This%20bill%20requires%20specified%20 commercial,artificial%20intelligence%20or%20machine%20learning[/footnote] with progress on the Act beginning to regain momentum.[footnote]Johnson, K. (2021). ‘The movement to hold AI accountable gains more steam’. Ars Technica. Available at: https://arstechnica.com/ tech-policy/2021/12/the-movement-to-hold-ai-accountable-gains-more-steam/3/[/footnote]

The focus of this case study is on a context where the public and private sector use of AIAs intersect – a public health body has created a database of medical imaging records and, as part of the process for granting access, has requested private-sector and academic researchers and developers complete an AIA. This is a novel context that presents its own unique challenges and learnings (see: ‘Annex 1: Proposed process in detail’), but has also yielded important considerations that we believe are pertinent and timely for other actors interested in AIAs (see: ‘Seven operational questions for AIAs’).

Goals of the NHS AI Lab NMIP AIA process

This report aims to outline a practical design of the AIA process for the NHS AI Lab’s NMIP project. To do this, we reviewed the literature to uncover both areas of consensus and uncertainty among AIA scholars and practitioners, in order to build on and extend existing research. We also interviewed key NHS AI Lab and NMIP stakeholders, employees at research labs and healthtech start-ups who would seek access to the NMIP and experts in algorithmic accountability issues in order to guide the development of our process (see: ‘Methodology’).

As discussed above, AIAs are context-specific and differ in their objectives and assumptions, and their construction and implementation. It is therefore vital that the NMIP AIA has clearly defined and explained goals in order to both communicate the purpose of an AIA for the NMIP
context, and ensure the process works, enabling a thorough, critical and meaningful ex ante assessment of impacts.

This information is important for developers who undertake the AIA process to understand the assumptions behind its method, as well as policymakers interested in algorithmic accountability mechanisms, in order to usefully communicate the value of this AIA and distinguish it from other proposals.

In this context, this AIA process is designed to achieve the following goals:

  1. accountability
  2. reflection/reflexivity
  3. standardisation
  4. independent scrutiny
  5. transparency.

These goals emerged both from literature review and interviews, enabling us to identify areas where the AIA would add value, complement existing governance initiatives and contribute to minimising harmful impacts.

  1. Accountability
    It’s important to have a clear understanding of what accountability means in the context of the AIA process. The definition that is most helpful here understands accountability as a depiction of the social relationship between an ‘actor’ and a ‘forum’, where being accountable describes an obligation of the actor to explain and justify conduct to a forum.[footnote]Bovens, M. (2006). Analysing and assessing public accountability. A conceptual framework. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-06-01. Available at: https://www.ihs.ac.at/publications/lib/ep7.pdf[/footnote] An actor in this context might be a key decision-maker within an applicant team, such as a technology developer and project principal investigator. The forum might comprise the arrangement of external stakeholders, such as clinicians who might use the system, members of the Data Access Committee (DAC) and members of the public. The forum must have the capacity to deliberate on the actor’s actions, ask questions, pass judgement and enforce sanctions if necessary.[footnote]Metcalf, J., Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Ranjit, S. and Elish, M.C. (2021). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments and accountability: the coconstruction of impacts’. Conference on Fairness Accountability, and Transparency [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445935[/footnote]
  2. Reflection/reflexivity
    An AIA process should prompt reflection from developers and critical dialogue with individuals who would be affected by this process about how the design and development of a system might result in certain harms and benefits – to clinicians, patients, and society. Behaving reflexively means examining or responding to one’s – or that of a teams’ – own practices, motives and beliefs during a research process. Reflexivity is an essential principle for completing a thorough, meaningful and critical AIA, closely related to the concept of positionality, which has been developed through work on AI ethics and safety in the public sector.[footnote]Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety. Available at: https://www.turing.ac.uk/sites/default/ files/2019-08/understanding_artificial_intelligence_ethics_and_safety.pdf[/footnote] Our reflexive exercise enables this practice among developers by providing an actionable framework for discussing ethical considerations arising from the deployment of AI systems, and a forum for exploration of individual biases and ways of viewing and understanding the world.

    The broad participation of a range of perspectives is therefore a critical element of increased awareness in a reflection that includes some level of awareness to positionality. The AIA exercises were built with continual reflexivity in mind, which provide a means for technology developers to examine ethical principles thoroughly during design and development phases.
  3. Standardisation
    Our literature review revealed that while many scholars have proposed possible approaches and methods for an AIA, these tend to be higher-level recommendations for an overall approach. There is little discussion around how individual activities of the AIA should be structured, captured and recorded. A notable exception is the Canadian AIA, which makes use of a questionnaire to capture the impact assessment process, providing a format for the AIA ‘users’ to follow in order to complete the AIA, and for external stakeholders to view once the AIA is published. Some existing data/AI governance processes were confusing for product and development teams. One stakeholder interviewee commented: ‘Not something I’m an expert in – lots of the forms written in language I don’t understand, so was grateful that our information governance chaps took over and made sure I answered the right things within that.’ This underscored the need for a clear and coherent, standardised AIA process to ensure that applicant teams were able to engage fully with the task and that completed AIAs are of a consistent standard. To ensure NMIP applicants find the AIA as effective and practical as possible, and to build consistency between applications, it is important they undergo a clearly defined process that leads to an output that can be easily compared and evaluated. To this end, our AIA process provides a standard template document, both to aid the process and keep relative uniformity between different NMIP applications. Over time, once this AIA has been trialled and tested, we envisage that standardised and consistent applications will also help the DAC and members of the public to begin to develop paradigms of the kinds of harms and benefits that new applicants should consider.

  4. Independent scrutiny
    The goal of independent scrutiny is to provide external stakeholders with the powers to scrutinise, assess and evaluate AIAs and identify any potential issues with process. Many proposed AIAs argue for multistakeholder collaboration,[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] but there is a notable gap in procedure for how participation would be structured in an AIA, and how external
    perspectives would be included in the process.
    We sought to address these gaps by building a participatory initiative as part of the NMIP AIA (for more information on the participatory workshop, see: ‘Annex 1: Proposed process in detail’). Independent scrutiny helps to build robust accountability, as it helps to formalise the actor-forum relationship, providing further opportunity for judgement and deliberation among the wider forum.[footnote]Wieringa, M. (2020). ’What to account for when accounting for algorithms: a systematic literature review on algorithmic accountability’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, p.1-18. ACM: Barcelona. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ abs/10.1145/3351095.3372833[/footnote] AIAs should be routinely scrutinised to ensure they are used and adopted effectively, that teams are confident and critical in their approach to examining impacts, and that AIAs provide continual value.
  5. Transparency
    In this context, we consider AIA transparency as building in critical oversight of the AIA process itself, focusing on making the AIA, as a mechanism of governance, transparent. This differs to making transparent details about the AI system and its logic – what has been referred to as ‘first-order transparency’.[footnote]Kaminski, M. (2020). ‘Understanding transparency in algorithmic accountability’. Cambridge Handbook of the Law of Algorithms, e.d. Woodrow Barfield. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [online] Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3622657[/footnote] This AIA aims to improve transparency via both internal and external visibility, by prompting applicant teams to document the AIA process and findings, which are then published centrally for members of the public to view. Making this information publicly available provides more information for regulators, civil society organisations and members of the public about what kinds of systems are being developed in the UK healthcare context, and how their societal impacts are understood by those who develop or research them.

In order to achieve these goals, the AIA process and output make use of two principal approaches: documentation and participation.

  1. Documentation
    Thorough recordkeeping is critical to this AIA process and can produce significant benefits for developers and external stakeholders.

    Teams who have access to documentation stating ethical direction are more likely to address ethical concerns with a project at the outset.[footnote]Boyd, K.L (2021). ’Datasheets for datasets help ML engineers notice and understand ethical issues in training data’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 5, 438, pp.1-27. [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3479582[/footnote] Documentation can change internal process and practice, as it necessitates reflexivity, which creates opportunities to better identify, understand and question assumptions and behaviours.

    This shift in internal process may also begin to influence external practice: it has been argued that good AIA documentation process may create what sociologists call ‘institutional isomorphism’, where industry practice begins to homogenise owing to social and normative pressures.[footnote]Selbst, A. (2021). ’An institutional view of algorithmic impact assessments’. 35 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (forthcoming), pp.1-79. [online] Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3867634[/footnote] Through consistent documentation, teams gain a richer context for present and future analysis and evaluation of the project.
  2. Participation
    Participation is the mechanism for bringing a wider range of perspectives to the AIA process. It can take various forms – from soliciting written feedback through to deliberative workshops – but should always aim to bring the lived experiences of people and communities who are affected by an algorithm to bear on the AIA process.[footnote]See: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/ participatory-data-stewardship/ for a framework of different approaches to participation in relation to data-driven technologies and systems.[/footnote]When carried out effectively, participation supports teams in building higher quality, safer and fairer products.[footnote]Madaio, M.A. et al (2020) ’Co-designing checklists to understand organizational challenges and opportunities around fairness in AI’ CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp.1-14 [online]. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3313831.3376445[/footnote] The participatory workshop in the NMIP AIA (see: ‘Annex 1: Proposed process in detail’ for a full description) enables the process of impact identification to go beyond the narrow scope of the applicant team(s). Building participation into the AIA process brings external scrutiny of an AI healthcare system from outside the teams’ perspective, provides alternate sources of knowledge and relevant lived experience and expertise. It also enables independent review of the impacts of an AI system, as participants are unencumbered by the typical conflicts of interest that may interfere with the ability of project stakeholders to judge their system impartially.

The context of healthcare AI

There is a surge in the development and trialling of AI systems in healthcare.[footnote]Davenport, T. and Kalakota, R. (2019). ‘The potential for artificial intelligence in healthcare’. Future Healthcare Journal, 6,2, pp.94-98. [online] Available at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6616181/[/footnote] A significant area of growth is the use of AI in medical imaging, where AI imaging systems assist clinicians in cancer screening, supporting diagnosis/prognosis, patient triage and patient monitoring.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. AI in imaging. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ai-lab/ai-lab-programmes/ai-in-imaging/[/footnote]

The UK Department of Health and Social Care (DHSC) has set out national commitments to support public and private sector AI research and development in healthcare by ensuring that developers and researchers have access to high-quality datasets to train and validate AI models, underlining four guiding principles that steer this effort:

  1. user need
  2. privacy and security
  3. interoperability and openness
  4. inclusion.[footnote]Department of Health and Social Care. (2018). The future of healthcare: our vision for digital, data and technology in health and care. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-future-of-healthcare-our-vision-for-digital-data-andtechnology- in-health-and-care/the-future-of-healthcare-our-vision-for-digital-data-and-technology-in-health-and-care[/footnote]

In the current NHS Long Term Plan, published in 2019, AI is described as a means to improve efficiency across service delivery by supporting clinical decisions, as well as a way to ‘maximise the opportunities for use of technology in the health service’.[footnote]NHS. (2019). The NHS Long Term Plan. Available at: https://www.longtermplan.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/nhs-long-termplan- version-1.2.pdf[/footnote] Current initiatives to support this drive for testing, evaluation and scale of AI-driven technologies include the AI in Health and Care Award, run by the Accelerated Access Collaborative, in partnership with NHSX (now part of the NHS Transformation Directorate)[footnote]NHSX is now part of the NHS Transformation Directorate. More information is available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/blogs/nhsxmoves- on/ At the time of research and writing NHSX was a joint unit of NHS England and the UK Department of Health and Social Care that reported directly to the Secretary of State and the Chief Executive of NHS England and NHS Improvement. NHSX was also the parent organisation of the NHS AI Lab. For the remainder of the report, ‘NHSX’ will be used to refer to this organisation.[/footnote] and the National Institute for Health Research (NIHR).

However, while data-driven healthcare innovation holds the potential to support new practices in healthcare, careful research into the integration of AI systems in clinical practice is needed to ground claims of model performance and to uncover where systems would be most beneficial in the context of particular clinical pathways. For example, a recent systematic review of studies measuring test accuracy of AI in mammography screening practice has revealed that radiologists still outperform the AI in detection of breast cancer.[footnote]Freeman, K., Geppert, J., Stinton, C., Todkill, D., Johnson, S., Clarke, A. and Taylor-Phillips, S. (2021). ‘Use of artificial intelligence for image analysis in breast cancer screening programmes: systematic review of test accuracy’. British Medical Journal 2021, 374 [online] Available at: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/34470740/[/footnote]

To ensure healthcare AI achieves the benefits society hopes for, it is necessary to recognise the possible risks of harmful impacts from these systems. For instance, concerns have been raised that AI risks further embedding or exacerbating existing health and social inequalities – a risk that is evidenced in both systems that are working as designed,[footnote]Wen, D., Khan, S., Ji Xu, A., Ibrahim, H., Smith, L., Caballero, J., Zepeda, L., de Blas Perez, C., Denniston, A., Lui, X. and Martin, R. (2021). ‘Characteristics of publicly available skin cancer image datasets: a systematic review’. The Lancet: Digital Health [online]. Available at: https://www.thelancet.com/journals/landig/article/PIIS2589-7500(21)00252-1/fulltext[/footnote] and in those that are producing errors or are failing.[footnote]Banerje, I et al. (2021). ‘Reading race: AI recognises patient’s racial identity in medical images’. Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2107.10356[/footnote]  [footnote]Antun, V., Renna, F., Poon, C., Adcock, B., Hansen, A. C. (2020). ‘On instabilities of deep learning in image reconstruction and the potential costs of AI’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, p. 117, 48 [online] Available at: https://www.pnas.org/content/117/48/30088[/footnote]

Additionally, there are concerns around the kinds of interactions that take place between clinicians and AI systems in clinical settings: the AI system may contribute to human error, override much-needed human judgement, or lead to overreliance or misplaced faith in the accuracy metrics of the system.[footnote]Topol, E. (2019). ‘High performance medicine: the convergence of human and artificial intelligence’. Nature Medicine, 25, pp.45-56. [online] Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-018-0300-7[/footnote]

The NHS has a longstanding commitment to privacy and processing personal data in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)[footnote]NHSX. How NHS and care data is protected. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/key-tools-and-info/data-saves-lives/how-nhs-and-care-data-is-protected[/footnote] which may create tension with the more recent commitment to make patient data available for companies.[footnote]NHS Digital. How NHS Digital makes decisions about data access. Available at: https://digital.nhs.uk/services/data-access-requestservice-dars/how-nhs-digital-makes-decisions-about-data-access[/footnote] Potential harmful impacts arising from use of these systems are myriad, from both healthcare-specific concerns around violating patient consent over the use of their data, to more generic risks such as creating public mistrust of AI systems and the institutions that develop or deploy them.

It is important to understand impacts do not have parity across people and groups: for example, a person belonging to a marginalised group may experience even greater mistrust around use of AI, owing to past discrimination.

These impacts can result in serious harm to both individuals and groups, who are often ‘left behind’ in provision of health and social care.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). The data divide. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/the-data-divide/[/footnote] Harmful impacts can arise from endemic forms of bias during AI design and development, from error or malpractice at the point of data collection, to over-acceptance of model output, and reducing vigilance at the point of end use.[footnote]Data Smart Schools. (2021). Deb Raji on what ‘algorithmic bias‘ is (…and what it is not). Available at: https://data-smart-schools. net/2021/04/02/deb-raji-on-what-algorithmic-bias-is-and-what-it-is-not/[/footnote] Human values and subjectivities such as biased or racist attitudes or behaviours can become baked-in to AI systems,[footnote]Balayn, A and GĂźrses, S. (2021). Beyond debiasing: regulating AI and its inequalities. European Digital Rights. Available at: https://edri. org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/EDRi_Beyond-Debiasing-Report_Online.pdf[/footnote] and reinforce systems of oppression once in use, resulting in serious harm.[footnote]Noble, S.U. (2018). Algorithms of oppression: how search engines reinforce racism. NYU Press[/footnote] For example, in the USA, an algorithm commonly used in hospitals to determine which patients required follow-up care was found to classify White patients as more ill than Black patients even when their level of illness was the same, affecting millions of patients for years before it was detected.[footnote]Chakradhar, S. (2019). ‘Widely used algorithm in hospitals is biased, study finds’. STAT. Available at: https://www.statnews. com/2019/10/24/widely-used-algorithm-hospitals-racial-bias/[/footnote]

Because of the risk and scale of harm, it is vital that developers of AI-based healthcare systems go through a process of assessing potential impacts of their system throughout its lifecycle. Doing so can help developers mitigate possible risks to patients and the public, reduce legal liabilities for healthcare providers who use their system, and consider how their system can be successfully integrated and used by clinicians.

Impacts arising from development and deployment
of healthcare AI systems

AI systems are valued by their proponents for their potential to support clinical decisions, monitoring of patient health, freeing resources and improving patient outcomes. These impacts, if realised, would hopefully result in beneficial, tangible outcomes, but there may also be consequences arising from when the AI system is used as intended or when it is producing errors or failing.

 

Many of these technologies are in their infancy, and often only recently adopted into clinical settings, so there is a real risk of these technologies producing adverse effects, causing harm to people and society in the near and long term. Given the scale that these systems operate at and the high risk of significant harm if they do fail in a healthcare setting, it is essential for developers to consider the impacts of their system before they are put in use.

 

Recent evidence provides examples of some kinds of impacts (intended or otherwise) that have emerged from the development and deployment of healthcare AI systems:

  • A study released in July 2021 found that algorithms used in healthcare are
    able to read a patient’s race from medical images including chest and hand
    X-rays and mammograms.[footnote]Gichoya, J.W. et al. (2021). ‘Reading race: AI recognises patient’s racial identity in medical images’. arXiv. Available at: https://arxiv.org/ abs/2107.10356[/footnote] Race is not an attribute normally detectable from scans. Other evidence shows that Black patients and patients from other marginalised groups may receive inferior care than White patients.[footnote]Frakt, A. (2020). ‘Bad medicine: the harm that comes from racism’. The New York Times. [online] Available at: https://www.nytimes. com/2020/01/13/upshot/bad-medicine-the-harm-that-comes-from-racism.html[/footnote] Being able to identify race from a scan (with any level of certainty) raises the risk of introducing an unintended system impact that causes harm to both individuals and society, reinforcing systemic health inequalities
  • A 2020 study of the development, implementation and evaluation of Sepsis
    Watch, an AI ‘early-warning system’ for assisting hospital clinicians in the early
    diagnosis and treatment of sepsis uncovered unintended consequences.[footnote]Sendak, M. et al. (2020). ‘“The human body is a black box”: supporting clinical decision-making with deep learning’. In Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. ACM:, New York, NY, USA, pp. 99–109. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372827[/footnote] Sepsis Watch was successfully integrated with clinical practice after close engagement with nurses and hospital staff to ensure it triggered an alarm in an appropriate way and led to a meaningful response. But the adoption of the system had an unanticipated impact of clinicians taking on an intermediary role between the AI system and other clinicians in order to successfully integrate the tool for hospital use. This demonstrates that developers should take into account the socio-environmental requirements to successfully implement and run an AI system.
  • A study released in December 2021 revealed underdiagnosis bias in AIbased
    chest X-ray (CXR) prediction models among marginalised populations,
    particularly in intersectional subgroups.[footnote]Seyyad-Kalantari, L., Zhang, H., McDermott, M., Chen, I. Y., Ghassemi, M. (2021). ‘Underdiagnosis bias of artificial intelligence algorithms applied to chest radiographs in underserved patient populations’. Nature Medicine, 27, pp. 2176-2182. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01595-0[/footnote] This example shows that analysis of how an AI system performs on certain societal groups may be missed, so careful consideration of user populations ex ante is critical to help mitigate harms ex post. It also demonstrates how some AI systems may result in a reduced quality of care that may result in injury to some patients.
  • A study on the implementation of an AI-based retinal scanning tool in Thailand for detecting diabetic eye disease found that its success depended on socio-environmental factors like whether the hospital had a stable internet connection and lighting conditions for taking photographs – when these were insufficient, the use of the AI system caused delays and disruption.[footnote]Beede, E., Elliott Baylor, E., Hersch, F., Iurchenko, A., Wilcox, L., Ruamviboonsuk, P. and Vardoulakis, L. (2020). ‘A human-centered evaluation of a deep learning system deployed in clinics for the detection of diabetic retinopathy’. In: CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (CHI ‘20), April 25-30, 2020, Honolulu, HI, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/fullHtml/10.1145/3313831.3376718[/footnote] They found that clinicians unexpectedly created ‘work-arounds’ for the intended study design use of the AI system. This reflected unanticipated needs that affected how the process worked, in particular that patients may struggle to attend distant hospitals for further examination, which made hospital referral a bad fallback for when the AI system failed. This concern was identified through researchers’ discussions with clinicians, showing the potential value of participation early in the design and development process.

The utility of AIAs in health policy: complementing existing governance processes in the UK healthcare space

The AIA process is intended to complement and build from existing regulatory requirements imposed on proposed medical AI products, recognising the sanctity of well-established regulation. As a result, it is essential to survey that regulatory context before diving into the specifics of what an AIA requires, and where an AIA can add value.

Compared to most other domains, the UK’s healthcare sector already has in place relatively mature regulatory frameworks for the development and deployment of AI systems with a medical purpose. The UK Government has indicated that further updates to regulation are
forthcoming, in order to be more responsive to data-driven technologies like AI.[footnote]Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (2020). Regulating medical devices in the UK. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/regulating-medical-devices-in-the-uk[/footnote] There is in a complex ecosystem of regulatory compliance, with several frameworks for risk assessment, technical, scientific and clinical assurance and data protection that those adopting or building these systems must navigate.

This AIA process is therefore proposed as one component in a broader accountability toolkit, which is intended to provide a standardised, reflexive framework for assessing impacts of AI systems on people and society. It was designed to complement – not replicate or override –existing governance processes in the UK healthcare space. Table 1 below compares the purpose, properties and evidence required by some of these processes, to map how this AIA adds value.

Table 1: How does this AIA complement some existing processes in the healthcare space?

Name of initiative Medical devices
regulation
NHS code of
conduct for digital
and data-driven
health technologies
(DHTs)
NICE evidence
standards
frameworks for
DHTs
Data protection
impact
assessments
(DPIAs)
ISO clinical
standards: 14155
& 14971
Type of initiative Legislation Non-mandatory,
voluntary best-practice
standards
Non-mandatory,
voluntary best-practice
standards
Mandatory impact
assessment (with a
legal basis under
the GDPR)
Non-mandatory
clinical standards
for medical devices
(including devices
with an AI
component)
Initiative details Follows the EU risk-based classification of medical devices implemented and enforced by a competent authority:
in the UK, this is the Medicines & Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency
(MHRA). MHRA’s medical device product
registration, known as a CE marking
process, is a
requirement under
the UK’s Medical Device Regulations
2002. Higher-risk products will have conformity assessments carried out by third parties: notified bodies.[footnote]Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). (2020). Medical devices: conformity assessment and the UKCA mark. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/medical-devices-conformity-assessment-and-the-ukca-mark[/footnote]
The NHS outlines 12
key principles of good practice for innovators designing and developing data-driven healthcare products, including ‘how to operate ethically’, ‘usability and
accessibility’, and technical assurance. There is
considerable emphasis on ‘good data protection practice, including data transparency’.
Outlines a set of standards for innovation, grouping DHTs into tiers based on
functionality for a proportionate, streamlined framework. The framework’s scope covers DHTs that
incorporate AI using fixed algorithms (but not DHTs using adaptive algorithms).
Completed as a guardrail against improper data handling and to protect individual data rights (DPIAs are not specific to healthcare). From the
International
Standards
Organisation, and considered gold standard, is internationally  recognised, and can be used as a benchmark for regulatory compliance.
Which part of
project lifecycle?
Whole lifecycle,
particularly
development, and
including post-deployment.
Development
and procurement.
Development
and procurement.
Ideation to
development.
Whole lifecycle.
Purpose To demonstrate the product meets
regulatory requirements and to achieve a risk
classification, from Class I (lowest perceived risk) to Class III (highest) that provides a quantified measure of risk.
To help developers understand NHS motivations and standards for buying digital and data-driven technology products. To help developers collect the appropriate evidence to demonstrate clinical effectiveness and
economic impact for their data-driven product.
To ensure safe and fair handling of
personal data and minimise risks arising from improper data handling, and as a legal compliance
exercise.
To provide
‘presumption of
conformity’ of good clinical practice during design, conduct, recording and reporting of
clinical investigations, to assess the clinical performance or effectiveness and safety of medical devices.
Output? Classification of device, e.g. Class IIb,
to be displayed outwardly. Technical documentation on metrics like safety and performance. Declaration of conformity resulting
in CE/UKCA mark.
No specific output. No specific output. Completed DPIA document, probably
a Word document or PDF saved as an internal record. While there is a general obligation to
notify a data subject about the processing
of their data, there is no obligation to
publish the results of
the DPIA.[footnote]Kaminski, M.E. and Malgieri, G. (2020). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments under the GDPR: producing multi-layered explanations’. International Data Privacy Law, 11,2, pp.125-144. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1993/idpl/ipaa020[/footnote]
No specific output.
What evidence
is needed?
Chemical, physical and biological properties of the product, and that the benefits outweigh risks and achieve claimed performance (proven with clinical evidence).

Manufacturers must also ensure ongoing safety by carrying out post-market surveillance under guidance of MHRA.

Value proposition,
mission statement,
assurance testing of product, and asks users to think of data ethics frameworks.
Evidence of
effectiveness of the technology and evidence of economic impact standards. Uses contextual questions to help identify ‘higher-risk’ DHTs, e.g. those with users from ‘vulnerable groups’.
Evidence of compliance with the GDPR regulation on data categories, data handling, redress procedures, scope, context and nature of processing.

Asks users to identify source and nature of risk on individuals, with an assessment of likelihood and severity of harm.

The DPIA also includes questions on consultations with ‘relevant stakeholders’.

Evidence of how rights, safety and wellbeing of subjects are protected, scientific conduct, and responsibilities
of principal
investigator. The ISO 14971
requires teams to build a risk-management plan, including a risk-assessment
to identify possible hazards.
How does the AIA differ from, and complement this process?
Building off the risk-based approach, the AIA encourages further reflexivity on who gets to decide and define these risks and impacts, broadening out the MHRA classification framework.

It also helps teams better understand impacts beyond risk to the individual.

This AIA proposes a DAC to assess AIAs; in future, this could be a notified body (as in the MHRA
initiative).

The code of conduct mentions DPIAs; this AIA would move beyond data-processing
risk. The guide considers impacts, such as impact on patient outcomes: the AIA adds weight by detailing procedure to achieve this impact: e.g. improving clinical outcomes because of the
comprehensive
assessment of
negative impacts,
producing a record of this information to
build evidence, and releasing it publicly for transparency.
Our impact
identification
exercise uses similar Q&A prompts to help developers assess risk, but the AIA
helps interrogate the ‘higher-risk’ framing: higher risk for who?
Who decides?The participatory workshop broadens out the people
involved in these discussions, to help build a more holistic
understanding of risk.
AIAs and DPIAs differ in scope and
procedure, and we therefore recommend a copy of the DPIA also be included as part the NMIP data access process. AIAs seek to encourage a reflexive discussion among project teams to identify and mitigate a wider array of potential impacts, including environmental, societal or individual harms.DPIAs are generally led by a single
data-controller processor, legal
expert or information-governance
team, limiting scope for
broader engagement. The AIA encourages engagement of individuals who may be affected by an AI system even if they are not subjects of that data.
The process of identifying possible
impacts and building
into a standardised framework is
confluent between
the ISO 14971 and the AIA. However,
the AIA does not measure for quality assurance or clinical robustness to avoid duplication. Instead,
it extends these
proposals by helping
developers better understand the needs of their users
through the
participatory
exercise.

 

There is no single body responsible for regulation for data-driven technologies in healthcare. Some of the key regulatory bodies for the development of medical devices in the UK that include an AI component are outlined in Table 2 below:

Table 2: Key regulatory bodies for data-driven technologies in healthcare

Regulatory body Medicines and
Healthcare products
Regulatory Agency
(MHRA)
Health Research
Authority (HRA)
Information
Commissioner’s Office
(ICO)
National Institute for Health & Care Excellence (NICE)
Details The MHRA regulates
medicine, medical
devices and blood
components in the UK. It
ensures regulatory
requirements are met
and has responsibility for setting post-market
surveillance standards
for medical devices.[footnote]Health Research Authority (HRA). Research Ethics Service and Research Ethics Committees. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/ about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/[/footnote] AI
systems that are
regulated by the MHRA as medical devices.
If AI systems are developed within the NHS, projects will need
approval from the Health Research Authority, who oversee responsible use of medical data, through
a process that includes
seeking ethical approval from an independent Research Ethics Committee (REC).[footnote]Health Research Authority (HRA). Research Ethics Service and Research Ethics Committees. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/ about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/[/footnote]The REC evaluates for ethical concerns around research methodology but does not evaluate for the potential broader societal impacts of
research.
The ICO is the UK’s data
protection regulator. AI
systems in health are
often trained on, and process individual
patients’ health data.There must be a lawful
basis for use of personal data in the UK,[footnote]Health Research Authority (HRA). Research Ethics Service and Research Ethics Committees. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/ about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/[/footnote] and
organisations are
required to demonstrate understanding of and compliance with data
security policies, usually by completing a data protection impact assessment (DPIA). The ICO assurance team may conduct audits of different health organisations to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act.[footnote]Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Findings from ICO audits of NHS Trusts under the GDPR. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/ media/action-weve-taken/audits-and-advisory-visits/2618960/health-sector-outcomes-report.pdf[/footnote]
NICE supports
developers and
manufacturers of healthcare products,
including data-driven technologies like AI systems, to be able to
produce robust evidence for their effectiveness.They have produced comprehensive guidance
pages for clinical conditions, quality standards and advice pages, including the NICE evidence standards framework for digital health technologies (see ‘Table 1’ above).[footnote]National Institute for Care Excellence (NICE). Evidence standards framework for digital health technologies. Available at: https://www. nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do/our-programmes/evidence-standards-framework-for-digital-health-technologies[/footnote]

 

It is important to emphasise that this proposed AIA process is not a replacement for the above governance and regulatory frameworks. NMIP applicants expecting to build or validate a product from NMIP data are likely to go on to complete (or in some cases, have already completed), the processes of product registration and risk classification, and are likely to have experience working with frameworks such as the ‘Guide to good practice’ and NICE evidence standards framework.

Similarly, DPIAs are widely used across multiple domains because of their legal basis and are critical in healthcare, where use of personal data is widespread across different research and clinical settings. As Table 1 shows, we recommend to the NHS AI Lab that NMIP applicant teams should be required to submit a copy of their DPIA as part of the data-access process, as it specifically addresses data protection and privacy concerns around the use of NMIP data, which have not been the focus of the AIA process.

The AIA process complements these processes by providing insights into potential impacts through a participatory process with patients and clinicians (see ‘What value can AIAs offer developers of medical technologies?’) The AIA is intended as a tool for building robust accountability by providing additional routes to participation and external scrutiny: for example, there is no public access requirement for DPIAs, so we have sought to improve documentation practice to provide stable records of the process.

This project also made recommendations to the NHS AI Lab around best practice for documenting the NMIP dataset itself, using a datasheet that includes information about the dataset’s sources, what level of consent it was collected under, and other necessary information to help inform teams looking to use NMIP data and conduct AIAs – because datasets can have downstream consequences for the impacts of AI systems developed with them. [footnote]Boyd, K.L. (2021). ‘Datasheets for datasets help ML engineers notice and understand ethical issues in training data’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 5, 438. [online] Available at: http://karenboyd.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ Datasheets_Help_CSCW-5.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]Gebru, T., Mogenstern, J., Vecchione, B., Wortman Vaughan, J., Wallach, H., Daumé III, H. and Crawford, K. (2018). Datasheets for datasets. ArXiv [online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010[/footnote]

Where does an AIA add value among existing processes?

Viewing impacts of AI systems with a wider lens

Given the high-stakes context of healthcare, many accountability initiatives use matrices of technical assurance, like accuracy, safety and quality. Additionally, technologies that build from patient data would need to be assessed for their impacts on individual data privacy and security.

This AIA process encourages project teams to consider a wider range of impacts on individuals, society and the environment in the early stages of their work. It encourages a reflexive consideration of common issues that AI systems in healthcare may face, such as considerations around the explainability and contestability of decisions, potential avenues for misuse or abuse of a system, and where different forms of bias may appear in the development and deployment of a system.

Broadening the range of perspectives in a governance process

Beyond third-party auditing, there is little scope in the current landscape for larger-scale public engagement activity to deliberate on governance or regulation of AI in the healthcare space. Public and patient participation in health processes is widespread, but many organisations lack the resources or support to complete public engagement work at the scale they’d like to. It emerged from stakeholder interviews that our AIA would need to include a bespoke participatory process, to provide insight into potential algorithmic harm in order to build meaningful, critical AIAs, which in turn will help to build better products.

Standardised, publicly available documentation

Many risk assessments, including other impact assessments like DPIAs, do not have a requirement for completed documentation to be published or for other evidence about how the process was undertaken to be evidenced.[footnote]Gebru, T., Mogenstern, J., Vecchione, B., Wortman Vaughan, J., Wallach, H., Daumé III, H. and Crawford, K. (2018). Datasheets for datasets. ArXiv [online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010[/footnote] It has been demonstrated that the varied applications of AI in healthcare worldwide have led to a lack of consensus and standardisation of documentation around AI systems and their adoption in clinical decision-making settings, which has implications both for evaluation and auditing of these systems, and for ensuring harm prevention.[footnote]Sendak, M., Gao, M., Brajer, N. and Balu, S. (2020). ‘Presenting machine learning model information to clinical end users with model facts labels’. npj Digital Medicine, 3,41, p1-4. [online] Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-020-0253-3[/footnote] For the NMIP context, the intention was to introduce a level of standardisation across all AIAs to help address this challenge.

What value can AIAs offer developers of medical
technologies?

With over 80 AI ethics guides and guidelines available, developers express confusion about how to translate ethical and social principles into practice that leads to inertia. To disrupt this cycle, it is vital that technology developers and organisations adopting AI systems have access to frameworks and step-by-step processes to proceed with ethical design.

We interviewed several research labs and private firms developing AI products to identify where an AIA would add value (see ‘Methodology’). Our research uncovered that academic research teams, small health-tech start-ups and more established companies all have different considerations, organisational resources and expertise to bring to the table, but there are still common themes that underscore why a developer benefits from this AIA process:

  1. Clearer frameworks for meeting NHS expectations. Developers see value
    in considering societal impacts at the outset of a project, but lack a detailed
    and actionable framework for thinking about impacts. This kind of AIA exercise
    can identify potential failure modes within the successful implementation of
    a medical technology, and can help developers meet the NHS’s compliance
    requirements.
  2. Early insights can support and improve patient care outcomes. Some technology developers we interviewed reported a struggle with reaching and
    engaging patients and representatives of the public at the scale they would
    like. The AIA enables this larger-scale, meaningful interaction, resulting in
    novel insights. For applicant teams early on in the development process, the
    participatory workshop provides important context for how an applicant’s
    AI system might be received. Better understanding patient needs before the
    majority of system development or application is underway allows for further
    consideration in design decisions that might have a tangible effect on the
    quality of patient care in settings supported by an AI system.
  3. Building on AI system risk categorisation. Applicants hoping to use NMIP
    data to build and validate products will also have to undertake the MHRA
    medical device classification, which asks organisations to assign a category
    of risk to the product. It can be challenging for AI developers to make a
    judgement on the risk level of their system, and so the framework requires
    developers to assign a pre-determined risk category using a flowchart for
    guidance. It may still be challenging for developers to understand why and
    how certain attributes or more detailed design decisions correspond to a
    higher level of risk.The AIA’s reflexive impact identification exercise and participatory workshop move beyond a process of mapping technical details and help build a comprehensive understanding of possible impacts. It also provides space for applicant teams to explore risks or impacts that they feel may not be wholly addressed by current regulatory processes, such as considering societal risk in addition to individual risk of harm.

Case study: NHS AI Lab’s National Medical Imaging Platform

In this research, the NHS AI Lab’s National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP) operates as a case study: a specific research context to test the applicability of algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) within the chosen domain of AI in healthcare. It should be emphasised that this is not an implementation case study – rather, it is a case study of designing and building an AIA process. Further work will be required to implement and trial the process, and to evaluate its effectiveness once in operation.

The NHS AI Lab – part of the NHS Transformation Directorate driving the digital transformation of care – aims to accelerate the safe, ethical and effective adoption of AI in healthcare, bringing together government, health and care providers, academics and technology companies to collaborate on achieving this outcome.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. The NHS AI Lab: accelerating the safe adoption of AI in health and care. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ai-lab/[/footnote]

The NMIP is an initiative to bring together medical-imaging data from across the NHS and make it available to companies and research groups to develop and test AI models.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP). Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ai-lab/ai-lab-programmes/ai-in-imaging/ national-medical-imaging-platform-nmip/[/footnote]

It is envisioned as a large medical-imaging dataset, comprising chest X-ray (CXR), magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and computed tomography (CT) images from a national population base. It is being scoped as a possible initiative after a precursor study, the National COVID Chest Imaging Database (NCCID), which was a centralised database that contributed to the early COVID-19 pandemic response.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. The National COVID Chest Imaging Database. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/covid-19-response/data-andcovid- 19/national-covid-19-chest-imaging-database-nccid/[/footnote] The NMIP was designed with the intention of broadening the geographical base and diagnostic scope of the original NCCID platform. At the time of writing, the NMIP is still a proposal and does not exist as a
database.

How is AI used in medical imaging?

 

When we talk about the use of AI in medical imaging, we mean the use of machine-learning techniques on images for medical purposes – such as CT scans, MRI images or even photographs of the body. Medical imaging can be used in medical specialisms including radiology (using CT scans or X-rays) and ophthalmology (using retinal photographs). Machine learning describes when computer software ‘learns’ to do a task from data it is given instead of being programmed explicitly to do that task. The use of machine learning with images is often referred to as ‘computer vision’. The field of computer vision – the use of machine learning (i.e. AI tools) to better process information about images – has had an impact in the medical field over a long period. [footnote]Esteva, A., Chou, K., Yeung, S., Naik, N., Madani, A., Mottaghi, A., Liu, Y., Topol, E., Dean, J., and Socher, R. (2021). ‘Deep learning-enabled medical computer vision’. npj Digital Medicine, pp.1-9 [online]. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s41746-020-00376-2[/footnote]

 

For example, AI in medical imaging may be used to make a diagnosis from a radiology image. The machine learning model will be trained on many radiology images (‘training data’) – some which exhibit the clinical condition, and some which don’t – and from this will ‘learn’ to recognise images with the clinical condition, with a particular level of accuracy (they won’t always be correct). This model could then be used in a radiology department for diagnosis. Other uses include identifying types or severity of a clinical condition. Currently, these models are mostly intended for use alongside clinicians’ opinions.

 

An example of AI in medical imaging is a software that uses machine learning to read chest CT scans, to detect possible early-stage lung cancer. It does this by identifying lung (pulmonary) nodules, a kind of abnormal growth that forms in the lung. Such products are intended to speed up the CT reading process and claim to lower the risk of misdiagnosis.

 

The NMIP, as part of the NHS AI Lab, is intended to collect medical images and associated data that could be used to train and validate machine learning models.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. National Medical Imaging Platform. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ai-lab/ai-lab-programmes/ai-in-imaging/ national-medical-imaging-platform-nmip/[/footnote]

An example product that might be built from a dataset like the NMIP would be a tool that helps to detect the presence of a cardiac tumour by interpreting images, after training on thousands of MRI images that show both presence and no presence of a tumour. As well as detection, AI
imaging products may help with patient diagnosis for clinical conditions like cancer, and may also help triage patients based on the severity of abnormality detected from a particular set of images. The developers of these products claim they have the potential to improve health outcomes – by speeding up waiting times for patient diagnosis, for example – and to ease possible resourcing issues at clinical sites.

The NMIP will be available, on application, for developers to test, train and validate imaging products. Organisations with a project that would benefit from access to the NMIP dataset would need to make an application to access the dataset, describing the project and how it will use NMIP data.

From interviews with stakeholders, we envisage that applicants will be seeking access to the NMIP for one of three reasons:

  1. To conduct academic or corporate research that uses images from the NMIP dataset.
  2. To train a new commercial medical product that uses NMIP data.
  3. To analyse and assess existing models or commercial medical products using NMIP data.

This AIA process is therefore aimed at both private and public-sector researchers and firms

In this proposed process, access to the NMIP will be decided by an NHS-operated
Data Access Committee (DAC). DACs are already used for access to other NHS datasets, such as the University College London Hospital (UCLH) DAC, which manages and controls access to COVID-19 patient data.[footnote]UCL. (2020). UCLH Covid-19 data access committee set up. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/joint-research-office/news/2020/jun/ uclh-covid-19-data-access-committee-set[/footnote] There is also a DAC process in place for the NCCID, which will help inform the process for the NMIP.

For the NCCID, the DAC evaluates requests for access on criteria such as scientific merit of the project, its technical feasibility, the track record of the research team, reasonable evidence that access to data can benefit patients and the NHS, compliance with the GDPR and NHS
standards of information governance and IT security. We anticipate the NMIP will evaluate for similar criteria, and have structured this process so that the AIA complements these other criteria by encouraging research teams to think reflexively about the potential benefits and harms of their project, engage with patients and clinicians to surface critical responses, and present a document outlining those impacts to the DAC.

DACs can deliberate on a number of ethical and safety issues around use of data, as shown in the detailed process outlined below. For example, in the NMIP context, the DAC will be able to review submitted AIAs and make judgements about the clarity and strength of the process of impact identification, but they may also be required to review a DPIA, which we recommend would be a requirement of access. This would provide a more well-rounded picture of how each applicant has considered possible social impacts arising from their project. However, evidence suggests DACs often deliberate predominately around issues of data privacy and the rights of individual data subjects[footnote]Cheah, P.Y. and Piasecki, J. (2020). ’Data access committees‘. BMC Medical Ethics, 21, 12 [online] Available at: https://link.springer. com/article/10.1186/s12910-020-0453-z[/footnote]  [footnote]Thorogood A., and Knoppers, B.M. (2017). ‘Can research ethics committees enable clinical trial data sharing?’. Ethics, Medicine and Public Health, 3,1, pp.56-63.[online] Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2352552517300129[/footnote] which is not the sole focus of our AIA. Accordingly, the NMIP DAC will be expected to broaden their expertise and understanding of a range of possible harms and benefits from an AI system – a task that we acknowledge is essential but may require additional resource and support.

The proposed AIA process

Summary

Our AIA process is designed to ensure that National Medical Imaging Platform (NMIP) applicants have demonstrated a thorough and thoughtful evaluation of possible impacts, in order to be granted access to the platform. The process presented here is the final AIA process we recommend the NHS AI Lab implements and makes requisite for NMIP applicants.

While this process is designed specifically for NHS AI Lab and NMIP applicants, we expect it to be of interest to policymakers, AIA researchers and those interested in adopting algorithmic accountability mechanisms.

As the first draft of this process, we expect the advice to develop over time as teams trial the process and discover its strengths and limitations, as the public and research community provide feedback on this process, and as new AIA practical frameworks emerge.

The process consists of seven steps, with three main exercises, or points of activity, from the NMIP applicant perspective: a reflexive impact identification exercise, a participatory workshop, and a synthesis of the two (AIA synthesis). See figure 1 (below) for an overview of the process.

Figure 1: Proposed AIA process

The described AIA process is initiated by a request from a team of technology developers to access the NMIP database. It is the project that sets the conditions for the AIA – for example, the dataset might be used to build a completely new model or, alternatively, the team may have a pre-existing functioning model that the team would like to be retrained or validated on the NMIP. At the point that the applicant team decides the project would benefit from NMIP data access, they will be required to begin the AIA process as part of their data-access request.

  1. AIA reflexive exerciseA reflexive impact identification exercise submitted to the NMIP DAC as part of the application to access the NMIP database.The exercise uses a questionnaire format, drawing from best-practice methodologies for impact assessments. It prompts teams to answer a set of questions that consider common ethical considerations in AI and healthcare literature, and potential impacts that could arise, based on the best-case and worst-case scenarios for their project. It then asks teams to discuss the potential harms arising from uses based on the identified scenarios, and who is most likely to be harmed.Applicants are required to consider harms in relation to their perceived importance or urgency, i.e. weight of the consequence, difficulty to remediate and detectability of the impact. Teams are then asked to consider possible steps to mitigate these harms. These responses will be captured in the AIA template.
  2. Application filtering
    At this stage, the NMIP DAC filters initial applications.Applications are judged according to the engagement shown toward the exercise: whether they have completed all the prompts set out in the AIA template, and whether the answers to the AIA prompts are written in an understandable format, reflecting serious and careful consideration to the potential impacts of this system.Those deemed to have met the above criteria will be invited to take part in the participatory workshop, and those that have not are rejected until the reflexive exercise is properly conducted.
  3. AIA participatory workshop
    Step three is a participatory process designed as an interactive workshop, which would follow a ‘citizen’s jury’ methodology,[footnote]Gastil, J. (ed.) (2005). The deliberative democracy handbook: strategies for effective civic engagement in the twenty-first century. 1. ed., 1. impr. Hoboken, N.J: Wiley.[/footnote] equipping patients and members of the public with a means to pose questions and pass judgement on the harm and benefit scenarios identified in the previous exercise (and possibly uncovering some further impacts).The workshop would be an informal setting, where participants should feel safe and comfortable to ask questions and receive support from the workshop facilitator and other experts present. An NHS AI Lab rapporteur would be present to document the workshop’s deliberations and findings on behalf of the patient and public participants.After the exercise has concluded, the participants will asynchronously review the rapporteur’s account and the list of impacts identified, and review any mitigation plans the applicant team has devised in this window. 
  4. AIA synthesis
    The applicant team(s) revisit the template, and work the new knowledge back into the template document, based on findings from the participatory workshop.
  5. Data-access decision
    This updated template is re-submitted to the DAC, who will also receive the account of the participatory workshop from the NHS AI Lab rapporteur.The DAC then makes a decision on whether to grant access to the data, based on a set of criteria relating to the potential risks posed by this system, and whether the product team has offered satisfactory mitigations to potentially harmful outcomes.
  6. AIA publication
    The completed AIAs are then published in a central, easily accessible location – probably the NMIP website – for internal record-keeping and the potential for external viewing on request.
  7. AIA iteration
    The AIA is then revisited on an ongoing basis by project teams, and at certain trigger points.

    Such reviews may be prompted by notable events, such as changes to the proposed use case or a significant model update. In some cases, the DAC may, as part of its data access decision, mandate selected project teams to revisit the AIA after a certain period of time to determine if they are allowed to retain access, at its discretion.

Learnings from the AIA process

1. AIA reflexive exercise

Recommendation

For this first step we recommend a reflexive impact identification and analysis exercise to be run within teams applying for the NMIP. This exercise enables teams to identify possible impacts, including harms, arising from development and deployment of the applicant team’s AI system by working together through a template of questions and discussion prompts.

Implementation detail

  1. Applicant teams should identify a lead for this exercise (we recommend the project team lead, principal investigator or product lead) and a notetaker (for small teams, these roles may be combined).
  2. Once identified, the lead should organise and facilitate a meeting with relevant team members to work through the prompts (estimated time: two-to-three hours). The notetaker will be responsible for writing up the team’s answers in the template document (estimate one-to-two hours).
  3. Teams will first give some high-level project information: the purpose, the intended uses of the system, model of research; the project team/organisation; the inputs and outputs for the system, and the stakeholders affected by the system, including users and the people it serves.
  4. The template then guides applicants through some common ethical considerations in the context of healthcare, AI and the algorithmic literature, including whether the project could exacerbate health inequalities, increase surveillance, impact the relationship between stakeholders, have environmental effects or whether it could be intentionally or unintentionally misused.
  5. In the next section, impact identification and scenarios, teams reflect on some possible scenarios arising from use of the system and what impacts they would have, including the best-case scenario when the system is working as designed and the worst-case scenario, when not working in some way. This section also asks for some likely challenges and hurdles encountered on the way to achieving the best-case scenario, and the socio-environmental requirements necessary to achieve success, such as a stable connection to the internet, or training for doctors and nurses.
  6. In the final section, teams undertake potential harms analysis – based on the scenarios identified earlier in the exercise, teams should consider what the potential harms resulting from implementation that should be designed for, and who is at risk of being harmed. Teams should also make a judgement on the perceived importance, urgency, difficulty and detectability of the harms.
  7. Teams are given space to detail some possible mitigation plans to minimise identified harms.

All thinking is captured by the notetaker in the AIA template document. It is estimated that this exercise will take three-to-five hours in total (discussion and documentation) to complete.

Frictions and learnings

The impact assessment design:
This exercise is designed to encourage critical dialogue and reflexivity within teams. By stipulating that evidence of these discussions should be built into a template, the AIA facilitates records and documentation for internal and external visibility.

This format of the exercise draws from an approach often used in impact assessments, including AIAs, adapting a Q&A or questionnaire format to prompt teams to consider possible impacts, discuss the circumstances in which impacts might arise and who might be affected. This exercise was also built to be aligned with traditional internal auditing processes – a methodical, internally conducted process with the intention to enrich understanding of possible risk once a system or product is in deployment.[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote]

Other impact assessments request consideration of high-level categories of impact, such as privacy, health or economic impact.[footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Algorithmic impact assessment tool. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html[/footnote] In this process, we chose to prompt consideration of impacts by asking teams to consider what they perceive to be the best and worst-case arising from the use of the system. Our hope is this will make the exercise easier to digest and engage with for those less familiar with adopting ethics discussions into their work. Impacts should relate to the kinds of challenges that are associated with AI systems, such as concerns around bias, misuse, explainability of findings, contestability; but may also include several of the ‘Generic data and digital health considerations’ outlined by the NHS such as concerns around patient involvement and ownership of health and care data.[footnote]NHSX. (2019). Artificial Intelligence: how to get it right. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/media/documents/NHSX_AI_report.pdf[/footnote]

Some other formats of impact assessment ask an assessor to assign a risk level (e.g. low to high) for a product, which may in turn dictate additional follow-up actions from a developer. The regulatory framework adopted by the MHRA classifies AI as a medical device using a risk-level system. We therefore expect most applicants to be familiar with this format, with some projects having a system that will have already undergone this process at the point of NMIP application. This process is intended to complement risk categorisation, giving developers and
project leads a richer understanding of potential harmful impacts of an AI system, to better inform this self-assessment of risk.

The current MHRA framework is focused primarily on risks to the individual, i.e. the risk of harm to a patient if a technology fails (similar to a DPIA, which focuses on the fundamental rights of an individual and the attendant risks of improper personal data handling). Assessment of individual risk is an important component of ensuring safe, fair and just patient outcomes, but we designed the reflexive exercise to go further than this framing of risk. By asking developers to reflexively examine impacts through a broader lens, they are able to consider some possible impacts of their proposed system on society, such as whether it might reinforce systemic biases and discrimination against certain marginalised groups. This process is not about identifying a total measure or quantification of risk, as incorporated in other processes such as the MHRA medical device classification system, but about better understanding impacts and broadening the range of impacts given due consideration.

It is possible that as a precedent of completed AIAs develops, the NHS may in future be able to ascribe particular risk categories based on common criteria or issues they see. But at this stage, we have intentionally chosen not to ask applicants to make a value judgement on risk severity. As described in ‘5. Data-access decision’, we recommend that applicants should also submit their DPIA as part of the application process, concurrently with the reflexive exercise. However, if the NHS team determined that not all project teams would have to undertake a DPIA prior to receiving full assessment by the DAC, then we would recommend a template amendment to reflect more considerations around data privacy.

Making complex information accessible:
We also experienced a particular challenge in this exercise of couching the language of ethical values like accountability and transparency into practical recommendations for technology developers to understand and comply with, given that many may be unfamiliar with AIAs and wider algorithmic accountability initiatives.

Expert stakeholder interviews with start-ups and research labs revealed enthusiasm for an impact assessment, but less clarity on and understanding of the types of questions that would be captured in an AIA and the kinds of impacts to consider. To address these concerns, we produced a detailed AIA template that helps applicant teams gain understanding of possible ethical considerations and project impacts, how they might arise, who they might impact the most, and which of the impacts are likely to result in harm. We also point to data, digital, health and algorithmic considerations from NHSX’s AI report,[footnote]NHSX. (2019). Artificial Intelligence: how to get it right. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/media/documents/NHSX_AI_report.pdf[/footnote] which many teams may be familiar with, and instruct applicants on how best to adopt plain language in their answers.

Limitations of the proposed process
We note that different NMIP applicants may have different interactions with the exercise once trialled: for example, an applicant developing an AI system from scratch may have higher expectations of what it might achieve or what its outcomes will be once deployed, than an applicant who is seeking to validate an existing system, and may be armed with prior evidence. Once these sorts of considerations emerge after the AIA process is trialled, we may be able to make a more robust claim about the utility of a reflexive exercise as a quality component of this AIA.

This exercise (in addition to the participatory workshop, below) is probably applicable to other AIA-process proposals, with some amendments. However, we emphasise that domain expertise should be used to ensure the reflexive exercise operates as intended, as a preliminary exploration of potential benefits and harms. Further study will be required to see how well this exercise works in practice for both project teams and the NHS DAC, how effective it proves at foreseeing which impacts may arise, and whether any revisions or additions to the
process are required.

2. Application filtering

Recommendation

We recommend that the DAC conducts an application-filtering exercise once the reflexive exercise has been submitted, to remove applications that are missing basic requirements, or will not meet the criteria for reasons other than the AIA.

Depending on the strength of the application, the DAC can choose to either reject NMIP applications at this stage, or invite applicants to proceed to the participatory workshop. Most of these criteria will be established by the NMIP team, and we anticipate they will be similar to
those for the National COVID Chest Imaging Database (NCCID), which sees an administrator and a subset of the DAC members involved in application screening for completeness, technical and scientific quality, and includes safeguards for conflicts of interest.[footnote]Based on NHS AI Lab documentation reviewed in research.[/footnote]

Implementation detail

Based on the review process for the National COVID Chest Imaging Database (NCCID), the precursor platform to the NMIP, the NHS AI Lab is likely to adopt the following filtering procedure:

  1. After the applicant team completes the reflexive exercise and builds the evidence into the template document, the teams submit the exercise as part of their application to the NMIP dataset.
  2. The person(s) fielding the data-access requests, such as the administrator, will check that all relevant information required in the AIA template has been submitted. In the instance that some is missing, the administrator will go back to the applicant to request it. If the initial submission is very incomplete, the application is declined at this step.
  3. The administrator passes the acceptable applications to members of the DAC.
  4. The members of the DAC chosen to filter the application are given opportunity to declare any conflict of interests with the applicant’s project. If one or both has a conflict of interest, they should select another expert to review the AIA at this stage.
  5. The selected members assess the AIA and make a judgement call about whether the applicant team can proceed on to the participatory workshop. The decision will be based on technical and scientific quality criteria established by the DAC, as well as review of the AIA, for which we suggest the following initial filtering criteria:
    1. The project team has completed the reflexive exercise.
    2. The answers to the AIA prompts are written in an understandable
      format, avoiding jargon and other technical language.
    3. The answers given do not identify any unacceptable impacts that would place severe risk on the health and wellbeing of patients and clinicians.

Frictions and learnings

Scale and resource:
The NHS AI Lab raised a challenge of scale for this process and suggested that a triage phase might be needed to identify applicants to prioritise for the participatory workshop in the event of a high volume of applications. However, in prioritising some applications over others for the participatory workshop, there is a risk of pre-empting what the findings would be; implicitly judging which applications might be of greater risk. Without a history of participatory impact identification, that judgement is a challenging one for the DAC or NHS AI Lab to make, and risks prioritising impacts and harms already well understood by established processes.

Consequently, we have recommended that all applicants should undertake the participatory workshop but that, as the process begins to be trialled, the DAC will develop a paradigm based on previous applications, which may enable them to make a judgement call for
applicant suitability.

3. AIA participatory workshop

Recommendation

We recommend that the NHS AI Lab runs centralised participatory impact assessment workshops, in order to bring a diverse range of lived experience and perspectives to the AIA process, and to support NMIP applicants who may not have the resources or skills to run a participatory process of this size. We believe this process will also help project teams identify risks and mitigation measures for their project and provide valuable feedback on how their project might be successfully integrated into the UK’s healthcare system.

Implementation detail

  1. We recommend the NHS AI Lab sets up a paid panel of 25–30 patients and members of the public who represent traditionally underrepresented groups who are likely to be affected by algorithms that interact with NMIP data, across dimensions such as age, gender, region, ethnic background, socio-economic background. This includes members of the impacted groups, in addition to adequate representatives of certain communities (e.g. a representative from a grassroots immigrant support organisation being able to speak to migrant experience and concerns).
  2. All panellists will be briefed on their role at an induction session, where they will be introduced to each other, learn more about AI and its uses in healthcare, and about the NMIP and its aims and purpose. Participants should also be briefed on the aims of the workshops, how the participatory process will work and what is expected of
    them.
  3. The panellists will be invited to discuss the applicant team’s answers to the reflexive exercise, possibly identifying other harms and impacts not already addressed by applicant teams. This is designed as an interactive workshop following a ‘citizen’s jury’ methodology,[footnote]For more information on citizen’s jury methodology, see Involve. Citizen’s jury. Available at: https://www.involve.org.uk/resources/ methods/citizens-jury[/footnote] equipping participants with a means to deliberate on the harms and benefit scenarios identified in the previous exercises (and possibly uncovering some further impacts). The workshop would be designed as an informal setting, where participants should feel safe and comfortable to ask questions and receive support from the workshop facilitator and other experts present. The workshops will involve a presentation from the developers of each applicant team on what their system does or will do, what prompted the need for it, how the system uses NMIP data, what outputs it will generate, how the AI system will be deployed and used and what benefits and impacts it will bring and how these were considered (reporting back evidence from the reflexive exercise).
  4. The panellists will then deliberate on the impacts identified to consider whether they agree with the best, worst and most-likely scenarios produced, what other considerations might be important and possible next steps. The facilitator will support this discussion, offering further questions and support where necessary.
  5. The Lab would have ownership over this process, and contribute staffing support by supplying facilitators for the workshops, as well as other miscellaneous resources such as workshop materials. The facilitator will coordinate and lead the workshop, with the
    responsibility for overseeing the impact identification tasks, fielding
    questions, and for leading on the induction session.
  6. 8–12 panellists will be present per workshop, to avoid the same people reviewing every application (8–12 participants per applicant project suggests a different combination for each workshop if there are six or more applications to review). We recommend one workshop per application, and that workshops are batched, so they can run quarterly.
  7. Also present at these workshops would be two ‘critical friends’: independent experts in the fields of data and AI ethics/computer science and biomedical sciences, available to judge the proposed model with a different lens and offer further support. An NHS rapporteur will also be present to provide an account of the workshop on behalf of the patient and public panellists that is fed back to the NHS AI Lab. The rapporteur’s account will be reviewed by the panellists to ensure it is an accurate and full representation of the workshop deliberations.
  8. Members of the applicant team will be present to observe the workshop and answer any questions as required, and will then return to their teams to update the original AIA with the new knowledge and findings.
  9. This updated AIA is then re-submitted to the NMIP DAC.

For the full participatory AIA implementation detail, see Annex 3.

Frictions and learnings

The bespoke participatory framework:
The impetus for producing a tailor-made participatory impact assessment framework came from combining learning from AIA literature with challenges with public and patient involvement (PPI) processes that were raised in our stakeholder interviews. 

There is consensus within the AIA literature that public consultation and participation are an important component of an AIA, but little consensus as to what that process should involve. Within the UK healthcare context, there is an existing participatory practice known as public and patient involvement (PPI). These are frameworks that aim to improve consultation and engagement in how healthcare research and delivery is designed and conducted.[footnote]Health Research Authority (HRA). What is public involvement in research? Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-andimproving- research/best-practice/public-involvement/[/footnote] PPI is well-supported and a common feature in healthcare research: many research funders now require evidence of PPI activity from research labs or companies as a condition of funding.[footnote]University Hospital Southampton. Involving patients and the public. Available at: https://www.uhs.nhs.uk/ ClinicalResearchinSouthampton/For-researchers/PPI-in-your-research.aspx[/footnote] Our interviews revealed a multitude of different approaches to PPI in healthcare, with varying levels of maturity and formality. This echoes research findings that PPI activities, and particularly reporting and documentation, can often end up as an ‘optional extra’ instead of an embedded practice.[footnote]Price, A., Schroter, S., Snow, R., et al. (2018). ‘Frequency of reporting on patient and public involvement (PPI) in research studies published in a general medical journal: a descriptive study’. BMJ Open 2018;8:e020452. [online] Available at: https://bmjopen.bmj. com/content/8/3/e020452[/footnote]

Our stakeholder interviews highlighted that PPI processes are generally supported among both public and private-sector organisations and are in use across the breadth of organisations in the healthcare sector, but many expressed challenges with engagement from patients and the public. One interviewee lamented the struggle to recruit participants: ‘Why would they want to talk to us? […] it might be that we’re a small company: why engage with us?’

In an earlier iteration of our AIA, we recommended applicants design and run the participatory process themselves, but our interviews identified varying capacity for such a process, and it was decided that this would be too onerous for individual organisations to manage on their own
– particularly for small research labs. One organisation, a healthtech start-up, reported that having more access to funding enabled them to increase the scope and reach of their activity: ‘We would always have been keen to do [PPI work], but [funding] is an enabler to do it bigger
than otherwise’. These interviews demonstrated the desire to undertake public participation, but also showcased a lack of internal resources to do so effectively.

There is also the risk that having individual applicants run this process themselves may create perverse incentives for ‘participation washing’, in which perspectives from the panellists are presented in a way that downplays their concerns.[footnote]Sloane, M., Moss, E., Awomolo, O., & Forlano, L. (2020). ‘Participation is not a design fix for machine learning’. arXiv. [online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.02423[/footnote] It will be preferable for this process to be run by a centralised body that is independent from applicants, as well as independent from the NHS, and can provide a more standardised and consistent experience across different applications. This led to the proposal that NHS AI Lab run the participatory process centrally, to ease the burden on applicants, reduce any conflicts of interests, and to gain some oversight over the quality of the process.

Lack of standardised method:
To address the challenge of a lack of standardised methods for how to run public engagement, we decided building a bespoke methodology for participation in impact assessment was an important recommendation for this project. This would provide a way to stabilise the differing PPI approaches currently in use in healthcare research, align the NMIP with best practice for public deliberation methods and ameliorate some concerns over a lack of standard procedure.

This process also arose from an understanding that developing a novel participatory process for an AIA requires a large amount of both knowledge and capacity for the process to operate meaningfully and produce high-quality outputs. To address this challenge, we have drawn from the Ada Lovelace Institute’s experience and expertise in designing and delivering public engagement in the data/AI space, as well as best practice from the field in order to co-ordinate an approach to a participatory AIA.

Resource versus benefit:
The participatory workshop is an extension of many existing participatory procedures in operation, and consequently is time and resource intensive for the stakeholders involved, but has significant benefits.

Beyond bringing traditionally underrepresented patients into the process, which is an important objective, we believe that the workshop offers the potential to build more intuitive, higher-quality products that understand and can respond to the needs of end users.

For applicants early on in the project lifecycle, the participatory workshop is a meaningful opportunity to engage with the potential beneficiaries of their AI system: patients (or patient representatives). It means possible patient concerns around the scope, applicability or use case for the proposed system can be surfaced while there is still opportunity to make changes or undertake further reflection before the system is in use. In this way, the participatory workshop strengthens the initial internally conducted exercise of impact identification.

Researchers have argued that, to support positive patient outcomes in clinical pathways in which AI systems are used to administer or support care, evaluation metrics must go beyond measures of technical assurance and look at how use of AI might impact on the quality of
patient care.[footnote]Kelly, C.J., Karthikesalingam, A., Suleyman, M., Corrado, G. and King. D. (2019). ‘Key challenges for delivering clinical impact with artificial intelligence’ BMC Medicine. 29 October, 17: 195. [online] Available at: https://bmcmedicine.biomedcentral.com/ articles/10.1186/s12916-019-1426-2[/footnote] The process provides a useful forum for communication between patients and developers, in which developers may be able to better understand the needs of the affected communities, and therefore build products better suited to them.

The process at scale:
Given that the NMIP is purported as a national initiative, challenges and uncertainties have arisen from the NHS AI Lab around how this process would operate at scale. We have sought to address this by recommending the NHS AI Lab run the workshops in batches, as opposed to on a rolling basis. We have also suggested that over time the NHS AI Lab may be able to use previous data-access decisions to triage future applications, and possibly even have applicants with similar projects sharing the same workshop.

Recompensing panellists appropriately:
All participants must be renumerated for their time, but we also recognise the inherent labour of attending these workshops, which may not be adequately covered or reflected by the renumeration offered.

Limitations of resource:
Other organisations hoping to adopt this exercise may be practically constrained by a lack of funding or available expertise. We hope that in future, as participatory methods and processes grow in prominence and the AIA ecosystem develops further, alternate sources of funding and support will be available for organisations wanting to adopt or adapt this framework for their contexts.

4. AIA synthesis

Recommendation

We recommend that after the participatory workshop is completed, the applicant team synthesises its findings with the findings from their original AIA template (completed in the reflexive exercise), building the knowledge produced back into the AIA, in order to ensure the deliberation-based impacts are incorporated and that applicant teams respond to them.

The synthesis step is a critical phase in accountability processes.[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote] It serves to summarise and consolidate the information gained throughout the AIA process and ensure they are incorporated into the assessment of impacts, and actionable steps for mitigations of harm.

Implementation detail

  1. Throughout the AIA process, thinking and discussion should be captured in the AIA template document, allowing documentation to be revisited after each exercise and as a record for future updates of the AIA.#
  2. Once the synthesis exercise has been completed, the AIA is considered complete. The AIA is then ready to be resubmitted to the NMIP DAC.

Frictions and learnings

Goals of the process:

The synthesis exercise serves two purposes:

  1. Documentation provides a stable record of activity throughout the AIA process, for internal and external viewing (by the DAC at resubmission phase, and the public, post-publication).
  2. It encourages a critical, reflexive response to the impactidentification process, by asking applicants to revisit their responses in the light of new information and knowledge from the participatory panel in the participatory workshop.

The NHS rapporteur report also incentivises a high-quality synthesis exercise, as it allows the DAC to refer back to a full account of the workshop, which has been reviewed by the patient and public panellists, to come to a final judgement of the applicant team’s willingness to incorporate new feedback and ability to be critical of their own processes and assumptions.

Supporting meaningful participation:
Some scholars in the public-participation literature have argued that meaningful participation should be structured around co-design and collaborative decision-making.[footnote]Madaio, M, Stark, L, Wortman Vaughan, J, Wallach, H. (2020). ‘Co-designing checklists to understand organisational challenges and opportunities around fairness in AI’. Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp.1-14 [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3313831.3376445[/footnote] We designed our participatory process as a feed-in point, for patients and the public to discuss and put forward ideas on how developers of AI systems might address possible benefits and harms.

The synthesis exercise ensures that these ideas become incorporated into the AIA template document, creating an artefact that the DAC and members of the public can view. Developers can then refer back to the AIA template as required throughout the remainder of the project development process.

Though undertaking a process of synthesis boosts opportunity for reflexivity and reflection, there is no guarantee that the broader stakeholder discussions that occur in the participatory workshop will lead to tangible changes in design or development practice.

In an ideal scenario, participants would be given opportunity to have direct decision-making power on design decisions. It has been argued that the ideal level of participation in AI contexts amounts to participatory co-design, a process that sees people and communities affected by the adoption of AI systems become directly involved in the design decisions that may impact them.[footnote]Costanza-Chock, S. (2020) Design justice: community-led practices to build the worlds we need. Cambridge: MIT Press[/footnote] In Participatory data stewardship, the Ada Lovelace Institute describes a vision for people being enabled and empowered to actively collaborate with designers, developers and deployers of AI systems – a step which goes further than both ‘informing’ people about data use, via transparency measures and ‘consulting’ people about AI system design, via surveys or opinion polls.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatorydata-stewardship/[/footnote]

Similarly, while beyond the scope of this study, it is suggested that participants would ideally be invited for multiple rounds of involvement, such as a second workshop prior to system deployment.[footnote]Madaio, M, Stark, L, Wortman Vaughan, J, Wallach, H. (2020). ‘Co-designing checklists to understand organisational challenges and opportunities around fairness in AI’. Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp.1-14 [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3313831.3376445[/footnote] This would enable participants to be able to make a permissibility call on whether the system should be deployed, based on the applicant team’s monitoring and mitigation plan, and again once the system is in use, so participants can voice concerns or opinions on any impacts that have surfaced ex post.

5. Data-access decision

Recommendation

We recommend that the NHS AI Lab uses the NMIP DAC to assess the strength and quality of each AIA, alongside the assessment of other material required as part of the NMIP application.

Implementation detail

  1. We recommend the DAC comprises at least 11 members, including academic representatives from social sciences, biomedical sciences, computer science/AI and legal fields and representatives from patient communities (see ‘NMIP DAC membership, process and criteria for assessment’ below).
  2. Once the participatory workshop is complete, and the applicant team has revised their AIA template, providing new evidence, the template is resubmitted to the DAC. In order to come to a data-access decision, the DAC follows the assessment guidelines, reviewing the quality of both the reflexive exercise and the workshop based on the detail in the AIA output template and the strength of engagement in the participatory workshop, as well as the supporting evidence from the NHS rapporteur. If the accounts and evidence have significant divergence, the applicant team may either be instructed to undertake further review and synthesis, or be denied access.
  3. The assessment guidelines include questions on whether the DAC agrees with the most-likely, worst-case, and best-case scenarios identified, based on their knowledge of the project team’s proposal, and whether the project meets the requirements and expectations of existing NHSX frameworks for digital health technologies.[footnote]Such as the NHS Code of Conduct for Data-driven Health and Care Technology, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/ publications/code-of-conduct-for-data-driven-health-and-care-technology/initial-code-of-conduct-for-data-driven-health-and-care- technology and NHSX’s ‘What Good Looks Like’ framework, available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/digitise-connect-transform/what-good-looks-like/what-good-looks-like-publication/[/footnote] The guidelines also establish normative guidelines for the DAC to ascertain the acceptability of the AIA based on whether the project meets the requirements and expectations of NHSX’s ‘What good looks like’ framework, which includes: ’being well led’, ’empowering citizens’ and ’creating healthy populations’ among others. If the process was deemed to have been completed incorrectly or insufficiently, or if the project is deemed to have violated normative or legal red lines, the DAC would be instructed to reject the application.
  4. In the NCCID data-access process, if the application is accepted, the applicant team would be required to submit a data-access framework contract and a data-access agreement. We believe the existing documentation from the NCCID, if replicated, would probably require applicant teams to undertake a DPIA, to be submitted with the AIA and other documentation at this stage. (If the Lab decides that not all applicant teams would be required to undertake a DPIA prior to this stage, we recommend the reflexive exercise be amended to include more data privacy considerations – see ‘AIA reflexive exercise’). Once these additional documents are completed and signed, access details are granted to the applicant.

NMIP DAC membership, process and criteria for assessment

We recommended to the NHS AI Lab that the NMIP DAC comprises at least 11 members:

  1. a chair from an independent institution
  2. an independent deputy chair from a patients-rights organisation or civil-society organisation
  3. two representatives from the social sciences
  4. one representative from the biomedical sciences
  5. one representative from the computer science/AI field
  6. one representative with legal and data ethics expertise
  7. two representatives from patient communities or patients-rights organisations
  8. two members of the NHS AI Lab.

For the NCCID, an administrator was required to help manage access requests, which would probably be required in the NMIP context. Similarly, we anticipate that in addition to the core committee, a four-person technical-review team of relevant researchers, data managers
and lab managers who can assess data privacy and security questions, may be appointed by the DAC (as per the NCCID terms).

The responsibilities of the DAC in this context are to consider and authorise requests for access to the NMIP, as well deciding whether to continue or disable access. They will base this decision on criteria and protocols for assessment and will assess the completed AIA, including the participatory workshop using the NHS AI Lab rapporteur’s account of the exercise (as described previously) as additional evidence.

For the NCCID project, the DAC assessed applications along the criteria of scientific merit, technical feasibility and reasonable evidence that access to the data can benefit patients and the NHS. This may be emulated in the NMIP, but broader recommendations for application
assessment beyond the AIAs are out of scope for this study.

As guidelines to support the DAC to make an assessment about the strength of the AIA we provide two groups of questions to consider: the AIA process and the impacts identified as part of the process.

Questions on the process include:

  1. Did the project team revise the initial reflexive exercise after the participatory workshop was conducted?
  2. Are the answers to the AIA prompts written in an understandable format, reflecting serious and careful consideration to the potential impacts of this system?
  3. Did the NHS AI Lab complete a participatory AIA with a panel featuring members of the public?
  4. Was that panel properly recruited according to the the NHS AI Lab AIA process guide?
  5. Are there any noticeable differences between the impacts/concerns/risks/challenges that the NHS AI Lab rapporteur identified and what the AIA document states? Is there anything unaddressed or missing?

Questions on the impacts include:

  1. Based on your knowledge of the project team’s proposal, do you agree with the most likely, worst-case, and best-case scenarios they have identified?
  2. Are there any potential stakeholders who may be more seriously affected by this project? Is that reason well-justified?
  3. For negative impacts identified, has the project team provided a satisfactory mitigation plan to address these harms?
    1. If you were to explain these plans to a patient who would be
      affected by this system, would they agree these are reasonable?

Frictions and learnings

The role of the DAC and accountability:
In an accountability relationship between applicant teams, the NHS AI Lab and members of the public, the DAC is the body that can pose questions and pass judgement, and ultimately is the authoritative body to approve, deny or remove access to the NMIP.

The motivation behind this design choice was the belief that a DAC could contribute to two primary goals of this AIA: accountability, by building an external forum to which the actor must be accountable; and standardisation, whereas applications grow in volume, the DAC will be able to build a case law of common benefits and harms arising from impact assessments and independent scrutiny, which may offer different or novel priorities to the AIA not considered by the applicant team(s).

Recommendations for the composition of the DAC contribute to broadening participation in the process, by bringing different forms of expertise and knowledge into the foreground, particularly those not routinely involved in data-access decision-making such as patient
representatives.

The literature review surfaced a strong focus on mandatory forms of assessment and governance in both the healthcare domain and AIA scholarship. In healthcare, many regulatory frameworks and legislation including the MHRA Medical Device Directive, a liability-based regime, ask developers to undertake a risk assessment to provide an indication of the safety and quality of a product and gatekeep entry to the market.

Initiatives like the MHRA Medical Device Directive address questions relating to product safety, but lack robust accountability mechanisms, a transparency or public-access requirement, participation and a broader lens to impact assessment, as discussed in this report. This AIA was designed to add value for project teams, the NHS and patients in these areas.

Legitimacy without legal instruments:
In the AIA space, recent scholarship from Data & Society argues that AIAs benefit from a ‘source of legitimacy’ of some kind in order to scaffold accountability and suggest that this might include being adopted under a legal instrument.[footnote]Madaio, M, Stark, L, Wortman Vaughan, J, Wallach, H. (2020). ‘Co-designing checklists to understand organisational challenges and opportunities around fairness in AI’. Proceedings of the CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems, pp.1-14 [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3313831.3376445[/footnote] However, there is not currently a legal requirement for AIAs in the UK, and the timeline for establishing such a legal basis is outside of the scope of this case study, necessitating a divergence from the literature. This will be a recurring challenge for AIAs as people look to trial and evaluate them as a tool at a faster pace than they are being adopted in policy.

This AIA process attempts to address this challenge by considering how alternative sources of legitimacy can be wielded, in lieu of law and regulation. Where top-down governance frameworks like legal regimes may prohibit participation and deliberation in decision-making, this AIA process brings in both internal and external perspectives of harms and benefits of AI systems. We recommended the NHS AI Lab make use of a DAC to prevent organisations building and assessing AIAs independently, as self-assessed AIAs. This may allay some concerns around interpretability and whether the AIA might end up being self-affirming.[footnote]Individual interpretation of soft governance frameworks may lead to some organisations picking and choosing which elements to enact, which is known as ’ethics washing’. See: Floridi, L. (2019). ‘Translating principles into practices of digital ethics: five risks of being unethical’. Philosophy & technology, 32, pp.185-193 [online] Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13347-019-00354-x[/footnote]

Potential weaknesses of the DAC model:
In this study, the DAC has the benefit of giving the AIA process a level of independence and some external perspective. We recognise however that the appointment of a DAC may prove to be an insufficient form of accountability and legitimacy once in place. We recommend the membership of the DAC comprise experts from a variety of fields to ensure diverse forms of knowledge. Out of 11 members, only two are patient representatives, which may disempower the patients and undermine their ability to pass judgement.

The DAC functions as an accountability mechanism in our context because the committee members are able to pass judgement and scrutinise on the completed AIAs. However, the fairly narrow remit of a DAC may result in an AIA expertise deficit, where the committee may
find their new role of understanding and responding to AIAs and adopting a broad lens to impact challenging.

The data-access context means that it is not possible to further specify additional project points where applicant teams might benefit from reflexive analysis of impacts, such as at ideation phase, or at the final moment pre-deployment, that would make the process more iterative.

Additionally, the DAC still sits inside the NHS as a mechanism and is not wholly external: in an ideal scenario, an AIA might be scrutinised and evaluated by an independent third party. This also raises some tensions around whether there might be, in some cases, political pressures on
the NMIP DAC to favour certain decisions. The DAC also lacks statutory footing, putting it at the mercy of NHS funding: if funds were to be redirected elsewhere, this could leave the DAC on uncertain ground.

As other AIAs outside this context begin to be piloted, a clearer understanding of what ‘good’ accountability might look like will emerge, alongside the means to achieve this as an ideal.

6. AIA publication

Recommendation

To build transparency and accountability, we recommend that the NHS AI Lab publishes all completed AIAs, by publishing the final AIA template, alongside the name and contact details of a nominated applicant team member who is willing to field further information and questions on the process from respective interested parties on request.

We also recommend the Lab publishes information on the membership of the DAC, its role and the assessment criteria, so that external viewers can learn how data-access decisions are made.

Implementation detail

  1. We recommend that the Lab publishes completed AIAs on a central
    repository, such as an NMIP website,[footnote]Such as the website designed for the National Covid Chest Imaging Database (NCCID), see: https://nhsx.github.io/covid-chestimaging- database/[/footnote] that allows for easy access by request from the public. Only AIAs that have completed both the reflexive exercise and the participatory workshop will be published. However, there may be value in the DAC periodically publishing high-level observations around the unsuccessful AIAs (as a collective, as opposed to individual AIAs), and we also note that individual applicant teams may want to publish their AIA independently, regardless of the access decision.
  2. The designed AIA template is intended to ensure the AIAs are able to be easily published by the Lab without further workload, and the template is an accessible document that follows a standard format. It is likely a nominated NHS AI Lab team member will be needed to publish the AIAs, such as an administrator.

Frictions and learnings

Public access to AIAs:
There is widespread consensus within the AIA and adjacent literature that public access to AIAs and transparent practice are important ideals.[footnote]Latonero, M. and Agarwal, A. (2021). Human rights impact assessments for AI: learning from Facebook’s failure in Myanmar. Carr Center for Human Rights Policy: Harvard Kennedy School. Available at: https://carrcenter.hks.harvard.edu/publications/humanrights-impact-assessments-ai-learning-facebook%E2%80%99s-failure-myanmar[/footnote] [footnote]Loi, M. in collaboration with Matzener, A., Muller, A. and Spielkamp, M. (2021). Automated decision-making systems in the public sector. An impact assessment tool for public authorities. Algorithm Watch. Available at: https://algorithmwatch.org/en/wp-content/ uploads/2021/06/ADMS-in-the-Public-Sector-Impact-Assessment-Tool-AlgorithmWatch-June-2021.pdf[/footnote] [footnote]Selbst, A.D. (2018). ‘The intuitive appeal of explainable machines’. Fordham Law Review 1085. [online] Available at: https://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3126971[/footnote] Public access to documentation associated with decision-making has been put forward as a way to build transparency and, in turn, public trust in the use of AI systems.[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] This is a particularly significant
dimension for a public-sector agency.[footnote]Hildebrandt, M. (2012). ‘The dawn of a critical transparency right for the profiling era’. Digital Enlightment Yearbook, pp.41-56 [online] Available at: https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/handle/2066/94126[/footnote]

Transparency is an important underpinning for accountability, where access to reviewable material helps to structure accountability relationships and improves the strength and efficacy of an impact assessment process.[footnote]Metcalf, J., Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Ranjit, S. and Elish, M.C. (2021). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments and accountability: the coconstruction of impacts’. Conference on Fairness Accountability, and Transparency [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445935[/footnote] Making AIAs public means they can be scrutinised and evaluated by interested parties, including patients and the public, and also enables deeper understanding and learning from approaches among research communities. Publication in our context also helps standardise applicants’ AIAs.

Other impact assessments, such as data protection impact assessments (DPIAs) and human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) have drawn criticism for not demonstrating consistent publication practice,[footnote]Metcalf, J., Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Ranjit, S. and Elish, M.C. (2021). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments and accountability: the coconstruction of impacts’. Conference on Fairness Accountability, and Transparency [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445935[/footnote] therefore missing opportunities to build accountability and public scrutiny. We also base our recommendation in part on audit processes, where transparent, auditable systems equip developers, auditors and
regulators with knowledge and investigatory powers for the benefit of the system itself, but also the wider ecosystem.[footnote]Singh, J, Cobbe, J and Norval, C. (2019). ‘Decision provenance: harnessing data flow for accountable systems’. IEEE Access, 7, pp. 6592-6574 [online]. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1804.05741[/footnote]

Putting transparency into practice:
In this study, we found that translating transparency ideals into practice in this context required some discussion and consensus around establishing the publishable output of the AIA. During our interview process, we surfaced some potential concerns around publishing commercially sensitive information from private companies. The AIA as it appears in the AIA template document does not necessitate commercially sensitive information or detailed technical attributes.

Further transparency mechanisms:
In this context, full transparency is not necessarily achieved by publishing the AIA, and other mechanisms might be needed for more robust transparency. For example, for organisations interested in transparent model reporting, we recommend developers consider completing and publishing a model card template – a template developed by Google researchers to increase machine learning model transparency by providing a standardised record of system attributes.[footnote]More information on model cards, including example model cards, can be found here: https://modelcards.withgoogle.com/about[/footnote] This framework has been adapted to a medical context, based on the original proposal from the team at Google.[footnote]Sendak, M., Gao, M., Brajer, N. and Balu, S. (2020). ‘“The human body is a black box”’: supporting clinical decision-making with deep learning’ Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency. ACM: New York, NY, USA, pp. 99–109. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372827[/footnote]

7. AIA iteration

Recommendation

We recommend that project teams revisit and update the AIA document at certain trigger points: primarily if there is a significant change to the system or its application.

We also recommend a two-year review point in all cases, because it can be hard to identify what constitutes a ‘significant change’. The exercise is designed to be a valuable reflection opportunity for a team, and a chance to introduce new team members who may have joined in the intervening time to the AIA process. The DAC might also make suggestions for an appropriate time period for revision in certain cases, and revision of the AIA could be a requirement of continued access.

Implementation detail

A potential process of iteration might be:

  1. After a regular interval of time has elapsed (e.g. two years), project teams should revisit the AIA. For some applicants, this might occur after the proposed AI system has entered into deployment. In this scenario, previously unanticipated impacts may have emerged.
  2. Reviewing the AIA output template and updating with new learnings and challenges will help strengthen record-keeping and reflexive practice.
  3. All iterations are recorded in the same way to allow stable documentation and comparison over time.
  4. If revision is a condition of continued access, the DAC may see fit to review the revised AIA.
  5. The revised AIA is then published alongside the previous AIA, providing important research and development findings to the research community, as with each AIA iteration, new knowledge and evidence may be surfaced.

Frictions and learnings

Benefits of ex post assessment:
Although we consider our AIA primarily as a tool for pre-emptive impact assessment, this iterative process provides a means for an AIA to function as both an ex ante and ex post assessment, bridging different impact-assessment methodologies to help build a more holistic picture of benefits and harms. This will capture instances where impacts emerge that have not been adequately anticipated by a pre-emptive AIA.

This would align our AIA with methods like AI assurance,[footnote]Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). (2019). An overview of the auditing framework for artificial intelligence and its core components. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/ai-blog-an-overview-of-the-auditing-framework-forartificial-intelligence-and-its-core-components/[/footnote] which offer a possible governance framework across the entire AI-system lifecycle, of which impact assessment is one component. There are other similar mechanisms already in place in the healthcare sector, such as the ISO/TR 20416 post-market surveillance standards, which provide users with a way to identify ‘undesirable effects’ at pace.[footnote]International Standards Organization (ISO). (2021). New ISO standards for medical devices. Available at: https://www.iso.org/news/ ref2534.html[/footnote]

Revising the AIA also equips teams with further meaningful opportunity for project reflection.[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote]

Limitations of the model:
Many impact assessment proposals suggest adopting an incremental, iterative approach to impact identification and evaluation, identifying several different project points for activity across the lifecycle.[footnote]Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Data protection impact assessments. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/ guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-protection-impact- assessments/[/footnote]  [footnote]The Equality and Health Inequalities Unit. (2020). NHS England and NHS Improvement: Equality and Health Inequalities Impact Assessment (EHIA). Available at: https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/1840-Equality-Health-Inequalities- Impact-Assessment.pdf[/footnote] However, as with other components of AIAs, many do not detail a specific procedure for monitoring and mitigation once the model is deployed.

Trigger points for iteration will probably vary across NMIP use cases owing to the likely breadth and diversity of potential applicants. The process anticipates that many applicants will not have fully embarked on research and development at the time of application, so the AIA is designed primarily as an ex ante tool, equipping NMIP applicants with a way to assess risk prior to deployment, while there is still opportunity to make design changes. We consider it as a mechanism that is equipped to diagnose possible harms so, accordingly, the AIA may be an insufficient mechanism to treat or address harms.

Healthcare and other contexts:
Although we recommend iteration of an AIA, the proposed process does not include an impact mitigation procedure. In the context of AI systems for healthcare, post-deployment monitoring fall under the remit of medical post-market surveillance, known as the medical device vigilance
system, and can report any ‘adverse incidents’ to the MHRA.[footnote]Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA). Guidance: Medical device stand-alone software including apps (including IVDMDs). Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/999908/Software_flow_chart_Ed_1-08b-IVD.pdf[/footnote]

The aim of iteration of the AIA is therefore to ensure impacts anticipated by the participatory process are addressed and new potential impacts can be identified. It provides impetus for continual reflection, building good practice for future products, and for ensuring thorough documentation into the future. This context is specific to our study: policymakers and researchers interested in trialling AIAs may find that building an ex post monitoring or evaluation framework is appropriate in domains where existing post-deployment monitoring is lacking.

Applicability of this AIA to other use cases

This case study differs from existing proposals and examples of AIAs in three ways. Those wanting to apply the AIA process will need to consider the specific conditions of other domains or contexts:

  1. Healthcare domain
    At the time of writing, this is the first detailed proposal for use of an AIA in a healthcare context. Healthcare is a significantly regulated area in the UK, particularly in comparison to other public-sector domains. There is also notable discussion and awareness of ethical issues in the sector, with recognition that many AI applications in healthcare would be considered ‘high risk’. In the UK, there are also existing public participation practices in healthcare – typically referred to as ‘patient and public involvement and engagement’ (PPIE) – and requirements for other forms of impact assessment, such as DPIAs and Equalities Impact Assessments. This means that an AIA designed for this context can rely on existing processes – and will seek to avoid unnecessary duplication of those processes – that AIAs in other domains cannot.
  2. Public and private-sector intersection
    AIA proposals and implementation have been focused on public-sector uses, with an expectation that those conducting most of the process will be a public-sector agency or team.[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute, Open Government Partnership. (2021). Algorithmic accountability for the public sector. Available at: https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Algorithmic impact assessment tool. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html[/footnote] While AIAs have not yet been applied in the private sector, there has been some application of human rights impact assessments to technology systems,[footnote]WATERFRONToronto. (2020). Preliminary Human Rights Impact Assessment for Quayside Project. Available at: http://blog. waterfrontoronto.ca/nbe/portal/wt/home/blog-home/posts/preliminary+human+rights+impact+assessment+for+quayside+project[/footnote] which may surface overlapping concerns through a human-rights lens. There are also similarities with proposals around internal-auditing approaches in the private sector.[footnote]Raji, D., Smart, A., White, R. N., Mitchell, M., Gebru, T., Hutchinson, B., Smith-Loud, J., Theron, D. and Barnes, P. (2020). ‘Closing the AI accountability gap: defining an end-to-end framework for internal algorithmic auditing’. Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.33–44. Barcelona: ACM. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372873[/footnote] To date, this case study is unique in looking explicitly at the intersection of public and private sector – with applications being developed by a range of mainly private actors for use of data
    originating in the public sector, with some oversight from a public-sector department (NHS).
  3. Data-access context
    This AIA is being proposed as part of a data-access process for a public-sector dataset (the NMIP). This is, to our knowledge, unique in AIAs so far. The DAC provides a forum for holding developers accountable where other proposals for AIAs have used legislation or independent assessors – to require the completion of the AIA, to evaluate the AIA and to prevent a project proceeding (or at least, proceeding with NHS data) if the findings are not satisfactory.

    These differences, and their implication for the design of this AIA, should be considered by anyone looking to apply parts of this process in another domain or context. We expect elements of this process, such as the AIA template and exercise formats, to prove highly transferrable.However, the core accountability mechanism – that the AIA is both required and reviewed by the DAC – is not transferrable to many potential AIA use cases outside data access; an alternative mechanism would be needed.Similarly, the centralisation of both publication and resourcing for the participatory workshops with the NHS AI Lab may not be immediately transferrable – though one could imagine a central transparency register and public-sector resource for participatory workshops providing this role for mandated public-sector AIAs.

Seven operational questions for AIAs

Drawing on findings from this case study, we identify seven operational questions for those considering implementing an AIA process in any context, as well as considerations for how the NMIP AIA process addresses these issues.

1. How to navigate the immaturity of the assessment ecosystem?

AIAs are an emerging method for holding AI systems more accountable to those who are affected by them. There is not yet a mature ecosystem of possible assessors, advisers or independent bodies to contribute to or run all or part of an AIA process. For instance, in environmental and fiscal impact assessment, there is a market of consultants available to act as assessors. There are public bodies and regulators who have the power to require their use in particular contexts under relevant legal statutes, and there are more established norms and standards around how these impact assessments should be conducted. [footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C. and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment- for-the-public-interest/[/footnote]

In contrast, AIAs do not yet have a consistent methodology, lack any statutory footing to require their use, and do not have a market of assessors who are empowered to conduct these exercises. A further complexity is that AI systems can be used in a wide range of different
contexts – from healthcare to financial services, from criminal justice to the delivery of public services – making it a challenge to identify the proper scope of questions for different contexts.

This immaturity of the AIA ecosystem poses a challenge to organisations hoping to build and implement AIAs, who may not have the skills or experience in house. It also limits the options for external and independent scrutiny or assessment within the process. Future AIA
processes must identify the particular context they are operating in, and scope their questions to meet that context.

In the NMIP case study, this gap is addressed by centring the NMIP DAC as the assessor of NIMP AIAs. They are a pre-existing group already intended to bring together a range of relevant skills and experience with independence from the teams developing AI, as well as with authority to require and review the process.

We focus the NMIP AIA’s scope on the specific context of the kinds of impacts that healthcare products and research could raise for patients in the UK, and borrow from existing NHS guidance on the ethical use of data and AI systems to construct our questions. In addition, under this proposal, the NHS AI Lab itself would organise facilitation of the participatory workshops within the AIA.

2. What groundwork is required prior to an AIA?

AIAs are not an end-to-end solution for ethical and accountable use of AI, but part of a wider AI-development and governance process.

AIAs are not singularly equipped to identify and address the full spectrum of possible harms arising from the deployment of an AI system,[footnote]Metcalf, J., Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Ranjit, S. and Elish, M.C. (2021). ‘Algorithmic impact assessments and accountability: the coconstruction of impacts’. Conference on Fairness Accountability, and Transparency [online] Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/ pdf/10.1145/3442188.3445935[/footnote] given that societal harms are unpredictable and some harms are experienced more profoundly by those occupying or holding simultaneous marginalised identities. Accordingly, our AIA should not be
understood as a complete solution for governing AI systems.

This AIA process does not replace other standards for quality and technical assurance or risk management already in use in the medical-device sector (see: ‘The utility of AIAs in health policy’). Teams hoping to implement AIAs should consider the ‘pre’ and ‘post’ AIA work that might be required, particularly given projects may be at different stages, or with different levels of AI governance maturity, at the point that they begin the AIA process.

For example, one proposed stakeholder impact assessment framework sets out certain activities to be taken place at the ‘alpha phase’[footnote]Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety. Alan Turing Institute. Available at: https://www.turing.ac.uk/ sites/default/files/2019-08/understanding_artificial_intelligence_ethics_and_safety.pdf[/footnote] (problem formulation), which includes ‘identifying affected stakeholders’: applicants may find it helpful to use this as a guide to identify affected individuals and communities early on in the process, and in order to be clear on how different interests might coalesce in this project. This is a useful precursor for completing the impact identification exercises in this AIA.

In the NMIP case study, in recognition of the fact that applicant teams are likely to be in differing stages of project development at the point of application, we make some recommendations for ‘pre-AIA’ exercises and initiatives that might capture other important project-management processes considered out of the scope of this AIA.

It is also important to have good documentation of the dataset any model or product will be developed on, to inform the identification of impacts. In the case of the NMIP, the AIAs will all relate to the same dataset (or subsets thereof). There is a significant need for documentation around NMIP datasets that sets out key information such as what level of consent the data was collected under, where the data comes from, what form it takes, what kinds of biases it has been tested for, and other essential pieces of information.

We made recommendations to the NHS AI Lab to take the burden of documenting the NMIP dataset using datasheets.[footnote]Boyd, K.L. (2021). ‘Datasheets for datasets help ML engineers notice and understand ethical issues in training data’. Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, 5, 438. [online] Available at: http://karenboyd.org/blog/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/ Datasheets_Help_CSCW-5.pdf[/footnote] [footnote]Gebru, T., Mogenstern, J., Vecchione, B., Wortman Vaughan, J., Wallach, H., Daumé III, H. and Crawford, K. (2018). Datasheets for datasets. ArXiv [online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1803.09010[/footnote] For AIAs in different contexts, dataset documentation may also be an essential precondition as it provides an important source of information to consider the potential impacts of uses of that data.

3. Who can conduct the assessment?

Previous studies highlight the importance of an independent ‘assessor’ in successful impact-assessment models, in other domains such as environmental or fiscal impact assessments.[footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C. and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment- for-the-public-interest/[/footnote] However, most proposals
for AIA processes, and the Canadian AIA model in implementation,[footnote]Government of Canada. (2020). Algorithmic impact assessment tool. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html[/footnote] have instead used self-assessment as the main mechanism.

Part of this difference may be due to whether the focus of an AIA is accountability or reflexivity: accountability prioritises independence of assessment as it creates a relational dynamic between a forum and an actor, whereas reflexivity prioritises self-assessment as a mechanism for learning and improvement on the part of the system developers.

In our NMIP case study, we seek to capture both interests – with the initial exercise allowing a reflexive, in-team process for developers, and the DAC review playing the role of an independent assessor. We acknowledge the significant power this process gives the DAC and the potential limitations of delegating this power to a committee established by the NHS. For example, there may be concerns around the ability of the DAC to make impartial decisions and not those that could serve wider NHS aims. We have included in our recommendations a potential composition of this DAC that includes members of the public, patients or patients-rights advocates, and other independent experts who are external to the NHS.

There is, however, a more immediate and practical constraint for those considering AIAs currently – who can assess. Without the wider ecosystem of assessment mentioned previously, for AIAs proposed in contexts outside a data-access process, or without a centralised body
to rely on, it may be a necessary short-term solution for companies to run and assess the AIA and participatory processes themselves. This, however, eliminates much of the possibility for independence, external visibility and scrutiny to improve accountability, so should not be
considered a long-term ideal, but rather a response to current practical constraint. For those building AIA processes in other domains, it will be essential to consider which actors are best equipped to play the role of an independent assessor.

4. How to ensure meaningful participation in defining and identifying impacts?

The literature on AIAs, and other methods of assessing AI systems, makes the case for consultation and participation of multidisciplinary stakeholders,[footnote]It should be noted that public consultation is distinct from public access, which refers to the publication of key documentation and other material from the AIA, as a transparency mechanism. See: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship, and Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C. and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment- for-the-public-interest/[/footnote] affected communities and the wider public.[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https:// ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote]  [footnote]European Commission. (2020). The Assessment List for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (ALTAI) for self-assessment. Available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/73552fcd-f7c2-11ea-991b-01aa75ed71a1[/footnote]  [footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C. and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impactassessment- for-the-public-interest/[/footnote]  [footnote]Institute for the Future of Work. (2021). Artificial intelligence in hiring: assessing impacts on equality. Available at: https://www.ifow.org/publications/artificial-intelligence-in-hiring-assessing-impacts-on-equality[/footnote] This can create a more accountable relationship between developers
of a technology and those affected by it, by ensuring that impacts are constructed from the perspective of those affected by a system, and not simply those developing a system.

There is, however, differing opinion on the people or groups that should be involved: some proposals are explicit in the requirement to include public perspectives in the impact assessment process, others simply suggest a mix of internal and external stakeholders. Types of participation also vary, and range from simply informing key stakeholders, to consultation, to collaboration for consensus-building.[footnote]For further information on participatory approaches, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data governance, and Arnstein, S. (1969). ‘A ladder of citizen participation’. Journal of the American Institute of Planners, 36, pp.216-224 [online] Available at: https:// www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01944363.2018.1559388[/footnote]

As with other constitutive components of AIAs, there is currently little procedure for how to engage practically with the public in these processes. Our framework seeks to bridge that gap, drawing from Ada’s internal public deliberation/engagement expertise to build a
participatory workshop for the NMIP AIA.

A key learning from this process is that there are significant practical challenges to implementing participatory ideals:

  • Some participatory exercises may be tokenistic or perfunctory, which
    means they do nothing to rebalance power between developers and
    affected communities and may be harmful for participants.[footnote]Sloane, M., Moss, E., Awomolo, O., & Forlano, L. (2020).’Participation is not a design fix for machine learning’. ArXiv. [online] Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.02423[/footnote] Beginning to address this must involve participants being renumerated for their time, given the safety and security to deliberate freely and provide critical feedback, and having assurance that their contributions will be addressed by a developer who will be required to respond to their concerns before the DAC.
  • There is a potential challenge in implementing robust, meaningful participatory processes at scale. In our case, the NMIP – as a large dataset comprised of different image formats – has scope to underpin a variety of different algorithms, models and products, so is expected to receive a large number of data-access applications. This means that any framework needs to be flexible and accommodating, and able
    to be scaled up as required. This may place considerable demand on resources. Pilot studies of our participatory workshop would help us further understand and account for some of these demands, as they arise in practice.

5. What is the artefact of the AIA and where can it be published?

Whether the goal of an AIA process is to encourage greater reflexivity and consideration for harmful impacts from developers or to hold developers of a technology more accountable to those affected by its system, an AIA needs an artefact – a document that comes from the process – to be able to be shared with others, and reviewed and assessed. Most proposals of AIAs recommend publication of results or key information,[footnote]Reisman, D., Schultz, J., Crawford, K. and Whittaker, M. (2018). Algorithmic impact assessments: a practical framework for public agency accountability. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/aiareport2018.pdf[/footnote] but do not provide a format or template in which to do so.

In public-sector use cases, the Canadian AIA has seen three published AIAs to date, with departments conducting the AIA being responsible for publication of results in an accessible format, and in both official languages – English and French – on the Canadian Open Government portal.[footnote]Government of Canada (2020). Algorithmic impact assessment tool. Available at: https://www.canada.ca/en/government/system/digital-government/digital-government-innovations/responsible-use-ai/algorithmic-impact-assessment.html[/footnote]

When publishing completed AIAs, an AIA process must account for the
following:

  • What will be published: what content, in what format? Our case study provides a template for developers to complete as the first exercise, and update throughout the AIA process, producing the artefact of the AIA that can then be published.
  • Where it will be published: is there a centralised location that the public can use to find relevant AIAs? In our case study, as all AIAs are being performed by applicants looking to use NMIP data, the NMIP can act as a central hub, listing all published AIAs. In public-sector use cases, a public-sector transparency register could be that centralised location.[footnote]UK.Gov. (2021). Algorithmic transparency standard. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/algorithmictransparency-standard[/footnote]
  • What are the limitations and risks of publishing: several of our interview subjects flagged concerns that publishing an AIA may raise intellectual property or commercial sensitivities, and may create a perverse incentive for project teams to write with a mindset for public relations rather than reflexivity. These are very real concerns, but they must be balanced with the wider goal of an AIA to increase accountability over AI systems.

This study seeks to balance this concern in a few ways. In this case study the AIA document would not contain deep detail on the functioning of the system that may raise commercial sensitivities, but rather focus on the potential impacts and a simple explanation of its intended use.

Study respondents flagged that an AIA within a data-access process may also raise concerns about publishing ‘unsuccessful’ AIAs – AIAs from applicants to the NMIP who were rejected (which may have been on grounds other than the AIA) – which could raise potential liability
issues. Given this constraint, we have chosen to prioritise publication of AIAs that have completed the reflexive exercise and the participatory workshop , and not AIAs that did not proceed past DAC filtering. However, we recognise there could be valuable learnings from AIAs that have been rejected, and would encourage the DAC to share observations and learnings from them, as well as enabling individual teams to voluntarily publish AIAs regardless of data-access outcome.

6. Who will act as a decision-maker on the suitability of the AIA and the acceptability of the impacts it documents?

As well as identifying what standards an AIA should be assessed against, it is necessary to decide who can assess the assessment.

There is not yet a standard for assessing the effectiveness of AIAs in a particular context, or a clear benchmark that AIAs can use for what ‘good’ looks like. This makes it hard to measure both the effectiveness of an individual AIA process in terms of what effects have been achieved or what harms have been prevented, and hard to evaluate different AIA approaches to ascertain which approach is more effective in a particular context.

A potential failure mode of an AIA would be a process that carefully documented a series of likely negative impacts of a system, but then saw the team proceed undeterred with development and deployment.[footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A, Singh, R., Elish, M.C, Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling accountability: algorithmic impact assessment for the public interest. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability-algorithmic-impact-assessment-for-the- public-interest/[/footnote] Similarly concerning would be a scenario where an AIA is poorly conducted, surfacing few of the potential impacts, but a team is able to point to a completed AIA as justification for continued development.

An AIA will require a decision to be made about what to do in response to impacts identified – whether that is to take no action (impacts considered acceptable), to amend parts of the AI system (impacts require mitigation or action), or to not proceed with the development or use of the system (impacts require complete prevention). This is a high-level decision about
the acceptability of the impacts documented in an AIA.

In our contextual example, the applicant team is a voluntary decisionmaker (they could propose changes to their system, or choose to end their NMIP application or entire system development as a result of AIA findings). However, the ultimate decision about acceptability of impacts lies with the NMIP DAC who would decide whether data can be made available for the applicant’s use case – this is, implicitly, a decision about the acceptability of impacts documented in the AIA (along with other documents) and whether the AIA has been completed to a sufficient standard.

To help the DAC in its decision-making, the proposal includes a draft terms of reference that specifies what a ‘good’ AIA in this context might look like and what rubric they should review it under. In order to prevent a myopic reading of an AIA, the DAC should comprise of a diverse panel of representatives, including representatives from the NHS AI Lab, the social sciences, biomedical sciences, computer science/AI, legal and data ethics and community representatives. It should also follow standards set for the cadence of committee meetings.

The guidelines instruct the DAC to accept or reject the applicant based on whether the AIA process has been run correctly, with evidence from both the reflexive exercise and the participatory workshop produced as part of the application, reflecting serious and careful consideration of impacts. The impetus behind these approaches is to provide a level of external scrutiny and visibility, which legitimise the process when compared with a wholly self-assessed approach.

In our context, we entrust the NMIP DAC with making the judgement call about the suitability of each AIA, and this then informs the final data-access decision. However, the role of the DAC in the NMIP context is broader than typical, as we are asking members to make an assessment
of a variety of potential impacts and harms to people and society, beyond privacy and security of individuals and their data.

Accordingly, AIAs designed for different contexts may require the chosen assessor to fulfil a slightly different role or require additional expertise. Over time, assessors of an AIA will need to arbitrate on the acceptability of the possible harmful impacts of a system and probably begin to construct clear, normative red lines. Regular and routine AIAs in operation across different domains will lead to clearer benchmarks for evaluation.

7. How will trials be resourced, evaluated and iterated?

Governments, public bodies and developers of AI systems are looking to adopt AIAs to create better understanding of, and accountability for potential harms from AI systems. The evidence for AIAs as a useful tool to achieve this is predominantly theoretical, or based in examples from
other sectors or domains. We do not yet know if AIAs achieve these goals in practice.

Anyone looking to adopt or require an AIA, should therefore consider trialling the process, evaluating it and iterating on the process. It cannot be assumed that an AIA is ‘ready to go’ out of the box.

This project has helped to bridge the gap between AIAs as a proposed governance mechanism, and AIAs in practice. The kinds of expertise, resources and timeframe needed to build and implement an AIA are valuable questions that should be discussed early on in the
process.

For trials, we anticipate three key considerations: resourcing, funding and evaluation.

  1. To resource the design and trialling of an AIA process will require skills from multiple disciplines: we drew on a mix of data ethics, technical, public deliberation, communications and domain expertise (in this case, health and medical imaging)
  2. Funding is a necessary consideration as our findings suggest the process may prove more costly than other forms of impact assessment, such as a data protection impact assessment (DPIA), due predominantly to the cost of running a participatory process.We argue that such costs should be considered a necessary condition of building an AI system with an application in high-stakes clinical pathways. The cost of running a participatory AIA will bring valuable insight, enabling developers to better understand how their system works in clinical pathways, outside of a research lab environment.
  3. A  useful trial will require evaluation, considering questions such as: is the process effective in increasing the consideration of impacts, does it include those who may be affected by the system in the identification of impacts, does it result in the reduction of negative impacts? This may be done as part of the trial, or through documentation and publication of the process and results for others to review and learn from.

Currently, there are very few examples of AIA practice – just four published AIAs from the Canadian government’s AIA process[footnote]An example of a publicly-available AIA, from the Canadian Government Directive on Automated Decision-making can be found here: https://open.canada.ca/aia-eia-js/?lang=en[/footnote] – with few details on the experience of the process or the changes resulting from it. As the ecosystem continues to develop, we hope that clearer routes to funding, trialling and evaluation will emerge, generating new AIAs: though policymakers may be disappointed to find that AIAs are not an ‘oven-ready’ approach, and that this AIA will need amendments before being directly transferable to other domains, we argue there is real value to be had to in beginning to test AIA approaches within, and across different domains.

Conclusion

This report has set out the assumptions, goals and practical features of a proposed algorithmic impact assessment process for the NHS AI Lab’s National Medical Imaging Platform, to contribute to the evidence base for AIAs as an emerging governance mechanism.

It argues that meaningful accountability depends on an external forum being able to pass judgement on an AIA, enabled through standardisation of documentation for public access and scrutiny, and through participation in the AIA, bringing diverse perspectives and relevant lived experience.

By mapping out the existing healthcare ecosystem, detailing a step-by-step process tailored to the NMIP context, including a participatory workshop, and presenting avenues for future research, we demonstrate how a holistic understanding of the use case is necessary to build an AIA that can confront and respond to a broad range of possible impacts arising from a specific use of AI.

As the first detailed proposal for the use of AIAs in a healthcare context, the process we have built was constructed according to the needs of the NMIP: our study adds weight to the argument that AIAs are not ‘ready to roll out’ across all sectors. However, we have argued that testing, trialling and evaluating AIA approaches will help build a responsive and robust assessment ecosystem, which may in turn generate further AIAs by providing a case law of examples, and demonstrating how certain resources and expertise might be allocated.

This report aligns three key audiences for this work: policymakers interested in AIAs, AIA practitioners and researchers, and developers of AI systems in the healthcare space.

Policymakers should pay attention to how this proposed AIA fits in the existing landscape, and to the findings related to process development that show some challenges, learnings and uncertainties when adopting AIAs.

There is further research to be carried out to develop robust AIA
practices.

Developers of AI systems that may be required to complete an AIA will want to use the report to learn how it was constructed and how it is implemented, as well as Annex 1 for the ‘AIA user guide’, which provides step-by-step detail. Building a shared understanding of the value of AIAs, who could adopt them, and what promise they hold for the AI governance landscape, while responding to the nuances of different domain contexts, will be critical for future applications of AIA.

This project has offered a new lens through which to examine and develop AIAs at the intersection of private and public-sector development, and to understand how public-sector activity could shape industry practice in the healthcare space. But this work is only in its
infancy.

As this report makes clear, the goals of AIAs – accountability, transparency, reflection, standardisation, independent scrutiny – can only be achieved if there is opportunity for proposals to become practice through new sites of enquiry that test, trial and evaluate AIAs, helping to make sure AI works for people and society

Methodology

To investigate our research questions and create recommendations for an NMIP-specific AIA process, we adopted three main methods:

  • a literature review
  • expert interviews
  • process development

Our literature review surveyed AIAs in both theory and practice, as well as analogous approaches to improving algorithmic accountability, such as scholarship on algorithm audits and other impact assessments for AI that are frequently adopted in tandem with AIAs. In order to situate discussion on AIAs within the broader context, we reviewed research from across the fields of AI and data ethics, public policy/public administration, political theory and computer science.

We held 20 expert interviews with a range of stakeholders from within the NHS AI Lab, NHSX and outside. These included clinicians and would-be applicants to the National Medical Imaging Platform, such as developers from healthtech companies building on imaging data, to understand how they would engage with an AIA and how it would slot into existing workstreams.

Finally, we undertook documentation analysis of material provided by the NHS AI Lab, NMIP and NCCID teams to help understand their needs, in order to develop a bespoke AIA process. We present the details of this process in ‘Annex 1: Proposed process in detail’, citing insights from the literature review and interviews to support the design decisions that define the proposed NMIP AIA process.

This partnership falls under NHS AI Lab’s broader work programme known as ‘Facilitating early-stage exploration of algorithmic risk’.[footnote]NHS AI Lab. The AI Ethics Initiative: Embedding ethical approaches to AI in health and care. Available at: https://www.nhsx.nhs.uk/ ai-lab/ai-lab-programmes/ethics/[/footnote]

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following colleagues for taking time to review a draft of this paper or offering their expertise and feedback:

  • Brhmie Balaram, NHS AI Lab
  • Dominic Cushnan, NHS AI Lab
  • Emanuel Moss, Data & Society
  • Maxine Mackintosh, Genomics England
  • Lizzie Barclay, Aidence
  • Xiaoxuan Liu, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust
  • Amadeus Stevenson, NHSX
  • Mavis Machirori, Ada Lovelace Institute.

This report was lead authored by Lara Groves, with substantive contributions from Jenny Brennan, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Aidan Peppin and Andrew Strait.

 

Annex 1: Proposed process in detail

As well as synthesising information about AIAs, this project has developed a first iteration of a process for using an AIA in a public-sector, data-access context. The detail of the process will not be applicable to every set of conditions in which AIAs might be used, but we expect it will
provide opportunities to develop further thinking for these contexts.

People and organisations wishing to understand more about, or implement, an AIA process will be interested in the detailed documentation developed for the NMIP and NHS AI Lab:

  • NMIP AIA user guide: a step-by-step guide to completing the AIA for
    applicants to the NMIP.
  • AIA reflexive template: the document NMIP applicants will fill in during
    the AIA and submit to the NMIP with their application.

Annex 2: NMIP Data Access Committee Terms of Reference

Responsibilities

  • To consider and authorise requests for access to the National Medical Image Platform (NMIP), a centralised database of medical images collected from NHS trusts.
  • To consider and authorise applications for the use of data from the NMIP.
  • To consider continuing or disabling access to the NMIP and uses of its data.
  • To judge applications using the criteria and protocols outlined in the NMIP’s data access documentation request forms, which include but are not limited to:
    • an algorithmic impact assessment (AIA) reflexive template
      (completed by requesting project teams)
    • an accompanying participatory workshop report (completed by an NHS AI Lab rapporteur on behalf of the patient and public participants for the participatory workshop)
    • a data protection impact assessment (DPIA).
  • To judge applications according to the NMIP Data Access Committee (DAC) policy, which includes guidance on the reflexive exercise and participatory workshop requirements. This guidance will be updated regularly and placed on the NMIP website.
  • To establish a body of published decisions on NMIP data access requests, as precedents which can inform subsequent requests for NMIP access and use.
  • To disseminate policies to applicants and encourage adherence to all
    guidance and requirements.

Membership

  • Membership of the DAC will comprise at least eleven members as
    outlined below:

    • a chair from an independent institution
    • an independent deputy Chair
    • two academic representatives from the social sciences
    • one academic representatives from the biomedical sciences
    • one academic representative from the computer science/AI field
    • one academic representative with legal and data ethics expertise
    • two non-academic representatives from patient communities
    • two members of the NHS AI Lab.
  • In addition to the core DAC, a four-person technical review team will comprise relevant researchers, data managers and lab managers who can assess data privacy and security questions. This team will be appointed by the DAC.
  • DAC members will be remunerated for their time according to an hourly wage set by NHS AI Lab.
  • An NHS AI Lab participatory workshop rapporteur will attend DAC meetings to provide relevant information when necessary to inform the decisions.
  • When reviewing data access requests, the following members from the project team will be in attendance to present their case:
    • the study’s principal investigator (PI)
    • a member of the study’s technical team.
  • When reviewing data-access requests, the DAC may request that a representative of the project’s funding organisation, members of a technical review team, or representatives reflecting experiential expertise relevant to the project may attend in an ex officio capacity to observe and provide information to help inform decisions.
  • Members, including the Chair and Deputy Chair, will usually be appointed for three years, with the option to extend for a further three after the first term only. Appointment to the DAC will be staggered in order to ensure continuity of membership. The recruitment process will occur annually, when new appointments are necessary, ahead of the second face-to-face meeting of the year.
  • The DAC will co-opt members as and when there is a need for additional expertise. These members will have full voting rights and their term will end on appointment of new members through the annual  recruitment process.

Modes of operation

  • The DAC will follow the guidance for assessing data access request documentation. Updating this guidance will involve a majority vote of the DAC to approve.
  • The DAC will meet virtually to address data access requests once each month. The DAC will meet face to face three times a year to discuss emerging issues in relation to data access and provide information on these to the individual studies and funders. Projects leads will be copied into email correspondence regarding individual applications.
  • Quoracy formally requires the attendance of half the full independent members (with at least one independent member with biomedical science expertise and one with social science expertise) and that either the Chair or the Deputy Chair must be present for continuity. For face-to-face meetings, where it is unavoidable, attendance of a member by teleconference will count as being present.
  • Comments from the technical review team will be circulated to the DAC along with any applications requesting access to the data.
  • Decisions of the DAC on whether to grant access to applications will be based on a majority vote. In the event that either a) a majority decision amongst DAC members is not reached; or b) a project lead has grave concerns that the DAC’s decision creates unreasonable risk for the project, the Chair of the DAC will refer the decision to the relevant appeals body.
  • Where appropriate, the DAC will take advantage of third-party specialist knowledge, particularly where an applicant seeks to use depletable samples. Where necessary the specialist will be invited to sit on the DAC as a co-opted member.

Reporting

  • Decisions of the Committee will be reported on the NMIP website and must be published no more than one month after a decision has been reached. Decisions must be accompanied by relevant documentation from the research.

Annex 3: Participatory AIA process

NHS AI Lab NMIP participatory AIA process outline

Overview

  • The recommendation is that NHS AI Lab sets up a paid panel of 25-30 patients and members of the public who reflect the diversity of the population who will be affected by algorithms that interact with NMIP data.
  • This panel will form a pool of participants to take part in a small series of activities that form the participatory component of the AIA process.
  • When an applicant to NMIP data is running their AIA process, the NHS AI Lab should work with them to set up a workshop with the panel to identify and deliberate on impacts. The applicant then develops responses that address the identified impacts, which the panel members review and give feedback on. The Data Access Committee (DAC) uses the outcomes of this process to support their consideration of the application, alongside the wider AIA.
  • The five stages of the participatory component are:
  1. recruit panel members
  2. induct panel members
  3. hold impact identification workshops
  4. technology developers (the NMIP applicants) review impacts identified
    in the workshops and develop plan to address or mitigate them
  5. panel review mitigation plans and feedback to NHS AI Lab DAC.

These stages are detailed below, along with an indication of required costs and resources, and additional links for information.

Panel recruitment

The panel forms a pool of people who can be involved in the reflexive impact workshop for each project. This is designed to factor in the panel recruitment and induction burden, by enabling projects to be reviewed in ‘batches’ – for instance, if the NMIP had quarterly application rounds, a panel may be recruited to be involved in all the reflexive workshops for
that round.

Note: the following numbers are estimates based on best practice. Exact numbers may vary depending on expected and actual application numbers.

  • 25–30 people who reflect the diversity of the population that might be affected by the algorithm across: age, gender, region, ethnic background, socio-economic background, health condition and access to care. The number 25–30 is designed assuming multiple AIAs are required, to ensure the same people aren’t reviewing every algorithm. 25-30 means you could have a different combination of 8–12 participants for each algorithm if there are six or more to review. If the number of AIAs needed is smaller than this, then a smaller panel could be used.
  • Recruited either via a social research recruitment agency, or via NHS trusts involved.
  • Panel does not need to be statistically representative of the UK public, but instead should reflect the diversity of perspectives and experiences in the populations/communities likely to be affected by the algorithms.[footnote]Steel, D., Bolduc, N., Jenei, K. and Burgess, M. (2020). ‘Rethinking representation and diversity in deliberative minipublics’. Journal of Deliberative Democracy, 16,1, pp.46-57 [online]. Available at: https://delibdemjournal.org/article/id/626/[/footnote]
  • (Ideally) one or two panel members should sit on the DAC as full members.
  • Panel members should be remunerated for their involvement on the panel. The amount should reflect the hours required to participate in all the activities: the induction, the assessment workshops, reviewing materials and feeding back on impact mitigation plans (inc. travel if necessary) (see ‘Resourcing and costs’).

Panel induction

After being recruited, the NHS AI Lab should run an induction session to inform the panel members about the NMIP, how the application and AIA process works and their role.

Participants:

  • All panel members: to attend and learn about the NMIP, AIAs – including where this exercise sits in the timeline of the AIA process (i.e. after NMIP applicants have completed internal AIA exercises) and their role.
  • NHS panel coordinator: to run the session and facilitate discussion.
  • Technology and Society (T&S) professional: to present to the panel on what algorithms are, what the AIA process is, and some common issues or impacts that may arise.

Structure:

  • Two hours, virtual or in-person (for either format, ensure participants have support to access and engage fully).
  • Suggested outline agenda:
    • introduction to each other
    • introduction to the NMIP – what it is, what it aims to do
    • introduction to the panel’s purpose and aims
    • presentation from T&S professional on what an algorithm is and what an AIA is followed by Q&A
    • interactive exercises and discussion of case studies of specific algorithm use cases, with strawperson examples; mapping how different identities/groups would interact with the algorithm (with a few example patients from different groups).
    • how the panel and participatory AIA process will work
    • what is required of the panel members.

Equipment and tools required:

  • Accessible room/venue and or online video-conferencing tool (e.g. Zoom – with provisions for visually or hearing impaired and neurodiverse people as required).
  • Slide deck for introductions and presentations (with accessibility provisions).
  • Any documentation for further reading (e.g. links to ‘about’ page of the NMIP, information about AIAs, document outlining participatory process and requirements of participants).

Outputs:

  • Participants are equipped with the knowledge they need to be able to
    be active members of the participatory process.

Participatory workshop

The participatory workshop follows the reflexive exercise and provides the forum for a broad range of people to discuss and deliberate on some impacts of the applicant’s proposed system, model or research.

Participants:

  • Panel members (8–12 people): to participate in the workshop and share their perspectives on the algorithm’s potential impacts.
  • Facilitator (one or two people): to lead the workshop, guide discussion and ensure the participants’ views are listened to. Facilitators could be an NHS AI Lab staff member, a user researcher from the applicant organisation or a consultant; either way, they must have facilitation experience and remain impartial to the process. Their role is to ensure the process happens effectively and rigorously, and they should have the skills and position to do so.
  • Rapporteur (one person, may be a facilitator): to serve the panel in documenting the workshop.
  • Technology developer representative (one or two people): to represent the technology development team, explain the algorithm, take questions and, crucially, listen to the participants and take notes.
  • (Ideally) ‘critical friend’ (one person): a technology and society (T&S) professional to join the workshop, help answer participants’ questions, and support participants to fully explore potential impacts. They are not intended to be deeply critical of the algorithm, but to impartially support the participants in their enquiry.
  • (Optional) a clinical ‘critical friend’ (one person): a medical professional to play a similar role to the T&S professional.

Structure:

  • Three hours, virtual or in-person (for either format, ensure participants
    have support to access and engage fully).
  • Suggested agenda:
    • Introductions to each other and the session, with a reminder of the
      purpose and agenda (10 mins).
    • Presentation from technology developers about their algorithm, in
      plain English (20 mins), covering:

      • Who their organisation is, its aims, values and whether it is
        for or non-profit, if it already works with NHS and how.
      • What their proposed algorithm is: what it aims to do (and what prompted the need for the algorithm), how it works (not in technical detail), what data will be input (both how the algorithm uses NMIP data and the other datasets used to train, if applicable), what outputs the algorithm will generate, how the algorithm will be deployed and used (e.g. in hospitals, via a direct-to-patient app etc.), who it will affect, what benefits it will bring, what impact considerations the team have already considered.
    • Q&A led by the lead facilitator (20 mins).
    • A session to identify potential impacts (45–60 mins with a break part way through, and a facilitator taking notes on a [virtual] whiteboard):
      • As one group or in two breakout groups, the participants consider the algorithm and generate ideas for how it could create impacts. With reference to the best, worst and most-likely scenarios that might arise from deployment of the algorithm that applicant teams completed for the reflexive exercise, participants will discuss these answers and provide their thoughts. Technology developer observes but does not participate unless the facilitator brings them in to address a technical or factual point. Critical friend observes and supports as required (guided by facilitator).
      • This task should be guided by the facilitator, asking questions to prompt discussion about the scenarios, such as:
        • What groups or individuals would be affected by this
          project?
        • What potential risks, biases or harms do you foresee
          occurring from use/deployment of this algorithm?
        • Who will benefit most from this project and how?
        • Who could be harmed if this system fails?
        • What benefits will this project have for patients and the NHS?
        • Of the impacts identified, what would be potential causes for this impact?
        • What solutions or measures would they like to see adopted to reduce the risks of harm?
      • A session to group themes in the impacts into the template and prioritise them (25 mins):
        • As one group or in two breakout groups, the participants
          consider any common themes in their identified impacts and group them together. (e.g. multiple impacts might relate to discrimination, or to reduced quality of care.) Technology developer observes but does not participate unless the facilitator brings them in to address a technical or factual point. Critical friend observes and supports as required (guided by facilitator). The facilitator should use a (virtual)
          whiteboard to fill out the template.
        • The participants then prioritise the themes and specific
          impacts by dot-voting159 they should be guided by the
          facilitator, asking questions such as:

          • Of the impacts identified, which are likely to cause high and very high risk of harm?
          • Of the impacts identified, which would you consider
            to be the most important? How consequential is this
            harm for the wellbeing of which stakeholders?
          • Of the impacts identified, which are urgent? How immediate would the threat of this impact be?
          • Of the impacts identified, which will be the most difficult to mitigate?
          • Of the impacts identified, which will be the most difficult to detect, given the current design?
        • Participants take a break while the technology developer reviews the templates of identified impacts. (10 mins).
        • A session with facilitated discussion so the technology developer can ask questions back to the participants, to clarify the impacts identified and further flesh out impacts (and provide overview of next steps: how will the developers be confronting/responding to the impacts identified in the development process, and what that could look like (i.e. model retraining) as well as updates to the AIA (25 mins).
        • Wrap up and close (5 mins).

Equipment and tools required:

  • Accessible room/venue and or online video conferencing tool (e.g. Zoom – with provisions for visually or hearing impaired and neurodiverse people as required).
  • Slide deck for introductions and presentations (with accessibility
    provisions). Ideally shared beforehand.
  • (Virtual) whiteboard/flipchart and post-its.
  • Impacts template prepared and ready to be filled in.

Outputs:

  • Filled out template that lists impacts and priority of them (based on
    dot-votes).
  • Technology developers should take notes to deepen their understanding of their algorithms’ potential impacts and perspectives of the public.

Applicant teams devise ideas to address or mitigate impacts

Following the workshop the applicant team should consider mitigations, solutions or plans to address the impacts identified during the workshop, and update the first iteration of the AIA in light of the participants’ deliberations.

This analysis should be worked back into the template as part of the synthesis exercise.

Panel reviews mitigation plans

  • The applicant team’s plans to address impacts are shared with the panel participants, who review them and share any feedback or reflections. This can be done asynchronously via email, over a period of two-to-four weeks. Assuming all participants are supported to engage: accessible materials, access to the web, etc.
  • Panel can make a judgement call on permissibility of the algorithm based on the developer’s updated proposals, for the DAC to consider.
  • The panels’ comments are used by the NHS AI Lab NMIP DAC to support their assessment of the overall AIA.

Resourcing and costs

Staff resources:

  • Panel coordinator: a member of NHS AI Lab staff to coordinate and run the panel process, and to ensure it is genuinely and fully embedded in the wider AIA and considered by the DAC. This individual should have experience and knowledge of: public engagement, public and stakeholder management, workshop design and working with those with complex health conditions. This could be a stand-alone role, or a part of another person’s role, as long as they are given sufficient time and capacity to run the process well.
  • Facilitators: additional NHS staff, partner organisation staff or freelancers to support workshop facilitation as required.
  • Technology developers and critical friends who participate in the impact identification workshops should be able to do this as part of their professional roles, so would not typically require remuneration.

Panel participant cost estimates:

Recruitment: there are two approaches to recruiting participants:

  1. Panel coordinator works with NHS trusts and community networks to directly recruit panel members (e.g. by sending email invitations). The coordinator would need to ensure they reach a wide population, so that the final panel is sufficiently diverse. This option has no additional cost, but is significantly time-intensive, and would require the co-ordinator to have sufficient capacity, support and skills to do so.
  2. Commission a research participant recruitment agency to source panel members and manage communication and remuneration.

Costs:

  • Recruitment cost estimated at ÂŁ100 per person for 30 people: ÂŁ3,000.
  • Administrative cost estimate for communications and remunerating
    participants: £2,000 – £4,000.
  • Remuneration: participants should be remunerated at industry best practice rates of ÂŁ20–£30 per hour of activity.
  • Assuming 30 participants who each participates in the induction (two hours) and a single ‘batch’ of NMIP applications, for example five workshops (15 hours) and reviews five mitigation plans (six hours), estimated remuneration costs would be: ÂŁ13,800 – ÂŁ20,700.

Miscellaneous costs to consider:

  • If hosting workshops virtually: cost for any software and accessibility support such as interactive whiteboards, video-conferencing software, live captioning, etc.
  • If hosting workshops in-person: venue hire, catering, travel etc.
  • Materials: printing, design of templates, information packs etc. as required.

 

 

 

 

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  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
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  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
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  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
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  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
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  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
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As part of this work, the Ada Lovelace Institute, the University of Exeter’s Institute for Data Science and Artificial Intelligence, and the Alan Turing Institute developed six mock AI and data science research proposals that represent hypothetical submissions to a Research Ethics Committee. An expert workshop found that case studies are useful training resources for understanding common AI and data science ethical challenges. Their purpose is to prompt reflection on common research ethics issues and the societal implications of different AI and data science research projects. These case studies are for use by students, researchers, members of research ethics committees, funders and other actors in the research ecosystem to further develop their ability to spot and evaluate common ethical issues in AI and data science research.


 

Executive summary

Research in the fields of artificial intelligence (AI) and data science is often quickly turned into products and services that affect the lives of people around the world. Research in these fields is used in the provision of public services like social care, determining which information is amplified on social media, what jobs or insurance people are offered, and even who is deemed a risk to the public by police and security services.  There has been a significant increase in the volume of AI and data science research in the last ten years, with these methods now being applied to other scientific domains like history, economics, health sciences and physics.

Figure 1: Number of AI publications in the world 2010-21[1]

Globally, the volume of AI research is increasing year-on-year and currently accounts for more than 4% of all published research.

Since products and services built with AI and data science research can have substantial effects on people’s lives, it is essential that this research is conducted safely and responsibly, and with due consideration for the broader societal impacts it may have. However, the traditional research governance mechanisms that are responsible for identifying and mitigating ethical and societal risks often do not address the challenges presented by AI and data science research.

As several prominent researchers have highlighted,[2] inadequately reviewed AI and data science research can create risks that are carried downstream into subsequent products,[3] services and research.[4] Studies have shown these risks can disproportionately impact people from marginalised and minoritised communities, exacerbating racial and societal inequalities.[5] If left unaddressed, unexamined assumptions and unintended consequences (paid forward into deployment as ‘ethical debt’[6]) can lead to significant harms to individuals and society. These harms can be challenging to address or mitigate after the fact.

Ethical debt also poses a risk to the longevity of the field of AI: if researchers fail to demonstrate due consideration for the broader societal implications of their work, it may reduce public trust in the field. This could lead to it becoming a domain that future researchers find undesirable to work in – a challenge that has plagued research into nuclear power and the health effects of tobacco.[7]

To address these problems, there have been increasing calls from within the AI and data science research communities for more mechanisms, processes and incentives for researchers to consider the broader societal impacts of their research.[8]

In many corporate and academic research institutions, one of the primary mechanisms for assessing and mitigating ethical risks is the use of Research Ethics Committees (RECs), also known in some regions as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or Ethics Review Committees (ERCs). Since the 1960s, these committees have been empowered to review research before it is undertaken and can reject proposals unless changes are made in the proposed research design.

RECs generally consist of members of a specific academic department or corporate institution, who are tasked with evaluating research proposals before the research begins. Their evaluations are based on a combination of normative and legal principles that have developed over time, originally in relation to biomedical human subjects research. A REC’s role is to help ensure that researchers justify their decisions for how research is conducted, thereby mitigating the potential harms they may pose.

However, the current role, scope and function of most academic and corporate RECs are insufficient for the myriad of ethical challenges that AI and data science research can pose. For example, the scope of REC reviews is traditionally only on research involving human subjects. This means that the many AI and data science projects that are not considered a form of direct intervention in the body or life of an individual human subject are exempt from many research ethics review processes.[9] In addition, a significant amount of AI and data science research involves the use of publicly available and repurposed datasets, which are considered exempt from ethics review under many current research ethics guidelines.[10]

If AI and data science research is to be done safely and responsibly, RECs must be equipped to examine the full spectrum of risks, harms and impacts that can arise in these fields.

In this report, we explore the role that academic and corporate RECs play in evaluating AI and data science research for ethical issues, and also investigate the kinds of common challenges these bodies face.

The report draws on two main sources of evidence: a review of existing literature on RECs and research ethics challenges, and a series of workshops and interviews with members of RECs and researchers who work on AI and data science ethics.

Challenges faced by RECs

Our evaluation of this evidence uncovered six challenges that RECs face when addressing AI and data science research:

Challenge 1: Many RECs lack the resources, expertise and training to appropriately address the risks that AI and data science pose.  

Many RECs in academic and corporate environments struggle with inadequate resources and training on the variety of issues that AI and data science can raise. The work of RECs is often voluntary and unpaid, meaning that members of RECs may not have the requisite time or training to appropriately review an application in its entirety. Studies suggest that RECs are often viewed by researchers as compliance bodies rather than mechanisms for improving the safety and impact of their research.

Challenge 2: Traditional research ethics principles are not well suited for AI research.

RECs review research using a set of normative and legal principles that are rooted in biomedical, human-subject research practices, which operate under a researcher-subject relationship rather than a researcher-data subject relationship. This distinction has challenged traditional principles of consent, privacy and autonomy in AI research, and created confusion and challenges for RECs trying to apply these principles to novel forms of research.

Challenge 3: Specific principles for AI and data science research are still emerging and are not consistently adopted by RECs.

The last few years have seen an emerging series of AI ethics principles aimed at the development and deployment of AI systems. However, these principles have not been well adapted for AI and data science research practices, signalling a need for institutions to translate these principles into actionable questions and processes for ethics reviews.

Challenge 4: Multi-site or public-private partnerships can exacerbate existing challenges of governance and consistency of decision-making.

An increasing amount of AI research involves multi-site studies and public-private partnerships. This can lead to multiple REC reviews of the same research, which can highlight different standards in ethical review of different institutions and present a barrier to completing timely research.

Challenge 5: RECs struggle to review potential harms and impacts that arise throughout AI and data science research.

REC reviews of AI and data science research are ex ante assessments, done before research takes place. However, many of the harms and risks in AI research may only become evident at later stages of the research. Furthermore, many of the types of harms that can arise – such as issues of bias, or wider misuses of AI or data – are challenging for a single committee to predict. This is particularly true with the broader societal impacts of AI research, which require a kind of evaluation and review that RECs currently do not undertake.

Challenge 6: Corporate RECs lack transparency in relation to their processes.

Motivated by a concern to protect their intellectual property and trade secrets, many private-sector RECs for AI research do not make their processes or decisions publicly accessible and use strict non-disclosure agreements to control the involvement of external experts in their decision-making. In some extreme cases, this lack of transparency has raised suspicion of corporate REC processes from external research partners, which can pose a risk to the efficacy of public-private research partnerships.

Recommendations

To address these challenges, we make the following recommendations:

For academic and corporate RECs

Recommendation 1: Incorporate broader societal impact statements from researchers.

A key issue this report identifies is the need for RECs to incentivise researchers to engage more reflexively with the broader societal impacts of their research, such as the potential environmental impacts of their research, or how their research could be used to exacerbate racial or societal inequalities.

There have been growing calls within the AI and data science research communities for researchers to incorporate these considerations in various stages of their research. Some researchers have called for changes to the peer review process to require statements of potential broader societal impacts,[11] and some AI/machine learning (ML) conferences have experimented with similar requirements in their conference submission process.[12]

RECs can support these efforts by incentivising researchers to engage in reflexive exercises to consider and document the broader societal impacts of their research. Other actors in the research ecosystem (funders, conference organisers, etc.) can also incentivise researchers to engage in these kinds of reflexive exercises.

Recommendation 2: RECs should adopt multi-stage ethics review processes of high-risk AI and data science research.

Many of the challenges that AI and data science raise will arise in different stages of research. RECs should experiment with requiring multiple stages of evaluations of research that raises particular ethical concern, such as evaluations at the point of data collection and a separate evaluation at the point of publication.

Recommendation 3: Include interdisciplinary and experiential expertise in REC membership.

Many of the risks that AI and data science research pose cannot be understood without engagement with different forms of experiential and subject-matter expertise. RECs must be interdisciplinary bodies if they are to address the myriad of issues that AI and data science can pose in different domains, and should incorporate the perspectives of individuals who will ultimately be impacted by the research.

For academic/corporate research institutions

Recommendation 4: Create internal training and knowledge-sharing hubs for researchers and REC members, and enable more cross-institutional knowledge sharing.

These hubs can provide opportunities for cross-institutional knowledge-sharing and ensure institutions do not develop standards of practice in silos. They should collect and share information on the kinds of ethical issues and challenges AI and data science research might raise, including case studies of research that raises challenging ethical issues. In addition to our report, we have developed a resource consisting of six case studies that we believe highlight some of the common ethical challenges that RECs might face.[13]

Recommendation 5: Corporate labs must be more transparent about their decision-making and do more to engage with external partners.

Corporate labs face specific challenges when it comes to AI and data science reviews. While many are better resourced and have experimented with broader societal impact thinking, some of these labs have faced criticism for being opaque about their decision-making processes. Many of these labs make consequential decisions about their research without engaging with local, technical or experiential expertise that resides outside their organisation.

For funders, conference organisers and other actors in the research ecosystem

Recommendation 6: Develop standardised principles and guidance for AI and data science research principles.

RECs currently lack standardised principles for evaluating AI and data science research. National research governance bodies like UKRI should work to create a new set of ‘Belmont 2.0’ principles[14] that offer some standardised approaches, guidance and methods for evaluating AI and data science research. Developing these principles should draw on a wide set of perspectives from different disciplines and communities who are impacted by AI and data science research, including multinational perspectives –  particularly from regions that have been historically underrepresented in the development of past research ethics principles.

Recommendation 7: Incentivise a responsible research culture.

AI and data science researchers lack incentives to reflect on and document the societal impacts their research. Different actors in the research ecosystem can encourage ethical behaviour – funders, for example, can create requirements that researchers conduct a broader societal impact statement of their research in order to receive a grant, and conference organisers and journal editors can encourage researchers to include a broader societal impact statement when submitting research. By creating incentives throughout the research ecosystem, ethical reflection can become more desirable and rewarded.

Recommendation 8: Increase funding and resources for ethical reviews of AI and data science research.

There is an urgent need for institutions and funders to support RECs, including paying for the time of staff and funding external experts to engage in questions of research ethics.

Introduction

The academic fields of AI and data science research have witnessed an explosive growth in the last two decades. According to the Stanford AI Index, between 2015 and 2020, the number of AI publications on open-access publication database arXiv grew from 5,487 to over 34,376 (see also Figure 1). As of 2019, AI publications represented 3.8% of all peer-reviewed scientific publications, an increase from 1.3% in 2011.[15] The vast majority of research appearing in major AI conferences comes from academic and industry institutions based in the European Union, China and the United States of America.[16] AI and data science techniques are also being applied across a range of other academic disciplines such as history,[17] economics,[18] genomics[19] and biology.[20]

Compared to many other disciplines, AI and data science have a relatively fast research-to-product pipeline and relatively low barriers for use, making these techniques easily adaptable (though not necessarily well suited) to a range of different applications.[21] While these qualities have led AI and data science to be described as ‘more important than fire and electricity’ by some industry leaders,[22] there have been increased calls from members of the AI research community to require researchers to consider and address ‘failures of imagination’[23] of the potential broader societal impacts and risks of their research.

Figure 2: The research-to-product timeline

This timeline shows how short the research-to-product pipeline for AI can be. It took less than a year from the release of initial research in 2020 and 2021, exploring how to generate images from text inputs, to the first commercial products selling these services.

The sudden growth of AI and data science research has exacerbated challenges for traditional research ethics review processes, and highlighted that they are poorly set up to address questions of broader societal impact of research. Several high-profile instances of controversial AI research passing institutional ethics review include image recognition applications that claim to identify homosexuality,[24] criminality,[25] physiognomy[26] and phrenology.[27] Corporate labs have also experienced high-profile examples of unethical research being approved, including a Microsoft chatbot capable of spreading disinformation,[28] and a Google research paper that contributed to the surveillance of China’s Uighur population.[29]

In research institutions, the role of assessing for research ethics issues tends to fall on Research Ethics Committees (RECs), also known in some regions as Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or Ethics Review Committees (ERCs). Since the 1960s, these committees have been empowered to reject research from being undertaken unless changes are made in the proposed research design.

These committees generally consist of members of a specific academic department or corporate institution, who are responsible for evaluating research proposals before the research begins. Their evaluations combine normative and legal principles, originally linked to biomedical human subjects research, that have developed over time.

Traditionally, RECs only consider research involving human subjects and only consider questions concerning how the research will be conducted. While they are not the only ‘line of defence’ against unethical practices in research, they are the primary actor responsible for mitigating potential harms to research subjects in many forms of research.

The increasing prominence of AI and data science research poses an important question: are RECs well placed and adequately set up to address the challenges that AI and data science research pose? This report explores these challenges that public and private-sector RECs face in evaluations of research ethics and broader societal impact issues in AI and data science research.[30] In doing so, it aims to help institutions that are developing AI research review processes take a holistic and robust approach for identifying and mitigating these risks. It also seeks to provide research institutions and other actors in the research ecosystem – funders, journal editors and conference organisers – with specific recommendations for how they can address these challenges.

This report seeks to address four research questions:

  1. How are RECs in academia and industry currently structured? What role do they play in the wider research ecosystem?
  2. What resources (e.g. moral principles, legal guidance, etc.) are RECs using to guide their reviews of research ethics? What is the scope of these reviews?
  3. What are the most pressing or common challenges and concerns that RECs are facing in evaluations of AI and data science research?
  4. What changes can be made so that RECs and the wider AI and data science research community can better address these challenges?

To address these questions, this report relied on a review of the literature on RECs, research ethics and broader societal impact questions in AI. The report also draws on a series of workshops with 42 members of public and private AI and data science research institutions in May 2021, along with eight interviews with experts in research ethics and AI issues. More information on our methodology can be found in ‘Methodology and limitations’.

This report begins with an introduction to the history of RECs, how they are commonly structured, and how they commonly operate in corporate and academic environments for AI and data science research. The report then discusses six challenges that RECs face – some of which are longstanding issues, others of which are exacerbated by the rise of AI and data science research. We conclude the paper with a discussion of these findings and eight recommendations for actions that RECs and other actors in the research ecosystem can take to better address the ethical risks of AI and data science research.

Context for Research Ethics Committees and AI research

This section provides a brief history of modern research ethics and Research Ethics Committees (RECs), discusses their scope and function, and highlights some differences between how they operate in corporate and academic environments. It places RECs in the context of other actors in the ‘AI research ecosystem’, such as organisers of AI and data science conferences, or editors of AI journal publications who set norms of behaviour and incentives within the research community. Three key points to take away from this chapter are:

  1. Modern research ethics questions are mostly focused on ethical challenges that arise in research methodology, and exclude consideration of the broader societal impacts of research.
  2. Current RECs and research ethics principles stem from biomedical research, which analyses questions of research ethics through a lens of patient-clinician relationships and is not well suited for the more distanced relationship in AI and data science between a researcher and data subject.
  3. Academic and corporate RECs in AI research share common aims, but with some important differences. Corporate AI labs tend to have more resources, but may also be less transparent about their processes.

What is a REC, and what is its scope and function?

Every day, RECs review applications to undertake research for potential ethical issues that may arise. Broadly defined, RECs are institutional bodies made up of members of an institution (and, in some instances, independent members outside that institution) who are charged with evaluating applications to undertake research before it begins. They make judgements about the suitability of research, and have the power to approve researchers to go ahead with a project or request that changes are made before research is undertaken. Many academic journals and conferences will not publish or accept research that fails to meet a review by a Research Ethics Committee (though as we will discuss below, not all research requires review).

RECs operate with two purposes in mind:

  1. To protect the welfare and interests of prospective and current research participants and minimise risk of harm to them.
  2. To promote ethical and societally valuable research.

In meeting these aims, RECs traditionally conduct an ex ante evaluation only once, before a research project begins. In understanding what kinds of ethical questions RECs evaluate for, it is also helpful to disentangle three distinct categories of ethical risks in research: [31]

  1. Mitigating research process harms (often confusingly called ‘research ethics’).
  2. Research integrity.
  3. Broader societal impacts of research (also referred to as Responsible Research and Innovation, or RRI).

The scope of REC evaluations is entirely on questions of mitigating the ethical risks from research methodology, such as how the researcher intends to protect the privacy of a participant, anonymise their data or ensure they have received informed consent.[32] In their evaluations, RECs may look at whether the research poses a serious risk to interests and safety of research subjects, or if the researchers are operating in accordance with local laws governing data protection and intellectual property ownership of any research findings.

REC evaluations may also probe on whether the researchers have assessed and minimised potential harm to research participants, and seek to balance this against the benefits of the research for society at large.[33] However, there are limitations to the aim of promoting ethical and societally valuable research. There are few frameworks for how RECs can consider the benefit of research for society at large. Additionally, this concept of mitigating methodological risks does not extend to considerations of whether the research poses risks to society at large, or to individuals beyond the subjects of that research.

 

Three different kinds of ethical risks in research

1.    Mitigating research process (also known as ‘research ethics’): The term research ethics refers to the principles and processes governing how to mitigate the risks to research subjects. Research ethics principles are mostly concerned with the protection, safety and welfare of individual research participants, such as gaining their informed consent to participate in research or anonymising their data to protect their privacy.

 

2.    Research integrity: These are principles governing the credibility and integrity of the research, including which whether it is intellectually honest, transparent, robust, and replicable.[34] In most fields, research integrity is evaluated via the peer review process after research is completed.

 

3.    Broader societal impacts of research: This refers to the potential positive and negative societal and environmental implications of research, including unintended uses (such as misuse) of research. A similar concept is Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) which refers to steps that researchers can undertake to anticipate and address the potential downstream risks and implications of their research.[35]

RECs, however, often do not evaluate for questions of research integrity, which is concerned with whether research is intellectually honest, transparent, robust and replicable.[36] These can include questions relating to whether data has been fabricated or misrepresented, whether research is reproducible, stating the limitations and assumptions of the research, and disclosing conflicts of interests.[37] The intellectual integrity of researchers is important for ensuring public trust in science, which can be eroded in cases of misconduct.[38]

Some RECs may consider complaints about research integrity issues that arise after research has been published, but these issues are often not considered as part of their ethics reviews. RECs may, however, assess a research applicant’s bona fides to determine if they are someone who appears to have integrity (such as if they have any conflicts of interest with the subject of their study). Usually, questions of research integrity are left to other actors in the research ecosystem, such as peer reviewers and whistleblowers who may notify a research institution or the REC of questionable research findings or dishonest behaviour. Other governance mechanisms for addressing research integrity issues include publishing the code or data of the research so that others may attempt to reproduce findings.

Another area of ethical risks that contemporary RECs do not evaluate for (but which we argue they should) is the responsibility of researchers to consider the broader societal effects of their research on society.[39] This is referred to as Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI), which moves beyond concerns of research integrity and is: ‘an approach that anticipates and assesses potential implications and societal expectations with regard to research and innovation, with the aim to foster the design of inclusive and sustainable research and innovation’.[40]

RRI is concerned with the integration of mechanisms of reflection, anticipation and inclusive deliberation around research and innovation, and relies on individual researchers to incorporate these practices in their research. This includes analysing potential economic, societal or environmental impacts that arise from research and innovation. RRI is a more recent development that emerged separately to RECs, stemming in part from the Ethical Legal and Societal Implications Research (ELSI) programme in the 1990s, which was established to research the broader societal implications of genomics research.[41]

Traditionally, RECs are usually not well equipped to deal with assessing subsequent uses of research, or their impacts on society. RECs often lack the capacity or remit to monitor the downstream uses of research, or to act as an ‘observatory’ for identifying trends in the use or misuse of research they reviewed at inception. This is compounded by the decentralised and fragmentary nature of RECs, which operate independently of each other and often do not evaluate each other’s work.

What principles do RECs rely on to make judgements about research ethics?

In their evaluations, RECs rely on a variety of tools, including laws like the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which cover data protection issues and some discipline-specific norms. At the core of all Research Ethics Committee evaluations, there are a series of moral principles that have evolved over time. These principles largely stem from the biomedical sciences, and have been codified, debated and edited by international bodies like the World Medical Association and World Health Organisation. The biomedical model of research ethics is the foundation for how concepts like autonomy and consent were encoded in law,[42] which often motivate modern discussions about privacy.

Some early modern research ethics codes, like the Nuremberg Principles and the Belmont Report, were developed in response to specific atrocities and scandals involving biomedical research on human subjects. Other codes, like the Declaration of Helsinki, developed out of a field-wide concern to self-regulate before governments stepped in to regulate.[43]

Each code and declaration seeks to address specific ethical issues from a particular regional and historical context. Nonetheless, they are united by two aspects. Firstly, they frame research ethics questions in a way that assumes a clear researcher-subject relationship. Secondly, they all seek to standardise norms of evaluating and mitigating the potential risks caused by research processes, to support REC decisions becoming more consistent between different institutions.

 

Historical principles governing research ethics

 

Nuremberg Code: The Nuremberg trials occurred in 1947 and revealed horrific and inhumane medical experimentation by Nazi scientists on human subjects, primarily concentration camp prisoners. Out of concern that these atrocities might further damage public trust in medical professionals and research,[44] the judges in this trial included a set of universal principles for ‘permissible medical experiments’ in their verdict, which would later become known as the Nuremberg Code.[45] The Code lists ten principles that seek to ensure individual participant rights are protected and outweigh any societal benefit of the research.

 

Declaration of Helsinki: Established by World Medical Association (WMA), the Helsinki Declaration seeks to articulate universal principles for human subjects research and clinical research practice. The WMA is an international organisation representing physicians from across the globe. The Helsinki Declaration has been updated repeatedly since its first iteration in 1964, with major updates occurring in 1975, 2000 and 2008. It specifies five basic principles for all human subjects research, as well as further principles specific to clinical research.

 

Belmont Report: This report was written in response to several troubling incidents in the USA, in which patients participating in clinical trials were not adequately informed about the risks involved. These include a 40-year-long experiment by the US Public Health Service and the Tuskegee Institute that sought to study untreated syphilis in Black men. Despite having over 600 participants (399 with syphilis, 201 without), the participants were deceived about the risks and nature of experiment and were not provided with a cure for the disease after it had been developed in the 1940s.[46] These developments led to the United States’ National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research to publish the Belmont Report in 1979, which listed several principles for research to follow: justice, beneficence and respect for persons.[47]

 

Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences Guidelines (CIOMS): CIOMS was formed in 1949 by the World Health Organisations and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), and is made up of a range of biomedical member organisations from across the world. In 2016, it published the International Ethical Guidelines for Health-Related Research Involving Humans,[48] which includes specific requirements for research involving vulnerable persons and groups, compensation for research participants, and requirements for researchers and health authorities to engage potential participants and communities in a ‘meaningful participatory process’ in various stages of research.[49]

 

Biomedical research ethics principles touch on a wide variety of issues, including autonomy and consent. The Nuremberg Code specified that, for research to proceed, a researcher must have consent given (i) voluntarily by a (ii) competent and (iii) informed subject (iv) with adequate comprehension. At the time, consent was understood as only applicable to healthy, non-patient participants, and thus excluded patients in clinical trials, access to patient information like medical registers and participants (like children or people with a cognitive impairment) who are unable to give consent.

Subsequent research ethics principles have adapted to these scenarios with methods such as legal guardianship, group or community consent, and broad or blanket consent.[50] Under the Helsinki Declaration, consent must be given in writing and states that research subjects can give consent only if they have been fully informed of the study’s purpose, the methods, risks and benefits involved, and their right to withdraw.[51] In all these conceptions of consent, there is a clearly identifiable research subject, who is in some kind of direct relationship with a researcher.

Another area that biomedical research principles touch on is the risk and benefit of research for research subjects. While the Nuremberg Code was unambiguous about the protection of research subjects, the Helsinki Declaration introduced the concept of benefit from research in proportion to risk.[52] The 1975 document and other subsequent revisions reaffirmed that, ‘while the primary purpose of medical research is to generate new knowledge, this goal can never take precedence over the rights and interests of individual research subjects.’[53]

However, Article 21 recommends that research can be conducted if the importance of its objective outweighs the risks to participants, and Article 18 states that a careful assessment of predictable risks to participants must be undertaken in comparison to potential benefits for individuals and communities.[54] The Helsinki Declaration lacks clarity on what constitutes an acceptable, or indeed ‘predictable’ risk and how the benefits would be assessed, and therefore leaves the challenge of resolving these questions to individual institutions.[55] The CIOMS guidance also suggests RECs should consider the ‘social value’ of health research in considering a cost/benefit analysis.

The Belmont Report also addressed the trade-off between societal benefit and individual risk, offering specific ethics principles to guide scientific research that include ‘respects for persons’, ‘beneficence’ and ‘justice’.[56] The principle of ‘respect for persons’ is broken down into respect for the autonomy of human research subjects and requirements for informed consent. The principle of ‘beneficence’ requires the use of the best possible research design to maximise benefits and minimise harms, and prohibits any research that is not backed by a favourable risk-benefit ratio (to be determined by a REC). Finally, the principle of ‘justice’ stipulates that the risks and benefits of research are distributed fairly, research subjects are selected through fair procedures, and to avoid any exploitation of vulnerable populations.

The Nuremberg Code created standardised requirements to identify who bears responsibility for identifying and addressing potential ethical risks of research. For example, the Code stipulates that the research participants have the right to withdraw (Article 9), but places responsibility on the researchers to evaluate and justify any risks in relation to human participation (Article 6), to minimise harm (Articles 4 and 7) and to stop the research if it is likely to cause injury or death to participants (Articles 5 and 10).[57] Similar requirements exist in other biomedical ethical principles like the Helsinki Declaration, which extends responsibility for assessing and mitigating ethical risks to both researchers and RECs.

A brief history of RECs in the USA and the UK

RECs are a relatively modern phenomenon in the history of academic research, and their origins stem from early biomedical research initiatives of the 1970s. The 1975 Declaration of Helsinki, an initiative by the World Medical Association (WMA) to articulate universal principles for human subjects research and clinical research practice, declared the ultimate arbiter for making assessments of ethical risk and benefit were specifically appointed, independent research ethics committees who are given the responsibility to assess the risk of harm to research subjects and the management of those risks.

 

In the USA, the National Research Act of 1974 requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for all human subjects research projects funded by the US Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW).[58] This was extended in 1991 under the ‘Common Rule’ so that any research involving human subjects that is funded by the federal government must undergo an ethics review by an IRB. There are certain exceptions for what kinds of research will go before an IRB, including research that involves the analysis of data that is publicly available, privately funded research, and research that involves secondary analysis of existing data (such as the use of existing ‘benchmark’ datasets that are commonly used in AI research).[59]

 

In the UK, the first RECs began operating informally around 1966, in the context of clinical research in the National Health Service (NHS), but it was not until 1991 that RECs were formally codified. In the 1980s, the UK expanded the requirement for REC review beyond clinical health research into other disciplines. Academic RECs in the UK began to spring up around this same time, with the majority coming into force after the year 2000.

 

UK RECs in the healthcare and clinical context are coordinated and regulated by the Health Research Authority, which has passed guidance for how medical healthcare RECs should be structured and operate, including the procedure of submitting an ethics application and the process of ethics review.[60] This guidance allows for greater harmony across different health RECs and better governance for multi-site research projects, but this guidance does not extend to RECs in other academic fields. Some funders such as the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council have also released research ethics guidelines for non-health projects to undergo certain ethics review requirements if the project involves human subjects research (though the definition of human subjects research is contested).[61]

RECs in academia

While RECs broadly seek to protect the welfare and interests of research participants and promote ethical and societally valuable research, there are some important distinctions to draw between the function and role of a REC in academic institutions compared to private-sector AI labs.

Where are RECs located in universities and research institutes?

Academic RECs bear a significant amount of the responsibility for assessing research involving human participants, including the scrutiny of ethics applications from staff and students. Broadly, there are two models of RECs used in academic research institutions:

  1. Centralised: A single, central REC is responsible for all research ethics applications, including the development of ethics policies and guidance.
  2. Decentralised: Schools, faculties or departments have their own RECs for reviewing applications, while a central REC maintains and develops ethics policies and guidance.[62]

RECs can be based at the institutional level (such as at universities), or at the regional and federal level. Some RECs may also be run by non-academic institutions, who are charged with reviewing academic research proposals. For example, academic health research in the UK may undergo review by RECs run by the National Health Service (NHS), sometimes in addition to review by the academic body’s own REC. In practice, this means that publicly funded health research proposals may seek ethics approval from one of the 85 RECs run by the NHS, in addition to non-NHS RECs run by various academic departments.[63]

A single, large academic institution, such as the University of Cambridge, may have multiple committees running within it, each with a different composition and potentially assessing different kinds of fields of research. Depending on the level of risk and required expertise, a research project may be reviewed by a local REC, school-level REC or may also be reviewed by a REC at the university level.[64]

For example, Exeter University has a central REC and 11 devolved RECs at college or discipline level. The devolved RECS report to the central REC, which is accountable to the University Council (governing body). Exeter University also implements a ‘dual assurance’ scheme, with an independent member of the university’s governing body providing oversight of the implementation of their ethics policy. The University of Oxford also relies on a cascading system of RECs, which can escalate concerns up the chain if needed, and which may include department and domain-specific guidance for certain research ethics issues.

Figure 3: The cascade of RECs at the University of Oxford[65]

This figure shows how one academic institution’s RECs are structured, with a central REC and more specialised committees.

What is the scope and role of academic RECs?

According to a 2004 survey of UK academic REC members, they play four principal roles:[66]

  1. Responsibility for ethical issues relating to research involving human participants, including maintaining standards and provision of advice to researchers.
  2. Responsibility for ensuring production and maintenance of codes of practice and guidance for how research should be conducted.
  3. Ethical scrutiny of research applications from staff and, in most cases, students.
  4. Reporting and monitoring of instances of unethical behaviour to other institutions or academic departments.

Academic RECs often include a function for intaking and assessing reports of unethical research behaviour, which may lead to disciplinary action against staff or students.

When do ethics reviews take place?

RECs form a gateway through which researchers apply to obtain ethics approval as a prerequisite for further research. At most institutions, researchers will submit their work for ethics approval before conducting the study – typically at the early stages in the research lifecycle, such as at the planning stage or when applying for research grants. This means RECs only consider an anticipatory assessment of ethical risks that the proposed method may raise.

This assessment relies on both ‘testimony’ from research applicants who document what they believe are the material risks, and a review by REC members themselves who assess the validity of that ‘testimony’, provide an opinion of what they envision the material risks of the research method might be, and how those risks can be mitigated. There is limited opportunity for revising these assessments once the research is underway, and that usually only occurs if a REC review identifies a risk or threat and asks for additional information. One example of an organisation that takes a different approach is the Alan Turing Institute, which developed a continuous integration approach with reviews taking place at various stages throughout the research life cycle.[67]

The extent of a REC’s review will vary depending on whether the project has any clearly identifiable risks to participants, and many RECs apply a triaging process to identify research that may pose particularly significant risks. RECs may use a checklist that asks a researcher whether their project involves particularly sensitive forms of data collection or risk, such as research with vulnerable population groups like children, or research that may involve deceiving research participants (such as creating a fake account to study online right-wing communities). If an application raises one of these issues, it must undergo a full research ethics review. In cases where a research application does not involve any of these initial risks, it may undergo an expedited process that involves a review of only some factors of the application such as its data governance practices.[68]

Figure 4: Example of the triaging application intake process for a UK University REC

If projects meet certain risk criteria, they may be subject to a more extensive review by the full committee. Lower-risk projects may be approved by only one or two members of the committee.

During the review, RECs may offer researchers advice to mitigate potential ethical risks. Once approval is granted, no further checks by RECs are required. This means that there is no mechanism for ongoing assessment of emerging risks to participants, communities or society as the research progresses. As the focus is on protecting individual research participants, there is no assessment of potential long-term downstream harms of research.

Composition of academic RECs

The composition of RECs varies between and even within various institutions. In the USA, RECs are required under the ‘common rule’ to have a minimum of five members with a variety of professional backgrounds, to be made up of people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds, and to have at least one member who is independent from the institution. In the UK, the Health Research Authority recommends RECs have 18 members, while the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) recommends at least seven.[69] RECs operate on a voluntary basis, and there is currently no financial compensation for REC members, nor any other rewards or recognition.

Some RECs are comprised of an interdisciplinary board of people who bring different kinds of expertise to ethical reviews. In theory, this is to provide a more holistic review of research that ensures perspectives from different disciplines and life experiences are factored into a decision. RECs in the clinical context in the UK, for example, must involve both expert members with expertise in the subject area and ‘lay members’, which refers to people ‘who are not registered healthcare professionals and whose primary professional interest is not in clinical research’.[70] Additional expertise can be sourced on an ad hoc basis.[71] The ESRC also further emphasises that RECs should be multi-disciplinary and include ethnic and gender diversity.[72] According to our expert workshop participants, however, many RECs that are located within a specific department of faculty are often not multi-disciplinary and do not include lay members, although specific expertise might be requested when needed.

The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage databank (SAIL)[73] offers one example of a body that does integrate lay members in their ethics review process. Their review criteria include data governance issues and risks of disclosure, but also whether the project contributes to new knowledge, and whether it serves the public good by improving health, wellbeing and public services.

RECs within the technology industry

In the technology industry, several companies with AI and data science research divisions have launched internal ethics review processes and accompanying RECs, with notable examples being Microsoft Research, Meta Research and Google Brain. In our workshop and interviews with participants, members of corporate RECs we spoke with noted some key facets of their research review processes. It is important, however, to acknowledge that little publicly available information exists on corporate REC practices, including their processes and criteria for research ethics review. This section reflects statements made by workshop and interview participants, and some public reports of research ethics practices in private-sector labs.

Scope

According to our participants, corporate AI research RECs tend to take a broader scope of review than traditional academic RECs. Their reviews may extend beyond research ethics issues and into questions of broader societal impact. Interviews with developers of AI ethics review practices in industry suggested a view that traditional REC models can be too cumbersome and slow for the quick pace of the product development life cycle.

At the same time, ex ante review does not provide good oversight on risks that emerge during or after a project. To address this issue, some industry RECs have sought to develop processes that focus beyond protecting individual research subjects and include considerations for the broader downstream effects for population groups or society, as well as recurring review throughout the research/product lifecycle.[74]

Several companies we spoke with have specific RECs that review research involving human subjects. However, as one participant from a corporate REC noted, ‘a lot of AI research does not involve human subjects’ or their data, and may focus instead on environmental data or other types of non-personal information. This company relied on separate ethics review process for such cases that considers (i) the potential broader impact of the research and (ii) whether the research aligns with public commitments or ethical principles the company has made.

According to a law review article on their research ethics review process, Meta (previously known as Facebook) claims to consider the public contribution of knowledge of research and whether it may generate positive externalities and implications for society.[75] A workshop participant from another corporate REC noted that ‘the purpose of [their] research is to have societal impact, so ethical implications of their research are fundamental to them.’ These companies also tend to have more resources to undertake ethical reviews than academic labs, and can dedicate more full-time staff positions to training, broader impact mapping and research into the ethical implications of AI.

The use of AI-specific ethics principles and red lines

Many corporate companies like Meta, Google and Microsoft have published AI ethics principles that articulate particular considerations for their AI and data science research to consider, as well as ‘red line’ research areas they will not undertake. For example, in response to employee protests against a US Department of Defense contract, Google stated it will not pursue AI ‘weapons or other technologies whose principal purpose or implementation is to cause or directly facilitate injury to people’.[76] Similarly, DeepMind and Element AI have signed a pledge against AI research for lethal autonomous weapons alongside over 50 other companies; a pledge that only a handful of academic institutions have made.[77]

According to some participants, articulating these principles can make more salient the specific ethical concerns that researchers at corporate labs should consider with AI and data science research. However, other participants we spoke with noted that, in practice, there is a lack of internal and external transparency around how these principles are applied.

Many participants from academic institutions we spoke with noted they do not use ‘red line’ areas of research out of concern that these red lines may infringe on existing principles of academic openness.

Extent of reviews

Traditional REC reviews tend to focus on a single one-off assessment of research risk at the early stages of a project. In contrast, one corporate REC we spoke with described their review as being a continuous process in which a team may engage with the REC at different stages, such as when a team is collecting data prior to publication, and post-publication reviews into whether the outcomes and impacts they were concerned with came to fruition. This kind of continuous review enables a REC to capture risks as they emerge.

We note that it was unclear whether this practice was common among industry labs or reflected one lab’s particular practices. We also note that some academic labs, like the Alan Turing Institute, are implementing similar initiatives to engage researchers at various stages of the research lifecycle.

A related point flagged by some workshop participants was that industry ethics review boards may vary in terms of their power to affect product design or launch decisions. Some may make non-binding recommendations, and others can green light or halt projects, or return a project to a previous development stage with specific recommendations.[78]

Composition of board and external engagement

The corporate REC members we spoke with all described the composition of their boards as being interdisciplinary and reflecting a broad range of teams at the company. One REC, for example, noted that members of engineering, research, legal and operations teams sit on their ethical review committee to provide advice not only on specific projects, but also for entire research programmes. Another researcher we spoke with described how their organisation’s ethics review process provides resources for researchers, including a list of ‘banned’ publicly accessible datasets that have questionable consent and privacy issues but are commonly used by researchers in academia and other parts of industry.

However, none of the corporate RECs we spoke with had lay members or external experts on their boards. This raises a serious concern that perspectives of people impacted by these technologies are not reflected in ethical reviews of their research, and that what constitutes a risk or is considered a high-priority risk is left solely to the discretion of employees of the company. The lack of engagement with external experts or people affected by this research may mean that critical or non-obvious information about what constitutes a risk to some members of society may be missed. Some participants we spoke with also mentioned that corporate labs experience challenges engaging with external stakeholders and experts to consult on critical issues. Many large companies seek to hire this expertise in-house, bringing in interdisciplinary researchers with social science, economics and other backgrounds. However, engaging external experts can be challenging, given concerns around trade secrets, sharing sensitive data and tipping off rival companies about their work.

Many companies resort to asking participants to sign non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which are legally binding contracts with severe financial sanctions and legal risks if confidential information is disclosed. These can last in perpetuity, and for many external stakeholders (particularly those from civil society or marginalised groups), signing these agreements can be a daunting risk. However, we did hear from other corporate REC members that they had successfully engaged with external experts in some instances to understand the holistic set of concerns around a research project. In one biomedical-based research project, a corporate REC claimed to have engaged over 25 experts in a range of backgrounds to determine potential risks their work might raise and what mitigations were at their disposal.

Ongoing training

Many corporate RECs we spoke with also place an emphasis on continued skills and training, including providing basic ‘ethical training’ for staff of all levels. One corporate REC member we spoke with noted several lessons learned from their experience running ethical reviews of AI and data science research:

  1. Executive buy-in and sponsorship: It is essential to have senior leaders in the organisation backing and supporting this work. Having a senior spokesperson also helped in communicating the importance of ethical consideration throughout the organisation.
  2. Culture: It can be challenging to create a culture where researchers feel incentivised to talk and think about the ethical implications of their work, particularly in the earliest stages. Having a collaborative company culture in which research is shared openly within the company, and a transparent process where researchers understand what an ethics review will involve, who is reviewing their work, and what will be expected of them can help address this concern. Training programmes for new and existing staff on the importance of ethical reviews and how to think reflexively helped staff level-set with what is expected of them.
  3. Diverse perspectives: Engaging diverse perspectives can result in more robust decision-making. This means engaging with external experts who represent interdisciplinary backgrounds, and may include hiring that expertise internally. This can also include experiential diversity, which incorporates perspectives of different lived experiences. It also involves considering one’s own positionality and biases, and being reflexive as to how one’s own biases and lived experiences can influence consideration for ethical issues.
  4. Early and regular engagement leads to more successful outcomes: Ethical issues can emerge at different stages of a research project’s lifecycle, particularly given quick-paced and shifting political and social dynamics outside the lab. Engaging in ethical reviews at the point of publication can be too late, and the earlier this work is engaged with the better. Regular engagement throughout the project lifecycle is the goal, along with post-mortem reviews of the impacts of research.
  5. Continuous learning: REC processes need to be continuously updated and improved, and it is essential to seek feedback on what is and isn’t working.

Other actors in the research ethics ecosystem

While academic and corporate RECs and researchers share the primary burden for assessing research ethics issues, there are other actors who share this responsibility to varying degrees, including funders, publishers and conference organisers.[79] Along with RECs, these other actors help establish research culture, which refers to ‘the behaviours, values, expectations, attitudes and norms of research communities’.[80] Research culture influences how research is done, who conducts research and who is rewarded for it.

Creating a healthy research culture is a responsibility shared by research institutions, conference organisers, journal editors, professional associations and other actors in the research ecosystem. This can include creating rewards and incentives for researchers to conduct their work according to a high ethical standard, and to reflect carefully on the broader societal impacts of their work. In this section, we examine in detail only three actors in this complex ecosystem.

Figure 5: Different actors in the research ecosystem

This figure shows some of the different actors that comprise the AI and data science research ecosystem. These actors interact and set incentives for each other. For example, funders can set incentives for institutions and researchers to follow (such as meeting certain criteria as part of a research application). Similarly, publishers and conferences can set incentives for researchers to follow in order to be published.

Organisers of research conferences can set particular incentives for a healthy research culture. Research conferences are venues where research is rewarded and celebrated, enabling career advancement and growth opportunities. They are also forums where junior and senior researchers from the public and private sectors create professional networks and discuss field-wide benchmarks, milestones and norms of behaviour. As Ada’s recent paper with CIFAR on AI and machine learning (ML) conference organisers explores, there are a wide variety of steps that conferences can take to incentivise consideration for research ethics and broader societal impacts.[81]

For example, in 2020, the Conference on Neural Information Processing (NeurIPS) introduced a requirement that submitted papers include a broader societal impact statement of the benefits, limitations and risks of the research.[82] These impact statements were designed to encourage researchers submitting work to the conference to consider the risks their research might raise, and to conduct more interdisciplinary consultation with experts from other domains and engagement with people who may be affected by their research.[83] The introduction of this requirement was hotly contested by some researchers, who were concerned it was an overly burdensome ‘tick box’ exercise that would become pro-forma over time.[84]  In 2021, NeurIPs shifted to adding ethical considerations into a checklist of requirements for submitted papers, rather than requiring a standalone statement for all papers to complete.

Editors of academic journals can set incentives for researchers to assess for and mitigate the ethical implications of their work. Having work published in an academic journal is primary goal for most academics, and a pathway for career advancement. Journals often put in place certain requirements for submissions to be accepted. For example, the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE) has released guidelines on research integrity practices in scholarly publishing, which stipulate that journals should include policies on data sharing, reproducibility and ethical oversight.[85] This includes requirements that studies involving human subjects research must provide self-disclosure that a REC has approved the study.

Some organisations have suggested journal editors could go further towards encouraging researchers to consider questions of broader societal impacts. The Partnership on AI (PAI) published a range of recommendations for responsible publication practice in AI and ML research, which include calls for a change in research culture that normalises the discussion of downstream consequences of AI and ML research.[86]

Specifically for conferences and journals, PAI recommends expanding peer review criteria to include potential downstream consequences by asking submitting researchers to include a broader societal impact statement. Furthermore, PAI recommends establishing a separate review process to evaluate papers based on risk and downstream consequences, a process that may require a unique set of multidisciplinary experts to go beyond the scope of current journal review practices.[87]

Public and private funders (such as research councils) can establish incentives for researchers to engage with questions of research ethics, integrity and broader societal impacts. Funders play a critical role in determining which research proposals will move forward, and what areas of research will be prioritised over others. This presents an opportunity for funders to encourage certain practices, such as requiring that any research that receives funding meets expectations around research integrity, Responsible Research and Innovation and research ethics. For example, Gardner recommends that grant funding and public tendering of AI systems should require a ‘Trustworthy AI Statement’ from researchers that includes an ex ante assessment of how the research will comply with the European HLEG’s Trustworthy AI standards.[88]

Challenges in AI research

In this chapter, we highlight six major challenges that Research Ethics Committees (RECs) face when evaluating AI and data science research, as uncovered during workshops conducted with members of RECs and researchers in May 2021.

Challenge 1:  Many RECs lack the resources, expertise and training to appropriately address the risks that AI and data science pose

Inadequate review requirements

Some workshop participants highlighted that many projects that raise severe privacy and consent issues are not required to undergo research ethics review. For example, some RECs encourage researchers to adopt data minimisation and anonymisation practices and do not require a project to undergo ethics reviews if the data is anonymised after collection. However, research has shown that anonymised data can still be triangulated with other datasets to enable reidentification,[89] raising a privacy risk to data subjects and implications for the consideration of broader impacts.[90] Expert participants noted that it is hard to determine if data collected for a project is anonymous, and that RECs must have the right expertise to fully interrogate whether a research project has adequately addressed these challenges.

As Metcalf and Crawford have noted, data science is usually not considered a form of direct intervention in the body or life of individual human subjects and is, therefore, exempt from many research ethics review processes.[91] Similar challenges arise with AI research projects that rely on data collected from public sources, such as surveillance cameras or scraped from the public web, which are assumed to pose minimal risk to human subjects. Under most current research ethics guidelines, research projects using publicly available or pre-existing datasets collected and shared by other researchers are also not required to undergo research ethics review.[92]

Some of our workshop participants noted that researchers can view RECs as risk averse and overly concerned with procedural questions and reputation management. This reflects some findings from the literature. Samuel et al found that, while researchers perceive research ethics as procedural and centred on operational governance frameworks, societal ethics are perceived as less formal and more ‘fuzzy’, noting the absence of standards and regulations governing AI in relation to societal impact.[93]

Expertise and training

Another institutional challenge our workshop participants identified related to the training, composition and expertise of RECs. These concerns are not unique to reviews of AI and data science and reflect long-running concerns with how effectively RECs operate. In the USA, a 2011 study found that university research ethics review processes are perceived by researchers as inefficient, with review outcomes being viewed as inconsistent and often resulting in delays in the research process, particularly for multi-site trials.[94]

Other studies have found that researchers view RECs as overly bureaucratic and risk-averse bodies, and that REC practices and decisions can vary substantially across institutions.[95] These studies have found that that RECs have differing approaches to determining which projects require a full rather than expedited review, and often do not provide a justification or explanation for their assessments of the risk of certain research practices.[96] In some documented cases, researchers have gone so far as to abandon projects due to delays and inefficiencies of research ethics review processes.[97]

There is some evidence these issues are exacerbated in reviews of AI and data science research. Dove et al found systemic inefficiencies and substantive weaknesses in research ethics review processes, including:

  • a lack of expertise in understanding the novel challenges emerging from data-intensive research
  • a lack of consistency and reasoned decision-making of RECs
  • a focus on ‘tick-box exercises’
  • duplication of ethics reviews
  • a lack of communication between RECs in multiple jurisdictions.[98]

One reason for variation in ethics review process outcomes is disagreement among REC members. This can be the case even when working with shared guidelines. For example, in the context of data acquired through social media for research purposes, REC members differ substantially in their assessment of whether consent is required, as well as the risks to research participants. In part, this difference of opinion can be linked to their level of experience in dealing with these issues.[99] Some researchers suggest that reviewers may benefit from more training and support resources on emerging research ethics issues, to ensure a more consistent approach to decision-making.[100]

A significant challenge arises from the lack of training – and, therefore, lack of expertise – of REC members.[101] While this has already been identified as a persistent issue with RECs generally,[102] AI and data science research can be applied to many disciplines. This means that REC members evaluating AI and data science research must have expertise across many fields. However, many RECs in this space frequently lack expertise across both (i) technical methods of AI and data science, and (ii) domain expertise from other relevant disciplines.[103]

Samuel et al found that some RECs that review AI and data science research are concerned with data governance issues, such as data privacy, which is perceived as not requiring AI-specific technical skills.[104] While RECs regularly draw on specialist advice through cross-departmental collaboration, workshop participants questioned whether resources to support examination of ethical issues relating to AI and data science research are made available for RECs.[105] RECs may need to consider which appropriate expertise is required for these reviews and how it will be sourced, for instance, via specialist ad-hoc advice, or the institution of sub-committees.[106]

The need for reviewers with expertise across disciplines, ethical expertise and cross-departmental collaboration is clear. Participants in our workshops questioned whether interdisciplinary expertise is sufficient to review AI and data science research projects, and whether experiential expertise (expertise on the subject matter gained through first-person involvement) is also necessary to provide a more holistic assessment of potential research risks. This could take the form of changing a REC’s composition to involve a broader range of stakeholders, such as community representatives or external organisations.

Resources

A final challenge that RECs face relates to their resourcing and the value given to their work. According to our workshop participants, RECs are generally under-resourced in terms of budget, staffing and rewarding of members. Many RECs rely on voluntary ‘pro bono’ labour of professors and other staff, with members managing competing commitments and an expanding volume of applications for ethics review.[107] Inadequate resources can result in further delays and have a negative impact on the quality of the reviews. Chadwick shows that RECs rely on the dedication of their members, who prioritise the research subjects, researchers, REC members and the institution ahead of personal gain.[108]

Several of our workshop participants noted reviewers do not have enough time to do a proper ethics review that evaluates the full range of potential ethical issues, or the right range of skills. According to several participants, sitting on a REC is often a ‘thankless’ task, which can make finding people willing to serve difficult. Those who are willing and have the required expertise risk being overloaded. Reviewing is ‘free labour’ with little or no recognition, and the question arises how to incentivise REC members. It was discussed that research ethics review should be budgeted appropriately to engage with stakeholders throughout the project lifecycle.

Challenge 2: Traditional research ethics principles are not well suited for AI research

In their evaluations of AI and data science research, RECs have traditionally relied on a set of legally mandated and self-regulatory ethics principles that largely stem from the biomedical sciences. These principles have shaped the way that modern research ethics is understood at research institutions, how RECs are constructed and the traditional scope of their remit.

Contemporary RECs draw on a long list of additional resources for AI and data science research in their reviews, including data science-specific guidelines like the Association of Internet Researchers ethical guidelines,[109] provisions of the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) to govern data protection issues, and increasingly the emerging field of ‘AI ethics’ principles. However, the application of these principles raises significant challenges for RECs.

Several of our expert participants noted these guidelines and principles are often not implemented consistently across different countries, scientific disciplines, or across different departments or teams within the same institution.[110] As prominent research guidelines were originally developed in the context of biomedical research, questions have been raised about their applicability to other disciplines, such as the social sciences, data science and computer science.[111] For example, some in the research community have questioned the extension of the Belmont principles to research in non-experimental settings due to differences in methodologies, the relationships between researchers and research subjects, different models and expectations of consent and different considerations for what constitutes potential harm and to whom.[112]

We draw attention to four main challenges in the application of traditional bioethics principles to ethics reviews of AI and data science research:

Autonomy, privacy and consent

One example of how biomedical principles can be poorly applied to AI and data science research relates to how they address questions of autonomy and consent. Many of these principles emphasise that ‘voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential’ and should outweigh considerations for the potential societal benefit of the research.

Workshop participants highlighted consent and privacy issues as one of the most significant challenges RECs are currently facing in reviews of AI and data science research. This included questions about how to implement ‘ongoing consent’, whereby consent is given at various stages of the research process; whether informed consent may be considered forced consent when research subjects do not really understand the implications of the future use of their data; and whether it is practical to require consent be given more than once when working with large-scale data repositories. A primary concern flagged by workshop participants was whether RECs put too much weight on questions of consent and autonomy at the expense of wider ethical concerns.

Issues of consent largely stem from the ways these fields collect and use personal data,[113] which differs substantially from the traditional clinical experiment format. Part of the issue is the relatively distanced relationship between data scientist and research subject. Here, researchers can rely on data scraped from the web – such as social media posts; or collected via consumer devices – such as fitness trackers or smart speakers.[114] Once collected, many of these datasets can be made publicly accessible as ‘benchmark datasets’ for other researchers to test and train their models. The Flickr Faces HQ dataset, for example, contains 70,000 images of faces collected from a photo-sharing website and made publicly accessible with a Creative Commons license for other researchers to use.[115]

These collection and sharing practices pose novel risks to the privacy and identifiability of research subjects, and challenge traditional notions of informed consent from participants.[116] Once collected and shared, datasets may be re-used or re-shared for different purposes than those understood during the original consent process. It is often not feasible for researchers re-using the data to obtain informed consent in relation to the original research. In many cases, informed consent may not have been given in the first place.[117]

Not being able to obtain informed consent does not give the researcher a blank slate, and datasets that are continuously used as a benchmark for technology development risk normalising the avoidance of consent-seeking practices. Some benchmark datasets, such as the longitudinal Pima Indian Diabetes Dataset (PIDD), are tied to a colonial past of oppression and exploitation of indigenous peoples, and its use as a benchmark dataset perpetuates these politics in new forms.[118] The challenges to informed consent can cause significant damage to public trust in institutions and science. One notable example involved a Facebook (now Meta) study in 2014, in which researchers were able to monitor users’ emotional states and manipulated their news feed without their consent, showing more negative content to some users.[119] The study led to significant public concern, and raised questions about how Facebook users could give informed consent in instances where they lack control, let alone awareness of the study.

In some instances, AI and data science research may also pose novel privacy risks relating to the kinds of inferences that can be drawn from data. To take one example, researchers at Facebook (now Meta) developed an AI system to identify suicidal intent in user-generated content, which could be shared with law enforcement agencies to conduct wellness checks on identified users.[120] This kind of ‘emergent’ health data produced through interactions with software platforms or products is not subject to the same requirements or regulatory oversight as data from a mental health professional.[121] This highlights how an AI system can infer sensitive health information about an individual based on non-health related data in the public domain, which could pose severe risks for the privacy of vulnerable and marginalised communities.

Questions of consent and privacy point to another tension between principles of research integrity and the ethical obligations towards protecting research participants from harm. In the spirit of making research reproducible, there is a growing acceptance among the AI and data science research community that scientific data should be openly shared, and that open access policies for data and code should be fostered so that other researchers can easily re-use research outputs. At the same time, it is not possible to make data accessible to everyone, as this can lead to harmful misuses of the data by other parties, or uses of that data that are for a purpose the data subject would not be comfortable with. Participants largely agreed, however, that RECs struggle to assess these types of research projects because the existing ex ante model of RECs addresses potential risks up front and may not be fit to address the potential emerging risks for data subjects.[122]

Risks to research subjects vs societal benefit

A related topic to consent is the challenge of weighing the societal benefit of research against the risks to the research subjects it poses.

Workshop participants acknowledged how AI and data science research create a different researcher-subject relationship from traditional biomedical research. For example, participants noted that research in a clinical context involves a person who is present and with whom researchers have close and personal interaction. A researcher in these contexts is identifiable to their subject, and vice versa. This relationship often does not exist in AI and data science research, where the ‘subject’ of research may not be readily identifiable or may be someone affected by research rather than someone participating in the research. Some research argues that AI and data science research marks a shift from ‘human subjects’ research to ‘data subjects’ research, in which care and concern for the welfare of participants should be given to those whose data is used.[123]

In many cases, data science and AI research projects rely on data sourced from the web through scraping, a process that challenges traditional notions of informed consent and raises questions about whether researchers are in a position to assess the risk of research to participants.[124] Researchers may not be able to identify the people whose data they are collecting, meaning they often lack a relational dynamic that is essential for understanding the needs, interests and risks of their research subjects.  In other cases, AI researchers may use publicly available datasets made available on online repositories like GitHub, and which may be repurposed for reasons that differ from their originally intended basis for collection. Finally, major differences arise with how data is analysed and assessed. Many kinds of AI and data science research rely on the curation of massive volumes of data, a process that many researchers outsource to third-party contract services such as Amazon’s MTurk. These processes create further separation between researchers and research subjects, outsourcing important value-laden decisions about the data to third-party workers who are not identifiable, accountable or known to research subjects.

Responsibility for assessing risks and benefit

Another challenge research ethics principles have sought to address is determining who is responsible for assessing and communicating the risk of research to participants.

One criticism has been that biomedical research ethics frameworks do not reflect the ‘emergent, dynamic and interactional nature’[125] of fields like the social sciences and humanities.[126] For example, ethnographic or anthropological research methods are open-ended, emergent and need to be responsive to the concerns of research participants throughout the research process. Meanwhile, traditional REC reviews have been solely concerned with an up-front risk assessment. In our expert workshops, several participants noted a similar concern within AI and data science research, where risks or benefits cannot be comprehensively assessed in the early stages of research.

Universality of principles

Some biomedical research ethics initiatives have sought to formulate universal principles for research ethics in different jurisdictions, which would help ensure a common standard of review in international research partnerships or multi-site research studies. However, many of these initiatives were created by institutions from predominantly Western countries to respond to Western biomedical research practices, and critics have pointed out that they therefore reflect a deeply Western set of ethics.[127] Other efforts have been undertaken to develop universal principles, including the Emanuel, Wendler and Grady framework, which uses eight principles with associated ‘benchmark’ questions to help RECs from different regions evaluate potential ethical issues relating to exploitation.[128] While there is some evidence that this model has worked well in REC evaluations for biomedical research in African institutions,[129] it has not yet been widely adopted by RECs in other regions.

Challenge 3: Specific principles for AI and data science research are still emerging and are not consistently adopted by RECs

A more recent phenomenon relevant to the consideration of ethical issues relating to AI and data science has been the proliferation of ethical principles, standards and frameworks for the development and use of AI systems.[130], [131], [132], [133] The development of standards for ethical AI systems has been taken up by bodies such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO).[134] Some of these efforts have occurred at the international level, such as the OECD or United Nations. A number of principles can be found across this spectrum, including transparency, fairness, privacy and accountability. However, these common principles have variations in how they are defined, understood and scoped, meaning there is no single codified approach to how they should be interpreted.[135]

In developing such frameworks, some have departed from widely adopted guidelines. For example, Floridi and Cowls propose a framework of five overarching principles for AI. This includes the traditional bioethics principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, autonomy and justice, drawn from the Belmont principles, but adds the principle of explicability, which combines questions of intelligibility (how something works) with accountability (who is responsible for the way it works).[136] Others have argued that international human rights frameworks offer a promising basis to develop coherent and universally recognised standards for AI ethics.[137]

Several of our workshop participants mentioned that it is challenging to judge the relevance of existing principles in the context of AI and data science research. During the workshops, a variety of additional principles were mentioned, for example, ‘equality’, ‘human-centricity’, ‘transparency’ and ‘environmental sustainability’. This indicates that there is not yet clear consensus around which principles should guide AI and data science research practices, and that the question of how those principles should be developed (and by which body) is not yet answered. We address this challenge in our recommendations.

The wide range of available frameworks, principles and guidelines demonstrate the difficulty for researchers and practitioners to select suitable frameworks or principles due to the current inconsistencies and a lack of a commonly accepted framework or principles guiding ethical AI and data science research. As many of our expert participants noted, this has led to confusion among RECs about whether these frameworks or principles should supplement biomedical principles, and how they should apply them to reviews of data science and AI research projects.

Complicating this challenge is the question of whether ethical principles guiding AI and data science research would be useful in practice. In a paper comparing the fields of medical ethics with AI ethics, Mittelstadt argues that AI research and development lacks several essential features for developing coherent research ethics principles and practices. These include the lack of common aims and fiduciary duties, a history of professional norms and bodies to translate principles into practice, and robust legal and professional accountability mechanisms.[138] While medical ethics draws on its practitioners being part of a ‘moral community’ characterised by common aims, values and training, AI cannot refer to such established norms and practices, given the wide range of disciplines and commercial fields it can be applied to.

The blurring of commercial and societal motives for AI research can cause AI developers to be driven by values such as innovation and novelty, performance or efficiency, rather than ethical aims rooted in biomedicine around concern for their ‘patient’ or for societal benefit. In some regions, like Canada, professional codes of practice and law around medicine have established fiduciary-like duties between doctors and their patients, which do not exist in the fields of AI and data science.[139] AI does not have a history and professional culture around ethics comparable to the medical field, which has a strong regulating influence on practitioners. Some research has also questioned the aims of AI research, and what kinds of practices are incentivised and encouraged within the research community. A study involving interviews with 53 AI practitioners in India, East and West African countries, and the USA showed that, despite the importance of high-quality data in addressing potential harms and a proliferation of data ethics principles, practitioners find the implementation of these practices to be one of the most undervalued and ‘de-glamorised’ aspects of developing AI systems.[140]

Identifying clear principles for AI research ethics is a major challenge. This is particularly the case because so few of the emerging AI ethics principles specifically focus on AI or data science research ethics. Rather, they centre on the ethics of AI system development and use. In 2019, the IEEE published a report entitled Ethically aligned design: Prioritizing human wellbeing with autonomous and intelligent systems, which contains a chapter on ‘Methods to Guide Ethical Research and Design’.[141] This chapter includes a range of recommendations for academic and corporate research institutions, including that: labs should identify stages in their processes in which ethical considerations, or ‘ethics filters’, are in place before products are further developed and deployed; and that interdisciplinary ethics training should be a core subject for everyone working in the STEM field, and should be incentivised by funders, conferences and other actors. However, this report stops short of offering clear guidance for RECs and institutions on how they should turn AI ethics principles into clear practical guidelines for conducting and assessing AI research.

Several of our expert participants observed that many AI researchers and RECs currently draw on legal guidance and norms relating to privacy and data protection, which can risk conflating questions of AI ethics into narrower issues of data governance. The rollout of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in 2018 created a strong incentive for European institutions and institutions working with personal data of Europeans to reinforce existing ethics requirements on how research data is collected, stored and used by researchers. Expert participants noted that data protection questions are common on most REC reviews. As Samuel notes, there is some evidence that AI researchers tend to perceive research ethics as data governance questions, a mindset of thinking that is reinforced by institutional RECs in some of the questions they ask.[142]

There have been some grassroots efforts to standardise research ethics principles and guidance for some forms of data science research, including social media research. The Association of Internet Researchers, for example, has published its third edition of ethical guidelines,[143] which includes suggestions for how to deal with privacy and consent issues posed by scraping online data, how to outline and address questions across different stages of the ethics lifecycle (such as considering issues of bias and in the data analysis stage), and considering issues of potential downstream harms with the use of that data. However, these guidelines are voluntary and are narrowly focused on social media research. It remains unclear whether RECs are consistently enforcing them. As Samuel notes, the lack of established norms and criteria in social media research has caused many researchers to rely on bottom-up, personal ‘ethical barometers’ that create discrepancies in how ethical research should be conducted.[144]

In summary, there are a wide range of broad AI ethics principles that seek to guide how AI technologies are developed and deployed. The iterative nature of AI research, in which a published model or dataset can be used by downstream developers to create a commercial product with unforeseen consequences, raises a significant challenge for RECs seeking to apply AI and data science research ethics principles. As many of our expert participants noted, AI ethics research principles must touch on both how research is conducted (including what methodological choices are made), and also involve consideration for the wider societal impact of that research and how it will be used by downstream developers.

Challenge 4: Multi-site or public-private partnerships can exacerbate existing challenges of governance and consistency of decision-making

RECs face governance and fragmentation challenges in their decision-making. In contrast to clinical research, which is coordinated in the UK by the Health Research Authority (HRA), RECs evaluating AI and data science research are generally not guided by an overarching governing body, and do not have structures to coordinate similar issues between different RECs. Consequently, their processes, decision-making and outcomes can vary substantially.[145]

Expert participants noted this lack of consistent guidance between RECs is exacerbated by research partnerships with international institutions and public-private research partnerships. The specific processes RECs follow can vary between committees, even within the same institution. This can result in different RECs reaching different conclusions on similar types of research. A 2011 survey of research into Institutional Review Board (IRB) decisions found numerous instances where similar research projects received significantly different decisions, with some RECs approving with no restrictions, others requiring substantial restrictions and others rejecting research outright.[146]

This lack of an overarching coordinating body for RECs is especially problematic for international projects that involve researchers working in teams across multiple jurisdictions, often with large datasets that have multiple sources across multiple sites.[147] Most biomedical research ethics guidelines recommend that multi-site research should be evaluated by RECs located in all respective jurisdictions,[148] on the basis that each institution will reflect the local regulatory requirements for REC review, which they are best prepared to respond to.

Historically, most research in the life sciences was conducted with a few participants at a local research institution.[149] In some regions, requirements for local involvement have developed to provide some accountability for research subjects. Canada, for example, requires social science research involving indigenous populations to meet specific research ethics requirements, including around community engagement and involvement with members of indigenous communities, and around requirements for indigenous communities to own any data.[150]

However, this arrangement does not fit the large-scale, international, data-intensive research of AI and data science, which often relies on the generation, scraping and repurposing of large datasets, often without any awareness of who exactly the data may be from or under what purpose it was collected. The fragmented landscape of different RECs and regulatory environments leads to multiple research ethics applications to different RECs with inconsistent outcomes, which can be highly resource intensive.[151] Workshop participants highlighted how ethics committees face uncertainties in dealing with data sourced and/or processed in heterogeneous jurisdictions, where legal requirements and ethical norms can be very different.

Figure 6: Public-private partnerships in AI research[152]

The graphs above show an increasing trend in public-private partnerships in AI research, and in multinational collaborations on AI research. With increasing public-private partnerships and multi-site research, this can increase the challenges for these kinds of research.

Public-private partnerships

Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are common in biomedical research, where partners from the public and private sector share, analyse and use data.[153] The type of collaborations can vary, from project-specific collaborations to long-term strategic alliances between different groups, or large multi-consortia. The data ecosystem is fragmented and complex, as health data is increasingly being shared, linked, re-used or re-purposed in novel ways.[154] Some regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) may apply to all research; however, standards, drivers or reputational concerns may differ between actors in the public and private sector. This means that PPPs navigate an equally complex and fragmented landscape of standards, norms and regulations.[155]

As our expert participants noted, public-private partnerships can raise concerns about who derives benefit from the research, who controls the intellectual property of findings, and how data is shared in a responsible and rights-respecting way. The issue of data sharing is particularly problematic when research is used for the purpose of commercial product or service development. For example, wearable devices or apps that track health and fitness data can produce enormous amounts of biomedical ‘big data’ when combined with other biomedical datasets.[156] While the data generated by these consumer devices can be beneficial for society, through opportunities to advance clinical research in, for instance, chronic illness, consumers of these services may not be aware of these subsequent uses, and their expectations of personal and informational privacy may be violated.[157]

These kinds of violations can have devastating consequences. One can take the recent example of the General Practice Data for Planning and Research (GPDPR), a proposal by England’s National Health Service to create a centralised database of pseudonymised patient data that could be made accessible for researchers and commercial partners.[158] The plan was criticised for failing to alert patients about the use of this data, leading to millions of patients in England opting out of their patient data being accessible for research purposes. As of this publication date, the UK Government has postponed the plan.

Expert participants highlighted that data sharing must be conducted responsibly, aligning with the values and expectations of affected communities, a similar view held by bodies like the UK’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation.[159] However, what these values and expectations are, and how to avoid making unwarranted assumptions, is less clear. Recent research suggests that participatory approaches to data stewardship may increase legitimacy of and confidence in the use of data that works for people and society.[160]

Challenge 5: RECs struggle to review potential harms and impacts that arise throughout AI and data science research

REC reviews of AI and data science research are ex ante assessments done before research takes place. However, many of the harms and risks in AI research may only become evident at later stages of the research. Furthermore, many of the types of harms that can arise – such as issues of bias, or wider misuses of AI or data – are challenging for a single committee to predict. This is particularly true with the broader societal impacts of AI research, which require a kind of evaluation and review that RECs currently do not undertake.

Bias and discrimination

Identifying or predicting potential biases, and consequent discrimination, that can arise in datasets and AI models at various stages of development constitute a significant challenge for the evaluation of AI and data science research. Numerous kinds of bias can arise during data collection, model development and deployment, leading to potentially harmful downstream effects.[161] For example, Buolamwini and Gebru demonstrate that many popular facial recognition systems have much poorer performance on darker skin and non-male identities due to sampling biases in the population dataset used to train the model.[162] Similarly, numerous studies have shown predictive algorithms for policing and law enforcement can reproduce societal biases due to choices in their model architecture, design and deployment.[163],[164],[165] In supervised machine learning, manually annotated datasets can harbour bias through problematic application of gender or race categories.[166],[167],[168] In unsupervised machine learning, datasets commonly represent different types of historical biases (because data reflect existing sociotechnical bias in the world), which lead to a lack of demographic diversity, aggregation or population.[169] Crawford argues that datasets used for model training purposes are asked to capture a very complex world through taxonomies consisting of discrete classifications, an act that requires non-trivial political, cultural and social choices.[170]

Figure 7: How bias can arise in different ways in the AI development lifecycle[171]

This figure uses the example of an AI-based healthcare application, to show how bias can arise from patterns in the real world, in the data, in the design of the system, and in its use.

Understanding the ways in which biases can arise in different stages of an AI research project creates a challenge for RECs, which may not have the capacity, time or resources to determine what kinds of biases might arise in a particular project or how they should be evaluated and mitigated. Under current REC guidelines, it may be easier for RECs to challenge researchers on how they can address questions concerning data collection and sampling bias issues, but questions concerning whether research may be used to create biased or discriminatory outcomes at the point of application are outside the scope of most REC reviews.

Data provenance

Workshop participants identified data provenance – how data is originally collected sourced by researchers – as another major challenge for RECs. The issue becomes especially salient when it comes to international and collaborative projects, which draw on complex networks of datasets. Some datasets may constitute ‘primary’ data – that is, data collected by researchers. Meanwhile, other data may be ‘secondary’, which includes data that is shared, disseminated or made public by others. With secondary data, the underlying purpose for its collection, its accuracy and biases embedded at the stage of collection may be unclear.

There is a need for RECs to consider not just where data is sourced from but to also probe into what its intended purposes are, how it has been tested for potential biases that may be baked into a project, and other questions about the ethics of its collection. Some participants said that it is not enough to ask whether a dataset received ethical clearance when collected. One practical tool that might address this would be standardisation of dataset documentation practices by research institutions. For example, there is the option to use datasheets, which list critical information about how a dataset was collected, who to contact with questions and what potential ethical issues it may raise.

Labour practices around data labelling

Another issue flagged by our workshop participants related to considerations for the labour conditions and mental and physical wellbeing of data annotators. Data labellers form part of the backbone of AI and data science research, and include people who review, tag and label data to form a dataset, or evaluate the success of a model. These workers are often recruited from services like MTurk. Research and data labeller activism has shown that many face exploitative working conditions and underpayment.[172]

According to some workshop participants, it remains unclear whether data labellers are considered ‘human subjects’ in their reviews. Their wellbeing is not routinely considered by RECs. While some institutions maintain MTurk policies, these are often not written from the perspective of workers themselves and may not fully consider the variety of risks that workers face. These can include non-payment of services, or asking workers to undertake too much work in too short of a time.[173] Initiatives like the Partnership on AI’s Responsible Sourcing of Data Enrichment Services and the Northwestern Institutional Review Board’s Guidelines for Academic Requesters offer models for how corporate and academic RECs might develop policies.[174]

Societal and downstream impacts

Several experts noted standard RECs practices can fail to assess the broader societal impacts of AI and data science research, leading to traditionally marginalised population groups being disproportionately affected by AI and data science research. Historically, RECs have an anticipatory role, with potential risks assessed and addressed at the initial planning stage of the research. The focus on protecting individual research subjects means that RECs generally do not consider potential broader societal impacts, such as long-term harms to communities.[175]

For example, a study using facial recognition technology to determine sexual orientation of people,[176] or the recognition of Uighur minorities in China,[177] poses serious questions for societal benefit and the impacts on marginalised communities – yet the RECs who reviewed these projects did not consider these kinds of questions. Since the datasets used in these projects consisted of images scraped from the internet and curated, the research did not constitute human subjects research, and therefore passed ethics review.

Environmental impacts

The environmental footprint of AI and data science is a further significant impact that our workshop participants highlighted as an area most RECs do not currently review for. Some forms of AI research, such as deep learning and multi-agent learning, can be compute-intensive, raising questions about whether their benefits offset the environmental cost.[178] Similar questions have been raised about large language models (LLMs), such as OpenAI’s GPT-3, which rely on intensive computational methods without articulating a clearly defined benefit to society.[179] Our workshop participants noted that RECs could play a role in assessing whether a project’s aims justify computationally intensive methods, or whether a researcher is using the most computationally efficient method of training their model (avoiding unnecessary computational spend). However, there is no existing framework for RECs to use to help make these kinds of determinations, and it is unclear whether many REC members would have the right competencies to evaluate such questions.

Considerations of ‘legitimate research’

Workshop participants discussed whether RECs are well suited to determine what constitutes ‘legitimate research’. For example, some participants raised questions about the intellectual proximity of AI research to discredited forms of pseudoscience like phrenology, citing AI research that is based on flawed assumptions about race and gender – a point raised in empirical research evaluating the use of AI benchmark datasets.[180] AI and data science research regularly involves the categorisation of data subjects into particular groups, which may involve crude assumptions that, nonetheless, can lead to severe population-level consequences. These ‘hidden decisions’ are often baked into a dataset and, once shared, can remain unchallenged for long periods of time. To give one example, portions of the MIT Tiny Images dataset, first created in 2006, were removed in 2018 after it was discovered to include racist and sexist categorisations of images of minoritised people and women.[181] This dataset has been used to train a range of subsequent models and may still be in use today, given the ability to download and repost datasets without subsequent documentation explaining their limitations. Several participants noted that RECs are not set up to identify, let alone assess, for these kinds of issues, and may consider defining ‘good science’ out of their remit.

A lack of incentives for researchers to consider broader societal impacts

Another point of discussion in the workshops was how to incentivise researchers to consider broader societal impact questions. Researchers are usually incentivised and rewarded by producing novel and innovative work, evidenced by publications in relevant scientific journals or conferences. Often, this involves researchers making broad statements about how AI or data science research can have positive implications for society, yet there is little incentive for researchers to consider potentially harmful impacts of their work.

Some of the expert participants pointed out that other actors in the research ecosystem, such as funders, could help to incentivise researchers to reflexively consider and document the potential broader societal impacts of their work. Stanford University’s Ethics and Society Review, for example, requires researchers seeking funding from the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence to write an impact statement reflecting on how their proposal might create negative societal impacts for society, how they can mitigate those impacts, and to work with an interdisciplinary faculty panel to ensure those concerns are addressed before funding is received. Participants in this programme overwhelmingly described it as a positive for their research and training experience.[182]

A more ambitious proposal from some workshop participants was to go beyond a risk-mitigation plan and incentivise research that benefits society. However, conceptualisations of social, societal or public good are contested, at best – there is no universally agreed on theory of what these are.[183] There are also questions about who is included in ‘society,’ and whether some benefits for those in a position of power would actively harm other members of society who are disadvantaged.

AI and data science research communities have not yet developed a rigorous method for deeply considering what constitutes public benefit, or a rigorous methodology for assessing the long-term impact of AI and data science interventions. Determining what constitutes the ‘public good’ or ‘public benefit’ would, at the very least, require some form of public consultation; even then, it may not be sufficient.[184]

One participant noted it is difficult in some AI and data science research projects to consider these impacts, particularly projects aimed at theory-level problems or small step-change advances in efficiency (for example, research that produces a more efficient and less computationally intensive method for training an image detection model). This dovetails with concerns raised by some in the AI and data science research community that there is too great a focus on creating novel methods for AI research instead of applying research to address applied, real-world problems.[185]

Workshop participants raised a similar concern about AI and data science research that is conducted without any clear rationale for addressing societal problems. Participants used the metaphor of a ‘fishing expedition’ to describe some types of AI and data science research projects that have no clear aim or objective but sought to explore large datasets to see what they found. As one workshop participant put it, researchers should always be aware that, just because data can be collected, or is already available, it does not mean that it should be collected or used for any purpose.

Challenge 6: Corporate RECs lack transparency in relation to their processes

Some participants noted that, while corporate lab reviews may be more extensive, they can also be more opaque, and are at risk of being driven by interests beyond research ethics, including whether research poses a reputational risk to the company if published. Moss and Metcalf note how ethics practices in Silicon Valley technology companies are often chiefly concerned with questions of corporate values and legal risk and compliance, and do not systematically address broader issues such as questions around moral, social and racial justice.[186] While corporate ethics reviewers draw on a variety of guidelines and frameworks, they may not address ongoing harms, evaluate these harms outside of the corporate context, or evaluate organisational behaviours and internal incentive structures.[187] It is worth noting that academic RECs have faced a similar criticism. Recent research has documented how academic REC decisions can be driven by a reputational interest to avoid ‘embarrassment’ of the institution.[188]

Several of our participants highlighted the relative lack of external transparency of corporate REC processes versus academic ones. This lack of transparency can make it challenging for other members of the research community to trust that corporate research review practices are sufficient.

Google, for example, launched a ‘sensitive topics’ review process in 2020 that asks researchers to run their work through legal, policy and public relations teams if it relates to certain topics like face and sentiment analysis or categorisations of race, gender or political affiliation.[189] According to the policy, ‘advances in technology and the growing complexity of our external environment are increasingly leading to situations where seemingly inoffensive projects raise ethical, reputational, regulatory or legal issues.’ In at least three reported instances, researchers were told to ‘strike a more positive tone’ and to remove references to Google products, raising concerns about the credibility of findings. In one notable example that became public in 2021, a Google ethical AI researcher was fired from their role after being told that a research paper they had written, which was critical of the use of large language models (a core component in Google’s search engine), could not be published under this policy.[190]

Recommendations

We conclude this paper with a set of eight recommendations, organised into sections aimed primarily at three stakeholders in the research ethics ecosystem:

  1. Academic and corporate Research Ethics Committees (RECs) evaluating AI and data science research.
  2. Academic and corporate AI and data science research institutions.
  3. Funders, conference organisers, journal editors, and other actors in the wider AI and data science research ecosystems.

For academic and corporate RECs

Recommendation 1: Incorporate broader societal impact statements from researchers

The problem

Broader societal impacts of AI and data science research are not currently considered by RECs. These might include ‘dual-use’ research (meaning it can be used for both civilian and military purposes), possible harms to society or the environment, and the potential for discrimination against marginalised populations.  Instead, RECs focus their reviews on questions of research methodology. Several workshop participants noted that there are few incentives for researchers to reflexively consider questions of societal impact. Workshop participants also noted that institutions do not offer any framework for RECs to follow, or training or guidance for researchers. Broader societal impact statements can ensure researchers reflect on, and document, the full list of potential harms, risks and benefits their work may pose.

Recommendations

Researchers should be required to undertake an evaluation of broader societal impact as part of their ethics evaluation.
This would be an impact statement that included a summary of the positive and negative impacts on society they anticipate from their research. They should include any known limitations or risks for misuse that may arise, such as whether their research findings are premised on assumptions that are particular to a geographic region, or if there is a possibility of using the findings to exacerbate certain forms of societal injustices.

Training should be designed and implemented for researchers to adequately conduct stakeholder and impact assessment evaluations, as a precondition to receive funding or ethics approval.[191]
These exercises should encourage researchers to consider the intended uses of their innovations and reflect on what kinds of unintended uses might arise. The result of these assessments can be included in research ethics documentation that reports on the researchers’ reflections on both discursive questions that invite open-ended opinion (such as what the intended use of the research may be) and categorical information that lists objective statistics and data about the project (such as the datasets that will be used, or the methods that will be applied). Some academic institutions are experimenting with this approach for research ethics applications.

Examples of good practice
Recent research from Microsoft provides a structured exercise for how researchers can consider, document and communicate potential broader societal impacts, including who the affected stakeholders are in their work, and what limitations and potential benefits it may have.[192]

Methods for impact assessment of algorithmic systems have emerged from the domains of human rights, environmental studies and data protection law. These methods are not necessarily standardised or consistent, but they seek to encourage researchers to reflect on the impacts of their work. Some examples include the use of algorithmic impact assessments in healthcare settings,[193] and in public sector uses of algorithmic systems in the Netherlands and Canada.[194]

In 2021, Stanford University tested an Ethics and Society Review board (ESR), which sought to supplement the role of its Institutional Review Board. The ESR requires researchers seeking funding from the Stanford Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence to consider negative or societal risks from their proposal, develop mitigative measures to assess those risks, and to collaborate with an interdisciplinary faculty panel to ensure concerns are addressed before funds are disbursed.[195] A pilot study of 41 submissions to this panel found that ‘58% of submitters felt that it had influenced the design of their research project, 100% are willing to continue submitting future projects to the ESR,’ and that submitting researchers sought additional training and scaffolding about societal risks and impacts.[196]

Figure 8: Stanford University Ethics and Society Review (ESR) process[197]

Understanding the potential impacts of AI and data science research can ensure researchers produce technologies that are fit for purpose and well-suited for the task at hand. The successful development and integration of an AI-powered sepsis diagnostic tool in a hospital in the USA offers an example of how researchers worked with key stakeholders to develop and design a life-changing product. Researchers on this project relied on continuous engagement with stakeholders in the hospital, including nurses, doctors and other staff members, to determine how the system could meet their needs.[198] By understanding these needs, the research team were able to tailor the final product so that it fitted smoothly within the existing practices and procedures of this hospital.

Open questions

There are several open questions on the use of broader societal impact statements. One relates to whether these statements should be a basis for a REC rejecting a research proposal. This was a major point of disagreement among our workshop participants. Some participants pushed back on the idea, out of concern that research institutions should not be in the position to determine what research is appropriate or inappropriate based on potential societal impacts, and that this may cause researchers to view RECs as a policing body for issues that have not occurred. Instead, these participants suggested a softer approach, whereby RECs require researchers to draft a broader societal impact statement but there is not a requirement for RECs to evaluate the substance of those assessments. Other participants noted that these impact assessments would be likely to highlight clear cases where the societal risks are too great, and that RECs should incorporate these considerations into their final decisions.

Another consideration related to whether a broader societal impacts evaluation should involve some aspect of ex post reviews of research, in which research institutions monitor the actual impacts of published research. This process would require significant resourcing. While there is no standard method for conducting these kinds of reviews yet, some researchers in the health field have called for this kind of ex post review conducted by an interdisciplinary committee of academics and stakeholders.[199]

Lastly, some workshop participants questioned whether a more holistic ethics review process could be broken up into parts handled by different sub-committees. For example, could questions of data ethics – how data should be handled, processed and stored, and which datasets are appropriate for researchers to use – have their own dedicated process or sub-committee? This sub-committee would need to adopt clear principles and set expectations with researchers for specific data ethics practices, and could also address the evolving dynamic between researcher and participants.

There was a suggestion that more input from data subjects could help, with a focus on how they can, and whether they should, benefit from the research, and whether this would therefore constitute a different type or segment of ethical review. Participants mentioned the need for researchers to think relationally and understand who the data subject is, the power dynamics at play and to work out the best way of involving research participants in the analysis and dissemination of findings.

Recommendation 2: RECs should adopt multi-stage ethics review processes for AI and data science research

The problem

Ethical and societal risks of AI and data science research can manifest at different stages of research[200] – from early ideation to data collection, to pre-publication. Assessing the ethical and broader societal impacts of AI research can be difficult as the results of data-driven research cannot be known in advance of accessing and processing data or building machine learning (ML) models. Typically, RECs only review research applications once before research beings, and with a narrow focus solely looking at ethical issues pertaining to methodology. This can mean that ethical review processes fail to catch risks that arise in later stages, such as potential environmental or privacy considerations if research is published, particularly for research that is ‘high risk’ and pertains to protected characteristics or has high potential for societal impact.

Recommendations

RECs should set up multi-stage and continuous ethics reviews, particularly for ‘high-risk’ AI research

RECs should experiment with requiring multiple stages of evaluations of research that raises particular ethical concern, such as evaluations at the point of data collection and a separate evaluation at the point of publication. Ethics review processes should engage with considerations raised at all stages of the research lifecycle. RECs must move away from being the ‘owners’ of ethical thinking into being stewards who guide researchers through the review process.

This means challenging the notion of an ethical review being a one-off exercise conducted at the start of a project, and instead shifts the approach of a REC and the ethics review process towards one that embeds ethical reflection throughout a project. This will benefit from more iterative ethics review processes, as well as additional interdisciplinary training for AI and data science researchers.

Several workshop participants suggested that multi-stage ethics review could consist of a combination of formal and informal review processes. Formal review processes could exist at the early and late stages, such as funding or publication, while at other points, the research team could be asked to engage in more informal peer-reviews or discussions with experts or reviewers. In the early stages of the project, milestones could be identified which are defined by the research teams, and in collaboration with RECs. For example, a milestone could be a grant submission, or when changing roles or adding new research partners to the project. Milestones could be used to trigger an interim review. Rather than following a standardised approach, this model allows for flexibility, as the milestones would be different for each project. This could also involve a tiered assessment, which is a standardised assessment based on identified risks a research project poses, which then determines the milestones.

Building on Burr & Leslie,[201] we can speak of four broad stages in an AI or data science research project: design, develop, pre-publication and post-deployment.

At the stage of designing a research project, policies and resources should be in place to:

  • Ensure new funders and potential partnerships adhere to an ethical framework. Beyond legal due diligence, this is about establishing partnerships on the basis of their values and a project’s goals.
  • Implement scoping policies that establish whether a particular research project must undertake REC processes. Two ways are suggested in the literature for such policies, and examining each organisation’s research and capability will help decide which is most suitable:
    • Sandler et al suggest a consultation process whereby RECs produce either ‘an Ethical Issues Profile report or a judgment that there are not substantive ethical issues raised’.[202]
    • The UK Statistics Authority employs an ethics self-assessment tool that determines a project’s level of risk.[203]
  • Additionally, scoping processes can result in establishing whether a project must undertake data, stakeholder, human rights or other impact assessments that focus on the broader societal impacts of their work (see Recommendation 1). Stanford’s Ethical and Societal Review Board offers one model for how institutions can set more ‘carrots and sticks’ for researchers to reflexively engage in the potential broader impacts of their research by tying the completion of a societal impact statement to their funding proposal.

At the development stage of a project, a typical REC evaluation should be undertaken to consider any ethical risks. RECs should provide a point of contact to ensure changes in the project’s aims and methods that raise new challenges are subjected to due reflection. This ensures an iterative process that aligns with the practicalities of research. RECs may also experiment with creating specialised sub-committees that address different issues, such as a separate data ethics review board that includes expertise in data ethics and domain-specific expertise, or a health data or social media data review board. It could help evaluate potential impact for people and society; depending on composition, it could also be adept at reviewing the technical aspects of a research project.[204] This idea builds from a hybrid review mechanism that Ferretti et al propose, which merges aspects of the traditional model of RECs with specialised research committees that assess particular parts of a research project.[205]

One question that RECs must turn into practice is to establish which projects must undertake particular REC processes, as it may be too burdensome for all projects to undergo this scrutiny. In some cases, it may be that a REC determines a project should undergo stricter scrutiny if an analysis of its potential impacts on various stakeholders highlights serious ethical issues. Whether or not a project is ‘in scope’ for a more substantial REC review process might depend on:

  • the level of risk it raises
  • the training or any certifications its researchers hold
  • whether it is reviewed by a relevant partner’s REC.

Determining what quantifies a risk is challenging, as not all risks may be evident or within the imagination of a REC. More top-level guidance on risks (see Recommendation 4) and interdisciplinary/experiential membership on RECs (see Recommendation 3) can help ensure that a wider scope of AI risks are identified.

At the stage of pre-publication of a research project, RECs should encourage researchers to revisit the ethical and broader societal impact considerations that may have arisen earlier. In light of the research findings, have these changed at all? Have new risks arisen? At this stage, REC members can act as stewards to help researchers navigate publication requirements, which may include filling in the broader societal impact statements that some AI and ML conferences are beginning to implement. They might also connect researchers with subject-matter experts in particular domains, who can help them understand potential ethical risks with their research. Finally, RECs may be able to provide guidance on how to release research responsibly, including whether to release publicly a dataset or code that may be used to cause harm.

Lastly, RECs and research institutions should experiment with post-publication evaluations of the impacts of research. RECs could, for example, take a pool of research submissions that involved significant ethical review and conduct an analysis of how that work was received 2–3 years down the line. Criteria this assessment could look at may include how that work was received by the media or press, who has cited that work subsequently, and whether negative or positive impacts came to fruition.

Figure 9: Example of multi-stage ethics review process

This figure shows what a multi-stage ethics review process could look like. It involves an initial self-assessment for broader impacts issues at the design stage, a REC review (and potential review by a specialised data ethics board at the production stage, another review of high-risk research at pre-publication stage, and a potential post-publication review of the research 2–3 years after it is published.

Examples of good practice

As explored above, there is not yet consensus on how to operationalise a continuous, multi-stage ethics review process, but there is an emerging body of work addressing ethics consideration at different stages in a projects’ lifecycle. Building on academic research,[206] the UK’s Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation has proposed an ‘AI assurance’ framework for continuously testing the potential risks of AI systems. This framework involves the use of different mechanisms like audits, testing and evaluation at different stages of an AI product’s lifecycle.[207] However, this framework is focused on AI products rather than research, and further work would be needed to adapt this framework for research.

D’Aquin et al propose an ethics-by-design methodology for AI and data science research that takes a broader view of data ethics.[208] Assessment usually happens at the research design/planning stage, and there are no incentives for the researcher to consider ethical issues as they eventually emerge with the progress of research. Instead, considerations for emerging ethical risks should be ongoing.[209] A few academic and corporate research institutions, such as the Alan Turing Institute, have already introduced or are in the process of implementing continuous ethics review processes (see Appendix 2). Further research is required to study how these work in practice.

Open questions

A multi-stage research review process should capture more of the ethical issues that arise in AI research, and enable RECs to evaluate ex post impacts of their research. However, continuous, multi-stage reviews require a substantial increase in resources and so are an option only for institutions who are ready to make an investment in ethics practices. These proposals could require multiples of the current time commitments of REC members and officers, and therefore require greater compensation for REC members.

The prospect of implementing a multi-stage review process raises further questions of scope, remit and role of ethics reviews. Informal reviews spread over time could see REC members take more of an advisory role than in the compliance-oriented models of the status quo, allowing researchers to informally check in with ethics experts, to discuss emerging issues and the best way to approach them. Dove argues that the role of RECs is to operate as regulatory stewards, who guide researchers through the review process.[210] To do this, RECs should establish communication channels for researchers to get in touch and interact. However, Ferretti et al warn there is a risk that ethics oversight might become inefficient if different committees overlap, or if procedures become confusing and duplicated. It would also be challenging to bring together different ethical values and priorities across a range of stakeholders, so this change needs sustaining over the long term.[211]

Recommendation 3: Include interdisciplinary expertise in REC membership

The problem

The make-up and scope of a REC review came up repeatedly in our workshops and literature reviews, with considerable concern raised about how RECs can accurately capture the wide array of ethical challenges posed by different kinds of AI and data science research. There was wide agreement within our workshop of the importance of ensuring that different fields of expertise have their voices heard in the REC process, and that the make-up of RECs should reflect a diversity of backgrounds.

Recommendations

RECs must include more interdisciplinary expertise in their membership

In recruiting new members, RECs should draw on members from different research and professional fields that go beyond just computer science, such as the social sciences, humanities, STEM sciences and other fields. By having these different disciplines present, they can each bring a different ethical lens to the challenges that a project may raise. RECs might also consider including members who work in the legal, communications or marketing teams to ensure that the concerns raised speak to a wider audience and respond to broader institutional contexts. Interdisciplinarity involves the development of a common language, a reflective stance towards research, and a critical perspective towards science.[212] If this expertise is not present at an institution, RECs could make greater use of external experts for specific questions that arise from data science research.[213]

RECs must include individuals with different experiential expertise

RECs must also seek to include members who represent different forms of experiential expertise, which includes individuals from historically marginalised groups with perspectives that are often not represented in these settings. This both includes more diverse experiences in discussions about data science and AI research outputs, and ensures that these meet the values of a culturally rich and heterogeneous society.

Crucially, the mere representation of a diversity of viewpoints is not enough to ensure the successful integration of those views into REC decisions. Members must feel empowered to share their concerns and be heard, and careful attention must be paid to the power dynamics that underlie how decisions are made within a REC. Mechanisms for ensuring more transparent and ethical decision-making practices are an area of future research worth pursuing.

In terms of the composition of RECs, Ferretti et al suggest that these should become more diverse and include members of the public and research subjects or communities affected by the research.[214] Besides the public, members from inside an institution should also be selected to achieve a multi-disciplinary composition of the board.

Examples of good practice

One notable example is the SAIL (Secure Anonymised Information Linkage) Databank, a Wales-wide research databank with approximately 30 billion records of individual level population datasets. Requests to access the databank are reviewed by an Information Governance Review Panel which includes representatives from public health agencies, clinicians, and members of the public who may be affected by the uses of this data. More information on SAIL can be found in Appendix 2.

Open questions

Increasing experiential and subject-matter expertise in AI and data science research reviews will hopefully lead to more holistic evaluations of the kinds of risks that may arise, particularly given the wide range of societal applications of AI and data science research. However, expertise from members of the public and external experts must be fairly compensated, and the impact of more diverse representation on these boards should be the subject of future study and evaluation.

Figure 10: The potential make-up of an AI/data science ethics committee[215]

For academic/corporate research institutions

Recommendation 4: Create internal training and knowledge-sharing hubs for researchers and REC members, and encourage more cross-institutional learning

The problem

A recurring concern raised by members of our workshops was a lack of shared resources to help RECs address common ethical issues in their research. This was coupled with a lack of transparency and openness of decision-making in many modern RECs, particularly for some corporate institutions where publication review processes can feel opaque to researchers. When REC processes and decisions are enacted behind closed doors, it becomes challenging to disseminate lessons learned to other institutions and researchers. It also raises a challenge for researchers who may come to view a REC as a ‘compliance’ body, rather than a resource for seeking advice and guidance. Several workshop participants noted that shared resources and trainings could help REC members, staff and students to better address these issues.

Recommendations

Research institutions should create institutional training and knowledge-sharing hubs

These hubs can serve five core functions:

1. Pooling shared resources on common AI and data science ethics challenges for students, staff and REC members to use.

The repository can compile resources, news articles and literature on ethical risks and impacts of AI systems, tagged and searchable by research type, risk or topic. These can prompt reflection on research ethics by providing students and staff with current, real-world examples of these risks in practice.

The hub could also provide a list of ‘banned’ or problematic datasets that staff or students should not use. This could help address concerns around datasets that are collected without underlying consent from research subjects, and which are commonly used as ‘benchmark’ datasets. The DukeMTC dataset of recorded videos on campus, for example, continues to be used by computer vision researchers in papers, despite being removed by Duke due to ethical concerns. Similar efforts to create a list of problematic datasets are underway at some major AI and ML conferences, and some of our workshop participants suggested that some research institutions already maintain lists like this.

2. Providing hypothetical or actual case studies of previous REC submissions and decisions to give a sense of the kinds of issues others are facing.

Training hubs could include repositories of previous applications that have been scrutinised and approved by the pertinent REC, which form a body of case studies that can inform both REC policies and individual researchers. Given the fast pace of AI and data science research, RECs can often encounter novel ethical questions. By logging past approved projects and making them available to all REC members, RECs can ensure consistency in their decisions about new projects.

We suggest that logged applications also be made available to the institution’s researchers for their own preparation when undertaking the REC process. Making applications available must be done with the permission of the relevant project manager or principal investigator, where necessary. To support the creation of these repositories, we have developed a resource consisting of six hypothetical AI and data science REC submissions that can be used for training purposes.[216]

3. Listing the institutional policies and guidance developed by the REC, such as policies outlining the research review process, self-assessment tools and societal impact assessments (see Recommendation 1).

By including a full list of its policies, hubs can foster dialogue between different processes within research institutions. Documentation from across the organisation can be shared and framed in its importance for pursuing thoughtful and responsible research.

In addition to institutional guidelines, we suggest training hubs include national, international or professional society guidelines that may govern specific kinds of research. For example, researchers seeking to advance healthcare technologies in the UK should ensure compliance with relevant Department of Health and Social Care guidelines, such as their guidelines for good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies.[217]

4. Providing a repository of external experts in subject-matter domains who researchers and REC members can consult with.

This would include a curated list of subject-matter experts in specific domains that students, staff and REC members can consult with. This might include contact details for experts in subjects like data protection law or algorithmic bias within or outside of the institution, but may extend to include lived experience experts and civil society organisations who can reflect societal concerns and potential impacts of a technology.

5. Signposting to other pertinent institutional policies (such as compliance, data privacy, diversity and inclusion).

By listing policies and resources on data management, sharing, access and privacy, training hubs could ensure researchers have more resources and training on how to properly manage and steward the data they use. Numerous frameworks are readily available online, such as the FAIR Principles,[218] promoting findability, accessibility, interoperability and reuse of digital assets; and DCC’s compilation of metadata standards for different research fields.[219]

Hubs could also include the institution’s policies on data labeller practices (if such policies exist). Several academic institutions have developed policies regarding MTurk workers that cover issues regarding fair pay, communication and acknowledgment.[220] [221] Some resources have even been co-written with input directly from MTurk workers. These resources vary from institution to institution, and there is a need for UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and other national research institutions to codify these requirements into practical guidance for research institutions. One resource we suggest RECs tap into is the know-how and policies of human resources departments. Most large institutions and companies will already have pay and reward schemes in place. Data labellers and annotators must have access to the same protections as other legally defined positions.

The hub can also host or link to forums or similar communication channels that encourage informal peer-to-peer discussions. All staff should be welcomed into such spaces.

Examples of good practice

There are some existing examples of shared databases of AI ethics issues, including the Partnership on AI’s AI Incident Database and Charlie Pownall’s AI, Algorithmic, and Automation Incidents and Controversies Database. These databases compile news reports of instances of AI risks and ethics issues and make them searchable by type and function.[222] [223]

The Turing Institute’s Turing Way offers an excellent example of a research institution’s creation of shared resources for training and research ethics issues. For more information on the Turing Way, see Appendix 2.

Open questions

One pertinent question is whether these hubs should exist at the institutional or national level. Training hubs could start at the institutional level in the UK, and over time could connect to a shared resource managed by a centralised body like UKRI. It may be easier to start at the institutional level with repositories of relevant documentation, and spaces that foster dialogue among an institution’s workforce. An international hub could help RECs coordinate with one another and external stakeholders through international and cross-institutional platforms, and explore the opportunity of inter-institutional review standards and/or ethics review processing. We suggest that training hubs be made publicly accessible and open to other institutions, and that they are regularly reviewed and updated as appropriate.

Recommendation 5: Corporate labs must be more transparent about their decision-making and do more to engage with external partners

The problem

Several of our workshop participants noted that corporate RECs face particular opportunities and challenges in reviews of AI and data science research. Members of corporate RECs and research institutions shared that they are likely to have more resources to undertake ethical reviews than public labs, and several noted that these reviews often come at various stages of a project’s lifecycle, including near publication.

However, there are serious concerns around a lack of internal and external transparency in how some corporate RECs make their decisions. Some researchers within these institutions have cited they are unable to assess what kind of work is acceptable or unacceptable, and there are reports of some companies changing research findings for reputational reasons. Some participants claimed that corporate labs can be more risk averse when it comes to seeking external stakeholder feedback, due to privacy and trade secret concerns. Finally, members of corporate RECs are made up of members of that institution, and do not reflect experiential or disciplinary expertise outside of the company. Several interview and workshop participants noted that corporate RECs often do not consult with external experts on research ethics or broader societal impact issues, choosing instead to keep such deliberations in house.

Recommendations

Corporate labs must publicly release their ethical review criteria and process

To address concerns around transparency, corporate RECs should publicly release details on their REC review processes, including what criteria they evaluate for and how decisions are made. This is crucial for public-private research collaborations, which risk the findings of public institutions being censored for private reputational concerns, and for internal researchers to know what ethical considerations they should factor into their research. Corporate RECs should also commit to releasing transparency reports citing how many research studies they have rejected, amended and approved, on what grounds, and some example case studies (even if hypothetical) exploring the reasons why.

Corporate labs should consult with external experts on their research ethics reviews, and ideally include external and experiential experts on members of their ethics review boards

Given their research may have significant impacts on people and society, corporate labs must ensure their research ethics review boards include individuals who sit outside the company and reflect a range of experiential and disciplinary expertise. Not including this expertise will mean that corporate labs lack meaningful evaluations of the risks their research can pose. To complement their board membership, corporate labs should also consult more regularly on ethics issues with external experts to understand the impact of their research on different communities, disciplines and sectors.

Examples of good practice

In a blog post from 2022, the AI research company DeepMind explained how their ethical principles applied to their evaluation of a specific research project relating to the use of AI for protein folding.[224] In this post, DeepMind stated they had engaged with more than 30 experts outside of the organisation to understand what kinds of challenges their research might pose, and how they might release their research responsibly. This offers a model of how private research labs might consult with external expertise, and could be replicated as a standard for DeepMind and other companies’ activities.

In our research, we did not identify any corporate AI or data science research lab that has released their policies and criteria for ethical review. We also did not identify any examples of corporate labs that have experiential experts or external experts on their research ethics review boards.

Open questions

Some participants noted that it can be difficult for corporate RECs to be more transparent due to concerns around trade secrets and competition – if a company releases details on its research agenda, competitors may use this information for their own gain. One option suggested by our workshop participants is to engage in questions around research practices and broader societal impacts with external stakeholders at a higher level of abstraction that avoids getting into confidential internal details. Initiatives like the Partnership on AI seek to create a forum where corporate labs can more openly discuss common challenges and seek feedback in semi-private ways. However, corporate labs must engage in these conversations with some level of accountability. Reporting what actions they are taking as a result of those stakeholder engagements is one way to demonstrate how these engagements are leading to meaningful change.

For funders, conference organisers and other actors in the research ecosystem

Recommendation 6: Develop standardised principles and guidance for AI and data science research principles

The problem

A major challenge observed by our workshop participants is that RECs often produce inconsistent decisions, due to a lack of widely accepted frameworks or principles that deal specifically with AI and data science research ethics issues. Institutions who are ready to update their processes and standards are left to take their own risks choosing how to draft new rules. In the literature, a plethora of principles, frameworks and guidance around AI ethics has started to converge around principles like  transparency, justice, fairness, non-maleficence, responsibility and privacy.[225] However, there has yet to be a global effort to translate these principles into AI research ethics practices, or to determine how ethical principles should be interpreted or operationalised by research institutions.[226] This requires researchers to consider diverse ethics interpretations and understanding in regions, other than Western societies, which so far have not adequately featured in this debate.

Recommendations

UK policymakers should engage in a multi-stakeholder international effort to develop a ‘Belmont 2.0’ that translates AI ethics principles into specific guidelines for AI and data science research.

There is a significant need for a centralised body, such as the OECD, Global Partnership on AI or other international body to lead a multinational and inclusive effort to develop more consistent ethical guidance for RECs to use with AI and data science research. The UK must take a lead on this and use its position in these bodies to call for the development of a ‘Belmont 2.0’ for AI and data science.[227] This effort must involve representatives from all nations and avoid the pitfalls of previous research ethics principle developments that have overly favoured Western conceptions of ethics and principles. This effort should seek to define a minimum global standard of research ethics assessment that is flexible, responsive to and considerate of local circumstances.

By engaging in a multinational effort, UK national research ethics bodies like the UK Research Integrity Office (UKRIO) can develop more consistent guidance for UK academic RECs to address common challenges. This could include standardised trainings on broader societal impact issues, bias and consent challenges, privacy and identifiability issues, and other questions relating to research integrity, research ethics and broader societal impact considerations.

We believe that UKRIO can also help in the effort for standardising RECs by developing common guidance for public-private AI research partnerships, and consistent guidance for academic RECs. A substantial amount of AI research involves public-private partnerships. Common guidance could include specific support for core language around intellectual property concerns and data privacy issues.

Examples of good practice

There are some existing cross-national associations of RECs that jointly draft guidance documents or conduct training programmes. The European Network of Research Ethics Committee (EUREC) is one such example, though others could be created for other regions, or specifically for RECs who evaluate AI and data science research.[228]

In respect to laws and regulations, experts observe a gap in the regulation of AI and data science research. For example, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does provide some guidance for how European research institutions should collect, handle and use data for research purposes, though our participants noted this guidance has been interpreted by different institutions and researchers in widely different ways, leading to legal uncertainty.[229] While the UK Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) published guidance on AI and data protection,[230] it does not offer specific guidance for AI and data science researchers.

Open questions

It is important to note that standardised principles for AI research are not a silver bullet. Significant challenges will remain in the implementation of these principles. Furthermore, as the history of biomedical research ethics principle development has shown, it will be essential for a body or network of bodies with global legitimacy and authority to steer the development of these principles, and to ensure that they accurately reflect the needs of regions and communities that are traditionally underrepresented in AI and data science research.

Recommendation 7: Incentivise a responsible research culture

The problem

RECs form one part of the research ethics ecosystem, a complex matrix of responsibility shared and supported by other actors including funding bodies, conference organisers, journal editors and researchers themselves.[231] In our workshops, one of the many challenges that our participants highlighted was a lack of strong incentives in this research ecosystem to consider ethical issues. In some cases, considering ethical risks may not be rewarded or valued by journals, funders or conference organisers. Considering the ethical issues that AI and data science research can raise, it is essential for these different actors to align their incentives and encourage AI and data science researchers to reflect on and document the societal impacts their research.

Recommendations

Conference organisers, funders, journal editors and other actors in the research ecosystem must incentivise and reward ethical reflection

Different actors in the research ecosystem can encourage a culture of ethical behaviour. Funders, for example, can create requirements that researchers conduct a broader societal impact statement of their research in order to receive a grant, and conference organisers and journal editors can encourage researchers to include a broader societal impact statement when submitting research. Conference organisers and journal editors can put in place similar requirements, and reward papers that exemplify strong ethical consideration. Publishers, for example, could potentially be assigned to evaluate broader societal impact questions in addition to research integrity issues.[232] By creating incentives for ethical reflection throughout the research ecosystem, ethical reflection can become more desirable and rewarded.

Examples of good practice

Some AI and data science conference organisers are putting in place measures to incentivise researchers to consider the broader societal impacts of their research. The 2020 NeurIPS conference, one of the largest AI and machine learning conferences in the world, required submissions to include a statement reflecting on broader societal impact, and created guidance for researchers to complete this.[233] The conference had a set of reviewers who specifically evaluated these impact statements. The use of these impact statements led to some controversy, with some researchers suggesting they could led to a chilling effect on particular types of research, and others suggesting difficulties in creating these kinds of impact assessments for more theoretical forms of AI research.[234] As of 2022, the NeurIPs conference has included these statements as part of its checklist of expectations for submission.[235] In a 2022 report, the Ada Lovelace Institute, CIFAR, and the Partnership on AI identified several measures that AI conference organisers could take to incentivise a culture of ethical reflection.[236]

There are also proposals underway for funders to include these considerations. Gardner and colleagues recommend that grant funding and public tendering of AI systems requires a ‘Trustworthy AI Statement’.[237]

Open questions

Enabling a stronger culture of ethical reflection and consideration in the AI and data science research ecosystem will require funding and resources. Reviewers of AI and data science research papers for conferences and journals already face a tough task; this work is voluntary and unpaid, and these reviewers often lack clear standards or principles to review against. We believe more training and support will be needed to ensure this recommendation can be successfully implemented.

Recommendation 8: Increase funding and resources for ethical reviews of AI and data science research

The problem

RECs face significant operational challenges around compensating their members for their time, providing timely feedback, and maintaining the necessary forms of expertise on their boards. A major challenge is the lack of resources that RECs face, and their reliance on voluntary and unpaid labour from institutional staff.

Recommendations

As part of their R&D strategy, UK policymakers must earmark additional funding for research institutions to provide greater resource, training and support to RECs.

In articulating national research priorities, UK policymakers should mandate an amount of funding towards initiatives that focus on interdisciplinary ethics training and support for research ethics committees. Funding must be made available for continuous, multi-stage research ethics review processes, and rewarding behaviour from organisations including UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) and UK research councils. Future iterations of the UK’s National AI Strategy should earmark funding for ethics training and for the work of RECs to expand their scope and remit.

Increasing funding and resources for institutional RECs will enable these essential bodies to undertake their critical work fully and holistically. Increased funding and support will also enable RECs to expand their remit and scope to capture risks and impacts of AI and data science research, which are essential for ensuring AI and data science are viewed as trustworthy disciplines and for mitigating the risks this research can pose. The traditional approach to RECs has treated their labour as voluntary and unpaid. RECs must be properly supported and resourced to meet the challenges that AI and data science pose.

Acknowledgements

This report was authored by:

  • Mylene Petermann, Ada Lovelace Institute
  • Niccolo Tempini, Senior Lecturer in Data Studies at the University of Exeter’s Institute for Data Science and Artificial Intelligence (IDSAI)
  • Ismael Kherroubi Garcia, Kairoi
  • Kirstie Whitaker, Alan Turing Institute
  • Andrew Strait, Ada Lovelace Institute

This project was made possible by the Arts and Humanities Research Council who provided a £100k grant for this work. We are grateful for our reviewers – Will Hawkins, Edward Dove and Gabrielle Samuel. We are also grateful for our workshop participants and interview subjects, who include the following and several others who wished to remain anonymous:

  • Alan Blackwell
  • Barbara Prainsack
  • Brent Mittelstadt
  • Cami RincĂłn
  • Claire Salinas
  • Conor Houghton
  • David Berry
  • Dawn Bloxwich
  • Deb Raji
  • Deborah Kroll
  • Edward Dove
  • Effy Vayena
  • Ellie Power
  • Elizabeth Buchanan
  • Elvira Perez
  • Frances Downey
  • Gail Seymour
  • Heba Youssef
  • Iason Gabriel
  • Jade Ouimet
  • Josh Cowls
  • Katharine Wright
  • Kerina Jones
  • Kiruthika Jayaramakrishnan
  • Lauri Kanerva
  • Liesbeth Venema
  • Mark Chevilet
  • Nicola Stingelin
  • Ranjit Singh
  • Rebecca Veitch
  • Richard Everson
  • Rosie Campbell
  • Sara Jordan
  • Shannon Vallor
  • Sophia Batchelor
  • Thomas King
  • Tristan Henderson
  • Will Hawkins

Appendix 1: Methodology and limitations

This report uses the term data science to mean the extraction of actionable insights and knowledge from data, which involves preparing data for analysis, performing data analysis using statistical methods leading to the identification of patterns in the data.[238]

This report uses the term AI research in its broadest sense, to cover research into software and systems that display intelligent behaviour, which includes subdisciplines like machine learning, reinforcement learning, deep learning and others.[239]

This report relied on a review of the literature on RECs, research ethics and broader societal impact questions in AI, most of which covers challenges in academic RECs. This report also draws on a series of workshops with 42 members of public and private AI and data science research institutions in May 2021, along with eight interviews with experts in research ethics and AI issues. These workshops and interviews provided some additional insight into the ways corporate RECs operate, though we acknowledge that much of this information is challenging to verify given the relative lack of transparency of many corporate institutions in sharing their internal research review processes (one of our recommendations is explicitly aimed at this challenge). We are grateful to our workshop participants and research subjects for their support in this project.

This report contains two key limitations:

  1. While we sought to review the literature of ethics review processes in both commercial and academic research institutions, the literature on RECs in industry is scarce and largely reliant on statements and articles published by companies themselves. Their claims are therefore not easily verifiable, and sections relating to industry practice should be read with this in mind.
  2. The report exclusively focuses on research ethics review processes at institutions in the UK, Europe and the USA, and our findings are therefore not representative of a broader international context. We encourage future work to focus on how research ethics and broader societal impact reviews are conducted in other regions.

Appendix 2: Examples of ethics review processes

In our workshops, we invited presentations from four UK organisations to share how they currently construct their ethics review processes. We include short descriptions of three of these institutions below:

The Alan Turing Institute

The Alan Turing Institute was established in 2015 as the UK National Institute for Data Science. In 2017, artificial intelligence was added to its remit, on Government recommendation. The Turing Institute was created by five founding universities and the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council.[240] The Turing Institute has since published The Turing Way, a handbook for reproducible, ethical and collaborative data science. The handbook is open source and community-driven.[241]

In 2020, The Turing Way expanded to a series of guides that covered reproducible research,[242] project design,[243] communication,[244] collaboration[245] and ethical research.[246] For example, the Guide for Ethical Research advises to consider consent in cases where the data is already available, and to understand the terms and conditions under which the data has been made available. The guide also advises to consider further societal consequences. This involves an assessment of the societal, environmental and personal risks involved in research, and measures in place to mitigate these risks.

As of writing, the Turing Institute is working on changes to its ethics review processes towards a continuous integration approach based on the model of ‘DevOps’. This is a term used in software development that involves a process of continuous integration and feedback loops across the stages of planning, building and coding, deployment and operations. To ensure ethical standards are upheld in a project, this model involves frequent communication and ongoing, real-time collaboration between researchers and research ethics committees. Currently an application to RECs for ethics review is usually submitted after a project is defined, and a funding application has been made. However, the continuous integration approach covers all stages in the research lifecycle, from project design to publication, communication and maintenance. For researchers, this means considering research ethics from the beginning of a research project and fostering a continuous conversation with RECs, for example when defining the project, or so that RECs could offer support when submitting an application for funding. The project documentation would be updated continuously as the project progresses through various stages.

The project would go through several rounds of reviews by RECs, for example, when accessing open data, during data analysis or at the publication stage. This is a rapid, collaborative process where researchers incorporate the comments from the expert reviewers. This model ensures that researchers address ethical issues as they arise throughout the research lifecycle. For example, the ethical considerations of publishing synthetic data cannot be known in advance, therefore, an ongoing ethics review is required.

This model of research ethics review requires a pool of practising researchers as reviewers. There would also need to be decision-makers who are empowered by the institution to reject an ethics application, even if funding is in place. Furthermore, this model requires permanent specialised expert staff who would be able to hold these conversations with researchers, which also requires additional resources.

SAIL Databank

The Secure Anonymised Information Linkage (SAIL) Databank[247] is a platform for robust secure storage and use of anonymised person-based data for research to improve health, wellbeing and services in Wales. The data held in this repository can be linked together to address research questions, subject to safeguards and approvals. The databank contains over 30 billion records from individual-level population datasets from about 400 data providers, used by approximately 1,200 data users. The data is primarily sourced in Wales, but also England.

The data is securely stored, and access is tightly controlled through a robust and proportionate ‘privacy by design’ methodology, which is regulated by a team of specialists and overseen by an independent Information Governance Review Panel (IGRP). The core datasets come from Welsh organisations, and include hospital inpatient and outpatient data. With the Core Restricted Datasets, the provider reserves the right to review every proposed use of the data, while approval for the Core Datasets is devolved to the IGRP.

The data provider divides the data into two parts. The demographic data goes to a trusted third party (an NHS organisation), which matches the data against a register of the population of Wales and assigns each person represented a unique anonymous code. The content data is sent directly to SAIL. The two parts can be brought together to create de-identified copies of the data, which are then subjected to further controls and presented to researchers in anonymised form.

The ‘privacy by design’ methodology is enacted in practice by a suite of physical, technical and procedural controls. This is guided by the ‘five safes’ model, for example, ‘safe projects’, ‘safe people’ (through research accreditation) or ‘safe data’ (through encryption, anonymisation or control before information can be accessed).

In practice, if a researcher wishes to work with some of the data, they submit a proposal and SAIL reviews feasibility and scoping. The researcher is assigned to an analyst who has extensive knowledge of the available datasets and who advises on which datasets they need to request data from, and which variables will help the researcher answer the questions. After this process, the researcher makes an application to SAIL, which goes to the IGRP. The application can be approved, rejected or recommendations for amendments made. The IGRP is comprised of representatives from organisations including Public Health Wales, Welsh government, Digital Health and Care Wales and the British Medical Association (BMA), and members of the public.

The criteria for review include, for example, an assessment of whether the research contributes to new knowledge, whether it improves health, wellbeing and public services, whether there is a risk that the output may be disclosive of individuals or small groups, and whether measures are in place to mitigate the risks of disclosure. In addition, public engagement and involvement ensures that a public voice is present in terms of considering potential societal impact, and who also provide a public perspective on research.

Researchers must complete a recognised safe researcher training programme and abide by the data access agreement. The data is then provided through a virtual environment, which allows the researchers to carry out the data analysis and request results. However, researchers cannot transfer data out of the environment. Instead, researchers must propose to SAIL which results they would like to transfer for publication or presentation, and these are then checked by someone at SAIL to ensure that they do not contain any disclosive elements.

Previously, the main data types were health data, but more recently, SAIL deals increasingly with administrative data, e.g. the UK Census, and with emerging data types, which may require multiple approval processes, and which can be a problem in terms of coordination. For example, data access that falls under the Digital Economy Act must have approval from the Research Accreditation Panel, and there is an expectation that each project will have undergone formal research ethical review, in addition to the IGRP.

University of Exeter

The University of Exeter has a central University Ethics Committee (UEC) and 11 devolved RECs at college or discipline level. The devolved RECS report to the UEC, which is accountable to the University Council (the governing body).[248] Exeter University also has a dual assurance scheme, with an independent member of the governing body also providing oversight.

The work of RECs is based on a single research ethics framework[249] which was first developed in 2013. This sets common standards and requirements, which also allows for flexibility to adapt to local circumstances. The framework underwent further substantial revision in 2019/20, which was a collaborative process with researchers from all disciplines with the aim to make it as reflective as possible of all discipline requirements while meeting common standards. Exeter also provides guidance and training on research ethics and as well as taught content for undergraduate and postgraduate students.

The REC operating principles[250] include:

  • independence (mitigating conflicts of interest and ensuring sufficient impartial scrutiny; enhancing lay membership of committees)
  • competence (ensuring that membership of committees/selection of reviewers is informed by relevant expertise and that decision-making is consistent, coherent, and well-informed; cross-referral of projects)
  • facilitation (recognising the role of RECs in facilitating good research and support for researchers; ethical review processes recognised as valuable by researchers)
  • transparency and accountability (REC decisions and advice to be open to scrutiny with responsibilities discharged consistently).

Some of the challenges include the lack of specialist knowledge, especially on emerging issues, such as AI and data science, new methods, or interdisciplinary research. Another challenge is information governance, e.g. ensuring that researchers have access to research data, as well as appropriate options for research data management and secure storage. Furthermore, ensuring transparency and clarity for research participants is important, e.g. active, or ongoing consent, where relevant. Secondary data use reviews include a risk-adapted or proportionate approach.

In terms of data sharing, researchers must have the appropriate permissions in place and understand the requirements of those. There are concerns about the potential misuse of data and research outputs, and researchers are encouraged to reflect on the potential implications or uses of their research, and to consider the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) with the support of RECs. The potential risks with data sharing and international collaborations means that it is important to ensure that there is informed decision-making around these issues.

Due to the potentially significant risks of AI and data science research, Exeter University currently focuses on the Trusted Research Guidance issued by the Centre for Protection of National Infrastructure. Export Control compliance plays a role as well, but there is a greater need for awareness and training.

The University of Exeter has scope in the existing research ethics framework for setting up a specialist data science and AI ethics reference group (advisory group), which requires further work, e.g. how to balance the conflict between having a very specialist group of researchers reviewing the research, while also maintaining a certain level of independence. This would require more specialist training for RECs and researchers.

Furthermore, the University is currently evaluating how to review international and multi-site research, and how to streamline the process of ethics review as much as possible to avoid potential duplication in research ethics applications. This also requires capacity building with research partners.

Finally, improving the ability for reporting, auditing and monitoring plays a significant role, especially as the University recently implemented a new single, online research ethics application and review system.


Footnotes

[1] Source: Zhang, D. et al. (2022). ‘The AI Index 2022 Annual Report’. arXiv. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2205.03468

[2] Bender, E.M. (2019). ‘Is there research that shouldn’t be done? Is there research that shouldn’t be encouraged?’. Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@emilymenonbender/is-there-research-that-shouldnt-be-done-is-there-research-that-shouldn-t-be-encouraged-b1bf7d321bb6

[3]Truong, K. (2020). ‘This Image of a White Barack Obama Is AI’s Racial Bias Problem In a Nutshell’. Vice. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/7kpxyy/this-image-of-a-white-barack-obama-is-ais-racial-bias-problem-in-a-nutshell

[4] Small, Z. ‘600,000 Images Removed from AI Database After Art Project Exposes Racist Bias’. Hyperallergic. Available at: https://hyperallergic.com/518822/600000-images-removed-from-ai-database-after-art-project-exposes-racist-bias/

[5] Richardson, R. (2021). ‘Racial Segregation and the Data-Driven Society: How Our Failure to Reckon with Root Causes Perpetuates Separate and Unequal Realities’. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 36(3). Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3850317; [5] Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html

[6] Petrozzino, C. (2021). ‘Who pays for ethical debt in AI?’. AI and Ethics, 1(3), pp. 205–208. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-020-00030-3

[7] Abdalla, M. and Abdalla, M. (2021). ‘The Grey Hoodie Project: Big Tobacco, Big Tech, and the Threat on Academic Integrity’. AIES ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3461702.3462563

[8] For example, a recent paper from researchers at Microsoft includes guidance for a structured exercise to identify potential limitations in AI research. See: Smith, J. J. et al. (2022). ‘REAL ML: Recognizing, Exploring, and Articulating Limitations of Machine Learning Research’. 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp. 587–597. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533122

[9] Metcalf, J. and Crawford, K. (2016). ‘Where are human subjects in big data research? The emerging ethics divide.’ Big Data & Society, 3(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/205395171665021

[10] Metcalf, J. and Crawford, K. (2016).

[11] Hecht, B. et al. (2021). ‘It’s Time to Do Something: Mitigating the Negative Impacts of Computing Through a Change to the Peer Review Process’. arXiv. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2112.09544

[12] Ashurst, C. et al. (2021). ‘AI Ethics Statements — Analysis and lessons learnt from NeurIPS Broader Impact Statements’. arXiv. Available at:
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.01705

[13] See: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). Looking before we leap: Case studies. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/resource/research-ethics-case-studies/

[14] Raymond, N. (2019). ‘Safeguards for human studies can’t cope with big data’. Nature, 568(7752), pp. 277–277. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-01164-z

[15] The number of AI journal publications grew by 34.5% from 2019 to 2020, compared to a growth of 19.6% between 2018 and 2019. See: Stanford University. (2021). Artificial Intelligence Index 2021, chapter 1. Available at: https://aiindex.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/2021-AI-Index-Report-_Chapter-1.pdf

[16] Chuvpilo, G. (2020). ‘AI Research Rankings 2019: Insights from NeurIPS and ICML, Leading AI Conferences’. Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@chuvpilo/ai-research-rankings-2019-insights-from-neurips-and-icml-leading-ai-conferences-ee6953152c1a

[17] Minsky, C. (2020). ‘How AI helps historians solve ancient puzzles’. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/2b72ed2c-907b-11ea-bc44-dbf6756c871a

[18] Zheng, S., Trott, A., Srinivasa, S. et al. (2020). ‘The AI Economist: Improving Equality and Productivity with AI-Driven Tax Policies’. Salesforce Research. Available at: https://blog.einstein.ai/the-ai-economist/

[19] Eraslan, G., Avsec, Ž., Gagneur, J. and Theis, F. J. (2019). ‘Deep learning: new computational modelling techniques for genomics’. Nature Reviews Genetics. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41576-019-0122-6

[20] DeepMind. (2020). ‘AlphaFold: a solution to a 50-year-old grand challenge in biology’. DeepMind Blog. Available at: https://deepmind.com/blog/article/alphafold-a-solution-to-a-50-year-old-grand-challenge-in-biology

[21] Boyarskaya, M., Olteanu, A. and Crawford, K. (2020). ‘Overcoming Failures of Imagination in AI Infused System Development and Deployment’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2011.13416

[22] Clifford, C. (2018). ‘Google CEO: A.I. is more important than fire or electricity’. CNBC. Available at: https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/01/google-ceo-sundar-pichai-ai-is-more-important-than-fire-electricity.html

[23] Boyarskaya, M., Olteanu, A. and Crawford, K. (2020). ‘Overcoming Failures of Imagination in AI Infused System Development and Deployment’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2011.13416

[24] Metcalf, J. (2017). ‘“The study has been approved by the IRB”: Gayface AI, research hype and the pervasive data ethics…’ Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/pervade-team/the-study-has-been-approved-by-the-irb-gayface-ai-research-hype-and-the-pervasive-data-ethics-ed76171b882c

[25] Coalition for Critical Technology. (2020). ‘Abolish the #TechToPrisonPipeline’. Medium. Available at: https://medium.com/@CoalitionForCriticalTechnology/abolish-the-techtoprisonpipeline-9b5b14366b16.

[26] Ongweso Jr, E. (2020). ‘An AI Paper Published in a Major Journal Dabbles in Phrenology’. Vice. Available at: https://www.vice.com/en/article/g5pawq/an-ai-paper-published-in-a-major-journal-dabbles-in-phrenology

[27]Colaner, S. (2020). ‘AI Weekly: AI phrenology is racist nonsense, so of course it doesn’t work’. VentureBeat. Available at: https://venturebeat.com/2020/06/12/ai-weekly-ai-phrenology-is-racist-nonsense-so-of-course-it-doesnt-work/.

[28] Hsu, J. (2019). ‘Microsoft’s AI Research Draws Controversy Over Possible Disinformation Use’.  IEEE Spectrum. Available at: https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/artificial-intelligence/machine-learning/microsofts-ai-research-draws-controversy-over-possible-disinformation-use

[29] Harlow, M., Murgia, M. and Shepherd, C. (2019). ‘Western AI researchers partnered with Chinese surveillance firms’. Financial Times. Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/41be9878-61d9-11e9-b285-3acd5d43599e

[30] This report does not focus on considerations relating to research integrity, though we acknowledge this is an important and related topic.

[31] For a deeper discussion on these issues, see: Ashurst, C. et al. (2022). ‘Disentangling the Components of Ethical Research in Machine Learning’. FAccT ’22: 2022 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp. 2057–2068. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3531146.3533781

[32] Dove, E. S., Townend, D., Meslin, E. M. et al. (2016). ‘Ethics review for international data-intensive research’. Science, 351(6280), pp. 1399–1400.

[33] Dove, E. S., Townend, D., Meslin, E. M. et al. (2016).

[34] UKRI. ‘Research integrity’. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/what-we-offer/supporting-healthy-research-and-innovation-culture/research-integrity/

[35] Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. ‘Responsible research and innovation’. UKRI. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/councils/epsrc/guidance-for-applicants/what-to-include-in-your-proposal/health-technologies-impact-and-translation-toolkit/research-integrity-in-healthcare-technologies/responsible-research-and-innovation/

[36] UKRI. ‘Research integrity’. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/what-we-offer/supporting-healthy-research-and-innovation-culture/research-integrity/

[37] Partnership on AI. (2021). Managing the Risks of AI Research. Available at: http://partnershiponai.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PAI-Managing-the-Risks-of-AI-Resesarch-Responsible-Publication.pdf

[38] Korenman, S. G., Berk, R., Wenger, N. S. and Lew, V. (1998). ‘Evaluation of the research norms of scientists and administrators responsible for academic research integrity’. Jama, 279(1), pp. 41–47.

[39] Douglas, H. (2014). ‘The moral terrain of science’. Erkenntnis, 79(5), pp. 961–979.

[40] European Commission. (2018). Responsible Research and Innovation, Science and Technology. Available at: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2777/45726

[41] National Human Genome Research Institute. ‘Ethical, Legal and Social Implications Research Program’. Available at: https://www.genome.gov/Funded-Programs-Projects/ELSI-Research-Program-ethical-legal-social-implications

[42] Bazzano, L. A. et al. (2021). ‘A Modern History of Informed Consent and the Role of Key Information’. Ochsner Journal, 21(1), pp. 81–85. Available at: https://doi.org/10.31486/toj.19.0105

[43] Hedgecoe, A. (2017). ‘Scandals, Ethics, and Regulatory Change in Biomedical Research’. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 42(4), pp. 577–599.  Available at: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0162243916677834

[44] Israel, M. (2015). Research Ethics and Integrity for Social Scientists, second edition. SAGE Publishing. Available at: https://uk.sagepub.com/en-gb/eur/research-ethics-and-integrity-for-social-scientists/book236950

[45] The Nuremberg Code was in part based on pre-war medical research guidelines from the German Medical Association, which included elements of patient consent to a procedure. These guidelines were disused during the rise of the Nazi Regime in favour of guidelines that contributed to the ‘healing of the nation’, as defendants at the Nuremberg trial put it. See: Ernst, E. and Weindling, P. J. (1998). ‘The Nuremberg Medical Trial: have we learned the lessons?’ Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine, 131(2), pp. 130–135; and British Medical Journal. (1996). ‘Nuremberg’. British Medical Journal, 313(7070). Available at: https://www.bmj.com/content/313/7070

[46] Center for Disease Control and Prevention. (2021). The U.S. Public Health Service Syphilis Study at Tuskegee. Available at: https://www.cdc.gov/tuskegee/timeline.htm

[47] The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. (1979). The Belmont Report.

[48] Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS). (2016). International Ethical Guidelines for Health-related Research Involving Humans, Fourth Edition. Available at: https://cioms.ch/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/WEB-CIOMS-EthicalGuidelines.pdf

[49] A more extensive study of the history of research ethics is provided by: Garcia, K. et al. (2022). ‘Introducing An Incomplete History of Research Ethics’. Open Life Sciences. Available at: https://openlifesci.org/posts/2022/08/08/An-Incomplete-History-Of-Research-Ethics/

[50] Hoeyer, K. and Hogle, L. F. (2014). ‘Informed consent: The politics of intent and practice in medical research ethics’. Annual Review of Anthropology, 43, pp. 347–362.

 

Legal guardianship: The Helsinki Declaration specifies that underrepresented groups should have adequate access to research and to the results of research. However, vulnerable population groups are often excluded from research if they are not able to give informed consent. A legal guardian is usually appointed by a court and can give consent on the participants’ behalf, see: Brune C,, Stentzel U., Hoffmann W. and van den Berg, N. (2021). ‘Attitudes of legal guardians and legally supervised persons with and without previous research experience towards participation in research projects: A quantitative cross-sectional study’. PLoS ONE, 16(9).

 

Group or community consent refers to research that can generate risks and benefits as part of the wider implications beyond the individual research participant. This means that consent processes may need to be supplemented by community engagement activities, see: Molyneux, S. and Bull, S. (2013). ‘Consent and Community Engagement in Diverse Research Contexts: Reviewing and Developing Research and Practice: Participants in the Community Engagement and Consent Workshop, Kilifi, Kenya, March 2011’. Journal of Empirical Research on Human Research Ethics (JERHRE), 8(4), pp. 1–18. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1525/jer.2013.8.4.1

 

Blanket consent refers to a process by which individuals donate their samples without any restrictions. Broad (or ‘general’) consent refers to a process by which individuals donate their samples for a broad range of future studies, subject to specified restrictions, see: Wendler, D. (2013). ‘Broad versus blanket consent for research with human biological samples’. The Hastings Center report, 43(5), pp. 3–4. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1002/hast.200

[51] World Medical Association. (2008). WMA Declaration of Helsinki – ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects. Available at: https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/

[52] Ashcroft, R. ‘The Declaration of Helsinki’ in: Emanuel, E. J., Grady, C. C., Crouch, R. A., Lie, R. K., Miller, F. G. and Wendler, D. D. (eds.). (2008). The Oxford textbook of clinical research ethics. Oxford University Press.

[53] World Medical Association. (2008). WMA Declaration of Helsinki – ethical principles for medical research involving human subjects. Available at: https://www.wma.net/policies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involving-human-subjects/

[54] World Medical Association. (2008).

[55] Millum, J., Wendler, D. and Emanuel, E. J. (2013). ‘The 50th anniversary of the Declaration of Helsinki: progress but many remaining challenges’. Jama, 310(20), pp. 2143–2144.

[56] The Belmont Report was published by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects in Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which was created for the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) based on authorisation by the U.S. Congress in 1974. The National Commission had been tasked by the U.S. Congress with the identification of guiding research ethics principles in response to public outrage over the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and other ethically questionable projects that emerged during this time.

[57] The Nuremberg Code failed to deal with several related issues, including how international research trial should be run, questions of care for research subjects after the trial has ended or how to assess the benefit of the research to a host community. See: Annas, G. and Grodin, M. (2008). The Nazi Doctors and the Nuremberg Code: Human Rights in Human Experimentation. Oxford University Press

[58] In 1991, the regulations of the DHEW became a ‘common rule’ that covered 16 federal agencies.

[59] Office for Human Research Protections. (2009). Code of Federal Regulations, Part 46: Protection of Human Subjects. Available at: https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/45-cfr-46/index.html

[60] In 2000, the Central Office for Research Ethics was formed, followed by the establishment of the National Research Ethics Service and later the Health Research Authority (HRA). See: NHS Health Research Authority. (2021). Research Ethics Committees – Standard Operating Procedures. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/research-ethics-committee-standard-operating-procedures/

[61] There is some guidance for non-health RECs in the UK – the Economic and Social Science Research Council released research ethics guidelines for any project funded by ESRC to undergo certain ethics review requirements if the project involves human subjects research. See: Economic and Social Research Council. (2015). ESRC Framework for Research Ethics. UKRI. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/councils/esrc/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics-guidance/framework-for-research-ethics/

[62] Tinker, A. and Coomber, V. (2005). ‘University research ethics committees—A summary of research into their role, remit and conduct’. Research Ethics, 1(1), pp. 5–11.

[63] European Network of Research Ethics Committees. ‘Short description of the UK REC system’. Available at: http://www.eurecnet.org/information/uk.html

[64] University of Cambridge. ‘Ethical Review’. Available at: https://www.research-integrity.admin.cam.ac.uk/ethical-review

[65] University of Oxford. ‘Committee information: Structure, membership and operation of University research ethics committees’. Available at: https://researchsupport.admin.ox.ac.uk/governance/ethics/committees

[66] Tinker, A. and Coomber, V. (2005). ‘University Research Ethics Committees — A Summary of Research into Their Role, Remit and Conduct’. SAGE Journals. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/174701610500100103

[67] The Turing Way Community et al. Guide for Ethical Research – Introduction to Research Ethics. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/ethical-research/ethics-intro.html

[68] For an example of a full list of risks and the different processes, see: University of Exeter. (2021). Research Ethics Policy and Framework: Appendix C – Risk and Proportionate Review checklist. Available at: https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/governanceandcompliance/researchethicsandgovernance/Appendix_C_Risk_and_Proportionate_Review_v1.1_07052021.pdf; and University of Exeter. (2021). Research Ethics Policy and Framework. Available at: https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/governanceandcompliance/researchethicsandgovernance/Revised_UoE_Research_Ethics_Framework_v1.1_07052021.pdf.

[69] NHS Health Research Authority. (2021). Governance arrangements for Research Ethics Committees. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/planning-and-improving-research/policies-standards-legislation/governance-arrangement-research-ethics-committees/; and Economic and Social Research Council. (2015). ESRC Framework for Research Ethics. UKRI. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/councils/esrc/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics-guidance/framework-for-research-ethics/

[70] NHS Health Research Authority. (2021). Research Ethics Committee – Standard Operating Procedures. Available at: https://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-us/committees-and-services/res-and-recs/research-ethics-committee-standard-operating-procedures/

[71] NHS Health Research Authority. (2021).

[72] Economic and Social Research Council. (2015). ESRC Framework for Research Ethics. UKRI. Available at: https://www.ukri.org/councils/esrc/guidance-for-applicants/research-ethics-guidance/framework-for-research-ethics/

[73] See: saildatabank.com

[74] Moss, E. and Metcalf, J. (2020). Ethics Owners. A New Model of Organizational Responsibility in Data-Driven Technology Companies. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/ethics-owners/

[75] We note this article reflects Facebook’s process in 2016, and that this process may have undergone significant changes since that period. See: Jackman, M. and Kanerva, L. (2016). ‘Evolving the IRB: building robust review for industry research’. Washington and Lee Law Review Online, 72(3), p. 442.

[76] See: Google AI. ‘Artificial Intelligence at Google: Our Principles’. Available at: https://ai.google/principles/.

[77] Future of Life Institute. (2018). Lethal autonomous weapons pledge. Available at: https://futureoflife.org/2018/06/05/lethal-autonomous-weapons-pledge/

[78] Moss, E. and Metcalf, J. (2020). Ethics Owners. A New Model of Organizational Responsibility in Data-Driven Technology Companies. Data & Society. Available at: https://datasociety.net/library/ethics-owners/

[79] Samuel, G., Derrick, G. E., and Van Leeuwen, T. (2019). ‘The ethics ecosystem: Personal ethics, network governance and regulating actors governing the use of social media research data.’ Minerva, 57(3), pp. 317–343. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-019-09368-3

[80] The Royal Society. ‘Research Culture’. Available at: https://royalsociety.org/topics-policy/projects/research-culture/

 

[81] Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Partnership on AI and Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). A culture of ethical AI: report. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/event/culture-ethical-ai-cifar-pai/

[82] Prunkl, C. E. et al. (2021). ‘Institutionalizing ethics in AI through broader impact requirements’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 3(2), pp. 104–110. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-021-00298-y

[83] Prunkl et al state that potential negative effects to impact statements are that these could be uninformative, biased, misleading or overly speculative, and therefore lack quality. The statements could lead to trivialising of ethics and governance and the complexity involved in assessing ethical and societal implications. Researchers could develop a negative attitude towards submitting an impact statement, and may find it a burden, confusing or irrelevant. The statements may also create a false sense of security, in cases where positive impacts are overstated or negative impacts understated, which may polarise the research community along political or institutional lines. See: Prunkl, C. E. et al. (2021).

[84] Some authors felt that the requirement of an impact statement is important, but there was uncertainty over who should complete them and how. Other authors also did not feel qualified to address the broader impact of their work. See: Abuhamad, G. and Rheault, C. (2020). ‘Like a Researcher Stating Broader Impact For the Very First Time’. arXiv. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.13032

[85] Committee on Publication Ethics. (2018). Principles of Transparency and Best Practices in Scholarly Publishing. Available at: https://publicationethics.org/files/Principles_of_Transparency_and_Best_Practice_in_Scholarly_Publishingv3_0.pdf

[86] Partnership on AI. (2021). Managing the Risks of AI Research: Six Recommendations for Responsible Publication. Available at: https://partnershiponai.org/workstream/publication-norms-for-responsible-ai/

[87] Partnership on AI. (2021).

[88] Gardner, A., Smith, A. L., Steventon, A. et al. (2021). ‘Ethical funding for trustworthy AI: proposals to address the responsibilities of funders to ensure that projects adhere to trustworthy AI practice’. AI and Ethics. pp.1–15. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-021-00069-w

[89] Vayena, E., Brownsword, R., Edwards, S. J. et al. (2016). ‘Research led by participants: a new social contract for a new kind of research’. Journal of Medical Ethics, 42(4), pp. 216–219.

[90] There are three types of disclosure risks and possible reidentification of an individual despite masking or de-identification of data: identity disclosure, attribute disclosure, e.g., when a person is identified to belong to a particular group, or inferential disclosure, e.g., when information about a person can be inferred with released data.  See: Xafis, V., Schaefer, G. O., Labude, M. K. et al. (2019). ‘An ethics framework for big data in health and research’. Asian Bioethics Review, 11(3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s41649-019-00099-x

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[195] Jensen, B. (2021). ‘A New Approach To Mitigating AI’s Negative Impact’. Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://hai.stanford.edu/news/new-approach-mitigating-ais-negative-impact

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[197] Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford University. ‘Ethics & Society Review – Stanford University’. Available at: https://casbs.stanford.edu/ethics-society-review-stanford-university

[198] Sendak, M., Elish, M.C., Gao, M. et al. (2020). ‘“The Human Body Is a Black Box”: Supporting Clinical Decision-Making with Deep Learning.’ FAT* ‘20: Proceedings of the 2020 Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp. 99–109. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3351095.3372827

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[202] Sandler, R. and Basel, J. (2019). Building Data and AI Ethics Committees, p. 19. Accenture. Available at: https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-107/accenture-ai-and-data-ethics-committee-report-11.pdf

 

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[205] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al. (2021).

[206] The concept of ‘ethical assurance’ is a process-based form of project governance that supports inclusive and participatory ethical deliberation while also remaining grounded in social and technical realities. See: Burr, C. and Leslie, D. (2021). ‘Ethical Assurance: A Practical Approach to the Responsible Design, Development, and Deployment of Data-Driven Technologies’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3937983

[207] Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (2022). The roadmap to an effective AI assurance ecosystem. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-roadmap-to-an-effective-ai-assurance-ecosystem

[208] d’Aquin, M., Troullinou, P., O’Connor, N. E. et al. (2018). ‘Towards an “Ethics by Design” Methodology for AI research projects’. AIES ’18: Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, pp. 54–59. Available at: https ://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3278721.3278765

[209] d’Aquin, M., Troullinou, P., O’Connor, N. E. et al. (2018).

[210] Dove, E. (2020). Regulatory Stewardship of Health Research: Navigating Participant Protection and Research Promotion. Edward Elgar.

[211] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al. (2021). ‘Ethics review of big data research: What should stay and what should be reformed?’. BMC Medical Ethics, 22(1), pp. 1–13. Available at: https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-021-00616-4

[212] d’Aquin, M., Troullinou, P., O’Connor, N. E. et al. (2018). ‘Towards an “Ethics by Design” Methodology for AI research projects’. AIES ’18: Proceedings of the 2018 AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society, pp. 54–59. Available at: https ://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3278721.3278765

[213] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al. (2021). ‘Ethics review of big data research: What should stay and what should be reformed?’. BMC Medical Ethics, 22(1), pp. 1–13. Available at: https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-021-00616-4

[214] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al (2021).

[215] Source: Sandler, R. and Basl, J. (2019). Building Data and AI Ethics Committees, p. 19. Accenture. Available at: https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/pdf-107/accenture-ai-and-data-ethics-committee-report-11.pdf

[216] See: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). Looking before we leap: Case studies. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/resource/research-ethics-case-studies/

[217] Department of Health and Social Care. (2021). A guide to good practice for digital and data-driven health technologies. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-conduct-for-data-driven-health-and-care-technology/initial-code-of-conduct-for-data-driven-health-and-care-technology

[218] Go Fair. Fair principles. Available at: https://www.go-fair.org/fair-principles/

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[221] Northwestern University. (2014). Guidelines for Academic Requesters. Available at: https://irb.northwestern.edu/docs/guidelinesforacademicrequesters-1.pdf

[222]Partnership on AI. AI Incidents Database. Available at: https://partnershiponai.org/workstream/ai-incidents-database/

[223] AIAAIC. AIAAIC Repository. Available at: https://www.aiaaic.org/aiaaic-repository

 

[224] DeepMind. (2022). ‘How our principles helped define Alphafolds release’. Available at: https://www.deepmind.com/blog/how-our-principles-helped-define-alphafolds-release

[225] Jobin, A., Ienca, M. and Vayena, E. (2019). ‘The global landscape of AI ethics guidelines’. Nature, 1, pp. 389–399. Available at : https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2

[226] Jobin, A., Ienca, M. and Vayena, E. (2019).

[227] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al. (2021). ‘Ethics review of big data research: What should stay and what should be reformed?’. BMC Medical Ethics, 22(1), pp. 1–13. Available at: https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-021-00616-4

[228] Dove, E. S. and Garattini, C. (2018). ‘Expert perspectives on ethics review of international data-intensive research: Working towards mutual recognition’. Research Ethics, 14(1), pp. 1–25.

[229] Mitrou, L. (2018). ‘Data Protection, Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Services: Is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) “Artificial Intelligence-Proof”?’. Social Science Research Network. Available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3386914

[230] Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Guidance on AI and data protection. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/guidance-on-ai-and-data-protection/

[231] Samuel, G., Derrick, G. E. and Van Leeuwen, T. (2019). ‘The ethics ecosystem: Personal ethics, network governance and regulating actors governing the use of social media research data’. Minerva, 57(3), pp. 317–343. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11024-019-09368-3

[232] Ferretti, A., Ienca, M., Sheehan, M. et al. (2021). ‘Ethics review of big data research: What should stay and what should be reformed?’. BMC Medical Ethics, 22(1), pp. 1–13. Available at: https://bmcmedethics.biomedcentral.com/articles/10.1186/s12910-021-00616-4

[233]  Ashurst, C., Anderljung, M., Prunkl, C. et al. (2020). ‘A Guide to Writing the NeurIPS Impact Statement’. Centre for the Governance of AI. Available at: https://medium.com/@GovAI/a-guide-to-writing-the-neurips-impact-statement-4293b723f832

[234] Castelvecchi, D. (2020). ‘Prestigious AI meeting takes steps to improve ethics of research’. Nature, 589(7840), pp. 12–13. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-020-03611-8

[235] NeurIPS. (2021). NeurIPS 2021 Paper Checklist Guidelines. Available at: https://neurips.cc/Conferences/2021/PaperInformation/PaperChecklist

[236] Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, Partnership on AI and Ada Lovelace Institute. (2022). A culture of ethical AI: report. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/event/culture-ethical-ai-cifar-pai/

[237] Gardner, A., Smith, A. L., Steventon, A. et al. (2021). ‘Ethical funding for trustworthy AI: proposals to address the responsibilities of funders to ensure that projects adhere to trustworthy AI practice’. AI and Ethics, 2. pp.1–15. Available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s43681-021-00069-w

[238] Provost, F. and  Fawcett T. (2013). ‘Data science and its relationship to big data and data-driven decision making’. Big Data, 1(1), pp. 51–59.

[239] We borrow from the definition used by the European Commission’s High Level Expert Group on AI. See: European Commission. (2019). Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI. Available at: https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ethics-guidelines-trustworthy-ai

[240] The Alan Turing Institute. ‘About us’. Available at: https://www.turing.ac.uk/about-us

[241] The Turing Way Community et al. (2019). The Turing Way: A Handbook for Reproducible Data Science. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/welcome

[242] The Turing Way Community et al. (2020). Guide for Reproducible Research. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/reproducible-research/reproducible-research.html

[243] The Turing Way Community et al. (2020). Guide for Project Design. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/project-design/project-design.html

[244] The Turing Way Community et al. (2020). Guide for Communication. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/communication/communication.html

[245] The Turing Way Community et al. (2020). Guide for Collaboration. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/collaboration/collaboration.html

[246]The Turing Way Community et al. (2020). Guide for Ethical Research. Available at: https://the-turing-way.netlify.app/ethical-research/ethical-research.html

[247] See: https://saildatabank.com/

[248] University of Exeter. (2021). Ethics Policy. Available at: https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/governanceandcompliance/researchethicsandgovernance/Ethics_Policy_Revised_November_2020.pdf

 

[249] University of Exeter. (2021). Research Ethics Policy and Framework. Available at: https://www.exeter.ac.uk/media/universityofexeter/governanceandcompliance/researchethicsandgovernance/Revised_UoE_Research_Ethics_Framework_v1.1_07052021.pdf

[250] University of Exeter (2021).

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  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
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  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
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  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
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  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
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  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
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  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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This post summarises the key points of the discussion and debate from the webinar which you can watch in full below:

This video is embedded with YouTube’s ‘privacy-enhanced mode’ enabled although it is still possible that if you play this video it may add cookies.  Read our Privacy policy and Digital best practice for more on how we use digital tools and data. 

Due to issues with the recording the introductory presentation from Matthia Spielkamp is missing. You can read a summary of what he said below and his slides are available here.

Over the last few months, high profile cases of algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems – such as the Home Office visa streaming tool, the Ofqual’s A-level grading algorithm, which were both abandoned, and the ‘Most Serious Violence’ programme under consideration by the West Midlands Police Ethics Board – have featured in the headlines. And research which reveals the extensive application of predictive analytics in public services across the UK is bringing into focus the increasing adoption of technological solutions to address governance problems.

However, there remains a persistent, systemic deficit in public understanding about where and how these systems are used, pointing to a fundamental issue of transparency.

In this event, we look at the transparency mechanisms that should be in place to enable us to scrutinise and challenge algorithmic decision-making (ADM) systems, in use in central and local government, and their process of deployment.

Among the proposals to achieve a baseline level of transparency is the possibility of instituting a public register as a mechanism for mandatory reporting of ADM systems. The proposal has been raised internationally, at a national and European level, and is now being tested in the cities of Amsterdam and Helsinki.

But while various options are considered for increasing algorithmic accountability in public-sector ADM systems in the UK, it is important to ask: what does effective mandatory reporting look like?

The Ada Lovelace Institute and international experts in public administration algorithms and algorithmic registers, surface key concerns, and relate them to the governance landscapes of different national contexts. In this event we ask:

  • How do we ensure that information on ADM systems is easily accessible and that various actors, from policymakers to the broader public, can meaningfully engage with it?
  • What are the pros and cons of setting up a register? How should it be structured? Is it the best way to enforce mandatory reporting? How will different audiences be able to mobilise the information it collects?
  • How do we ensure that, whichever transparency requirement is in place, it leads to reliable accountability mechanisms?

Chair

Speakers

  • Soizic Penicaud

    Etalab, France
  • Meeri Haataja

    Saidot, Finland
  • Natalia Domagala

    Head of Data Ethics, UK Cabinet Office
  • Matthias Spielkamp

    Algorithm Watch

IMOGEN:

The topic of today’s event – looking at practical tools and the policy development that we need around transparency – feels particularly timely.

In the UK context, it is great to see a direct reference to transparency in the Government’s newly published National Data Strategy, and of course, transparency has long been a key term in the data ethics debate. The word transparency crops up in pretty much every data ethics set of principles we have seen over the recent years and, in the public sector, there is a baseline presumption across Europe that there should exist a level of scrutiny and democratic accountability on algorithmic decision-making systems.

Despite that, I think it is fair to say that we still lack a systematic understanding of what tools are in deployment, let alone the crucial questions on their social impacts and on why transparency around algorithmic decisions is hard to achieve. This is due not just to the fact that the ones in question are new or technical products, but firstly because we face the real challenge on how to articulate the object that we are trying to be transparent about.

We have words like algorithm, automated decision systems, predictive analytics, data analytic and AI in the general sense, which may cover everything from an automated phone system in a GP to a wholesale transformation of a local authority’s data practices. Similarly to the word ‘algorithm’, the word ‘transparency’ can cover many things. People’s desire for transparency may be motivated by their interest in knowing a system’s code, scrutinising and understanding front-line decision-making and decisions over the organisations involved.

A third issue at stake is how we make transparency meaningful, by that I mean ensuring that a person can understand algorithmic decision-making systems in use, that their use is important to them, and ensuring that transparency does contribute to or facilitates some form of accountability. All of us are aware of transparency mechanisms that have not achieved these objectives, and this is a challenge to bear in mind. Alongside this, it is important to consider how we square the necessity for transparency with the limited resources we have to digest information and discuss it critically.

I, for one, am sure that the panellists welcome what you may see as a growing consensus in parts of Europe: that we need more systematic and proactive forms of transparency when it comes to public sector algorithms. So, I am really excited to have these speakers with us today, who can speak to or are grappling with some practical initiatives about how we create mechanisms for algorithmic transparency.

I would like to turn to Matthias from Algorithm Watch. You have argued for the institution of a public register of algorithmic decision-making systems. How did the idea come up and how does it sit with the work you have been doing at the national and international level?

MATTHIAS:

Slides from Matthias’ talk are available here.

The idea of having a public register for automated decision-making in the public sector started from doing a stock-taking exercise in a review of automated decision-making systems in Europe. We first looked at different European countries and tried to find out where automated decision-making systems are in use. We thought that the term ‘automated decision-making’ better captures the challenge at hand, which is about the impact socio-technical systems have on people and societies and not so much about technology. For example, when a meaningful decision on an individual’s life or a decision that has an impact on the public good and society in general is made through a system that includes algorithmic analysis and the use of big data, then we describe the system as performing automated decision-making. It does not have to be a live big-data analysis but if the algorithms are trained on data to come up with a decision-making model, then our definition encompasses it.

In our work, we found out that there are a lot of these systems in use all over the place in Europe. I suppose that many of the people in the audience today are from the UK and the UK has a tradition of automating public sector services. Many people, however, are surprised to see that, for instance, in Germany, public services are being digitised and automated only very slowly. This presents us with an opportunity, right because there have been many mistakes in various countries, such as the United Kingdom and the Nordic countries, which could still be avoid by states that lag slightly behind in this automation process.

Yesterday we released a second edition of the same review, adding a couple of countries case studies and keeping the UK, although it is not part of the EU anymore.

Clearly, the question we are trying to address is how do we achieve transparency? We have a couple of policy recommendations, which were developed from the review. The first one is the one you are familiar with – to increase transparency of ADM systems by establishing a register for the systems used in the public sector. The second recommendation is to introduce legally binding frameworks to support and enable public research, as it is necessary to have access to datasets in order to know how a system works, and then to create a meaningful accountability framework.

In other words, there needs to be a legal obligation for those responsible for the ADM system to disclose and to document the purpose of the system, an explanation of the model, and the information on who developed the system.

With regards to this we are working with Michele Loi, at the University of Zurich in Switzerland, who co-authored a paper that references the notion of ‘design publicity’. ‘Design publicity’ means that, in the first instance, we need information about the goal that the algorithm is designed to pursue and the moral constraints it is designed to respect. In the second instance, we need performance transparency, meaning that we need to know how a goal is translated into a machine learning problem and to be able to establish, through a conformity assessment, whether this translation complies to the set moral constraints and what decisions are taken by consistently applying the same algorithm in multiple scenarios.

IMOGEN:

I will now turn to Soizic from Etalab in France. One of your functions is to support the government and the local Government transparency and decision-making, so tell us more about the French landscape around this and the approach and the governance and in particular your role there.

SOIZIC:

As Imogen mentioned, I work at Etalab, the French Government taskforce for open data, open-source and data policy. We are not a regulatory body, but a government body and our work on transparency stems from our work on open data and open source. Part of our aims is, indeed, helping agencies implement the legal framework that applies to transparency of public sector algorithms. The framework is grounded in public administrative law and the right to access administrative information, and requires an administrative agency, that uses an algorithmic system to make a decision about an individual or a legal entity, to disclose certain information about that system. In particular, the legal framework requires every agency to inventory the main algorithmic treatments, disclose the rules and criteria used by the algorithm and the way that it is involved in the decision-making process.

We can see that this requirement may allude to the idea of a public registry. Indeed, a few weeks after Amsterdam and Helsinki’s registers went live, the French city of Nantes released and published the first French public registry of algorithmic decision-making system. Notably, it showcases only two algorithms so far, and they are not AI, but rule-based benefit allocation algorithms.

One thing to say about Etalab is that we work with a variety of other government agencies and institutional actors involved in this space, including the regulatory body in charge of access to information, the regulatory body in charge of data protection and the ombudsman on discrimination. Indeed, among the difficulties of dealing with the topic of algorithmic transparency in public administration there is the fact that it needs a lot of co-ordination, it is often difficult to pinpoint who we should work with in local and central government. Due to Etalab’s background in open data and open source, we have access to the ones who are interested in those topics. Furthermore, we try to get in touch with data protection officers in government agencies, but it can be difficult to identify who we should address and a lot depends on how much single individuals are interested in the topic.

With regards to this, it is good to mention that working with local and central governments on this issue inevitably means choosing what to focus on. The field we are in is fast-moving and agencies have little resources to allocate to this issue. This is obviously not ideal, but the reality is that we need to acknowledge the circumstances and prioritise where we work and on what.

For instance, one of the main questions we get asked by the agencies we interact with is: what are the main algorithmic treatments we should focus on? The risk is that agencies focus on the algorithms that are easier to explain, the ones that are open, and spend energies with tasks that do not help us tackle the more harmful or dangerous tools in place.

So, what we are trying to do now is working with volunteer public servants to develop practical guides and tools that show examples of what we are looking for. For instance, we have been working on the topic of public registries with a few people who are trying to implement them in their agencies and on establishing a list of potential algorithmic treatments to record, so that agencies can go through it and verify if they are using any of the listed algorithms.

Another important thing to mention concerns difficulties that we have encountered due to the legal framework and its limits – something that also Algorithm Watch’s Automating Society report rightly mentions. One of the main limitations is its exceptions for algorithms pertaining to national security or fraud control and all topics of government that could be sensitive. The problem is obviously that these areas of government are often among the ones where the more dangerous and harmful algorithms are used.

One last thing I wanted to bring attention to is that, since our legal framework is relatively open, there is a risk that we only focus on making algorithms transparent after they are implemented, while we have to think about how to use tools, including registries, as ways to promote transparency during the conception of algorithms, so that we don’t lose track of the main goal we are trying to achieve, which is to protect citizens’ rights.

IMOGEN:

Now to Meeri, could you talk to us about how things are evolving in Amsterdam and Helsinki and the city-focused approach you have taken and, in particular, Saidot’s role in the partnership.

MEERI:

I am CEO and co-founder of Saidot and, from the start of our activities, it has been clear to us that algorithmic transparency is a foundational principle and it will be a very important factor when taking forward AI governance.

Soizic mentioned the fact that public administrations have little resources in the public sector and that is one of the driving factors of our register project, which consists in putting together a scalable and adaptable register platform solution that can be used by Government agencies and private companies, to collect information on algorithmic systems and share them flexibly with different stakeholder groups.

I wanted to start my intervention by showing an article that captures the sense of the work we have been doing. I really wanted to thank Floridi for this and to present the piece as a reference for everyone.

Our register-related work started from a common methodology applied in two cities, Amsterdam and Helsinki. Both published their respective registers about a month ago and everybody is free and welcome to visit the registers.

We conceived them as libraries about different algorithmic or AI systems – by the way, Amsterdam is using the word ‘algorithm’, while Helsinki, ‘AI’ and we are looking forward to learn from practice and feedback with regards to where we draw the line on what systems we should bring to the register.

With this project, we wanted to offer an overview of the cities and collect and report on the systems that are important and influence the everyday lives of citizens.

When you access the register, you can click on the systems reported and get a sense of the whole thing: the systematic information that we are providing, the application cases in which algorithmic systems and AI are used.

There are differences between the two registers as well. For example, the Amsterdam register links to systems source code on GitHub. This cannot be the case for all systems, as many are offered by third party organisations, like in Helsinki, which registers systems all provided by private companies.

During the process, we have conducted research and interviews with clients and stakeholders in order to achieve a model that serves the wider public, meaning not only tech experts by also the ones who do not know very much about technology and are not necessarily interested in it. Basically, what we have achieved is a layered model, where you can find more information based on your interest. Crucial to this process, has been the driving input from the cities, which are looking for both transparency and citizens’ participation.

Clearly, in their current forms, the registers are only a teaser that we hope to further develop and expand also through feedback and on the basis of repeatable design patterns.

If I have to say where I see this process going is towards the development of the user interface and the back end, also towards diversification that can accommodate different metadata models that could be suitable for different national contexts, cities and specific domains, such as education or others which may have specific requirements.

The feedback so far has been very positive. People see that this project is a major step forward in matters of trust of citizens in their governments and look forward to seeing where we will go next with the Amsterdam and Helsinki registers and, possibly, with other cities.

IMOGEN:

Lastly, to Natalia. I am sure many organisations were pleased to see a commitment in the National Data Strategy around the public sector use of algorithms, which is still in the consultation stage. We are not asking you to present a blueprint or to give any government new headlines, but it will be great to hear where you and where the UK Government are on this, what you expect; if there are certain countries you are looking to for models; the research you may do or where you are on the journey towards some form of public sector algorithmic transparency.

NATALIA:

I would like to start with an attempt to situate algorithmic transparency in the UK within its broader institutional context. Algorithmic transparency is a multidisciplinary area at the intersection of open data and transparency policies and data policy. Similarly to what was said earlier about the French governance landscape, our team comes from the wider transparency and openness movement.

Transparency and open data are nothing new in the UK. We have a long-standing tradition of it and a long-standing work with open-by-default policies, which applies to open data for all public sector departments. This approach supports benefits of transparency for a number of outcomes.

First, accountability driving trust in decision-making, by being transparent about the evidence base for decisions and the deliberation behind policy developments. This aligns with reasoning for increasing algorithmic transparency.

The second aspect I want to stress is efficiency. If we release data and models in the open, it is easier to spot duplication and systemic issues, errors that can be reviewed and addressed collectively. Again, this is something that is very much applicable to algorithmic models as well.

The third aspect concerns the economic outcomes. By making data freely available, companies and public sector agencies can use it as the base of innovative product developments and other services.

So, the policy foundations for algorithmic transparency are here already. What we are doing now is building on this foundation, scoping and developing further work on it.

We have the Data Ethics Framework, launched in 2016 and refreshed in 2020. We have the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation and their excellent research and proactive transparency in the use of algorithmic can be an organic extension of these activities.

The commitment we have in the National Data Strategy focuses on exploring the development of appropriate and effective mechanisms to deliver transparency on the use of algorithms. Governments around the world are looking at this and in relation to the next phase of the Artificial Intelligence developments. Enhancing the capacity to assess and audit decisions made by algorithms should be an essential and integral part of the process of scaling AI deployment in the public sector.

Currently, there is no standardised global model for algorithmic transparency, so the work on scoping the field should be composed of two key parts, the technical aspect and the organisational aspect.

We are looking at models from the other countries and regions and I am particularly interested in the following five issues.

First, the format and technical specifications. What kind of models of transparency tools exist? Are they isolated? Are they part of the wider impact assessment system, as in the case of Canada? What is the thought process behind each particular model?

The second issue is accessibility to non-expert audience and any follow-up activities: can the public, without prior knowledge of data or algorithms, understand the information that is provided? I think this has been done really well in the case of Helsinki and Amsterdam, and also in Canada. The Helsinki register is clear, the website is simple and does not use expert language. There are visuals and examples.

As a third point, what are the enforcement mechanisms? Again, in Canada, they have the directive on automated decision-making, and it is really interesting to hear about the legal framework established in France. In the UK, we are also looking into this.

Fourth, the wider organisational structure and legacy within which each transparency model functions is really important as well. In Canada, the directive applies to automated-decision systems developed after a certain cut-off date. I wonder how this can work in other countries. How do we make sure that the measures that we implement are really effective and cover as many algorithmic decision-making systems as possible.

Last, but not least, we need to think about accountability mechanisms. I really cannot stress this enough. What can citizens do with the published information? What kind of processes are in place to ensure that the citizens can challenge a process? As you have all just said, transparency on its own is not enough.

Q&A session

IMOGEN:

I have a question on a problem that we (at the Ada Lovelace Institute) have been grappling with: how do we define the object we want to bring transparency to? Is there a common set of terms for the sorts of things we are looking at? From a research perspective, we may want to spot trends. I wonder if any of the speakers can reflect on how that works in your own country contexts or in what you are proposing? Does your process start from a descriptive account of an algorithm, or are there some developing and underlying common frameworks that help classify what you are unpicking? For instance, Meeri, what exactly are you recording when you are asking a public office to describe an algorithm, is that description mainly prescriptive text or do you have a typology or an underlying framework that helps you understand and distinguish different types of evolving practices?

MEERI:

We have been calling what we have produced a metadata model and it includes documentation information or images regarding the architecture of a system, but it is also a classification. It is a never-ending job of structuring information and we are learning from feedback. One important aspect is that the back-end of the register needs to support the kind of complete transparency that is relevant to interested stakeholders and owners of the system. For example, from the perspective of accountability, what you see on the public website is the contact information of organisations and departments in charge of a system. Then there is a contact for the person that covers a specific role of responsibility with regards to the system and then there is the name of the suppliers. This is what you see on the website and the underlining model reflects these entries plus the ones that were not published yet at least for each specific system. Choosing which fields to register and which ones to publish is something that we have to manage all the time and that we have decided through collecting feedback from experts and users. For example, cyber security related information cannot always be public to everyone. What we need is a flexible model that can be customised.

IMOGEN:

There is a question in the chat that relates to the previous one, what are the strengths and weaknesses of focusing on a more local level approach versus a national level approach? Soizic, you engage with both levels, would you like to share your thoughts?

SOIZIC:

In my opinion, the tools for governance and transparency can stay the same for both levels. What will change might be the types of algorithms used at locally and centrally. Sometimes, the most intrusive systems operate at the local level. In terms of work on public registers, we have been working together with public servants from both the local and the national levels at the same time. Being a central government agency, we may have had a bias towards focusing on central level transparency, but we need to consider that the local level, especially where there is a tradition of public participation, may actually be the place where these discussions can have more impact.

MATTHIAS:

I agree with you, Soizic, but, at the same time, as I have shown in my quick intro, we think there is a value in advancing a European-wide legislation on public administration algorithmic transparency. I have no idea at the moment how realistic it is, given the priorities that the Commission has set, but it would be valuable because, in many cases, we are talking not only about small and medium-sized companies that provide services, but also about global companies. If they have the ability to deal in different ways with different civil servants, then this puts them in a position of power. If we had a European-wide legislation, there would be a clear directive to follow.

NATALIA:

Yes, I just wanted to add a few thoughts. Obviously, I come to this from a national level perspective, but I think that the biggest difference between the local and the central level discourses is actually in terms of public awareness and how engaged the public is in the whole transparency process. On the local level, the residents are invested in the subject and more likely to see the use of algorithms in their everyday lives. For example, if we look at the parking chatbot in Helsinki, I’m assuming that most adult residents with cars will have used it, contributing to the increasing understanding of how AI is deployed. This can make them more willing to engage with algorithmic transparency measures and provide feedback.

MEERI:

On the one hand, we are interested in collecting and displaying the same type of information at both local and central government levels, the same information is relevant for private provides because these companies are serving the public agencies at both levels. On the other hand, I think that the local governments are in a position to drive transparency initiatives as they are actively implementing AI systems. Also, the issue of public trust is very concrete and tangible for them. However, again, the model we are building is scalable and, so far, I have not come across something that would be so unique that the same approach would not be applicable in a different and bigger context. Then, obviously, there is an important role for governments to play to show examples of best practice.

IMOGEN:

Thank you. There is a question specifically for Natalia, asking about what the government is doing to encourage or to ensure public bodies comply with the Data Ethics Framework. This is a wider question we can ask to the other panellists as well: to what extent are actions around transparency or impact assessments to be thought of within an ethical framework? Would this be strong enough? Or do we need regulations? Perhaps, Natalia can start and if the others wish to come in, please do so.

NATALIA:

Thank you very much. A great question. I am always happy to talk about the Data Ethics Framework, as we recently refreshed it. First of all, the Data Ethics Framework does not substitute the existing legislation. We have the Data Protection Act, the Equalities Act, for instance, and the Data Ethics Framework is mainly a tool to enable our data scientists and data policymakers to innovate in a responsible way, to ensure that they are able to identify ethical considerations and mitigate them within their projects. In terms of the work we are doing now to ensure that the framework is used, there are a few strands of work. First of all, we are trying to embed the framework in as many Government processes as possible. For example, we have recently worked with the Crown Commercial Service on AI procurement systems, so suppliers that are bidding may be required to demonstrate they comply with the Data Ethics Framework. We are looking at challenges and needs in data ethics implementation and are also scoping work on how we can increase data ethics skills in the public sector. And this will naturally connect to whatever we will end up doing on algorithmic transparency as well.

IMOGEN:

Another question has come in through the Q&A chat around procurement of technology. Often the systems in use are not purely developed in the public domain, I wonder if there are examples from your respective countries on where the issue of procurement sits in the transparency discourse.

MATTHIAS:

Mozilla and AI Now have put out a paper and a response to the European Commission ‘s consultation, asking for a change in procurement practices and groups like ourselves and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism have been looking at the use of data in the public sector and procurement. We think that this is a good approach to adopt. Changing procurement rules and implementing transparency requirements is a huge lever to be used. But it is still a long way away and a long-term goal to pursue. From what I understand, there are very limited chances of revising the procurement directive at the moment.

MEERI:

I will quickly comment on this. Amsterdam started working on procurement a year ago when they were buying data-intensive technology from third parties. I think that these procurement terms for algorithmic systems are available now for anyone and there is a very good document explaining the rationale behind them. I think that this kind of transparency is very important. It is really a role of every person procuring AI in Government to recognise they are in a position to push for transparency through procurement as this can have a major impact on the whole private sector. So far, the vendor collaboration on AI transparency, for example, in Helsinki has been smooth with no significant issues. Clearly, this may be an opportunity for the vendors as well and releasing this kind of information will be useful for other cities and government agencies.

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  2. Born, G. Morris, J. Diaz, F. and Anderson, A. (2021). Artificial intelligence, music recommendation, and the curation of culture: A white paper, pp. 10–13. Schwartz Reisman Institute for Technology and Society. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ef0b24bc96ec4739e7275d3/t/60b68ccb5a371a1bcdf79317/1622576334766/Born-Morris-etal-AI_Music_Recommendation_Culture.pdf
  3. See: European Union. (2022). Digital Services Act, Article 27. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2022:277:TOC; For details of Article 17 of the Cybersecurity Administration of China (CAC)’s Internet Information Service Algorithm Recommendation Management Regulations, see: Huld, A. (2022). ‘China Passes Sweeping Recommendation Algorithm Regulations’. China Briefing News. Available at: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/china-passes-sweeping-recommendation-algorithm-regulations-effect-march-1-2022/
  4. Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision. (2001). Public broadcasting: why? how? pp. 11–15. UNESCO Digital Library. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000124058
  5. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  6. Conseil mondial de la radiotélévision. (2001). Public broadcasting: why? how? pp. 11–15. UNESCO Digital Library. Available at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000124058
  7. BBC. (2022). The BBC Story – 1920s factsheet. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/historyofthebbc/1920s.pdf
  8. Tambini, D. (2021). ‘Public service media should be thinking long term when it comes to AI’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/medialse/2021/05/12/public-service-media-should-be-thinking-long-term-when-it-comes-to-ai/
  9. Higgins, C. (2014). ‘What can the origins of the BBC tell us about its future?’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/media/2014/apr/15/bbc-origins-future
  10. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  11. Statutory governance of public service media also varies from country to country and reflects national political and regulatory norms. The BBC is regulated by the independent broadcasting regulator Ofcom. The European Union’s revised Audio Visual Service Directive requires member states to have an independent regulator but this can take different forms. See: European Commission. (2018). Digital Single Market: updated audiovisual rules. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_18_4093. For example, France has a central regulator, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel. But in Germany, although public service media objectives are defined in the constitution, oversight is provided by a regional broadcasting council, Rundfunkrat, reflecting the country’s federal structure. In Belgium too, regulation is devolved to two separate councils representing the country’s French and Flemish speaking regions.
  12. BBC. (2017). ‘Mission, values and public purposes’. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/bbc.com/aboutthebbc/governance/mission/. For comparison, ARD, the German public service media organisation articulates its values as: ‘Participation, Independence, Quality, Diversity, Localism, Innovation, Value Creation, Responsibility’. See: ARD. (2021). Die ARD – Unser Beitrag zum Gemeinwohl. Available at: https://www.ard.de/die-ard/was-wir-leisten/ARD-Unser-Beitrag-zum-Gemeinwohl-Public-Value-100
  13. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  14. Not all public service media are publicly funded. Channel 4 in the UK for example is financed through advertising but owned by the public (although the UK Government has opened a consultation on privatisation).
  15. Circulation and profits for print media have declined in recent years but in some cases promote their proprietors’ interests through political influence – for instance the Murdoch-owned Sun in the UK or the Axel Springer-owned Bild Zeitung in Germany.
  16. Ofcom. (2020). The Ofcom Broadcasting Code (with the Cross-promotion Code and the On Demand Programme Service Rules). Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/broadcast-codes/broadcast-code
  17. Ofcom. (2022). ‘Ofcom launches 15 investigations into RT’. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/news-centre/2022/ofcom-launches-investigations-into-rt
  18. Ofcom. (2021). Guide to video on demand. Available at: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/tv-radio-and-on-demand/advice-for-consumers/television/video-on-demand
  19. Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO). (2022). ‘What we do’. Available at: https://www.ipso.co.uk/what-we-do/; IMPRESS. ‘Regulated Publications’. Available at: https://impress.press/regulated-publications/
  20. UK Government. Communications Act 2003, section 265. Available at: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/section/265
  21. Lowe, G. and Martin, F. (eds.). (2014). The Value and Values of Public Service Media.
  22. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22, Annex 1. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  23. The 12th Inter-State Broadcasting Treaty, the regulatory framework for public service and commercial broadcasting across Germany’s federal states, introduced a three-step test for assessing whether online services offered by public service broadcasters met their public service remit. Under the three-step test, the broadcaster needs to assess: first, whether a new or significantly amended digital service satisfies the democratic, social and cultural needs of society; second, whether it contributes to media competition from a qualitative point of view and; third, the associated financial cost. See: Institute for Media and Communication Policy. (2009). Drei-Stufen-Test. Available at: http://medienpolitik.eu/drei-stufen-test/
  24. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  25. Spotify. (2022). ‘About Spotify’. Available at: https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info/
  26. Netflix. (2022). ‘Netflix Culture’. Available at: https://jobs.netflix.com/culture
  27. Silberling, A. (2022). ‘Spotify adds COVID-19 content advisory’. TechCrunch. Available at: https://social.techcrunch.com/2022/03/28/spotify-covid-19-content-advisory-joe-rogan/; Jackson, S. (2022). ‘Jimmy Carr condemned by Nadine Dorries for “shocking” Holocaust joke about travellers in Netflix special His Dark Material’. Sky News. Available at: https://news.sky.com/story/jimmy-carr-condemned-for-disturbing-holocaust-joke-about-travellers-in-netflix-special-his-dark-material-12533148
  28. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  29. BBC Trust. (2012). BBC Trust assessment processes Guidance document. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/pvt/assessment_processes_guidance.pdf
  30. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  31. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  32. Lowe, G.F. and Maijanen, P. (2019). ‘Making sense of the public service mission in media: youth audiences, competition, and strategic management’. Journal of Media Business Studies. doi: 10.1080/16522354.2018.1553279; Schulz, A., Levy, D. and Nielsen, R.K. (2019). ‘Old, Educated, and Politically Diverse: The Audience of Public Service News’, pp. 15–19, 29–30. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/our-research/old-educated-and-politically-diverse-audience-public-service-news
  33. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  34. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  35. Ofcom. (2021). Small Screen: Big Debate – Recommendations to Government on the future of Public Service Media. Available at: https://www.smallscreenbigdebate.co.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0023/221954/statement-future-of-public-service-media.pdf
  36. House of Commons Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee. (2021). The future of public service broadcasting, HC 156. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5801/cmselect/cmcumeds/156/156.pdf
  37. European Commission. (2022). ‘European Media Freedom Act: Commission launches public consultation’. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_22_85
  38. The Economist. (2021). ‘Populists are threatening Europe’s independent public broadcasters’. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/04/08/populists-are-threatening-europes-independent-public-broadcasters
  39. The Economist. (2021).
  40. The Sutton Trust. (2019). Elitist Britain, pp. 40–42. Available at: https://www.suttontrust.com/our-research/elitist-britain-2019/; Friedman, S. and Laurison, D. (2019). ‘The class pay gap: why it pays to be privileged’. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/07/the-class-pay-gap-why-it-pays-to-be-privileged
  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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A report which sets out how regulation provides clear, unambiguous rules, which are necessary if the UK is to embrace AI on terms that will be beneficial for people and society.

Regulate to innovate provides evidence for how the UK might develop its approach to AI regulation, which is in line with its ambition for innovation – as set out in the UK AI Strategy – as well as recommendations for the Office for AI’s forthcoming White Paper on the regulation and governance of AI.

Executive summary

In its 2021 National AI Strategy, the UK Government laid out its ambition to make the UK an ‘AI superpower’, bringing economic and societal benefits through innovation. Realising this goal has the potential to transform the UK’s society and economy over the coming decades, and promises significant economic and societal benefits. But the rapid development and proliferation of AI systems also poses significant risks.

As with other disruptive and emerging technologies,[footnote]Mazzucato, M. (2015). ‘From Market Fixing to Market-Creating: A New Framework for Economic Policy’, SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2744593.[/footnote] creating a successful, safe and innovative AI-enabled economy will be dependent on the UK Government’s ability to establish the right approach to governing and regulating AI systems. And as the UK AI Council’s Roadmap, published in January 2021, states, ‘the UK will only feel the full benefits of AI if all parts of society have full confidence in the science and the technologies, and in the governance and regulation that enable them.’[footnote] AI Council. (2021). AI Roadmap. UK Government. January 2021. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-roadmap [accessed 11 October 2021].[/footnote]

The UK is well placed to develop the right regulatory conditions for AI to flourish, and to balance the economic and societal opportunities with associated risks,[footnote]Office for AI. (2021). National AI Strategy. UK Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1020402/National_AI_Strategy_-_PDF_version.pdf.[/footnote] but urgently needs to set out its approach to this vital, complex task.

However, articulating the right governance and regulatory environment for AI will not be easy.

By virtue of their ability to develop and operate independently of human control, and to make decisions with moral and legal consequences, AI systems present a uniform set of general regulatory and legal challenges concerning agency, causation, accountability and
control. At the same time, the specific regulatory questions posed by AI systems vary considerably across the different domains and industries in which they might be deployed.

Regulators must therefore be able to find ways of accounting consistently for the general properties of AI while also attending to the peculiarities of individual use cases and business models. While other states and economic blocs are already in the process of engaging with tough but unavoidable regulatory challenges through new draft legislation, the UK has still to commit to its regulatory approach to AI.

In September 2021, the Office for AI pledged to set out the Government’s position on AI regulation in a White Paper, to be published in early 2022. Over the course of 2021, the Ada Lovelace Institute convened a cross-disciplinary panel of experts to explore approaches to AI regulation, and inform the development of the Government’s position. Based on this, and Ada’s own research, this report sets out how the UK might develop its approach to AI regulation in line with its ambition for innovation. In this report we:

  1. explore some of the aims and objectives of AI regulation that might have been considered alongside economic growth
  2. outline some of the challenges associated with regulating AI
  3. review the regulatory toolkit, and options for rules and system design, which address technologies, markets and use-specific issues
  4. identify and evaluate some of the different tools and approaches that might be used to overcome the challenges of AI regulation
  5. assess the institutional and legal conditions required for the effective regulation of AI
  6. raise outstanding questions that the UK Government will have to answer in setting out and realising its approach to AI regulation.

The report also identifies a series of conclusions for policymakers, as well as specific recommendations for the Office for AI’s White Paper on the regulation and governance of AI. To present a viable roadmap for the UK’s regulatory ecosystem, the White Paper will need to make clear commitments in three important areas:

  • The development of new, clear regulations for AI.
  • Improved regulatory capacity and coordination.
  • Improved transparency standards and accountability mechanisms.

The development of new, clear regulations for AI

We make the case for the UK Government to:

  • develop a clear description of AI systems that reflects its overall approach to AI regulation, and criteria for regulatory intervention
  • create a central function to oversee the development and implementation of AI-specific, domain-neutral statutory rules for AI systems that are rooted in legal
    and ethical principles
  • require individual regulators to develop sector-specific codes of practice for the regulation of AI.

Improved regulatory capacity and coordination

We argue that there is a need for:

  • expanded funding for regulators to help them deal with analytical and enforcement challenges posed by AI systems
  • expanded funding and support for regulatory experimentation and the development of anticipatory and participatory capacity within individual regulators
  • the development of formal structures for capacity sharing, coordination and intelligence sharing between regulators dealing with AI systems
  • consideration of what additional powers regulators may need to enable them to make use of a greater variety of regulatory mechanisms.

Improving transparency standards and accountability mechanisms

The impacts of AI systems may not always be visible to, or controllable by, policymakers and regulators alone. As such, regulation and regulatory intelligence gathering will have to be complemented by, and coordinated with extra-regulatory mechanisms such as standards,
investigative journalism and activism. We argue that the UK Government should consider:

  • using the UK’s influence over international standards to improve the transparency and auditability of AI systems
  • how best to maintain and strengthen laws and mechanisms to protect and enable journalists, academics, civil-society organisations, whistleblowers and citizen auditors to hold developers and deployers of AI systems to account.

Overall, this report finds that, far from being an impediment to innovation, effective, future-proof regulation will provide companies and developers with the space to experiment and take risks without being hampered by concerns about legal, reputational or ethical exposure.

Regulation is also necessary to give the public the confidence to embrace AI technologies, and to ensure continued access to foreign markets.

The report also highlights how regulation is an indispensable tool, alongside robust industry codes of practice and judicious public-funding and procurement decisions, to help navigate the narrow path between the risks and harms these technologies present.

We propose that the clear, unambiguous rules that regulation can provide are necessary if
the UK is to embrace AI on terms that will be beneficial in the long term.

To support this approach, we should resist the characterisation that regulation is the enemy of
innovation: modern, relevant, effective regulation will be the brakes that allow us to drive the UK’s AI vehicle successfully and safely into new and beneficial territories.

Finally, this research outlines the major questions and challenges that will need to be addressed in order to develop effective and proportionate AI regulation. In addition to supporting the UK Government’s thinking on how to become an ‘AI superpower’ in a manner that manages risk and results in broadly felt public benefit, we hope this report will contribute to live debates on AI regulation in Europe and the rest of the world.

How to read this report

This report is principally aimed at influencing the emerging policy discourse around the regulation of AI in the UK, and around the world.

  • In the introduction we argue that regulation represents the missing link in the UK’s overall AI strategy, and that addressing this gap will be critical to the UK’s plans to become an AI superpower.
  • Chapter 1 sets out the aims and objectives UK AI regulation should pursue, in addition to economic growth.
  • Chapter 2 reviews the generic regulatory toolkit, and sets out the different ways that regulatory rules and systems can be conceived and configured to deal with different kinds of problems, technologies and markets.
  • Chapters 3 and 4 review some of the specific challenges associated with regulating AI systems, and set out some of the tools and approaches that have the potential to help overcome or ameliorate these difficulties.
  • Chapter 5 articulates some general lessons for policymakers considering how to regulate AI in a UK context.
  • Chapter 6 sets out some specific recommendations for the Office for AI’s forthcoming White Paper on the regulation and governance of AI.

If you’re a UK policymaker thinking about how to regulate AI systems

We encourage you to read the recommendations at the end of this report, which set out some of the key pieces of guidance we hope the Office for AI will incorporate in their forthcoming White Paper.

If you’re from a regulatory body

Explore the mechanisms and approaches to regulating AI, set out in chapter 3, which may provide some ideas for how your organisation can hold these systems more accountable.

If you’re a policymaker from outside of the UK

Many of the considerations articulated in this report are, despite the UK framing, applicable to other national contexts. The considerations for regulating AI that are set out in chapters 1, 2 and 3 are universally applicable.

If you’re a developer of AI systems, or an AI academic

The introduction and the lessons for policymakers section set out why the UK needs to take a new approach to the regulation of AI.

A note on terminology: Throughout this report, we use ‘regulation’ to refer to the codified ‘hard’ rules and directives established by governments to control and govern a particular domain or technology. By contrast, we use the term ‘governance’ to refer to non-regulatory means by which a domain or technology might be controlled or influenced, such as norms, conventions, codes of practice and other ‘soft’ interventions.

 

The terms ex ante (before the event) and ex post (after the event) are used throughout this document. Here, ‘ex ante’ regulation typically refers to regulatory mechanisms intended to prevent or ameliorate future harms, whereas ‘ex post’ refers to mechanisms intended to remedy harms after the fact, or to provide redress.

Introduction

In its 2021 National AI Strategy, the UK Government outlines three core pillars for setting the country on a path towards becoming a global AI and science superpower. These are:[footnote]Office for AI. (2021). National AI strategy. UK Government. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy.[/footnote]

  1. investing in the long-term needs of the AI ecosystem
  2. supporting the transition to an AI-enabled economy
  3. ensuring the UK gets the national and international governance of AI technologies right to encourage innovation, investment and protect the public and ‘fundamental values’.[footnote] The strategy uses, but does not define a range of terms related to values, including ‘fundamental values’, ‘our ethical values’, ‘our democratic values’, ‘UK values’, ‘fundamental UK values’ and ‘open society values’. It also refers to ‘values such as fairness, openness, liberty, security, democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights’[/footnote]

As part of its third pillar, the strategy states the Office for AI will set out a ‘national position on governing and regulating AI’ in a White Paper in early 2022. This report seeks to help the Office for AI develop this forthcoming strategy, setting out some of the key challenges associated
with the regulation of AI, different options for approaching the task and a series of concrete recommendations for the UK Government.

The publication of the new AI strategy represents an important articulation of the UK’s ambitions to cultivate and utilise the power of AI. It provides welcome detail on the Government’s proposed approach to AI investment, and their plans to increase the use of AI systems throughout different parts of the economy. Whether the widespread adoption of AI systems will increase economic growth remains to be seen, but it is a belief that underpins this Government’s strategy, and this paper does not seek to explore that assumption.[footnote]One challenge is whether increasing AI adoption may only serve to consolidate the power of a handful of US-based tech companies who use their resources to acquire AI-based start ups. A 2019 UK Government review of digital competition found that ‘over the last 10 years the 5 largest firms have made over 400 acquisitions globally. See Furman, J. (2019). Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel. HM Treasury. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-panel.[/footnote]

The strategy also highlights some areas that will require further policy thinking and development in the near future. The chapter ‘Governing AI effectively’, notes some of the challenges associated with governing and regulating AI systems that are top of mind for this Government and surveys some of the different regulatory approaches that could be taken, but remains agnostic on which might work best for the UK.

Instead, it asks whether the UK’s current approach to AI regulation is adequate, and commits to set out ‘the Government’s position on the risks and harms posed by AI technologies and our proposal to address them’ in a White Paper in early 2022. In making a commitment to set out the UK’s ‘national position on governing and regulating AI’, the Government has set itself an ambitious timetable for articulating how it intends to address one of the most important gaps in current UK AI policy.

This report explores how the UK’s National AI Strategy might address the regulation and governance of AI systems. It is informed by the Ada Lovelace Institute’s own research and analysis into mechanisms for regulating AI, as well as two expert workshops that the Institute convened in April and May 2021. These convenings brought together academics, public and civil servants, regulators and representatives from civil society organisations to discuss:

  1. How the UK’s regulatory and governance mechanisms may have to evolve and adapt into order to serve the needs and ambitions of the UK’s approach to AI.
  2. How Government policy can support the UK’s regulatory and governance mechanisms to undergo these changes.

The Government is already in the process of drawing up and consulting on plans for the future of UK data regulation and governance, much of which relates to the use of data for AI systems.[footnote]Department for Digital, Culture Media & Sport. (2021). Data: A new direction. UK Government. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1016395/Data_Reform_Consultation_Document__ Accessible_.pdf[/footnote] While relevant to AI, dataprotection law does not holistically address the kinds of risks and impacts AI systems may present – and is not enough on its own to provide AI developers, users and the public with the clarity and protection they need to integrate these technologies into society with confidence.

Where work to establish a supporting ecosystem for AI is already underway, the Government has so far focused primarily on developing and setting out AI-governance measures, such as the creation of bodies like the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI), with less attention
and activity on specific approaches to the regulation of AI systems.[footnote] The first UK AI strategy (called the UK AI Sector Deal), published in 2017 and updated in 2019, makes relatively little mention of the role of regulation and governance. In discussing how to build trust in the adoption of AI and address its challenges, the strategy is limited to calls for the creation of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation to ‘ensure safe, ethical and ground-breaking innovation in AI and data-driven technologies.’ Though the CDEI, since its inception, has produced various helpful pieces of evidence and guidance on ethical best practice around AI (such as a review into bias in algorithmic decision-making and an adoption guide for privacy-enhancing technologies), thinking on how regulation, specifically, might support the responsible development and use of AI remains less advanced.[/footnote]

To move forward, the UK Government will have to answer fundamental questions on the regulation of AI systems in the forthcoming White Paper, including:

  • What should the goal of AI regulation be, and what kinds of regulatory tools and mechanisms can help achieve those objectives?
  • Do AI systems require bespoke regulation, or can the regulation of these systems be wrapped into existing sector-specific regulations, or a broader regulatory package for digital technologies?
  • Should regulating AI require the creation of a single AI regulator, or empower existing regulatory bodies with the capacity and resources to regulate these systems?
  • What kinds of governance practices work for AI systems, and how can regulation incentivise and empower these kinds of practices?
  • How can regulators best address some of the underlying root causes of the harms associated with AI systems?[footnote]Balayan, A., and GĂźrses, S., (2021). Beyond Debiasing: Regulating AI and its inequalities. European Digital Rights. Available at: https://edri.org/our-work/if-ai-is-the-problem-is-debiasing-the-solution.[/footnote]

For the UK’s AI industry it will be vital that the Government provides actionable answers to these questions. Creating a world-leading AI economy will require consistent and understandable rules, clear objectives and meaningful enforcement mechanisms.

Other world leaders in AI development are already establishing regulations around AI. In April 2021, the European Commission released a draft proposal for the regulation of AI (part of a suite of regulatory proposals for digital markets and services), which proposes a risk-based
model for establishing certain requirements on the sale and deployment of AI technologies.[footnote] European Commission. (2021). A Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artifical Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206 [accessed 4 October 2021].[/footnote] While this draft is still subject to extensive review, it has the potential to set a new global standard for AI regulation that other countries are likely to follow.

In August 2021, the Cyberspace Administration of China passed a set of draft regulations for algorithmic systems,[footnote] Cyberspace Administration of China (国家互联网信息办公室). (2021). Notice of the State Internet Information Office on the Regulations on the Management of Recommendations for Internet Information Service Algorithms (Draft for Solicitation of Comments). 27 August. Available at: www-cac-gov-cn.translate.goog/2021-08/27/c_1631652502874117.htm?_x_tr_sch=http&_x_tr_sl=zh-CN&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=ajax,nv,elem [Accessed 16 September 2021].[/footnote] which includes requirements and standards for the design, use and kinds of data that algorithmic systems can use.[footnote]For an interesting analysis, see Schaefer, K. (2021). 27 August. Available at: https://twitter.com/kendraschaefer/status/1431134515242496002 [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote] The USA is taking a slower and more fragmented route to the regulation of AI, but is also heading towards establishing its own approach.[footnote] Since 2019, numerous government offices – including the White House’s Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Institute of Standards and Technology, and the Department of Defence Innovation Board – have set out positions and principles for a national framework on AI.[/footnote]

Throughout 2021, the US Congress has introduced several pieces of federal AI governance and data-protection legislation, such as the Information Transparency and Personal Data Control Act, which would establish similar requirements to the EU GDPR.[footnote]US Congress. (2021). H.R.1816 – Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act. Available at: www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1816/.[/footnote] In October 2021, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy announced its intention to develop a ‘bill of rights’ to ‘clarify the rights and freedoms [that AI systems] should respect.’[footnote] Lander, E., and Nelson, A. (2021). ‘Americans need a bill of rights for an AI-powered world,’ Wired, 10 October. Available at: www.wired.com/story/opinion-bill-of-rights-artificial-intelligence [accessed 11 October 2021].[/footnote] Moreover, it is looking increasingly likely that geostrategic considerations will push the EU and the USA into closer regulatory proximity over the coming years, with EU President von der Leyen having recently pushed for the EU and the USA to start collaborating together on the promotion and governance of AI systems.[footnote]In a November 2020 speech at the Council on Foreign Relations. See Branson, A. (2020). ‘European Commission woos US over AI agreement.’ Global Government Forum. Available at: www.globalgovernmentforum.com/european-commission-woosus-over-ai-agreemen[/footnote]

As the positions of the world’s most powerful states and economic blocs on the regulation of AI become clearer, more developed and potentially more aligned, it will be increasingly incumbent on the UK to set out its own plans, or risk getting left behind. Unless the UK carves out its own approach towards the regulation of AI, it risks playing catch-up with other nations, or having to default to approaches developed elsewhere that may not align with the Government’s particular strategic objectives. Moreover, if domestically produced AI systems do not align with regulatory standards adopted by other major trade blocs, this could have significant implications for companies operating in the UK’s domestic AI sector, who could find themselves excluded from non-UK markets.

As well as trade considerations, a clear regulatory strategy for AI will be essential to the UK Government’s stated ambitions to use AI to power economic growth, raise living standards and address pressing societal challenges like climate change. As the UK has learned from a variety of different industries, from its enduringly strong life-sciences sector,[footnote] Kent, C. (2019). ‘UK Healthcare Industry Analysis 2019: Why Britain Is a World Leader’. Pharmaceutical Technology. Available at: https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/sponsored/uk-healthcare-industry-analysis-2019/ [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] to recent successes in fintech,[footnote]McLean, A., and Wood, I. (2015). ‘Do Regulators Hold the Key to FinTech Success?’, Financier Worldwide Available at: www.financierworldwide.com/do-regulators-hold-the-key-to-fintech-success [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] a clear and robust regulatory framework is essential for the development and diffusion of new technologies and processes. A regulatory framework would ensure developers and deployers of AI systems know how to operate in accordance with the law and protect against the kinds of well-documented harms associated with these technologies,[footnote]McGregor, S. (2020). When AI Systems Fail: Introducing the AI Incident Database. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://partnershiponai.org/aiincidentdatabase.[/footnote] which can undermine public confidence in their development and use.

The need for clear and comprehensive AI regulation is pressing. As a complex, novel technology, the benefits of AI are yet to be evenly distributed to all members of society, yet there is a growing body of evidence around the ways they can cause harm.[footnote]Pownall, C. (2021). AI, algorithmic and automation incidents and controversies. Available at: https://charliepownall.com ai-algorithimic-incident-controversy-database.[/footnote] Across the world, AI systems are being increasingly used in high-stakes settings such as determining which job applicants are successful,[footnote]Dattner, B., Chamorro-Premuzic, T., Buchband, R., and Schettler, L. (2019). ‘The Legal and Ethical Implications of Using AI in Hiring’, Harvard Business Review, 25 April 2019. Available at: https://hbr.org/2019/04/the-legal-and-ethical-implications-of-using-ai-in-hiring [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] what public benefits residents are eligible to claim,[footnote]Martinho-Truswell, E. (2018). ‘How AI Could Help the Public Sector’, Harvard Business Review, 26 January 2018. Available at: https://hbr.org/2018/01/how-ai-could-help-the-public-sector [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] what kind of loan a prospective financial-services client can receive,[footnote]Faggella, D., (2020). ‘Artificial Intelligence Applications for Lending and Loan Management’, Emerj. Available at: https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-applications-lending-loan-management/ [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] or what risk to society a person may potentially pose.[footnote]Tashea, J. (2017). ‘Courts Are Using AI to Sentence Criminals. That Must Stop Now’, Wired. Available at: www.wired.com/2017/04/ courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/ [accessed 20 September 2021][/footnote] In many of these instances, AI systems have not yet been proven capable of addressing these kind of tasks fairly or accurately; in others, they have not been properly integrated into the complex social environments in which they have been deployed.

But building such a regulatory framework for AI will not be easy. In virtue of their ability to develop and operate independently of human control, and to make decisions with moral and legal consequences, AI systems present a uniform set of regulatory and legal challenges
concerning agency, causation, accountability and control.[footnote]Turner, J. (2018). Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Palgrave Macmillan.[/footnote]

At the same time, the specific regulatory questions posed by AI systems vary considerably across the different domains and industries in which they might be deployed. Regulators must find ways of accounting consistently for the general properties of AI, while also attending to the
peculiarities of individual use-cases and business models.

In these contexts, AI systems raise unprecedented legal and regulatory questions, such as their ability to automate morally significant decision-making processes in ways that can be difficult to predict, and their capacity to develop and operate independently of human control.

AI systems are also frequently complex and opaque, and often fail to fall neatly within the contours of existing regulatory systems – they either straddle regulatory remits, or else fall through the gaps in between them. And they are developed for a variety of purposes in different domains, where their impacts, benefits and risks may vary considerably.

These features can make it extremely difficult for existing regulatory bodies to understand if, how and in what manner to intervene.

As a result of this ubiquity and complexity, there is no pre-existing regulatory framework – from finance, medicine, product safety, consumer regulation or elsewhere – that can be reworked to readily apply to an overall, cross-cutting approach to UK AI regulation, nor any that look capable of playing such a role without substantial modifications. Instead, a coherent, effective, durable regulatory framework for AI will have to be developed from first principles, borrowing and adapting regulatory techniques, tools and ideas where they are relevant and developing new ones where necessary.

Difficulties posed by the intrinsic features of AI systems are compounded by the current nature of the business practices of many companies that develop AI systems. The developers of AI systems often fail to sit neatly within any one geographic jurisdiction, and face few
existing regulatory requirements to disclose details of how and where their systems operate. Moreover, the business models of many of the largest and most successful firms that develop AI systems tend towards market dominance, data agglomeration and user disempowerment.

All this makes the Office for AI’s task of using their forthcoming White Paper to set out the UK’s position on governing and regulating AI a substantial challenge. Even if the Office for AI limits itself to the articulation of a high-level direction of travel for AI regulation, doing so will involve adjudicating between competing values and visions of the UK’s relationship to AI, as well as between differing approaches to addressing the multiple regulatory challenges posed by the technology.

Over the course of 2021, the Ada Lovelace Institute has undertaken multiple research projects and convened expert conversations on many of issues relevant to how the UK should approach the regulation of AI.

These included:

  • two expert workshops exploring the potential underlying goals of a regulatory system for AI in the UK, the different ways it might be designed, and the tools and mechanisms it would require
  • workshops considering the EU’s emerging approach to AI regulation
  • research on algorithmic accountability in the public sector and on transparency methods of algorithmic decision-making systems.

Drawing on the insights generated, and on our own research and deliberation, this report sets out to answer the following questions on how the UK might go about developing its approach to the regulation of AI:

  1. What might the UK want to achieve with a regulatory framework for AI?
  2. What kinds of regulatory approaches and tools could support such outcomes?
  3. What are the institutional and legal conditions needed to enable them?

As well as influencing broader policy debates around AI regulation, it is our hope that these considerations are useful in informing the development of the Office for AI’s White Paper, the publication of which presents a critical opportunity to help ensure that regulation delivers on its promise to help the UK live up to its ambitions of becoming an ‘AI superpower’ – and ensuring that such a status delivers economic and societal benefits.

Expert workshops on the regulation of AI

 

In April and May 2021, the Ada Lovelace Institute (Ada) convened two expert workshops, bringing together academics, AI researchers, public and civil servants and civil-society organisations to explore how the UK Government should approach the regulation of AI. The insights gained from these workshops have, alongside Ada’s own research and deliberation, informed the discussions presented in this report.[footnote]Any references in this report to the views and insights of ‘expert participants’ are references to the discussions in the two workshops.[/footnote]

 

These discussions were initially framed around the approach of the UK’s National AI Strategy to AI regulation. In practice, they became broader dialogues about the UK’s relationship to AI, what the goals of Government policy regarding AI systems should be and the UK’s approach to their regulation.

 

  • Workshop one: Explored the underlying goals and aims of UK AI policy, particularly with regards to regulation and governance. A key aim here was to establish what long-term objectives, alongside economic growth, the UK should aspire to achieve through AI policy.
  • Workshop two: Concentrated on identifying the specific mechanisms and policy changes that would be needed for the realisation of a successful, joined-up approach to AI regulation. Participants were encouraged to consider the challenges associated with the different objectives of AI policy, as well as broader challenges associated with regulating AI. They then discussed what regulatory approaches, tools and techniques might be required to address them. Participants were also invited to consider whether the UK’s regulatory infrastructure itself may need to be adapted or supplemented.

 

The workshops were conducted under Chatham House rules. With the exception of presentations given by expert participants, none of the insights produced by these workshops are attributed specifically to individual people or organisations.

 

Expert participants are listed out in full in the acknowledgements section at the end of the report.

 

Representatives from the Office for AI also attended the workshops as observers.

UK AI strategies and regulation

The UK Government’s thinking on the regulation of AI has developed significantly over the past five years. This box sets out some of the major milestones in the Government’s position on the regulation and governance of AI over this time, with the aim of putting the 2021 UK AI Strategy into the context of recent history.

2017-19 UK AI strategy

The original UK AI strategy (called the UK AI Sector Deal), published in 2017 and updated in 2019, makes relatively little mention of the role of regulation.[footnote]European Commission. United Kingdom AI Strategy Report. Available at: https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/ai-watch/united-kingdom-ai-strategy-report_en.[/footnote] In discussing how to build trust in the adoption of AI and address its challenges, the strategy is limited to calls for the creation of the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) to ‘ensure safe, ethical and ground-breaking innovation in AI and data-driven technologies’. The report also calls for the creation of the Office for AI to help the UK Government implement this strategy. The UK Government has since created guidance on the ethical adoption of data-driven technologies and the mitigation of potential harms, including guidelines, developed jointly with the Alan Turing Institute, for ethical AI use in the public sector,[footnote]Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding artificial intelligence ethics and safety: A guide for the responsible design and implementation of AI systems in the public sector. The Alan Turing Institute. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.3240529.[/footnote] a review into bias in algorithmic decision-making[footnote]Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. (2020). Review into bias in algorithmic decision-making. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/cdei-publishes-review-into-bias-in-algorithmic-decision-making.[/footnote] and an adoption guide for privacy-enhancing technologies.[footnote]Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation. (2021). Privacy Enhancing Technologies Adoption Guide. Available at: https://cdeiuk.github.io/ pets-adoption-guide[/footnote]

2021 UK AI roadmap

In January 2021, the AI Council, an independent-expert committee that provides advice to the Office for AI on the AI ecosystem and its AI strategy implementation, published a roadmap with 16 recommendations for how the UK can develop a revised national AI strategy.[footnote]AI Council. (2021). AI Roadmap. UK Government. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/ai-roadmap.[/footnote]

The roadmap states that:

  • A revised AI strategy presents an important opportunity for the UK Government to develop a strategy for the regulation and governance of AI technologies produced
    and sold in the UK, with the goal improving safety and public confidence in their use.
  • The UK must become ‘world-leading in the provision of responsible regulation and governance’.
  • Given the rapidly changing nature of AI’s development, the UK’s systems of governance must be ‘ready to respond and adapt more frequently than has typically been true of systems of governance in the past’.

The Council recommends ‘commissioning an independent entity to provide recommendations on the next steps in the evolution of governance mechanisms, including impact and risk assessments, best-practice principles, ethical processes and institutional mechanisms that will increase and sustain public trust’.

2021 Scottish AI strategy

Some parts of the UK have further articulated their approach to the regulation of AI. In March 2021, the Scottish Government released an AI strategy that includes five principles that ‘will guide the AI journey from concept to regulation and adoption to create a chain of trust throughout the entire process.’[footnote]Digital Scotland. (2021) Scotland’s AI Strategy: Trustworthy, Ethical and Inclusive. Available at: www.scotlandaistrategy.com.[/footnote]These principles draw on the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) five complementary values-based principles for the responsible stewardship of trustworthy AI. These are:[footnote]Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2019). OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: www.oecd.org/going-digital/ai/principles.[/footnote]

  1. AI should benefit people and the planet by driving inclusive growth, sustainable
    development and wellbeing.
  2. AI systems should be designed in a way that respects the rule of law, human rights,
    democratic values and diversity, and they should include appropriate safeguards –
    for example, enabling human intervention where necessary – to ensure a fair
    and just society.
  3. There should be transparency and responsible disclosure around AI systems to
    ensure that people understand AI-based outcomes and can challenge them.
  4. AI systems must function in a robust, secure and safe way throughout their life cycles
    and potential risks should be continually assessed and managed.
  5. Organisations and individuals developing, deploying or operating AI systems should
    be held accountable for their proper functioning in line with the above principles.

The Scottish strategy also calls for the Government to ‘develop a plan to influence global AI
standards and regulations through international partnerships’.

2021 Digital Regulation Plan

In July 2021, the Department for Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) released a policy paper outlining their thinking on the regulation of digital technologies, including AI.[footnote]Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport. (2021). Plan for Digital Regulation. UK Government. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/digital-regulation-driving-growth-and-unlocking-innovation.[/footnote] The paper provides high-level considerations, including the establishment of three principles that should guide future plans for the regulation of digital technologies. These are:

  1. Actively promote innovation: Regulation should ‘be designed to minimise unnecessary burdens on businesses’, be ‘outcomes-focused’, backed by clear evidence of harm, and consider the effects on innovation (a concept the paper does not define). The Government’s approach to regulation should also consider non-regulatory interventions like technical standards first.
  2. Achieve forward-looking and coherent outcomes: This section states regulation should be coordinated across regulators to reduce undue burdens or duplicating existing regulation. Regulation should take a ‘collaborative approach’ by working with businesses to test out new interventions and business models. Approaches to regulation should ‘address underlying drivers of harm rather than symptoms, in order
    to protect against future changes’.
  3. Exploit opportunities and address challenges in the international arena: Regulation should be interoperable with international regulations, and policymakers should ‘build in international considerations from the start’, including via the creation of international standards.

The Digital Regulation Plan includes several mechanisms for putting these principles into practice, including plans to create more regulatory coordination and cooperation, engagement in international forums, and plans to embed these principles across government. However, this policy paper stops short of providing specific recommendations, approaches or frameworks for the regulation of AI systems, and provides only a broad set of considerations that are top of mind for this Government. It does not address specific regulatory tools, mechanisms or approaches the UK should consider towards AI, nor does it provide specific guidance for the overall approach the UK should take towards regulating these technologies.

2021 UK AI Strategy

Released in September 2021, the most recent UK AI Strategy sets out three pillars to lead the UK towards becoming an AI science superpower, including:

  • investing in the long-term needs of the AI ecosystem
  • supporting the transition to an AI-enabled economy
  • ensuring the UK gets the national and international governance of AI technologies right to encourage innovation, investment and protect the public and fundamental values.

Sections one and two of the strategy include plans to launch a National AI Research and Innovation (R&I) programme to align funding priorities across UK research councils, plans to publish a Defence AI Strategy articulating military uses of AI, and other investments to expand investment in the UK’s AI sector. The third pillar on governance includes plans to pilot an AI Standards Hub to coordinate UK engagement in AI standardisation globally, fund the Alan Turing Institute to update guidance on AI ethics and safety in the public sector, and increase the capacity of regulators to address the risks posed by AI systems. In discussing AI regulation, it makes references to embedding values such as fairness, openness, liberty, security, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.

Chapter 1: Goals of AI regulation

Recent policy debates around AI have emphasised cultivating and utilising the technology’s potential to contribute to economic growth. This focus is visible in the newly published AI strategy’s approach to regulation, which stresses the importance of ensuring that the regulatory system fosters public trust and a stable environment for businesses without unduly inhibiting AI innovation.

Although it is prominent in the current Government’s AI policy discussions, economic growth is just one of several underlying objectives for which the UK’s regulatory approach to AI could be
configured. As experts in our workshops pointed out, policymakers may also, for instance, want to stimulate the development of particular forms of AI, single out particular industries for disruption by the technology, or avoid particular consequences of the technology’s development and adoption.

Different underlying objectives will not necessarily be mutually exclusive, but prioritisation matters – choices about which to explicitly include and which to emphasise will have a significant effect on downstream policy choices. This is especially the case with regulation, where new regulatory institutions, approaches and tools will need to be chosen and coordinated with broader strategic goals in mind.

The first of the two expert workshops identified and debated desirable objectives for the regulation of AI in addition to economic growth – and explored what adopting these would mean, in concrete terms, for the UK’s regulatory system.[footnote] As set out above, the expert workshops considered the question of how the UK should approach the regulation of AI through the lens of the UK National AI Strategy, though the discussion quickly expanded to cover the UK’s regulatory approach to AI more generally.[/footnote]

A clear point of consensus among the workshop participants, and an important recommendation of this report, was that the Government’s approach to AI must not be focused exclusively on fostering economic growth, and must consider the unique properties of how AI systems are developed, procured and integrated.

Rather than concentrating exclusively on increasing the rate and extent of AI development and use, expert participants stressed that the Government’s approach to AI must also be attentive to the technology’s unique features, the particular ways it might manifest itself, and the specific effects it might have on the country’s economy, society and power structures.

The need to take account of the unique features of AI is a reason for developing a bespoke, codified regulatory approach to the technology – rather than accommodating it within a broader, technology-neutral, industrial strategy. Perhaps more importantly, though, workshop
participants were keen to highlight that many of AI’s most significant opportunities can only be utilised, and many of its risks can only be mitigated, with the help of an overarching Government strategy that sets out intentions for the use, regulation and governance of these systems. By attending to AI’s specific properties, it will be easier for Government to steer the beneficial development and use of AI to address societal challenges, and for the potential risks posed by the technology to be effectively managed.

In light of the specific challenges and opportunity AI poses, expert participants identified four additional objectives that might be usefully built into any AI strategy (outlined below). A common theme cutting across the discussion was that the UK should build in as an objective the protection and advancement of human rights and societally important values, such as agency, democracy, the rule of law, equality and privacy.


 

Objective 1: Ensure AI is used and developed in accordance with specific values and norms

A common refrain among participants was that the UK AI policy should articulate a set of high-level norms or ethical principles to govern the country’s desired relationship with AI systems. As several experts pointed out, other countries’ national AI strategies, including that of Scotland, have articulated a set of values.[footnote]Digital Scotland. (2021). Scotland’s AI Strategy: Trustworthy, Ethical and Inclusive. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dc00e9e32cd095744be7634/t/606430e006dc4a462a5fa1d4/1617178862157/Scotlands_AI_Strategy_Web_updated_single_page_aps.pdf [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote] The purpose of these principles would be to inform specific policy decisions in relation to AI, including the development of regulatory policy and sector-specific guidance and best practice.

The articulation of clear, universal and specific values in a prominent AI-policy document (such as an AI strategy) can help establish a common language and set of principles that could be referenced in future policy and public debates regarding AI. In this instance, the principles would set out how the Government should cultivate and direct the development of the technology, as well as how its use should be governed. They may also extend to the programming and decision-making architecture of AI systems themselves, setting out the values and priorities the UK public would want the developers and deployers of AI systems to uphold when putting them in operation.[footnote]Public opinion on these values and priorities would be determined empirically through, for instance, deliberative public engagement.[/footnote]

In its latest AI strategy, the UK Government makes brief references to several values, including fairness, openness, liberty, security, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights.[footnote]Office for AI. (2021). National AI strategy. UK Government. P. 50. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy[/footnote] While the values and norms articulated by a national AI strategy would not themselves be able to adjudicate between competing interests and views on specific questions, they do create a framework for weighing and justifying particular courses of action. Medical ethics is a good example of the value of a common language and framework, as it provides medical practitioners with a toolkit to think about different value-laden decisions they might encounter in their practice.[footnote]British Medical Association. (n.d). Ethics. Available at: www.bma.org.uk/advice-and-support/ethics [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote] In the AI strategy, the values are not well defined enough to underpin this function, nor are they translated into clearly actionable steps to support their being upheld.

There are already a number of AI ethics principles developed by national and international organisations that the UK could draw from to further define and articulate its values for AI regulation.[footnote]Jobin, A., Ienca, M. & Vayena, E. (2019). ‘The global landscape of AI ethics guidelines’. Nature Machine Intelligence. 1.9 pp. 389–99. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-019-0088-2[/footnote] One example mentioned by expert participants is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) five complementary values-based principles for the responsible stewardship of AI,[footnote]Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (2019). OECD Principles on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: www.oecd. org/going-digital/ai/principles/ [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote] which the Scottish AI strategy draws on heavily.[footnote]Digital Scotland. (2021). Scotland’s AI Strategy: Trustworthy, Ethical and Inclusive. Available at: https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5dc00e9e32cd095744be7634/t/606430e006dc4a462a5fa1d4/1617178862157/Scotlands_AI_Strategy_Web_updated_single_page_aps.pdf [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote]

Another idea raised by the expert participants was that UK AI policy (and industrial strategy more broadly), should aim to establish and support democratic, inclusive mechanisms for resolving value-laden policy and regulatory decisions. Here, expert participants suggested that
deliberative public-engagement exercises, such as citizens’ assemblies and juries, could be used to set high-level values, or to inform particularly controversial, value-laden policy questions. In addition, participatory mechanisms should be embedded in the development and oversight of governance approaches to AI and data – a topic explored in a recent Ada Lovelace Institute report on participatory data stewardship.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatory-data-stewardship [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote]

Expert participants noted that sustained public trust in AI will be vital, and the existence of such processes could be a useful means of ensuring that policy decisions regarding AI are aligned with public values.

However, it is important to note that while ‘building public trust’ in AI is a common and valuable objective surfaced in AI-policy debates, this framing also places the burden of responsibility onto the public to ‘be more trusting’, and does not necessarily address the root issue: the trustworthiness of AI systems.

Public participation in UK AI policy must therefore be recognised as effective not only at framing or refining existing policies in ways that will be considered more acceptable to the public, but to define the fundamental values that underpin those policies. Without this, there
is a significant risk that AI will not align with public hopes, needs and concerns, and this will undermine trust and confidence.


Objective 2: Avoid or ameliorate specific risks and harms

Another commonly voiced view from workshop participants was that UK AI policy should be configured explicitly with a view to reduce, mitigate or completely avoid particular harms and categories of harms associated with AI and its business models. In outlining the particular kinds of harm that AI policy – and particularly regulation – should aim to address, reference was made to the following:

  • harms to individuals and marginalised groups
  • distributional harms
  • harms to free, open societies.

Harms to individuals and marginalised groups

In discussing the potential harms to individuals and marginalised groups associated with AI, participants highlighted the fact that AI systems:

  • Can exhibit bias, with the result that individuals may experience AI systems treating them unfairly or drawing unfair inferences about them. Bias can take many forms, and be expressed in several different parts of the AI product development lifecycle – including ‘algorithmic’ bias in which an AI system’s outputs unfairly bias human judgement.[footnote]Selwyn, N. (2021). Deb Raji on what ‘algorithmic bias’ is (…and what it is not). Data Smart Schools. Available at: https://data-smart-schools.net/2021/04/02/deb-raji-on-what-algorithmic-bias-is-and-what-it-is-not[/footnote]
  • Are often more effective or more accurate for some groups than for others.[footnote]Buolamwini, J., Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification.’ Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR 81:77 91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr. press/v81/buolamwini18a.html.[/footnote] This can lead to various kinds of harm, ranging from individuals having false inferences made about their identity or characteristics,[footnote]Hill, K. (2020). ‘Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match.’ New York Times. Available at: www.nytimes. com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html[/footnote] to individuals being denied or locked out of services due to the failure of AI systems to work for them.[footnote]Ledford, H. (2019). ‘Millions of black people affected by racial bias in health-care algorithms.’ Nature. 574. 7780 pp. 608–9. Available at: www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03228-6[/footnote]
  • Tend to be optimised for particular outcomes.[footnote]Leslie, D. (2019). Understanding Artificial Intelligence Ethics and Safety: A Guide for the Responsible Design and Implementation of AI Systems in the Public Sector. The Alan Turing Institute. Available at: https://doi.org/10.5281/ZENODO.3240529.[/footnote] There is a tendency on the part of those developing AI systems to forget, or otherwise insufficiently consider, how the outcomes for which systems have been optimised might affect underrepresented groups within society.
  • Can cause, and often rely on, the violation of individual privacy rights.[footnote]Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. London: Profile Books.[/footnote] A lack of privacy can impede an individual’s ability to interact with other people and organisations on equal terms and can cause individuals to change their behaviour.[footnote]Solove, D. J. (2011). Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security. New Haven London: Yale University Press.[/footnote]

Distributional harms

Many of the harms associated with AI systems relate to the capacity of AI and its associated business models to drive and exacerbate economic inequality. Workshop participants listed several specific kinds of distributional harms that AI systems can raise:

  • The business models of leading AI companies tend towards monopolisation and concentration of market share. Because machine-learning algorithms base their outcomes on data, well-established AI companies that can collect proprietary datasets tend to have an advantage over newer companies, which can be self-perpetuating. In addition, the large amounts of data required to train some machine-learning algorithms present a high barrier of entry into the market, which can incentivise mergers, acquisitions and partnerships.[footnote]Furman, J., Coyle, D., Fletcher, A., McAuley, D., and Marsden, P. (2019). Unlocking digital competition, Report of the Digital Competition Expert Panel. HM Treasury. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/unlocking-digital-competition-report-of-the-digital-competition-expert-panel.[/footnote] As several recent critiques have pointed out, addressing the harms of AI must look at the wider social, political and economic power underlying the development of these systems.[footnote]Balayan, A., GĂźrses, S. (2021). Beyond Debiasing: Regulating AI and its inequalities. European Digital Rights. Available at: https://edri.org/our-work/if-ai-is-the-problem-is-debiasing-the-solution[/footnote]
  • Labour’s declining share of GDP. Related to the tendency of AI-business models towards monopolisation, some economists have suggested that one reason for labour’s declining share of GDP in developed countries is that ‘superstar’ tech firms, which employ relatively few workers but produce significant dividends for investors, have come to represent an increasing share of overall economic activity.[footnote]Autor, D., Dorn, D., Katz, L., Patterson, C., and Van Reenen, J. (2020). ‘The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of Superstar Firms’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 135.2, 645–709. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjaa004[/footnote]
  • Skills-biased technological change and automation. Expert participants also cited the potential for automation and skills-biased technological change driven by AI to lead to greater inequality. While it is contested whether the rise of AI will necessarily lead to greater economic inequality in the long term, economists have argued that the short-term disruption caused by the transition from one ‘techno-economic paradigm’ to a new one will lead to significant inequality unless policy responses are developed to counter these tendencies.[footnote]Perez, C. (2015). ‘Capitalism, Technology and a Green Global Golden Age: The Role of History in Helping to Shape the Future’, The Political Quarterly, 86 pp. 191–217. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12240.[/footnote]
  • AI systems’ capacity to undermine the bargaining power between workers and employers, and to exacerbate inequalities between participants in markets. Finally, participants cited the ability of AI systems to undermine worker power and collective-bargaining capacity.[footnote]Institute for the Future of Work. (2021). The Amazonian Era: The gigification of work. Available at: https://www.ifow.org/publications/the-amazonian-era-the-gigification-of-work[/footnote] The use of AI systems to monitor and feedback on worker performance, and the application of AI to recruitment and pay-setting processes are two means by which AI could tip the balance of power further towards employers rather than workers.[footnote]Partnership on AI. (2021). Redesigning AI for Shared Prosperity: an Agenda. Pp 23–24. Available at: https://partnershiponai.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/PAI-Redesigning-AI-for-Shared-Prosperity.pdf.[/footnote]

Harms to free, open societies

Our expert participants also pointed to the capacity of AI systems to undermine many of the necessary conditions for free, open and democratic societies. Here, participants cited:

  • The use of AI-driven systems to distort competitive political processes. AI systems that tailor content to individuals based on their data profile or behaviour (mostly through social media or search platforms) can be used to influence voter behaviour and the direction of democratic debates. This is recognised as problematic because
    access to these systems is likely to be unevenly distributed across the population and political groups, and because the opacity of content creation and sharing can undermine the democratic ideal of a commonly shared and accessible political discourse – as well as ideals about public debate being subject to public reason.[footnote]Quong, J. (2018). ‘Public Reason’ in Zalta, E. N. and Hammer, E. (eds) The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford: Center for the Study of Language and Information. Available at: www.scirp.org/reference/referencespapers.aspx?referenceid=2710060 [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote]
  • The use of AI-driven systems to undermine the health and competitiveness of markets. In the market sphere, AI-enabled functions such as real-time, A/B testing,[footnote]Where two or more options are presented to users to determine which is more preferable.[/footnote] hypernudge,[footnote]Where an individual’s data and responses to stimuli is used to inform how choices are framed to them, with a view towards predisposing them towards particular choices. See: Yeung, K. (2017). ‘”Hypernudge”: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’, Information, Communication & Society, 20.1 pp.118–136. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1186713.[/footnote] and personalised pricing and search[footnote]Where the prices or search results seen by a consumer are determined by their data profile. See: Competition and Markets Authority. (2018). Pricing algorithms: Economic working paper on the use of algorithms to facilitate collusion and personalised pricing, p. 63. Available at: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/746353/Algorithms_ econ_report.pdf.[/footnote] undermine the ability of consumers to choose freely between competing products in a market, and can significantly skew the balance of power between consumers and large companies.
  • Surveillance, privacy and the right to freedom of expression and assembly. The ability of AI-driven systems to monitor and surveil citizens has the potential to create a powerful negative effect on citizens exercising their rights to free expression and discourse – negatively affecting the tenor of democracies.
  • The use of AI systems to police and control citizen behaviour. It was noted that many AI systems could be used for more coercive methods of controlling or influencing citizens. Participants cited ‘social-credit’ schemes, such as the one being implemented in China, as an example of the kind of AI system that seeks to manipulate or enforce certain forms of social behaviour without adequate democratic oversight or control.[footnote]The authors of this paper note that many of the claims about the efficacy and goals of the Chinese social-credit system have been exaggerated in the Western media. See Matsakis, L. (2019). ‘How the West Got China’s Social Credit System Wrong.’ Wired. Available at: www.wired.com/story/china-social-credit-score-system.[/footnote]

Objective 3: Use AI to contribute to the solution of grand societal challenges

Another common view of workshop participants was that a country’s approach to AI regulation could be informed by its stated priorities and objectives for the use of AI in society. One of the common aims of many existing national AI strategies is to articulate how a country can leverage its AI ecosystem to develop solutions to, and means of addressing substantial, society-wide challenges facing individual nations – and indeed humanity – in coming decades.[footnote]Dutton, T. (2018). ‘An Overview of National AI Strategies’, Politics + AI. Available at: https://medium.com/politics-ai/an-overview-of-national-ai-strategies-2[/footnote]

Candidates for these challenges range from decarbonisation and dealing with the effects of climate change, navigating potential economic displacement brought about by AI systems (and the broader context of the ‘fourth industrial revolution’), to finding ways to manage the difficulties, and make best use, of an ageing population – which is itself one of the UK’s 2017 Industrial Strategy grand challenges. Workshop participants also referred to the potential for AI to be deployed to address the long-term effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and it’s potential to ameliorate future public-health crises.

Workshop participants emphasised that the purpose of articulating grand-societal challenges that AI can address was to provide an effective way to think about the coordination of different industrial strategy levers, from R&D and regulatory policy, to tax policy and public-sector
procurement. This approach would sidestep the risk of an AI national strategy that commands more AI for the sake of AI, or a strategy that places too much hope on the potential benefit of AI to bring positive societal change across all economic and societal sectors.

By articulating grand challenges that AI can address, the UK Government can help establish funding and research priorities for applications of AI that show high reward and proven efficacy. As an example, the French national AI strategy articulates several grand challenges as areas of focus for AI, including addressing the COVID-19 pandemic and fighting climate change.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Knowledge for Policy: France AI Strategy Report. Available at: https://knowledge4policy.ec.europa.eu/ai-watch/france-ai-strategy-report_en[/footnote]

A reservation to consider with the societal-challenge approach is that it absolves Government of articulating a sense of direction when it comes to the UK’s relationship to AI. Setting out that we want AI to be used to address particular problems, and how AI is to be supported and guided to develop in a manner conducive to their solution, does not provide any indication of the level of risk we are willing to tolerate, the kinds of applications of AI we may or may not want to encourage or permit (all else remaining equal) or how our industrial and regulatory policy
should address difficult, values-based trade-offs.


Objective 4: Develop AI regulation as a sectoral strength

A fourth suggestion put forward by some workshop participants was that the UK should seek to develop AI regulation as a sectoral strength. There was limited agreement on what this goal might entail in practice, and whether it would be feasible.

Despite the UK’s strengths in academic AI research, most participants agreed that, because of existing market dynamics in the tech industry – in which a combination of mostly US and Chinese firms dominate the market, it will be very difficult to the UK market to create the
next industry powerhouse.

However, an idea that emerged in the first workshop was that the UK could potentially become world leading in flexible, innovative and ethical approaches to the regulation of AI. The UK Government has expressed explicit ambitions to lead the world in tech and data ethics since at
least 2018.[footnote]Kelion, L. (2018). ‘UK PM seeks ‘safe and ethical’ artificial intelligence.’ BBC News. 25 January. Available at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-42810678.[/footnote] Workshop participants noted that the UK already has an established reputation for regulatory innovation, and that the country is potentially well placed to develop an approach to the regulation of AI that is compatible with EU standards, but more sophisticated and nuanced.

This idea received additional scrutiny in the second workshop, which saw a more sustained and critical discussion, detailed below, of what cultivating a niche in the regulation of AI might look like in practice, and of the benefits it might bring.

Why is leadership in AI regulation desirable?

Some participants challenged whether leadership in the regulation of AI would actually be desirable, and if so how.

It was noted that, in some cases, a country that drives the regulatory agenda for a particular technology or science will be in a good position to attract greater levels of expertise and investment. For instance, the UK is a world leader in biomedical research and technology, in large part because it has a robust regulatory system that ensures a high quality of accuracy, safety and public trust.[footnote]Calvert, M. J., Marston, E., Samuels, M., Cruz Rivera, S., Torlinska, B., Oliver, K., Denniston, A. K., and Hoare, S. (2019). ‘Advancing UK regulatory science and innovation in healthcare’, Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine. 114.1. pp. 5-11. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/0141076820961776[/footnote] It was cautioned, however, that the UK’s status with the regulation of biomedical technology is the product of the combination of demanding standards, a pragmatic approach to the interpretation of those standards and a rigorously enforced institutional regime.

Some expert panellists suggested that, despite the fact that many regulatory rules have been set at an EU level, the UK has become a leader in the regulation of the life sciences because it combined those high ethical and legal standards with sufficient flexibility to enable genuine innovation – rather than because it relaxed regulatory standards.

The UK can’t compete on regulatory substance, but could compete on some aspects of regulatory procedure and approach

There was a degree of scepticism among expert panellists about whether the model that has enabled the UK to achieve leadership in the regulation of the biomedical-sciences industry would be replicable or would yield the same results in the context of AI regulation. In contrast to the biomedical sciences – where there are strict and clearly defined routes into practice – it is difficult for a regulator to understand and control actors developing and deploying AI systems. The scale and the immediacy of the impacts of AI technologies also tends to be far greater
than in biomedical sciences, as is the number of domains in which AI systems could potentially be deployed.

In addition to this, it was noted that the EU also has ambitions to become a global leader in the ethical regulation of AI, as demonstrated by the European Commission’s proposed AI regulations.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). A Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa. eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A52021PC0206 [accessed 4 October 2021].[/footnote] It is therefore unclear what the UK might leverage to position itself as a distinct leader, alongside a larger, geographically adjacent and more influential economic bloc with a good track record of exporting its regulatory standards, which also has ambitions to occupy this space. The EU’s proposal of a comprehensive AI regulation also means that the UK does not have a first-mover advantage when it comes to the regulation of AI.

Many participants of our workshops thought it was unlikely that the UK would be able to compete with the EU (or other large economic blocs) on regulatory substance, or the specific rules and regulations governing AI. Some workshop participants observed that the comparatively small size of the UK market would mean that approval from a UK regulatory
body is of less commercial value to an AI company than regulatory approval from the EU.

In terms of regulatory substance, some participants considered whether the UK could make itself attractive as a place to develop AI products by lowering regulatory standards, but other participants noted this would be undesirable and would go against the grain of the UK’s strengths in the flexible enforcement of exacting regulatory standards. Moreover, participants suggested that a ‘race to the bottom’ approach would be counter-productive, given the size of the UK market and the higher regulatory standards that are already developing elsewhere.
Adopting this approach could mean that UK-based AI developers would not be able to sell their services and products in regions with higher regulatory standards.

Despite the limited prospects for the UK leading the world in the development of regulatory standards for AI, some workshop participants argued that it may be possible for the UK to lead on the processes and procedures for regulating AI. The UK does have a good reputation for
following regulatory processes and for regulatory process innovation (as exemplified by regulatory sandboxes, a model that has been replicated by many other jurisdictions, including the EU).[footnote]Privacy & Information Security Law Blog. (2021). Regulatory Sandboxes are Gaining Traction with European Data Protection Authorities. Hunton Andrews Kurth. Available at: https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2021/02/25/regulatory-sandboxes-are-gaining-traction-with-european-data-protection-authorities[/footnote]

While sandboxes no longer represent a unique selling point for the UK, the UK may be able to make itself more attractive to AI firms by establishing a series of regulatory practices and norms aimed at ensuring that companies have better guidance and support in complying with
regulations than they might receive elsewhere. These sorts of processes are particularly appealing to start-ups and small- to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), who may struggle to navigate and comply with regulatory processes more than their larger counterparts.

A final caveat that several expert participants made was that, although more supportive regulatory processes might be enough to attract start-ups and early-stage AI ventures to the UK, keeping such companies in the UK as they grow will also require the presence of the right financial, legal and a research-and-development supportive ecosystem. While this report does not seek to answer the question of what this wider ecosystem should look like, it is clear that a regulatory framework is a necessary condition for the realisation of the Government’s stated
ambition of developing a world-leading AI sector, closely coordinated with policies to nurture and maintain these other enabling conditions.

Chapter 2: Challenges for regulating AI systems

Given AI’s relative novelty, complexity and applicability across both domains and industries, the effective and consistent regulation of AI systems presents multiple challenges. This chapter details some of the most significant of these, as highlighted by our expert workshop
participants, and sets out additional analysis and explanation of these issues. The following chapter, ‘Tools, mechanisms and approaches for regulating AI’, details some ways these challenges might be dealt with or overcome. Additional details on some of the different considerations when designing and configuring regulatory systems, which may be a useful companion to these two chapters, can be found in the annex.

The table below maps the regulatory challenges identified with the relevant tools, mechanisms and approaches for overcoming them.

Regulatory challenges and relevant tools, mechanisms and approaches

Challenges for regulating AI systems  Potentially useful approach, tool or mechanism
AI regulation demands bespoke, cross-cutting rules Regulatory capacity building

Regulatory coordination

The incentive structures and power dynamics of AI-business models can run counter to regulatory goals and broader societal values Regulatory capacity building

Regulatory coordination

It can be difficult to regulate AI systems in a manner that is proportionate Risk-based regulation
Professionalisation
Many AI systems are complex and opaque Regulatory capacity building
Algorithmic impact assessment
Transparency requirements
Inspection powers
External-oversight bodies
International standards
Domestic standards (e.g. via procurement)
AI harms can be difficult to separate from the technology itself Moratoria and bans

AI regulation demands bespoke, cross-cutting rules

Perhaps one of the biggest challenges presented by AI is that regulating it successfully is likely to require the development of new, domain-neutral laws and regulatory principles. There are several, interconnected reasons for this:

  1. AI presents novel challenges for existing legal and regulatory principles
  2. AI presents systemic challenges that require a coordinated response
  3. horizontal regulation will help avoid boundary disputes and aid industry-specific policy development
  4. effective, cross-cutting legal and regulatory principles won’t emerge organically
  5. the challenges of developing bespoke, horizontal rules for AI.

1. AI presents novel challenges for existing legal and regulatory principles

One argument for developing new laws and regulatory principles for AI is that those in existence are not fit for purpose.

AI has two features that present difficulties for contemporary legal principles. The first is its tendency to fully or partially automate moral decision-making processes in ways that can be opaque, difficult to explain and difficult to predict. The second is the capacity of AI systems
to develop and operate independently of human control. For these reasons, AI systems can challenge legal notions of agency and causation as the relationship between the behaviour of the technology and the actions of the user or developer can be unclear, and some AI systems
may change independently of human control and intervention.

While these principles have been unproblematically applied to legal questions concerning other emerging technologies, it is not clear that they will apply readily to those presented by AI. As barrister Jacob Turner explains, in contrast to AI systems, ‘a bicycle will not re-design
itself to become faster. A baseball bat will not independently decide to hit a ball or smash a window.’[footnote]Turner, J. (2018). Robot Rules: Regulating Artificial Intelligence. Palgrave Macmillan. P. 79.[/footnote]

2. AI presents systemic challenges that require a coordinated response

In addition to demanding new approaches to legal principles of agency and causation the effective regulation and governance of AI systems will require high levels of coordination.

As a powerful technology that can operate at scale and be applied in a wide range of different contexts, AI systems can manifest impacts at the level of the whole economy and the whole of society, rather than being confined to particular domains or sectors. Among policymakers
and industry professionals, AI is regularly compared to electricity, with claims that it can transform a wide range of different sectors.[footnote]Lynch, S. (2017). Andrew Ng: Why AI Is the New Electricity. Stanford Graduate School of Business. Available at: www.gsb.stanford.edu/ insights/andrew-ng-why-ai-new-electricity.[/footnote] Whether or not this is hyperbole, the ambition to integrate AI systems across a wide variety of core services and applications raises risks of significant negative outcomes. If governments aspire to use regulation and other policy mechanisms to control the systematic impacts of AI, they will have to coordinate legal and regulatory responses to particular uses of AI. Developing a general set of principles to which all regulators must adhere when dealing with AI is a practical way of doing this.

3. Horizontal regulation will help avoid boundary disputes and aid industry-specific policy development

There are also practical arguments for developing cross-cutting legal and regulatory principles for AI. The gradual shift from narrow to general AI will mean that attempts to regulate the technology exclusively through the rules applied to individual domains and sectors will become increasingly impractical and difficult. A fully vertical or compartmentalised approach to the regulation of AI would be likely to lead to boundary disputes, with persistent questions about whether particular applications or kinds of AI fall under the remit of one regulator or another – or both, or neither.

4. Effective, cross-cutting legal and regulatory principles won’t emerge organically

Clear, cross-cutting legal and regulatory principles for AI will have to be set out in legislation, rather than developed through, and set out in common law. Perhaps the most important reason for this is that setting out principles in statute makes it possible to protect against the potential harms of AI in advance (ex ante), rather than once things have gone wrong (ex post) – something a common law approach would be incapable of doing. Given the potential gravity and scope of the sorts of harms AI is capable of producing, it would be very risky to wait until
harms occur to develop legal and regulatory protections against them.

The Law Society’s evidence submission to the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee summarises some of reasons to favour a statutory approach to regulating and governing AI:

‘One of the disadvantages of leaving it to the Courts to develop solutions through case law is that the common law only develops by applying legal principles after the event when something untoward has already happened. This can be very expensive and stressful for all those affected. Moreover, whether and how the law develops depends on which cases are pursued, whether they are pursued all the way to trial and appeal, and what arguments the parties’ lawyers choose to pursue. The statutory approach ensures that there is a framework in place that everyone can understand.’[footnote]The Law Society. (2016). Written evidence submitted by the Law Society (ROB0037). Available at: http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/science-and-technology-committee/robotics-and-artificial-intelligence/written/32616.html [accessed 20 September 2021].[/footnote]

5. The challenges of developing bespoke, horizontal rules for AI

The need to develop new, domain-neutral, AI-specific law raises several difficult questions for policymakers. Who should be responsible for developing these legal and regulatory principles? What values and priorities should these principles reflect? How can we ensure that those developing the principles have a good enough understanding of the ways AI can and might develop and impact on society?

It can be difficult to regulate AI systems in a manner that is proportionate

Given the range of applications and uses of AI, a critical challenge in developing an effective regulatory approach is ensuring that rules and standards are strong enough to capture potential harms, while not being unjustifiably onerous for more innocuous or lower-risk
uses of the technology.

The difficulties of developing proportionate regulatory responses to AI are compounded because, as with many emerging technologies, it can be difficult for a regulatory body to understand the potential harms of a particular AI system before that system has become widely deployed or used. However, waiting for harms to become clear and manifest before embarking on regulatory interventions can come with significant risks. One risk is that harms may transpire to be grave, and difficult to reverse or compensate for. Another is that, by the time the harms of an AI system have become clear, these systems may be so integrated into economic life that ex post regulation becomes very difficult.[footnote]Liebert, W., and Schmidt, J. C. (2010). ‘Collingridge’s Dilemma and Technoscience: An Attempt to Provide a Clarification from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Science’, Poiesis & Praxis, 7.1–2 pp. (2010), 55–71 Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/ s10202-010-0078-2.[/footnote]

The incentive structures and power dynamics created by AI-business models can run counter to regulatory goals and broader societal values

Several expert participants also noted that an approach to regulation must acknowledge the current reality around the market and business dynamics for AI systems. As many powerful AI systems rely on access to large datasets, the business models of AI developers can be heavily
skewed towards accumulating proprietary data, which can incentivise both extractive data practices and restriction of access to that data.

Many large companies now provide AI ‘as a service’, raising the barrier to entry for new organisations seeking to develop their own independent AI capabilities.[footnote]Cobbe, J., and Singh, J. (2021). ‘Artificial Intelligence as a Service: Legal Responsibilities, Liabilities, and Policy Challenges’. SSRN Electronic Journal. Available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3824736 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3824736.[/footnote] In the absence of strong countervailing forces, this can create incentive structures for businesses, individuals and the public sector that are misaligned with the ultimate goals of regulators and the values of the public. Expert participants in workshops and follow-up discussions identified two of these possible perverse incentive structures: data dependency and the data subsidy.

Data dependency

The principle of universal public services under democratic control is undermined by the public sector’s incentives to rely on large, private companies for data analytics, or for access to data on service users. These services promise efficiency benefits, but threaten to disempower
the public-service provider, with the following results:

  • Public-service providers may feel incentivised to collect more data on their service users that they can use to inform AI services.
  • By relying on data analytics provided by private companies, public services give up control of important decisions to AI systems over which they have little oversight or power.
  • Public-service providers may feel increasingly unable to deliver services effectively without the help of private tech companies.

The data subsidy

The principle of consumer markets that provide choice, value and fair treatment is undermined by the public’s incentives to provide their data for free or cheaper services (the ‘data subsidy’). This can result in phenomena like personalised pricing and search, which undermine consumer bargaining power and de facto choice, and can lead to the exploitation of vulnerable groups.

Many AI systems are complex and opaque

Another significant difficulty concerning the regulation of AI concerns the complexity and opacity of many AI systems. In practice, it can be very difficult for a regulator to understand exactly how an AI system operates, whether there is the potential for it to cause harm, and whether it has done so. The difficulty in understanding AI systems poses serious challenges, and in looking for solutions, it is helpful to distinguish between some of the sources of these challenges, which may include:

  1. regulators’ technical capacity and resources
  2. the opacity of AI developers
  3. the opacity of AI systems themselves.

1. Regulators’ technical capacity and resources

Firstly, many expert participants, including some from regulatory agencies, noted that existing regulatory bodies struggle to regulate AI systems due to a lack of capacity and technical expertise.

There are over 90 regulatory agencies in the UK that enforce legislation in sectors like transportation, public utilities, financial services, telecommunications, health and social services and many others. As of 2016, the total annual expenditure on these regulatory agencies was around £4 billion – but not all regulators receive the same amount, with some like the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) or the Office of Communications (Ofcom) receiving far more than smaller regulators like the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (EHRC).[footnote]National Audit Office. (2017). A short guide to regulation. UK Government. Available at: www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/0 9/A-Short-Guide-to-Regulation.pdf[/footnote]

Some regulators like the CMA and the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) already have some in-house employees specialising in data science and AI techniques, to reflect the nature of the work they do and kinds of organisations they regulate. But as AI systems become more widely used in various sectors of the UK economy, it becomes more urgent for regulators of all sizes to have access to the technical expertise required to evaluate and assess these systems, along with the powers necessary to investigate AI systems.

This poses questions about how regulators might best build their capacity to understand and engage with AI systems, or secure access to this expertise consistently.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute (Forthcoming). Technical approaches for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems in social media platforms. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection.[/footnote]

2. The opacity of AI developers

Secondly, many of the difficulties regulators have in understanding AI systems result from the fact that much of the information required to do so is proprietary, and that AI developers and tech companies are often unwilling to share information that they see as integral to their business model. Indeed, many prominent developers of AI systems have cited intellectual property and trade secrets as reasons to actively disrupt or prevent attempts to audit or assess their systems.[footnote]Facebook, for example, has recently shut down independent attempts to monitor and assess their platform’s behaviour. See: Kayser-Bril, N. (2021). AlgorithmWatch forced to shut down Instagram monitoring project after threats from Facebook. Algorithm Watch. Available at: https://algorithmwatch.org/en/instagram-research-shut-down-by-facebook/, and Bobrowsky, M. (2021). ‘Facebook Disables Access for NYU Research Into Political-Ad Targeting’. Wall Street Journal. Available at: www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-cuts-off-access-for-nyu-research-into-political-ad-targeting-11628052204.[/footnote]

While some UK regulators do have powers to inspect AI systems, where those systems are developed by regulated entities, the inspection of systems becomes much more difficult when those systems are provided by third parties. This issue poses questions about the powers regulators might need to require information from AI developers or users, along with standards of openness and transparency on the part of such groups.

3. The opacity of AI systems themselves

Finally, in some cases, there are also deeper issues concerning the ability of anyone, even the developers of an AI system, to understand the basis on which it may make decisions. The biggest of these is the fact that non-symbolic AI systems, which are the kind of AI responsible for some of the most recent impressive advances in the field, tend to operate as ‘black boxes’, whose decision-making sequences are difficult to parse. In some cases, it may be the case that certain types of AI systems may not be appropriate for deployment in settings where it is essential to be able to provide a contestable explanation.

These difficulties in understanding AI systems’ decision-making processes become especially problematic in cases where a regulator might be interested in protecting against ‘procedural’ harms, or ‘procedural injustices’. In these cases, a harm is recognised not because of the nature of the outcome, but because of the unfair or flawed means by which that outcome was produced.

While there are strong arguments to take these sorts of harms seriously, they can be very difficult to detect without understanding the means by which decisions have been made and the factors that have been taken into account. For instance, looking at who an automated credit-scoring system considers to be most and least creditworthy may not reveal any obvious unfairness – or at the very least will not provide sufficient evidence of procedural harm, as any discrepancies between different groups could theoretically have a legitimate explanation. It is only when considering how these decisions have been made, and whether the system has taken into account factors that should be irrelevant, that procedural unfairness can be identified or ruled out.

AI harms can be difficult to separate from the technology itself

The complexity of the ways that AI systems can and could be deployed means that there are likely to be some instances when regulators are unsure of their ability to effectively isolate potential harms from potential benefits.

These doubts may be caused by a lack of information or understanding of a particular application of AI. There will inevitably be some instances in which it is very difficult to understand exactly the level of risk posed by a particular form of the technology, and if and how the risks posed by it might be mitigated or controlled, without undermining the benefits of
the technology.

In other cases, these doubts may be informed by the nature of the application itself, or by considerations of the likely dynamics affecting its development. There may be instances where, due to the nature of the form or application of AI, it seems difficult to separate the harms it poses from its potential benefits. Regulators might also doubt whether particular high-risk forms or uses of AI can realistically be contained to a small set of heavily controlled uses. One reason for this is that the infrastructure and investment required to make limited deployments of a high-risk application possible create long-term pressure to use the technology more widely: the industry developing and providing the technology is incentivised to advocate for a greater variety of uses. Government and public bodies may also come under
pressure to expand the use of the technology to justify the cost of having acquired it.

Chapter 3: Tools, mechanisms and approaches for regulating AI systems

To address some of the challenges outlined in the previous section, our expert workshop participants identified a number of tools, mechanisms and approaches to regulation that could potentially be deployed as part of the Government’s efforts to effectively regulate AI systems at different stages of the AI lifecycle.

Some mechanisms can provide an ex ante pre-assessment of an AI system’s risk or impacts, while others provide ongoing monitoring obligations and ex post assessments of a system’s behaviour. It is important to understand that no single mechanism or approach will
be sufficient to regulate AI effectively – but that regulators will need a variety of tools in their toolboxes to draw on as needed.

Many of the mechanisms described below follow the National Audit Office’s Principles of effective regulation,[footnote]National Audit Office. (2021). Principles of effective regulation. UK Government. Available at: www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Principles-of-effective-regulation-SOff-interactive-accessible.pdf[/footnote] which we believe may offer a useful guide for the Government’s forthcoming White Paper.


Regulatory infrastructure – capacity building and coordination

Capacity building and coordination

The 2021 UK AI Strategy acknowledges that regulatory capacity and coordination will be a major area of focus for the next few years. Our expert participants also proposed sustained and significant expansion of the regulatory system’s overall capacity and levels of coordination, to support successful management of AI systems.

If the UK’s regulators are to adjust to the scale and complexity of the challenges presented by AI, and control the practices of large, multinational tech companies effectively, they will need greater levels of expertise, greater resourcing and better systems of coordination.

Expert participants were keen to stress that calls for the expansion of regulatory capacity should not be limited to the cultivation of technical expertise in AI, but should also extend to better institutional understanding of legal principles, human-rights norms and ethics. Improving regulators’ ability to understand, interrogate, predict and navigate the ethical and legal challenges posed by AI systems is just as important as improving their ability to understand and scrutinise the workings of the systems themselves.[footnote]Yeung, K., Howes, A., and Pogrebna, G. (2020). ‘AI Governance by Human Rights-Centered Design, Deliberation, and Oversight: An End to Ethics Washing’, in Dubber, M. D., Pasquale, F., and Das, S. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Ethics of AI. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 75–106. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190067397.013.5.[/footnote]

Expert participants also emphasised some of the limitations of AI-ethics exercises and guidelines that are not backed up by hard regulation and the law[footnote]Whittlestone, J., Nyrup, R., Alexandrova, A., Dihal, K., and Cave, S. (2019). Ethical and societal implications of algorithms, data, artificial intelligence: A roadmap for research. London: Nuffield Foundation. Available at: www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/Ethical-and-Societal-Implications-of-Data-and-AI-report-Nuffield-Foundat.pdf.[/footnote] – and cited this as an important reason to embed ethical thinking within regulators specifically.

There are different models for allocating regulatory resources, and for improving the system’s overall capacity, flexibility and cohesiveness, any model will need:

  • a means to allocate additional resources efficiently, avoiding duplication of effort across regulators, and guarding against the possibility of gaps and weak spots in the regulatory ecosystem
  • a way for regulators to coordinate their responses to the applications of AI across their respective domains, and to ensure that their actions are in accordance with any cross-cutting regulatory principles or laws regarding AI
  • a way for regulators to share intelligence effectively and conduct horizon-scanning exercises jointly.

One model would be to have centralised regulatory capacity that individual regulators could draw upon. This could consist of AI experts and auditors, as well as funding available to support capacity building in individual regulators. A key advantage of a system of centralised regulatory capacity is that regulators could draw on expertise and resources as and when needed, but the system would have to be designed to ensure that individual regulators had sufficient expertise to understand when they needed to call in additional resources.

An alternative way of delivering centralised regulatory capacity is a model where experts on AI and related disciplines are distributed within individual regulators and circulate around, reporting back cross-cutting intelligence and knowledge. This would build expert capacity and
understanding of the effects AI is having on different sectors and parts of the regulatory system, to identify common trends and to strategise and coordinate potential responses.

Another method would be to have AI experts permanently embedded within individual regulators, enabling them to develop deep expertise of the particular regulatory challenges posed by AI in that domain. In this model experts would have to communicate and liaise across regulatory bodies to prevent siloed thinking.

Finally, a much-discussed means of improving regulatory capacity is the formation of a new, dedicated AI regulator. This regulatory body could potentially serve multiple functions, from setting general regulatory principles or domain-specific rules for AI regulation, to providing capacity and advice for individual regulators, to overseeing and coordinating horizon-scanning exercises and coordinating regulatory responses to AI across the regulatory ecosystem.

Most expert participants did not feel that there would be much benefit from establishing an independent AI regulator for the purposes of setting and enforcing granular regulatory rules. There are some common and consistent questions that all kinds of AI systems raise around issues of accountability, fairness, explainability of automated decisions, the relationship between machine and human agency, privacy and bias.

However, most expert participants agreed that regulatory processes and rules need to be specific to the domain in which AI is being deployed. Some participants acknowledged that there may be some need for an entity to develop and maintain a common set of principles and
standards for the regulation of AI, and to ensure that individual regulators apply those principles in a manner that is consistent – by maintaining an overview of the coherence of all the regulatory rules governing AI, and by providing guidance for individual regulators on how to interpret the cross-industry regulatory principles.

None of the above models should be seen as mutually exclusive, nor substitutes for more money and resources being given to all regulators to deal with AI. Creating pooled-regulatory capacity that individual regulators can draw on need, and should not, come at the expense of
improving levels of expertise and analytic capacity within individual regulatory bodies.

With regards to regulatory coordination, several participants noted that existing models aimed at helping regulators work together on issues presented by AI systems should be continued and expanded. For example, the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum functions with the CMA, ICO, Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) to ‘ensure a greater level of cooperation given the unique challenges posed by regulation of online platforms’.[footnote]Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum. (2021). UK Government. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/collections/the-digital-regulation-cooperation-forum[/footnote]

Anticipatory capacity

If the regulatory system is to have a chance of addressing the potential harms posed by AI systems and business models effectively, it will need to better understand and anticipate those harms. The ability to anticipate AI harms is also fundamental to overcoming the difficulty
of designing effective ex ante rules to protect against harms that have not yet necessarily occurred on a large scale.

One promising approach to help regulators better understand and address the challenges posed by AI is ‘anticipatory regulation’, a set of techniques and principles intended to help regulators be more proactive, coordinated and democratic in their approach to emerging
technologies.[footnote]Armstrong, H., Gorst, C., Rae, J. (2019). Renewing Regulation: ‘anticipatory regulation’ in an age of disruption. Nesta. Available at: www.nesta.org.uk/report/renewing-regulation-anticipatory-regulation-in-an-age-of-disruption.[/footnote] These techniques include horizon-scanning and futures exercises, such as scenario mapping (especially as collaborations between regulators and other entities), along with iterative, collaborative approaches, such as regulatory sandboxes. They may also include
participatory-futures exercises like citizen juries that involve members of the public, particularly those from traditionally marginalised communities, to help anticipate potential scenarios.

There is already support for regulators to experiment with anticipatory techniques, such as that provided by the Regulators’ Pioneer Fund, and initiatives to embed horizon scanning and futures thinking into the regulatory system, such as the establishment of the Regulatory Horizons Council.[footnote]UK Government. (2021). Regulatory Horizons Council (RHC). Available at: www.gov.uk/government/groups/regulatory-horizons-council-rhc.[/footnote] However, for these techniques to become the norm among regulators, Government support for anticipatory methods will have to be more generous, provided by default and long term.

Workshop participants noted that harms posed by emerging technologies can be overlooked because policymakers lack understanding of how new technologies or services might affect
particular groups. Given this, some participants suggested that efforts to bring in a variety of perspectives to regulatory policymaking processes, via public-engagement exercises or through drives to improve the diversity of policymakers themselves, would have a positive
effect on the regulators’ capacity to anticipate and understand harms and unintended consequences of AI.[footnote]For some ideas on the kinds of participatory mechanisms policymakers could use, please read Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Participatory data stewardship. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/participatory-data-stewardship.[/footnote]

Developing a healthy ecosystem of regulation and governance

Several participants in our workshops noted the need for the UK to adopt a regulatory approach to AI that enables an ‘ecosystem’ of governance and accountability that rewards and incentivises self-governance, and makes possible third-party, independent assessments and reviews of AI systems.

Given the capacity for AI technologies to be deployed in a range of settings and contexts, no single regulator may be capable of assessing an AI system for all kinds of harms and impacts. The Competition and Markets Authority, for example, seeks to address issues of competition and enable a healthy digital market. The Information and Commissioners Office seeks to address issues of data protection and privacy, while the Equalities and Human Rights Commission seeks to address fundamental human rights issues across the UK. AI systems can raise a variety of different risks which may fall under different regulatory bodies.

One major recommendation from workshop participants, and one evidenced in our research into assessment and auditing methods,[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: Tools for Assessing Algorithmic Systems. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems/ [accessed 11 October 2021].[/footnote] is that successful regulatory frameworks enable an ecosystem of governance and accountability by empowering regulators, civil-society organisations, academics and members of the public to hold systems to account. The establishment of whistleblower laws, for example, can empower tech workers who identify inherent risks to come forward to a regulator.[footnote]Johnson, K. (2020). ‘From whistleblower laws to unions: How Google’s AI ethics meltdown could shape policy’. VentureBeat. Available at: https://venturebeat.com/2020/12/16/from-whistleblower-laws-to-unions-how-googles-ai-ethics-meltdown-could-shape-policy.[/footnote]

A regulatory framework might also enable greater access to assess a system’s impacts and behaviour by civil-society organisations and academic labs, who are currently responsible for the majority of audits and assessments that have identified alarming AI-system behaviour.
A regulatory framework that empowers other actors in the ecosystem can help remove the burden from individual regulators to perform these assessments entirely on their own.


Regulatory approaches – risk-based approaches
to regulating AI

In 2021, the European Commission released a draft risk-based framework to regulate AI systems that identifies what risk a system poses and assigns specific requirements for developers to meet based on that risk level.[footnote]European Commission. (2021). Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206.[/footnote] Like the EU, the UK could consider adopting a risk-based approach to the regulation of AI systems, based on their impacts on society. Importantly, the levels of risk in the Commission’s proposed framework are not based on the underlying technological method used (for example, deep learning vs. reinforcement learning), but on the potential impact on ‘fundamental rights’.[footnote]Lum, K., and Chowdhury, R. (2021). ‘What is an “algorithm”? It depends whom you ask’. MIT Technology Review. Available at: www.technologyreview.com/2021/02/26/1020007/what-is-an-algorithm.[/footnote]

The EU model creates four tiers of risks posed by the use of AI in a particular context – unacceptable risk (uses that are banned), high, moderate and minimal risk. Each tier comes with specific requirements for developers of those systems to meet. High-risk systems, for
example, must undergo a self-conformity assessment and be listed on a European-wide public register.

While the EU AI regulation states the protection of fundamental rights is a core objective, another clear aim of this regulation is to develop harmonised rules of AI regulation for all member states to adopt. The proposed regulation seeks to ensure a consistent approach across all member states, and so pre-empt and overrule the development of national regulation of AI systems. To achieve this, it relies heavily on EU-standards bodies to establish specific requirements for certain systems to meet based on their risk category. As several academics have noted, these standards bodies are often inaccessible to civil-society organisations, and may be poorly suited for the purposes of regulating AI.[footnote]Veale, M., and Zuiderveen Borgesius, F. (2021). ‘Demystifying the Draft EU Artificial Intelligence Act’. Computer Law Review International. 22 (4). Available at: https://osf.io/preprints/socarxiv/38p5f; Cath-Speth, C. (2021). Available at: https://twitter.com/c___cs/status/1412457639611600900.[/footnote]

A risk-based approach to regulating AI will ensure not all uses of AI are treated the same, which may help avoid unnecessary regulatory scrutiny and wasting of resources on uses of AI that are low risk.

However, risk-based systems of regulation come with their own challenges. One major challenge relates to the identification of risks.[footnote]Baldwin, R., and Black, J. (2016). Driving Priorities in Risk-Based Regulation: What’s the Problem? Journal of Law and Society. 43.4 pp. 565–95. Available at: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/jols.12003[/footnote] How should a regulatory system determine what qualifies as a high-risk, medium-risk or low-risk application of a technology? Who gets to make this judgement, and according to what framework of risk? Risks are social constructs, and what may present a risk to one individual in society may benefit another. To mitigate this, if the UK chooses a risk-based approach to regulating AI, it should include a framework for defining and assessing risk that includes a participatory process involving civil-society organisations and those who are likely to be affected by those systems.

Some AI systems are dynamic technologies that can be used in different contexts, so assessing the risk of a system – like an open-source facial recognition API – may miss the unique risks it poses when deployed in different contexts or for different purposes. For example, identifying the presence of a face for a phone camera will create different risks than if
the system is used in the creation of a surveillance apparatus for a law-enforcement body. This suggests that there may need to be different mechanisms for assessing the risk of an AI system and its impacts at different stages of its ‘lifecycle’.

Some of the mechanisms described below have the potential to help both developers and regulators assess the risk of a system in early research and development stages, while others may be useful for assessing the risk of a system after it has been procured or deployed.
Mechanisms like impact assessments or participatory methods of citizen engagement offer a promising pathway for the UK to develop an effective tier-based system of regulation that captures risk at different stages of an AI system’s lifecycle. However, more work is needed to determine the effectiveness of these mechanisms.


Regulatory tools and techniques

This section provides some examples of mechanisms and tools for the regulation of AI that our expert participants discussed, and draws heavily on a recent report documenting the ‘first wave’ of public-sector algorithm accountability mechanisms.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute, AI Now Institute and Open Government Partnership. (2021). Algorithmic Accountability for the Public Sector. Available at: www.opengovpartnership.org/documents/algorithmic-accountability-public-sector.[/footnote]

This section is not a holistic description of all the mechanisms that regulators might use – sandboxes, for example, are notably absent – but rather seeks to describe some existing, emerging mechanisms for AI systems that are less well-known, and provides some guidance for the UK Government when considering the forthcoming White Paper and in its forthcoming AI Assurance Roadmap.[footnote]In its 2021 National AI Strategy, the UK Government states the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation will publish a roadmap for ‘AI Assurance’ which sets out a number of different governance mechanisms and roles for different actors to play in holding AI systems more accountable.[/footnote]

Algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs)

To assess the potential impacts of an AI system on people and society, regulators will need new powers to audit, assess and inspect such systems. As the Ada Lovelace Institute’s report Examining the Black Box notes, the auditing and assessment of AI systems can occur prior to a system’s deployment and after its deployment.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: Tools for Assessing Algorithmic Systems. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems.[/footnote]

 

Impact assessments have a lengthy history of use in other sectors to assess human rights, equalities, data protection, financial and environmental impacts of a policy or technology ex ante. Their purpose is to provide a mechanism for holding developers and procurers of a technology more accountable for its impacts, by enabling greater external scrutiny of its risks and benefits.

 

Some countries and developers have begun to use algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) as a mechanism to explore the impacts of an AI system prior to its use. AIAs offer a way for developers or procurers of a technology to engage members of affected communities about what impacts they might foresee an AI system causing, and to document potential impacts. They can also provide developers of a technology with a standardised mechanism for reflecting on intended uses and design choices in the early stages, enabling better organisational practices that can maximise the benefits of a system and minimise its harms. For example, the Canadian Directive on Automated
Decision-Making is a public-sector initiative that requires federal public agencies
to conduct an AIA prior to the production of an AI system.[footnote]As of the date of this report, only two AIAs have been completed by Canadian federal agencies under this directive. Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, Government of Canada. (2019). Directive on Automated Decision Making. Available at: www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/pol/ doc-eng.aspx?id=32592.[/footnote]

 

While there is no one-size-fits-all approach to conducting AIAs, recent research has identified ten constitutive elements to any AIA process that ensure meaningful accountability.[footnote]Moss, E., Watkins, E.A., Singh, R., Elish, M.C., and Metcalf, J. (2021). Assembling Accountability Through Algorithmic Impact Assessment. Data & Society Research Institute. Available at: http://datasociety.net/library/assembling-accountability.[/footnote] These include the establishment of a clear independent assessor, the public posting of the results of the AIA, and the establishment of clear methods of redress.

Auditing and regulatory inspection

While impact assessments offer a promising method for an ex ante assessment of an AI system’s impacts on people and society, auditing and regulatory inspection powers offer a related method to assess an AI system’s behaviour and impacts ex post and over time.

Regulatory inspections are used by regulators in other sectors to investigate potentially harmful behaviours. Financial regulatory inspections, for example, enable regulators to investigate the physical premises, documents, computers and systems of banks and other
financial institutions. Regulatory inspections of AI systems could involve the use of similar powers to assess a system’s performance and accuracy, along with its broader impacts on society.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: Tools for Assessing Algorithmic Systems. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems.[/footnote]

Conducting a meaningful regulatory inspection of an algorithmic system would require regulators to have powers to accumulate specific types of evidence, including information on:

  • Policies – company policies and documentation that identify the goals of the AI system, what it seeks to achieve, and where its potential weaknesses lie.
  • Processes – assessment of a company’s process for creating the system, including what methods they chose and what evaluation metrics they have applied.
  • Outcomes – the ability to assess the outcomes of these systems on a range of different users of the system.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and Reset. (2020). Inspecting algorithms in social media platforms. Available at: https://www. adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/inspecting-algorithms-in-social-media-platforms/[/footnote]

Regulatory inspections may make use of technical audits of an AI system’s performance or behaviour over a period of time. Technical-auditing methods can help to answer several kinds of questions relating to an AI system’s behaviour, such as whether a particular system is
producing biased outputs or what kind of content is being amplified to a particular user demographic by a social media platform.

In order to conduct technical audits of an AI system, regulators will need statutory powers granting them the ability to access, monitor and audit specific technical infrastructures, code and data underlying a platform or algorithmic system. It should be noted that most technical auditing of AI systems is currently undertaken by academic labs and civil-society organisations, such as the Gender Shades audit that identified racial and gender biases in several facial-recognition systems.[footnote]Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). Gender shades: intersectional accuracy disparities in commercial gender classification. In: Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, 81, p1–15. New York: PLMR. Available at: http://proceedings.mlr. press/v81/buolamwini18a/buolamwini18a.pdf[/footnote]

Transparency requirements

Several expert participants noted a major challenge with regulating AI systems is the lack of transparency about where these systems are being used in both the public and private sectors. Without disclosure of the existence of these systems, it is impossible for regulators,
civil-society organisations, or members of the public to understand what AI-based decisions are being made about them or how their data is being used.

This lack of transparency creates an inherent roadblock for regulators to assess the risk of certain systems effectively, and anticipate future risk down the line. A lack of transparency may also undermine public trust in institutions that use these systems, diminishing trust in government institutions and consumer confidence in UK businesses that use AI
systems. The public outcry over the 2020 Ofqual A-level algorithm was in response to the deployment of an algorithmic system that had insufficient public oversight.[footnote]Office for Statistics Regulation. (2021). Ensuring statistical models command public confidence. Available at: https://osr.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/publication/ensuring-statistical-models-command-public-confidence/.[/footnote]

External-oversight bodies

Another mechanism a UK regulatory framework might consider implementing is a wider adoption of external-oversight bodies that review the procurement or use of AI systems in particular contexts. The West Midlands Police Department currently uses an external-ethics committee – consisting of police officials, ethicists, technologists and members of the local community – to review department requests to procure AI-based technologies, such as live facial-recognition systems and algorithms designed to predict an individual’s likelihood to commit a crime.[footnote]West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner (2021). Ethics Committee. Available at: www.westmidlands-pcc.gov.uk/ ethics-committee/.[/footnote] While the committee’s decisions are non-binding, they are published on the West Midlands Police website.

External-oversight bodies can also serve the purpose of ensuring a more participatory form of public oversight of AI systems. By enabling members of an affected community to have a say in the procurement and use of these systems, external-oversight bodies can ensure the procurement, adoption and integration of AI-systems is carried out in accordance with democratic principles. Some attempts to create external-oversight bodies have been in bad faith, and these types of bodies must be given meaningful oversight and fair representation if they are to succeed.[footnote]Richardson, R. ed. (2019). Confronting Black Boxes: A Shadow Report of the New York City Automated Decision System Task Force. AI Now Institute. Available at: https://ainowinstitute.org/ads-shadowreport-2019.html.[/footnote]

Standards

In addition to laws and regulatory rules, standards for AI systems, products and services have the potential to form an important component of the overall governance of the technology.

One notable potential use of standards is around improving the transparency and explainability of AI systems. Regulators could develop standards, or standards for tools, to ensure data provenance (knowing where data came from), reproducibility (being able to recreate a given result) and data versioning (saving snapshot copies of the AI in specific states with a view to recording which input led to which output).

At an international level, the UK AI Strategy states that the UK must get more engaged in international standard-setting initiatives,[footnote]Office for AI. (2021). National AI Strategy. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-ai-strategy[/footnote] a conclusion that many expert participants also agreed with. The UK already exerts considerable influence over international standards on AI, but can and should aspire to do so more systematically.

At a domestic level, the UK could enforce specific standards of practice around the development, use and procurement of AI systems by public authorities. The UK Government has developed several non-binding guidelines around the development and use of data-driven technologies, including the UK’s Data Ethics Framework that guides responsible data
use by public-sector organisations.[footnote]Central Digital and Data Office. (2018). Data Ethics Framework. UK Government. Available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-ethics-framework/data-ethics-framework.[/footnote] Guidelines and principles like these can help developers of AI systems identify what kinds of approaches and practices they should use that can help mitigate harms and maximise benefits. While these guidelines are currently voluntary, and are largely focused on the public sector, the UK could consider codifying them into mandatory requirements for both public- and private-sector organisations.

A related mechanism is the development of standardised public procurement requirements that mandate developers of AI systems undertake certain practices. The line between public and private development of AI systems is often blurry, and in many instances public-sector organisations procure AI systems from private agencies who maintain and support the system. Local authorities in the UK often procure AI systems from private developers, including for many high-stakes settings like decisions around border control and the allocation of state benefits.[footnote]BBC News. (2020). ‘Home Office Drops “racist” Algorithm from Visa Decisions’. 4 August. Available at: www.bbc.com/news/ technology-53650758; BBC News. (2021). ‘Council Algorithms Mass Profile Millions, Campaigners Say’. 20 July. Available at: www.bbc.com/news/uk-57869647.[/footnote]

Procurement agreements are a crucial pressure point where public agencies can place certain requirements around data governance, privacy and assessing impacts on a developer. The City of Amsterdamhas already created standardised language for this purpose in 2020. Called the ‘Standard Clauses for Municipalities for Fair Use of Algorithmic Systems’, this language places certain conditions on the procurement of data-driven systems, including that underlying data quality of a system is assessed and checked.[footnote]Municipality Amsterdam. (2020). Standard Clauses for Municipalities for Fair Use of Algorithmic Systems. Gemeente Amsterdam. Available at: www.amsterdam.nl/innovatie/[/footnote] The UK might therefore consider regulations that codify and enforce public-procurement criteria.

Despite the importance of standards in any regulatory regime for AI, they have several important limitations when it comes to addressing the challenges posed by AI systems. First, standards tend to be developed through consensus, and are often developed at an international level. As such, they can take a very long time to develop and modify. A flexible
regulatory system capable of dealing with issues that arise quickly or unexpectedly, should therefore avoid overreliance on standards, and will need other means of addressing important issues in the short term.

Moreover, standards are not especially well-suited to dealing with considerations of important and commonly held values such as such as agency, democracy, the rule of law, equality and privacy. Instead they are typically used to moderate the safety, quality and security of products. While setting standards on AI transparency and reporting could be instrumental in enabling regulators to understand the ethical impacts of AI systems, the qualitative nature of broader, values-based considerations could make standards poorly suited to addressing such questions directly.

It will therefore be important to avoid overreliance on standards, instead seeing them as a necessary but insufficient component of a convincing regulatory response to the challenges posed by AI.

The UK’s regulatory system will need get the balance between standards and rules right, and will need to be capable of dealing with issues pertaining to ethical and societal questions posed by AI as well as questions of safety, quality, security and consumer protection. Equally,
it will be important for the regulatory system to have mechanisms to respond to both short- and long-term problems presented by AI systems.

Though standards do have the potential to improve transparency and explainability, some participants in our expert workshops noted that the opaque nature of some AI systems places hard limits on the pursuit of transparency and explainability, regardless of the mechanism used
to pursue these goals. Given this, it was suggested that the regulatory system should place more emphasis on methods that sidestep the problem of explainability, looking at the outcomes of AI systems, rather than the processes by which those outcomes are achieved.[footnote]This is a relatively common approach taken by regulators currently, who understandably do not want to, or feel under-qualified to get into the business of auditing code. A difficulty with this approach is that the opacity of AI systems can make it difficult to predict and assess the outcomes of their use in advance. As a result, ‘outcomes-based’ approaches to regulating AI need to be grounded in clear accountability for AI decisions, rather than attempts to configure AI systems to produce more desirable outcomes.[/footnote]

A final caveat concerning standards is that standard setting is also currently heavily guided and influenced by industry groups, with the result that standards tend to be developed with a particular set of concerns and in mind.

Standards could potentially be a more useful complement to other regulatory and governance activity were their development to be influenced by a broader array of actors, including civil-society groups, representatives of communities particularly affected by AI, academics and regulators themselves. Should the UK become more actively involved in standard setting for AI systems, this would present a good opportunity to bring a greater diversity of voices and groups to the table.

Professionalisation

Another suggested mechanism by which the UK regulatory system could seek to address the risks and harms posed by AI systems was the pioneering of an ethical-certification and training framework for those people designing and developing AI systems. Establishing professional
standards could offer a way for regulators to enforce and incentivise particular governance practices, giving them more enforcement ‘teeth’.

There are several important differences between AI as a sector and domain of practice, and some of the sectors where training and professional accreditation have proven the most successful, such as medicine and the law. These professionalised fields have a very specific
domain of practice, the boundaries of which are clear and therefore easy to police. There are also strong and well established social, economic and legal sanctions for acting contrary to a professional code of practice.

Some expert panellists argued there is potentially a greater degree of tension between the business models for AI development and potential contents of an ethical certification for AI developers. Some expert participants noted that the objections to certain AI systems lie not
in how they are produced but in their fundamental business model, which may rely on practices like the mass collection of personal data or the development of mass-surveillance systems that some may see as objectionable. This raises questions about the scope and limits of professionalised codes of practice and how far they might be able to help.

Another common concept when discussing the professionalisation of the AI industry is that of fiduciary duties, which oblige professionals to act solely in the best interest of a client who has placed trust and dependence in them. However, some expert participants pointed out that though this model works well in industries like law and finance, it is less readily applicable to data-driven innovation and AI, where it is not the client of the professional who is vulnerable, but the end consumer or subject of the product being developed. The professional culture
of ethics exemplified by the fiduciary duty exists within the context of particular, trusting relationship between professional and client which isn’t mirrored in most AI business models.

Moratoria and bans

In response to worries about instances in which it may be impossible for regulators to assure themselves that they can successfully manage the harms posed by high-risk applications of AI, it may be desirable for the UK to refrain entirely from the development or deployment of
particular kinds of AI technology, either indefinitely or until such a time as risks and potential mitigations are better understood.

Facial recognition was cited by our expert workshop participants as an example of a technology that, in some forms, could pose sufficiently grave risks to an open and free society as to warrant being banned outright – or at the very least, being subjected to a moratorium. Other countries, including Morocco, have put in place temporary moratoria on the use of these kinds of systems until existing legal frameworks can be established.[footnote]National Control Commission for the Protection of Personal Data. (2020). Press release accompanying the publication of deliberation No. D-97-2020 du 26/03/2020’ (in French). Available at: https://www.cndp.ma/fr/presse-et-media/communique-de-presse/661-communique-de-presse-du-30-03-2020.html [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote] Similar bans exist on city uses of facial recognition in the US cities of Portland and San Francisco, though these have come with some criticism around their scope and effectiveness.[footnote]Simonite, T., and Barber, G. (2019). ‘It’s Hard to Ban Facial Recognition Tech in the iPhone Era’. Wired. Available at: www.wired.com/story/hard-ban-facial-recognition-tech-iphone.[/footnote]

One challenge with establishing bans and moratoria for certain technological uses is the necessity of developing a process for assessing the risks and benefits of these technologies, and endowing a regulator with the power to enact these restrictions. Currently, the UK has not endowed any regulator with explicit powers to make these bans of AI systems, nor with the capacity to develop a framework for assessing in which contexts certain uses of a technology would be worthy of a ban or moratoria. If the UK is to consider this mechanism, one initial step would be to develop a framework for the kinds of systems that may meet an unreasonable bar of risk.

Another worry expressed by some expert participants was whether bans and moratoria could end up destroying the UK’s own research and commercial capacity in a particular emerging technological field. Would a ban on facial-recognition systems, for example, be overly broad and risk creating a chilling effect on potential positive uses of the underlying technology?

Other expert participants were far less concerned with this possibility, and argued that bans and moratoria should focus on specific uses and outcomes of a technology rather than its underlying technique. A temporary moratoria could be restricted to specific high-risk
applications that require additional assessment of their effectiveness and impact, such as the use of live facial recognition in law enforcement settings. In the UK, current bans and moratoria on live facial recognition have been dealt with by court challenges like the recent decision on the New South Wales Police use of the technology.[footnote]Courts and Tribunals Judiciary. (2020). R (on the application of Edward Bridges) v. The Chief Constable of South Wales Police and the Secretary for the State for the Home Department. Case No: C1/2019/2670. Available at: https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/R-Bridges-v-CC-South-Wales-ors-Judgment.pdf [accessed 22 October 2021].[/footnote]

Chapter 4: Considerations for policymakers

This section sets out some general considerations for policymakers, synthesised from our expert workshops and the Ada Lovelace Institute’s own research and deliberations. These are not intended to be concrete policy recommendations (see chapter 5), but are general
lessons about the parameters within which the Government’s approach to AI regulation and governance will need to be developed, and the issues that need to be addressed with the current regulatory system.

In summary, policymakers should consider the following:

  1. Government ambitions for AI will depend on the stability and certainty provided by robust, AI-specific regulation and law.
  2. High regulatory standards and innovative, flexible regulatory processes will be critical to supporting AI innovation and use.
  3. A critical challenge with regulating AI systems is that risks can arise at various stages of an AI system’s development and deployment.
  4. The UK’s approach to regulation could involve a combination of a unified approach to the governance of AI, with new, cross-cutting rules set out in statute, and sectoral approaches to regulation.
  5. Substantial regulatory capacity building will be unavoidable.
  6. Promising regulatory approaches and tools will need to be refined and embedded into regulatory systems and structures.
  7. New tools need to be ‘designed into’ the regulatory system.

1. Government ambitions for AI will depend on the stability and certainty provided by robust, AI-specific regulation and law

One of the clearest conclusions to be drawn from the considerations in the previous two sections is that, done properly, AI regulation is a prerequisite, rather than an impediment to the development of a flourishing UK AI ecosystem.

Government ambitions to establish the UK as a ‘science superpower’ and use emerging technologies such as AI to drive broadly felt, geographically balanced economic growth will rely on the ability of the UK’s regulatory system to provide stability, certainty and continued
market access for innovators and businesses, and accountability and protection from harms for consumers and the public.

In particular, without the confidence, guidance and support provided by a robust regulatory system for AI, companies and organisations developing AI or looking to exploit its potential will have to grapple with the legal and ethical ramifications of systems on their own. As AI
systems become more complex and capable – and as a greater variety of entities look to develop or make use of them – the existence of clear regulatory rules and a well-resourced regulatory ecosystem will become increasingly important in de-risking the development and use of AI, helping to ensure that it is not just large incumbents that are able to work with the technology.

Critically, the Government’s approach to the governance and regulation of AI needs to be attentive to the specific features and potential impacts of the technology. Rather than concentrating exclusively on increasing the rate and extent of AI development and diffusion, the UK’s approach to AI regulation must also be attentive to the particular ways the technology
might manifest itself, and the specific effects it stands to have on the country’s economy, society and power structures.

In particular, a strategy for AI regulation needs to be designed with the protection and advancement of important and commonly held values, such as agency, human rights, democracy, the rule of law, equality and privacy, in mind. The UK’s AI Strategy already makes reference to some of these values, but a strategy for regulation must provide greater clarity
on how these should apply to the governance of AI systems.

2. High regulatory standards and innovative, flexible regulatory processes will be critical to supporting AI innovation and use

In practice, creating the stability, certainty and continued market access needed to cultivate AI as a UK strength will require the Government to commit to developing and maintaining high, flexible regulatory standards for AI.

As observed by our workshop panellists, there is limited scope for the UK to develop more permissive regulatory standards than its close allies and neighbours, such as the USA and the European Union. Notably, as well as undermining public confidence in a novel and powerful
technology, aspiring to regulatory standards that are lower than those of the European Union would deprive UK-based AI developers of the ability to export their products and services not only to the EU, but to other countries likely to adopt or closely align with the bloc’s regulatory model.

There are, nonetheless, significant opportunities for the UK to do AI regulation differently to, and more effectively than, other countries. While the UK will need to align with its allies on regulatory standards, the UK is in a good position to develop more flexible, resilient and
effective regulatory processes. The UK has an excellent reputation and track record in regulatory innovation, and the use of flexible, pragmatic approaches to monitoring and enforcement. This expertise, which has in part contributed to British successes in fields such as bioscience and fintech, should be leveraged to produce a regulatory ecosystem that supports and empowers businesses and innovators to develop and exploit the potential of AI.

3. A critical challenge with regulating AI systems is that risks can arise at various stages of an AI system’s development and deployment

Unlike most other technologies, AI systems can raise different kinds of risks at different stages of a system’s development and deployment. The same AI system applied in one setting (such as a facial scan for authenticating entry to a private warehouse) can raise significantly
different risks when applied in another (such as authenticating entry to public transport). Similarly, some AI systems are dynamic, and their impacts can change drastically when fed new kinds of data or when deployed in a different context. An ex ante test of a system’s behaviour in ‘lab’ settings may therefore not provide an accurate assessment of that system’s actual impacts when deployed ‘in the wild’.

Many of the proposed models for regulating AI focus either on ex ante assessments that classify an AI system’s risk, or ex post findings of harm in a court of law. One option the UK might consider is an approach to AI regulation that includes regulatory attention at all stages of an AI system’s development and deployment. This may, for example, involve using ex ante algorithmic impact assessments (AIAs) of a system’s risks and benefits pre-deployment, along with post-deployment audits of that system’s behaviour.

If the UK chooses to follow this model, it will have to provide regulators with the necessary powers and capacity to undertake these kinds of holistic regulatory assessments. The UK may also consider delegating some of these responsibilities to independent third parties, such as
algorithmic-auditing firms.

4. The UK’s approach to regulation could involve a combination of a unified approach to the governance of AI, with new, cross-cutting rules set out in statute, and sectoral approaches to regulation

A common challenge raised by our expert participants was whether the UK should adopt a unified approach to regulating AI systems involving a central function that oversees all AI systems, or if regulation should be left to individual regulators who approach these issues on a sectoral or case-by-case basis.

One approach the UK Government could pursue is a combination of the two. While individual regulators can and should develop domain- and sector-specific regulatory rules for AI, there is also a need for a more general, overarching set of rules, which outline if and under what
circumstances the use of AI is permissible. The existence of such general rules is a prerequisite for a coherent, coordinated regulatory and legal response to the challenges posed by AI.

If they are to provide the stability, predictability and confidence needed for UK to get the most out of AI, these new, AI-specific regulatory rules will probably have to be developed and set out in statute.

The unique capacity of AI systems to develop and change independently of human control and intervention means that existing legal and regulatory rules will be likely to prove inadequate. While the UK’s common-law system may develop to accommodate some of these features, this will only happen slowly (if it happens at all) and there is no guarantee the resulting rules will be clear or amount to a coherent response to the technology.

5. Substantial regulatory capacity building will be unavoidable

The successful management of AI will require a sustained and significant expansion of the regulatory system’s overall capacity and levels of coordination.

There are several viable options for how to organise and allocate additional regulatory capacity, and to improve the ability of regulators to develop sector-specific regulatory rules that amount to a coherent whole. Regardless of the specific institutional arrangements, any
capacity building and coordination efforts must ensure that:

  1. additional resources can be allocated without too much duplication of effort, and that gaps and blind spots in the regulatory system are avoided
  2. regulators are able to understand how their responses to AI within their specific domains contribute to the broader regulatory environment, and are provided with clear guidance on how their policies can be configured to complement those of other regulators
  3. regulators are able to easily share intelligence and jointly conduct horizon-scanning exercises.

6. Promising regulatory approaches and tools will need to be refined and embedded into regulatory systems and structures

There are a number of tools and mechanisms that already exist, or that are currently being developed, that could enable regulators to effectively rise to the challenges presented by AI – many of which were pioneered by UK entities.

These include tools of so called ‘anticipatory regulation’, such as regulatory sandboxes, regulatory labs and coordinated horizon scanning and foresight techniques, as well as deliberative mechanisms for better understanding informed public opinion and values regarding emerging technologies, such as deliberative polling, citizens’ juries and assemblies.

Some of these tools are still emerging and should be tested further to determine their value, such as the use of transparency registers to disclose where AI systems are in operation, or algorithmic impact assessments to provide an ex ante assessment of an AI system’s benefits
and harms. While many of the above tools have the potential to prove invaluable in helping regulators and lawmakers rise to the challenges presented by AI, many are still nascent or have only been used in limited circumstances. Moreover, many of the tools needed to help regulators address the challenges posed by AI do not yet exist.

To ensure that regulators have the tools they require, there needs to be a substantial, long-term commitment to supporting regulatory innovation and experimentation, and to supporting the diffusion of the most mature, proven techniques throughout the regulatory ecosystem. This ongoing experimentation will be crucial to ensure that the regulatory system does not become overly dependent on particular kinds of regulatory interventions, but instead has a toolkit that allows it to respond quickly to emerging harms and dangers, as well as being able to develop
more nuanced and durable rules and standards in the longer term.

7. New tools need to be ‘designed into’ the regulatory system

As well as helping cultivate and refine new regulatory tools and techniques, further work is required to understand how regulatory structures and processes might be configured to best enable them.

This is particularly true of anticipatory and participatory mechanisms. The value of techniques like sandboxing, horizon scanning and citizen juries is unlikely to be fully realised unless the insight gained from these activities is systematically reflected in the development and
enforcement of broader regulatory rules.

A good example of how these tools are likely to be most useful if ‘designed into’ regulatory systems and processes is provided by risk-based regulation. Given the variety of applications of AI systems, the UK may choose to follow the approach of the European draft AI regulation and adopt some form of risk-based regulation to prevent gross over or under regulation of AI systems. However, if such an approach is to avoid creating gaps in the regulatory system, in which harmful practices escape appropriate levels of regulatory scrutiny, the system’s ability to
make and review judgements about which risk categories different AI systems should fall into will need to be improved.

One element of this will be using anticipatory mechanisms to help predict harms and unintended consequences that could arise from different uses of AI. Participatory mechanisms that involve regulators working closely with local-community organisations, members of
the public and civil society may also help regulators identify and assess risks to particular groups.

Perhaps the bigger challenge, though, will be to design processes by which the risk tiers into which different kinds of systems fall are regularly reviewed and updated, so that AI systems whose risk profiles may change over time do not end up being over or under regulated.

Chapter 5: Open questions for Government

This section sets out a series of open questions that we believe the White Paper on AI regulation and governance should respond to, before making a series of more specific recommendations about things that we believe it should commit to.

We acknowledge that these open questions touch on complex issues that cannot be easily answered. In the coming months, we encourage the Office for AI to engage closely with members of the public, academia, civil society and regulators to further develop these ideas.

Open questions

AI systems present a set of common, novel regulatory challenges, which may manifest differently in different domains, and which demand holistic solutions. A coherent regulatory response to AI systems therefore requires a combination of general, cross-cutting regulatory
rules and sector-specific regulations, tailored to particular uses of AI.

Finding the right balance between these two will depend on how the UK chooses to answer several open questions relating to the regulation of AI. A more detailed discussion around some of these questions, along with other considerations when designing and configuring regulatory systems, can be found in the annex.

What to regulate?

First, the UK Government must determine what kinds of AI systems it seeks to regulate, and what definition it will use to classify AI systems appropriately. Some possible options include:

  1. Regulating all AI systems equally. Anything classified as an ‘AI system’ must follow common rules. This may require the UK choosing a more precise definition of ‘AI system’ to ensure particular kinds of systems (such as those used to augment or complement human decision-making) are included. This may prove resource
    intensive both for regulators and for new entrants seeking to build AI, but this approach could ensure no potentially harmful system avoids oversight.
  2. Regulating higher-risk systems. This would involve creating risk tiers and regulating ‘higher-risk’ systems more intensely than lower risk, and could involve the UK adopting a broader and more encompassing definition of AI systems. A challenge with risk-based approaches to regulation comes in identifying and assessing the level of risk, particularly when risks for some members of society may be benefits for others. The UK could consider assigning risk tiers in a number of ways, including:
    1. Enumerating certain domains (such as credit scoring, or public services) that are inherently higher risk.[footnote]This is the approach the EU’s Draft AI Regulation takes. See Annex III of the European Commission. (2021). Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts (COM(2021) 206 final).[/footnote] This approach could be easily bypassed by a developer seeking to classify their system in a different domain, and it may not capture ‘off-label’ uses of a system that could have harmful effects.
    2. Enumerating certain uses (such as facial-recognition systems that identify people in public places) as higher risk. This approach could also be easily bypassed by a developer who reclassifies the use of their system, and would require constant updating of new high-risk uses and a process for determining that risk.
    3. Enumerating certain criteria for assigning higher risk. These could include ex ante assessments of the foreseeable risk of a system’s intended and reasonably likely uses, along with ex post assessments of a system’s actual harms over time.

Who to regulate?

The UK Government must similarly choose who is the focus of AI regulation. This could include any of the following actors, with different obligations and requirements applying to each one:

  1. Developers: Those who create a system. Regulatory rules that enforce ex ante requirements about a system’s design, intended use or oversight could be enforced against this group.
  2. Adapters: A sub-developer who creates an AI system based on building blocks provided by other developers. For example, a developer who uses the Google Cloud ML service, which provides machine-learning models for developers to use, could be classified as an adapter. Similarly, a developer who utilises ‘foundation’ models like OpenAI’s GPT-3 to train their model could be classified as an adapter.[footnote]For a discussion about the opportunities and risks of ‘foundation models,’ see Bommasani, R., et al. (2021). On the opportunities and risks of foundation models. Stanford FSI. Available at: https://fsi.stanford.edu/publication/opportunities-and-risks-foundation-models[/footnote]
  3. Deployers: The person who is responsible for putting a system into practice. While a deployer may have procured this system from a developer, they may not have access to the source code or data of that system.[footnote]The EU’s Draft AI regulation attempts to distinguish between developers and ‘users,’ a term that can be confused with those who are subject to an AI system’s decisions. See Smuha, N. et al. (2021). How the EU Can Achieve Legally Trustworthy AI: A Response to the European Commission’s Proposal for an Artificial Intelligence Act. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3899991 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3899991.[/footnote]

How and when to regulate?

Part of the challenge with regulating AI systems is that risks and harms may arise in different stages of a product’s lifecycle. Addressing this challenge requires a combination of both ex ante and ex post regulatory interventions. Some options the UK Government could consider include:

  1. Ex ante criteria that all AI systems must meet. These could be both technical requirements around the quality of datasets an AI system is trained on, along with governance requirements including documentation standards (such as the use of model cards) and bias assessments. A regulatory system could ensure developers of an AI system meet these requirements through either:
    1. Self-certification: A developer self-certifies they are meeting these requirements. This raises a risk of certification becoming a checkbox exercise that is easily gameable.[footnote]The EU’s proposed regulations follow this same approach.[/footnote]
    2. Third-party certification: The UK Government could require developers to obtain a certification from a third-party, either a regulator or Government-approved independent certifier. This could enable more independent certification, but may become a barrier for smaller firms.
  2. Ex ante sectoral codes of practice. Certain sectors may choose to implement additional criteria on an AI system before it enters the market. This may be essential for certain sectors like healthcare that require additional checks for patient safety and operability of a system. This could include checks about how well a system has
    been integrated into a particular environment, or checks on how a system is behaving in a sandbox environment.
  3. Ex post auditing and inspection requirements. Regulators could evaluate the actual impacts and risks of a system post-deployment by inspecting and auditing its behaviour. This may require expanding on existing multi-regulator coordination efforts like the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum to identify gaps and share
    information, and to create longitudinal studies on the risk and behaviour of an AI system over time.
  4. Novel forms of redress. This could include the creation of an ombudsman or form of consumer champion for intaking and raising complaints about an AI system on behalf of people and society, and ensuring the appropriate regulator has dealt with them.

Chapter 6: Recommendations for the Government’s White Paper on AI regulation

With the above open questions in mind, we recommend the Government focuses on taking action in the following three areas in their forthcoming White Paper on AI regulation:

  1. The development of new, clear regulations for AI.
  2. Improved regulatory capacity and coordination.
  3. Improving transparency standards and accountability mechanisms.

1. The development of new, clear regulations for AI

Recommendation 1:

The Government should establish a clear definition of AI systems that matches their overall approach towards regulation.

How broad and encompassing this definition may be will depend on what kind of regulatory approach the Government chooses (for example, risk-based vs all-encompassing), what criteria the Government chooses to trigger intervention (such as systems they classify as ‘high risk’ vs ‘low risk’) and which actors the Government chooses to target regulation at (such as the developers of AI or the deployers).

  • In their White Paper, the Government should explore the possibility of combining sectoral and risk-based approaches, and should commit to engaging with civil society on these questions.
  • The Government should commit to ensuring the definition and approach to AI they choose will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny.

Recommendation 2:

Government should consider creating a central function to oversee the development and implementation of AI-specific, domain-neutral statutory rules for AI systems. These rules should be subject to regular parliamentary scrutiny.

These domain-neutral statutory rules could:

  • set out consistent ways for regulators to approach common challenges posed by AI systems (such as accountability for automated decision-making, the encoding of contestable, value-laden judgements into AI systems, AI bias, the appropriate place for human oversight and challenge of AI systems, the problems associated with understanding, trusting and making important choices on the basis of opaque AI decision-making processes). The proposed approaches should be rooted in legal concepts and ethical values such as fairness, liberty, agency, human rights, democracy and the rule of law.

The specific understanding of these concepts and values should be informed not just by the existing discourse on AI ethics, but also by engagement with the public. The Government should commit to co-developing these rules with members of the public, civil society
and academia. These rules should:

  • include and set out a requirement for, and mechanism by which the central function must regularly revisit the definition of AI, the criteria for regulatory intervention and the domain-neutral rules themselves. The central function should be required to provide an annual report to Parliament on the status and operation of these rules.
  • provide a means of requiring individual regulators to attend to, and address the systemic, long-term impacts of AI systems. While the regulatory system as a whole is a potentially critical lever in addressing them, many of the most significant impacts of AI systems – such as how they affect democracies and alter the balance of power
    between different groups in society – are not covered by the narrow, domain-bounded remits of individual regulators. The provision of domain-neutral rules for AI regulation would be one way to require and mandate individual regulators to make regulatory decisions with a view to addressing these larger, more systemic issues – and could be a way of guiding regulators to do so in a coordinated manner.
  • provide a means for regulators to address all stages of an AI system’s lifecycle, from research to product development to procurement and post-deployment. This would require regulators to use ex ante regulatory mechanisms (such as impact assessments) to assess the potential impacts of an AI system on people and society, along with ex post mechanisms (such as regulatory inspections and audits) to determine the actual impact of an AI system’s behaviour on people and society. Regulators could also be required to use anticipatory methods to assess the potential future risks posed by AI systems in different contexts.
  • be intended to supplement, rather than replace, existing laws governing AI systems. These rules should complement existing health and safety, consumer protection, human rights and data-protection regulations and law.

In addition to developing and updating the domain-neutral rules, the central function could be responsible for:

  • leading cross-regulatory coordination on the regulation of AI systems, along with cross-regulatory horizon-scanning and foresight exercises to provide intelligence on potential harms and challenges posed by AI systems that may require regulatory responses
  • monitoring common challenges with regulating AI and, where there is evidence of problems that require new legislation, making recommendations to Parliament to address gaps in the law.

Recommendation 3:

Government should consider requiring regulators to develop sector-specific codes of practice for the regulation of AI.

These sector-specific codes of practices would:

  • lay out a regulator’s approach to setting and enforcing regulatory rules covering AI systems in particular contexts or domains, as well as the general regulatory requirements placed on developers, adapters and deployers of those systems
  • be developed and maintained by individual regulators, who are best placed to understand the particular ways in which AI systems are deployed in regulatory domains, the risks involved in those deployments, their current and future impacts, and the practicality of different regulatory interventions
  • be subject to regular review to ensure that they keep pace with developments in AI technologies and business models.

Potential synergy between recommendations 2 and 3

While recommendations 2 and 3 could individually each bring benefits to the regulatory system’s capacity to deal with the challenges posed by AI, we believe that they would be most beneficial if implemented together, enabling a system in which cross-cutting regulatory rules inform and work in tandem with sector-specific codes of practice.

Below we illustrate one potential way that the central function, domain-neutral statutory rules and sector-specific codes of practice could be combined to improve the coordination and responsiveness of the regulatory system with regards to AI systems.

A potential model for horizontal and vertical regulation of AI

 

On this model:

  • The central function would create domain-neutral statutory rules.
  • Individual regulators would be required to take the domain-neutral statutory rules into account when developing and updating the sector-specific codes of practice. These sector-specific codes of practice would apply the domain-neutral statutory rules to specific kinds of AI systems, or the use of those systems in specific contexts. These codes of practice should include enforcement mechanisms that address all stages of an AI system’s lifecycle, including ex ante assessments like impact assessments and ex post audits of a system’s behaviour.
  • Careful adherence to the domain-neutral statutory rules when developing the sector-specific codes of practice would help ensure that the multiple different AI codes of practice, developed across different regulators, all approached AI regulation with the same high-level goals in mind.
  • The central function would have a duty to advise and work with individual regulators on how best to interpret the domain-neutral statutory rules when developing sector-specific codes of practice.

2. Improved regulatory capacity and coordination

AI systems are often complex, opaque and straddle regulatory remits. For the regulatory system to be able to deal with these challenges, significant improvements will need to be made to regulatory capacity (both at the level of individual regulators and the whole regulatory
system) and to improve coordination and knowledge sharing between regulators.

Recommendation 4:

Government should consider expanded funding for regulators to deal with analytical and enforcement challenges posed by AI systems. This funding will support building regulator capacity and coordination.

Recommendation 5:

Government should consider expanded funding and support for regulatory experimentation, and the development of anticipatory and participatory capacity within individual regulators. This will involve bringing in new forms of public engagement and futures expertise.

Recommendation 6:

Government should consider developing formal structures for capacity sharing, coordination and intelligence sharing between regulators dealing with AI systems.

These structures could include a combination of several different models, including centralised resources of AI knowledge, experts rotating between regulators and the expansion of existing cross-regulator forums like the Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum.

Recommendation 7:

Government should consider granting regulators the powers needed to enable them to make use of a greater variety of regulatory mechanisms.

These include providing statutory powers for regulators to engage in regulatory inspections of different kinds of AI systems. The Government should commission a review of the powers different regulators will need to conduct ex ante and ex post assessments of an AI system before, during, and after its deployment.


3. Improving transparency standards and accountability mechanisms

The impacts of AI systems may not always be visible to, or controllable by policymakers and regulators alone. This means that regulation and regulatory intelligence gathering will need to be complemented by and coordinated with extra-regulatory mechanisms, such as standards,
investigative journalism and activism.

Recommendation 8:

Government should consider how best to use the UK’s influence over international standards to improve the transparency and auditability of AI systems.

While these are not a silver bullet, they can help ensure the UK’s approach to regulation and governance remains interoperable with approaches in other regions.

Recommendation 9:

Government should consider how best to maintain and strengthen laws and mechanisms to protect and enable journalists, academics, civil-society organisations, whistleblowers and citizen auditors to hold developers and deployers of AI systems to account.

This could include passing novel legislation to require the disclosure of AI systems when in use, or requirements for AI developers to disclose data around systems’ performance and behaviour.

Annex: The anatomy of regulatory rules and systems, and how these apply to AI

To explore how the UK’s regulatory system might adapt to meet the needs of the Government’s ambitions for AI, it is useful to consider ways in which regulatory systems (and sets of regulatory rules) can vary.

This section sets out some important variables in the design of regulatory systems, and how they might apply specifically to the regulation of AI. It is adapted from a presentation given at the second of the expert workshops, by Professor Julia Black, who has written
extensively on this topic.[footnote]Black, J., and Murray, A. D. (2019). ‘Regulating AI and machine learning: setting the regulatory agenda’. European Journal of Law and Technology, 10 (3). Available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/102953/4/722_3282_1_PB.pdf[/footnote]

The following section addresses the challenges some of these variables may pose for the regulation of AI.

Why to regulate: The underlying aims of regulation

Regulatory systems can vary in terms of their underlying aims. Regulatory systems may have distinct, narrowly defined aims (such as maximising choice and value for consumers within a particular market, or ensuring a specific level of safety for a particular category of product), and may also have been driven by different broader objectives.

In the context of the regulation of AI, some of the broader values that could be taken into consideration by a regulatory system might include economic growth, the preservation of privacy, the avoidance of concentrations of market power and distributional equality.

When to regulate: The timing of regulatory interventions

A second important variable in the design of a regulatory system concerns the stage at which regulatory interventions take place. Here, there are three, mutually compatible, options:

Before: A regulator can choose to intervene prior to a product or service entering a market, or prior to it receiving regulatory approval. In the context of AI, examples of ex ante regulation might include pre-market entry requirements, such as audits and assessments of AI systems by regulators to ascertain the levels of accuracy and bias.[footnote]Ada Lovelace Institute and DataKind UK. (2020). Examining the Black Box: Tools for Assessing Algorithmic Systems Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/examining-the-black-box-tools-for-assessing-algorithmic-systems.[/footnote] It might also include bans on specific uses of AI in particular, high-risk settings.

During: A regulator can also intervene during the course of the operation of a business model, product or service. Here, this will be stipulating requirements that need to be met by the product during the course of its operation. Typically, this type of intervention will require some form of inspection regime to ensure ongoing compliance with the regulator’s requirements. In the context of AI, it might involve establishing mechanisms by which regulators can inspect algorithmic systems, or requirements for AI developers to disclose information on the performance of their systems – either publicly or to the regulator.

After: A regulator can intervene retrospectively to remedy harms, or address breaches of regulatory rules and norms. Retrospective regulation can take the form of public enforcement, undertaken by regulators with statutory enforcement powers, or private-sector enforcement pursued via contract, tort and public-law remedies. An AI-related example might be regulators having the power to issue fines to developers or users of AI systems for breaches of regulatory rules, or as redress for particular harms done to individuals or groups resulting from failure to comply with regulation.

What to regulate: Targets of regulatory interventions

A third important variable concerns the targets of regulatory interventions. Here, regulators and regulatory systems can be configured to concentrate on any of the following:

Conduct and behaviour: One of the most common forms of intervention involves regulating the conduct or behaviour of a particular actor or actors. On the one hand, regulation of conduct can be directed at suppliers of goods, products or services, and often involves stipulating:

  1. rules for how firms should conduct business,
  2. requirements to provide information or guidance to consumers, or
  3. responsibilities that must be borne by particular individuals.

Regulation of conduct can also be directed towards consumers, however. Attempts to regulate consumer behaviour typically involve the provision of information or guidance to help consumers better navigate markets. This kind of regulation may also involve manipulation of the way that consumers’ choices are presented and framed, known as ‘choice architecture’, with a view towards ‘nudging’ consumers to make particular choices.

Systems and processes: A second target of regulation are the systems and processes followed by companies and organisations. Regulators may look to dictate aspects of business processes and management systems or else introduce new processes that companies and organisations have to follow, such as health-and-safety checks
and procedures. Regulators may also target technical and scientific processes, for example, the UK Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority addresses the scientific processes that can be adopted for human fertilisation.

Market structure: A third target of regulation is the overall dynamics and structure of a market with the aim of addressing current or potential market failures. Regulation of market structure may be aimed at preventing monopolies or other forms of anti-competitive behaviours or structures, or at more specific goals, such as avoiding moral hazard or containing the impact of the collapse of particular companies or sectors. These can be achieved though competition law or through the imposition of sector-specific rules.

Technological infrastructure should be a key concern for regulators of AI, particularly given that the majority of AI systems and ‘cloud’ services are going to be built and dependent on physical infrastructure provided by big tech. Regulators will want to consider control of the infrastructure necessary for the functioning of AI (and digital technologies more
generally), as well as the competition implications of this trend.

It is worth noting that the early 2020s is likely to be a time of significant change in approaches to competition law – particularly in relation to the tech industry. In the USA, the Biden administration has shown greater willingness than any of its recent predecessors to reform competition law, though the extent and direction of any changes remains unclear.[footnote]Bietti, E. (2021). ‘Is the Goal of Antitrust Enforcement a Competitive Digital Economy or a Different Digital Ecosystem?’ Ada Lovelace Institute. Available at: www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/blog/antitrust-enforcement-competitive-digital-economy-digital-ecosystem/ [accessed 20 September 2021][/footnote] In the EU, the Digital Markets Act[footnote]Tambiama, M. (2021). Digital Markets Act – Briefing, May 2021, p. 12. Available at: www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/690589/EPRS_BRI(2021)690589_EN.pdf[/footnote] is set to change the regulatory landscape dramatically. For a UK Government eager to stimulate and develop the UK tech sector, getting the UK regulatory system’s
approach to competition law right will be imperative to success.

Calculative methods: A particularly important target of regulation in the context of AI is calculative and decision-making models. These can range from simple mathematical models that set the prices of consumer products, to more complex algorithms used to
rate a person’s credit worthiness, or the artificial-neural networks used to power self-driving vehicles.

Regulation of calculative methods can be undertaken by directly stipulating the requirements for the model (for instance stating that a decision-making model should have a particular accuracy threshold), or else by regulating the nature of the calculative or decision-making models themselves. For instance, in finance, a regulator might stipulate the means by which a bank calculates its liabilities – the cash reserves it must set aside as contingency.

How widely to regulate: The scope of regulatory intervention

An important related variable that is particularly salient in the context of a general-purpose technology like AI is the scope of regulation. Here, it is useful to distinguish between:

  1. The scope of the aims of regulation: One the one hand, a regulatory intervention might aim for the use of AI in a particular context to avoid localised harms, and for the use of AI in a particular domain to be consistent with the functioning of that domain. On the other, individual regulators might also be concerned with how the use of AI in their particular enforcement domain affects other domains, or how the sum of all regulatory rules concerning AI across different industries or domains affects the technology’s overall impact on society and the economy.
  2. The institutional scope of regulation: Closely related is the question of the extent to which regulators and other institutions see and develop regulatory rules as part of a coherent whole, or whether they operate separately.
  3. The geographical scope of regulation: Is regulation set at a national or a supranational level?

As a general rule, regulation with a narrow scope is easier for individual regulators to design and enforce, as it provides regulatory policy development and evaluation with fewer variables and avoids difficult coordination problems. Despite these advantages, narrow approaches to regulation have significant setbacks, which are of particular relevance to a general-purpose technology like AI, and may make the difficulties of more holistic, integrated approaches worth considering:

  • Regulatory systems that focus on addressing narrowly defined issues can often be blind to issues that are only visible in the aggregate.
  • Regulatory systems characterised by regulators with narrow areas of interest are more prone to blind spots in between domains of regulation.
  • The existence of regulators and regulatory regimes with narrow geographical or market scope can increase the risks of arbitrage (where multinational firms exploit the regulatory differences between markets to circumvent regulation).

How to regulate: Modes of regulatory intervention, and tools and techniques

A final variable is the tools, approaches and techniques used by a regulator or regulatory system.

The different mechanisms by which regulators can achieve their objectives can be divided up into the following categories:

  • norms
  • numbers
  • incentives and sanctions
  • regulatory approach
  • trust and legitimacy.

Norms

Perhaps the most common means of regulating is by setting norms. Regulatory norms can take the form of specific rules, or more general principles. The latter can be focused either on the outcomes the regulated entity should produce, or the nature of the processes or
procedures undertaken. In terms of scope, norms can be specific to particular firms or industries, or can be cross sectoral or even cross jurisdictional.

While norms do tend to require enforcement, there are many cases where norms are voluntarily adhered to, or where norms create a degree of self-regulation on the part of regulated entities. In the context of AI, regulatory policy (and AI policy more generally) may attempt to encourage norms of data stewardship,116 greater use of principles of data minimisation and privacy-by-design, and transparency about when and how AI systems are used. In some cases, however, the nature of the incentive structures and business models for tech companies will place hard limits on the efficacy of reliance on norms. (For instance,
corporations’ incentives to maximise profits and to increase shareholder value in the short term may outweigh considerations about adherence to specific norms).

Numbers

Another important means of regulatory intervention is by stipulating prices for products in a market, or by stipulating some of the numerical inputs to calculative models. For instance, if a company uses a scorecard methodology to make a particular, significant decision, a regulator might decide to stipulate the confidence threshold.

These kinds of mechanisms may be indirectly relevant to AI systems used to set prices within markets, and could be directly relevant for symbolic AI systems, where particular numerical inputs can have a significant and clear effect on outputs. However, recent literature on competition law and large technology companies highlights that a fixture
on price misses other forms of competition concern.[footnote]Khan, L. (2017). ‘Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox’. Yale Law Journal. Volume 126, No. 3. Available at: www.yalelawjournal.org/note/ amazons-antitrust-paradox.[/footnote]

Incentives and sanctions

Regulators can also provide incentives or impose penalties to change the behaviours of actors within a market. These might be pegged to particular market outcomes (such as average prices or levels of consumer satisfaction), to specific conduct (such as the violation of regulatory rules or principles) or to the occurrence of specific harms. Penalties can take the form of fines, requirements to compensate injured parties, the withdrawal of professional licenses or, in extreme cases, criminal sanctions. A prime example of the use of sanctions in tech regulation is provided by the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, which imposes significant fines on companies for non-compliance.[footnote]General Data Protection Regulation. Available at: https://gdpr.eu/fines.[/footnote]

Regulatory approach

Finally, there are various questions of regulatory approach. Differences in regulatory approach might include whether a regulatory regime is:

  • Anticipatory, whereby the regulator attempts to understand potential harms or market failures before they emerge, and to address them before they become too severe, or reactive, whereby regulators respond to issues once harms or other problems are clearly manifest. In the realm of technology regulation, anticipatory approaches are perhaps the best answer to the ‘Collingridge dilemma’: when
    new technologies and business models do present clear harms that require regulation, these often only become apparent to regulators well after they have become commonplace. By this time, the innovations in question have often become so integrated into economic life that post hoc regulation is extremely difficult.[footnote]Liebert, W., and Schmidt, J. C. (2010)[/footnote] However, anticipatory approaches tend to have to err on the side of caution, potentially leading to a greater degree of overregulation than reactive approaches – which can operate with a fuller understanding of the harms and benefits of new technologies and business models.
  • Compliance based, where a regulator works with regulated entities to help them comply with rules and principles, or deterrence based, where regulatory sanctions provide the main mechanisms by which to incentivise adherence. This difference also tends to be more pronounced in the context of emerging technologies, where there is less certainty regarding what is and isn’t allowed under regulatory rules.
  • Standardised, where all regulated products and services are treated the same, or risk based, whereby regulators monitor and restrict different products and services to differing degrees, depending on judgements of the severity or likelihood of potential harms from regulatory failure.[footnote]In determining how to calibrate a regulatory response to a product or technology to the level of risk it presents, two of the most important factors are 1) If and to what extent the harms it could cause are reversible or compensatable; and 2) whether the harms done are contained in scope, or broader and more systemic.[/footnote] By creating different levels of regulatory requirements, the rules created by risk-based systems can be less
    onerous for innovators and businesses, but also depend on current (and potentially incorrect) judgements about the potential levels of risk and harms associated with different technologies or business models. Risk-based approaches come with the danger of creating gaps in the regulatory system, in which harmful practices or technologies can escape an appropriate level of regulatory scrutiny.

Trust and legitimacy

There are different things that different groups will require from a regulator or regulatory system in order for the system to be seen as trustworthy and legitimate. These include:

  • Expertise: A regulator needs to have, and be able to demonstrate a sufficient level of understanding of the subject matter they are regulating. This is particularly important in industries or areas where asymmetries of information are common, such as AI. While relevant technical expertise is a necessity for regulators, in many contexts (and especially that of AI regulation) understanding the dynamics
    of sociotechnical systems and their effects on people and society will also be essential.
  • Normative values: It is also important for a regulator to take into account societal values when developing and enforcing regulatory policy. For example, in relation to AI, it will be important for questions about privacy, distributional justice or procedural fairness to be reflected in a regulator’s actions, alongside considerations of efficiency, safety and security.
  • Constitutional, democratic and participatory values: A final important set of factors affecting the legitimacy and trustworthiness of a regulator concern whether a regulator’s ways of working are transparent, accountable and open to democratic participation and input. Ensuring a regulator is open to meaningful participation can
    often be difficult, depending on its legal and practical ability to make decisions differently in response to participatory interventions, and on the accessibility of the decisions being made.

Acknowledgements

We are grateful to the expert panellists who took part in our workshops in April and May 2021, the findings of which helped inform much of this report. Those involved in these workshops are listed below.

Workshop participant Affiliation
Ghazi Ahamat Centre for Data Ethics & Innovation
Mhairi Aitken Alan Turing Institute
Haydn Belfield Haydn Belfield Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
Elettra Bietti Berkman Klein Center for Internet and Society
Reuben Binns University of Oxford
Kate Brand Competition and Markets Authority
Lina Dencik Data Justice Lab, Cardiff University
George Dibb Institute for Public Policy Research
Mark Durkee Centre for Data Ethics & Innovation
Alex Georgiades UK Civil Aviation Authority
Mohammed Gharbawi Bank of England
Emre Kazim University College London
Paddy Leerssen University of Amsterdam
Samantha McGregor Arts and Humanities Research Council
Seán ÓhÉigeartaigh Leverhulme Centre for the Future of Intelligence
& Centre for the Study of Existential Risk
Lee Pope Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport
Mona Sloane New York University, Center for Responsible AI
Anna Thomas Institute for the Future of Work
Helen Toner Center for Security and Emerging Technology
SalomĂŠ Viljoen Columbia Law School
Karen Yeung Birmingham Law School & School of Computer Science

We are also grateful to those who, in addition to participating in the workshops, provided comments at different stages of this report and whose thinking, ideas and writing we have drawn on heavily, in particular: Professor Julia Black, London School of Economics; Jacob Turner, barrister at Falcon Chambers and Professor Lillian Edwards, University of Newcastle.


 

This report was lead authored by Harry Farmer, with substantive contributions from Andrew Strait and Imogen Parker.

Preferred citation: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Regulate to innovate. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/regulate-innovate/

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  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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In 2022, JUST AI moved to being hosted by the LSE. Learnings from this pilot project have contributed to greater understanding of the challenges and approaches to funding and hosting fellowship programmes, within the Ada Lovelace Institute and in the development of a broader data and AI research and funding community globally.

This is the first of a series of posts reflecting on different aspects of the mapping process. Here, we describe the conversation between quantitative literature mapping and qualitative critique, and the meaning of this conversation for the understanding of key data and AI ethics issues. This post describes our use of network methods to investigate the relationship between ‘data justice’ work and broader endeavours across the field of data and AI ethics.

We use network methods in our research as a way to describe different clusters of work occurring around data and AI ethics, and to identify the kinds of work capable of linking together different perspectives. We believe that in this urgent area of investigation, where issues have a broad impact, the separation and specialisation that often characterises scientific work might mean that the risks, harms and sociotechnical patterns of influence around data and AI are not discussed broadly between different kinds of practitioners and experts. This siloing influences how these ideas are talked about publicly as well. Given the significance of AI technologies across fields and in many areas of life, there is a lot at stake in terms of the quality and integration of discussions about data and AI ethics.

Understanding relationships of ideas

Quantitative and network-based literature mapping provides a way to assess the state of a research field by mapping and visualising it. Using social-network analysis techniques can include mapping the relationships between and prominence of institutions and individuals, as well as co-authorship (who writes with whom), to describe the relationships between people. Another set of techniques, including citation clusters, term co-occurrence mapping and topic modelling, looks at the thematic and conceptual structure of networks.

One of the maps of the field of data and AI ethics that we made based on one of these techniques – co-authorship relationships – looks like this:

An image representing a small section of a large network, with names of authors in bold, over round nodes whose size indicates their prominence in a network of connections. Lines indicate connections between authors representing co-authorships in publications
Figure 1.1: An image representing a small section of a large network, with names of authors in bold, over round nodes whose size indicates their prominence in a network of connections. Lines indicate connections between authors representing co-authorships in publications

In this phase of literature mapping the JUST AI team drew on a deliberately restricted interpretation of data and AI ethics, which was operationalised into a search string that combined technical terms (‘data science’, ‘big data’, AI, ‘artificial intelligence’, ‘machine learning’, ‘robot*’, ‘autonomous system’, ‘automated decision’, ‘deep learning’, ‘autonomous vehicle’) with a small set of keywords to capture ethics (‘ethic*’ (the root word of ethic, ethics, ethical, etc.), moral and virtue) in the title, keywords or abstracts of papers found in major repositories: Clarivate’s Web of Science, the SpringerLink database, the digital library of the Association for Computing Machinery (ACM), as well as two preprint archives, the Social Science Research Network’s database and ArXiv. The search spanned the period between 2010 and March of 2021.

Collecting publication data like this might seem quite straightforward – after all it is digital ‘big data’ that you can collect through the search interfaces of repositories using automated methods. However, this data collection is a hugely labour-intensive exercise, with large amounts of manual effort going into the collection, aggregation, cleaning and harmonising of data drawn from different sources. In addition, some of these methods were new to our team, and we had to familiarise ourselves with the process. We also had to make important decisions about what to include in the final dataset, and we chose to make this decision after reviewing the abstracts of each paper individually to determine whether they were connected to AI/data ethics, or if the use of key terms was spurious, referring for example to obtaining ethics approval.

Snapshot of a spreadsheet showing part of the data collected
Figure 1.2: Snapshot of a spreadsheet showing part of the data collected

Following manual sorting, we used network methods to describe how people discuss different concepts and how specific (or critical) concepts create new conversations that link to larger discussions. For example, we were interested in exploring how an emerging concept that has become important to our project’s work, data justice, relates to conversations about AI ethics, as described above. To do this, we performed a similar search as before, but this time using only ‘data justice’ as an exact phrase, and mapped it against the papers in our larger AI ethics dataset that also address justice. Below we describe how this type of mapping helps to understand interdisciplinary conversations that are currently emerging.

Zooming in to ‘data justice’

Figure 1.2 - Network visualisation of articles (orange) and authors (purple) addressing ‘data justice’ - on the left - and justice-related work within AI ethics - on the right. The image shows that the discourse on data justice is rather disconnected from current discussions about justice within AI ethics, and that only a small number of authors function as connectors.
Figure 1.3: Network visualisation of articles (orange) and authors (purple) addressing ‘data justice’ – on the left – and justice-related work within AI ethics – on the right. The image shows that the discourse on data justice is rather disconnected from current discussions about justice within AI ethics, and that only a small number of authors function as connectors.

In the network visualisation we shared last week, we showed two clusters of papers centred around the concepts of ‘justice’ (as discussed within the literature on AI/data ethics) and ‘data justice’. These clusters are linked through a small number of scholars and papers, depicted in the network as an interconnected series of threads. These connections represent two possibilities. On the one hand, a small number of authors, such as Jo Bates or Emiliano TrerĂŠ, make contributions to both discussions and therefore have different papers in both datasets. On the other hand, some papers, such as Linnet Taylor’s piece ‘What is Data Justice?‘ (2017), or Mamello Thinyane’s piece ‘Operationalizing Data Justice in Health Informatics‘ (2019), appears in both groups.

The connections of authors and papers to both groups suggest looking more closely at the interconnected threads (as described above) to find ways of envisioning the relationships between people and ideas. We read some of these papers to see what these links might be. For example, Emiliano TrerĂŠ’s paper, ‘Exploring Data Justice’ (2019), describes the creation of the Data Justice Lab and Conference at Cardiff. This group of scholars and practitioners have been consciously working to redefine principles of data governance in line with principles of social justice. The Lab works collaboratively between scholars in law, policy, sociology and politics as well as with public-sector organisations. The lab holds a biannual interdisciplinary conference and publishes accessible white papers and reports along with academic articles. Data Justice Lab members have papers that appear across the two clusters – their approach is described as connective and interdisciplinary, and our description using network methods suggests that this indeed plays a significant role in defining a new approach and in sharing it broadly through strategic connections with other ideas. Given what is at stake in this research, interdisciplinary, connective research practices may well play a significant role.

Arguably, because our search for ‘ethics’ papers did not include the keyword ‘justice’ itself, some influential work is excluded from representation in the map above. This includes articles that our team recognise as significant to the field, even though they do not employ keywords in the same way. This points to the ways that these methods depend on how terms are defined at the start – you get out what you put in. We decided to separate ‘ethics’ and ‘justice’ in part because some scholars like D’Ignazio and Klein have noticed a bifurcation between ‘ethics’ and ‘justice’ and we were curious about what this might mean. It would equally be possible to define ‘justice’ as one of the key terms applying to ‘ethics’ – this could create a wholly different sort of network.

The multi-method conversations that JUST AI researchers have begun proceed from a spirit of generosity. This pays attention to the perspectives that different methodologies make possible, as well as to the different ways that researchers position their arguments. Together, these approaches highlight potential new conversations that can enhance work on data and AI ethics. We will be publishing our data openly on GitHub and inviting other researchers to work with it, as a way of generating other kinds of visualisations and other potential descriptions of the field.


Image credit: gremlin

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  41. BBC. (2021). Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  42. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  43. Booth, P. (2020). New Vision: Transforming the BBC into a subscriber-owned mutual. Institute of Economic Affairs. Available at: https://iea.org.uk/publications/new-vision
  44. Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport and John Whittingdale OBE MP. (2021). John Whittingdale’s speech to the RTS Cambridge Convention 2021. UK Government. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/john-whittingdales-speech-to-the-rts-cambridge-convention-2021
  45. Mazzucato, M., Conway, R., Mazzoli, E., Knoll E. and Albala, S. (2020). Creating and measuring dynamic public value at the BBC, p.22. UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose. Available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/bartlett/public-purpose/sites/public-purpose/files/final-bbc-report-6_jan.pdf
  46. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  47. Tennenholtz, M. and Kurland, O. (2019). ‘Rethinking Search Engines and Recommendation Systems: A Game Theoretic Perspective’. Communications of the ACM, December 2019, 62(12), pp. 66–75. Available at: https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2019/12/241056-rethinking-search-engines-and-recommendation-systems/fulltext; Jannach, D. and Adomavicius, G. (2016), ‘Recommendations with a Purpose’. RecSys ’16: Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp7–10. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2959100.2959186; Jannach, D., Zanker, M., Felfernig, and Friedrich, G. (2010). Recommender Systems: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511763113; Ricci, F., Rokach, L. and Shapira, B. (2015). Recommender Systems Handbook. Springer New York: New York. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4899-7637-6
  48. Singh, S. (2020). Why Am I Seeing This? – Case study: Amazon. New America. Available at: https://www.newamerica.org/oti/reports/why-am-i-seeing-this
  49. Liu, S. (2017). ‘Personalized Recommendations at Tinder’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/SessionsEvents/dr-steve-liu-chief-scientist-tinder-at-mlconf-sf-2017
  50. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  51. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  52. See Annex 1 for more details.
  53. Interview with Ben Fields, Lead Data Scientist, Digital Publishing, BBC (2021).
  54. See Annex 2 for more details.
  55. BBC. (2019). ‘Join the DataLab team at the BBC!’. BBC Careers. Available at: https://careerssearch.bbc.co.uk/jobs/job/Join-the-DataLab-team-at-the-BBC/40012; BBC Datalab. ‘Machine learning at the BBC’. Available at: https://datalab.rocks/
  56. McGovern, A. (2019). ‘Understanding public service curation: What do “good” recommendations look like?’. BBC. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/887fd87e-1da7-45f3-9dc7-ce5956b790d2
  57. Interview with Andrew McParland, Principal Engineer, BBC R&D (2021).
  58. Commercial (i.e. non public service) BBC services however still use external recommendation providers. See: Taboola. (2021). ‘BBC Global News Chooses Taboola as its Exclusive Content Recommendations Provider’. Available at: https://www.taboola.com/press-release/bbc-global-news-chooses-taboola-as-its-exclusive-content-recommendations-provider
  59. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  60. European Broadcasting Union. PEACH. Available at: https://peach.ebu.io/
  61. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (NPO) (2021).
  62. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  63. The Article 29 Working Group defines profiling in this instance as ‘automated processing of data to analyze or to make predictions about individuals’.
  64. Information Commissioner’s Office and The Alan Turing Institute. (2021). Explaining decisions made with AI. Available at: https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/key-dp-themes/explaining-decisions-made-with-artificial-intelligence/
  65. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  66. Macgregor, M. (2021).
  67. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  68. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020). ‘Our AI Ethics Guidelines’. Bayerisch Rundfunk. https://www.br.de/extra/ai-automation-lab-english/ai-ethics100.html
  69. Bedford-Strohm, J., KĂśppen, U. and Schneider, C. (2020).
  70. Media perspectives. (2021). ‘Intentieverklaring voor verantwoord gebruik van KI in de media. [Letter of intent for responsible use of AI in the media]’. Available at: https://mediaperspectives.nl/intentieverklaring/
  71. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook
  72. BBC. (2017). Written evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence. Available at: https://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/artificial-intelligence-committee/artificial-intelligence/written/70493.html
  73. BBC Media Centre. (2020). Tim Davie’s introductory speech as BBC Director-General. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2020/tim-davie-intro-speech
  74. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  75. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  76. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636; Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  77. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  78. Helberger, N., Karppinen, K. and D’Acunto, L. (2018). ‘Exposure diversity as a design principle for recommender systems’. Information, Communication & Society, 21(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2016.1271900
  79. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021). This point was also captured in separate studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  80. Interview with Uli KĂśppen, Head of AI + Automation Lab, Co-Lead BR Data, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  81. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  82. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  83. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  84. BBC. (2021). BBC Annual Plan 2021-22. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/aboutthebbc/reports/annualplan/annual-plan-2021-22.pdf
  85. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  86. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  87. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022) ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4(4), pp. 323–330. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00475-7
  88. Zuboff, S. (2015). ‘Big other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’. Journal of Information Technology, 30(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/jit.2015.5
  89. van Dijck, J. (2014). ‘Datafication, dataism and dataveillance: Big Data between scientific paradigm and ideology’. Surveillance & Society, 12(2). Available at: https://doi.org/10.24908/ss.v12i2.4776; Srnicek, N. (2017). Platform capitalism. Polity.
  90. Lane, J. (2020). Democratizing Our Data: A Manifesto. MIT Press.
  91. Tempini, N. (2017). ‘Till data do us part: Understanding data-based value creation in data-intensive infrastructures’. Information and Organization, 27(4). Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.infoandorg.2017.08.001
  92. Interview with Matthias Thar, Bayerische Rundfunk (2021).
  93. Macgregor, M. (2021). Responsible AI at the BBC: Our Machine Learning Engine Principles. BBC Research and Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/publications/responsible-ai-at-the-bbc-our-machine-learning-engine-principles
  94. This is not unique to the BBC, and many academic papers and industry publications also reflect a similar implicit normative framework in their definitions of recommendation systems.
  95. The organisations’ goals are not necessarily in tension with that of the users, e.g. helping audiences finding more relevant content might help audiences get better value for money (which is a goal of many public service media organisations) but that is still goal which shapes how the recommendation system is developed, rather than a necessary feature of the system.
  96. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2020). ‘Recommender systems and their ethical challenges’. AI & Society, 35, pp.957–967. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00146-020-00950-y
  97. Interview with Jonas Schlatterbeck, Head of Content ARD Online & Leiter Programmplanung, ARD (2021).
  98. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  99. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  100. Interview with Jannick Kirk Sørensen, Associate Professor in Digital Media, Aalborg University (2021).
  101. We explore these examples in more detail later in the chapter.
  102. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  103. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  104. Interview with David Graus, Lead Data Scientist, Randstad Groep Nederland (2021).
  105. Prunkl, C. (2022). ‘Human autonomy in the age of artificial intelligence’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.99–101. Available at: doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-022-00449-9
  106. European Broadcasting Union. (2012). Empowering Society: A Declaration on the Core Values of Public Service Media, p. 4. Available at: https://www.ebu.ch/files/live/sites/ebu/files/Publications/EBU-Empowering-Society_EN.pdf
  107. Interview with David Caswell, Executive Product Manager, BBC News Labs (2021).
  108. Milano, S., Mittelstadt, B., Wachter, S. and Russell, C. (2021), ‘Epistemic fragmentation poses a threat to the governance of online targeting’. Nature Machine Intelligence. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1038/s42256-021-00358-3
  109. Milano, S., Taddeo, M. and Floridi, L. (2021). ‘Ethical aspects of multi-stakeholder recommendation systems’. The Information Society, 37(1). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.2020.1832636
  110. Buolamwini, J. and Gebru, T. (2018). ‘Gender Shades: Intersectional Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification’. Proceedings of the 1st Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency. Conference on Fairness, Accountability and Transparency, PMLR, pp. 77–91. Available at: https://proceedings.mlr.press/v81/buolamwini18a.html
  111. Angwin, J., Larson, J., Mattu, S. and Kirchner, L. (2016). ‘Machine Bias’. ProPublica. Available at: https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
  112. Sweeney, L. (2013). ‘Discrimination in online ad delivery’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1301.6822
  113. Noble, S. U. (2018). Algorithms of Oppression. New York: New York University Press; Bender, E.M., Gebru, T., McMillan-Major, A. and Shmitchell, S. (2021). ‘On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big?’. FAccT ’21: Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency, pp.610–623. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922
  114. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B. and Russell, C. (2020). ‘Why Fairness Cannot Be Automated: Bridging the Gap Between EU Non-Discrimination Law and AI’. Computer Law & Security Review, 41. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3547922
  115. Boratto, L., Fenu, G. and Marras, M. (2021) ‘Interplay between upsampling and regularization for provider fairness in recommender systems’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, 31(3), pp. 421–455.Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-021-09294-8
  116. Biega, A. J., Gummadi, K. P. and Weikum, G. (2018). ‘Equity of Attention: Amortizing Individual Fairness in Rankings’. SIGIR ’18: The 41st International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research & Development in Information Retrieval, pp. 405–414. Available at: https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3209978.3210063
  117. Abdollahpouri, H., Adomavicius, G., Burke, R., et al. (2020). ‘Multistakeholder recommendation: Survey and research directions’. User Modeling and User-Adapted Interaction, pp.127–158. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11257-019-09256-1
  118. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  119. Pariser, E. (2011). The filter bubble: what the Internet is hiding from you. Penguin Books.
  120. Nguyen, C. T. (2018). ‘Why it’s as hard to escape an echo chamber as it is to flee a cult’. Aeon. Available at: https://aeon.co/essays/why-its-as-hard-to-escape-an-echo-chamber-as-it-is-to-flee-a-cult
  121. Arguedas, A. R., Robertson, C. T., Fletcher, R. and Nielsen R.K. (2022). ‘Echo chambers, filter bubbles, and polarisation: a literature review.’ Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/echo-chambers-filter-bubbles-and-polarisation-literature-review
  122. Scharkow, M., Mangold, F., Stier, S. and Breuer, J. (2020). ‘How social network sites and other online intermediaries increase exposure to news’. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(6), pp. 2761–2763. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1918279117
  123. A similar finding exists in other studies of public service media organisations – see: Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  124. Paudel, B., Christoffel, F., Newell, C. and Bernstein, A. (2017). ‘Updatable, Accurate, Diverse, and Scalable Recommendations for Interactive Applications’. ACM Transactions on Interactive Intelligent Systems, 7(1), pp.1–34. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/2955101
  125. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021).
  126. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  127. Interview with Nic Newman, Senior Research Associate, Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism (2021).
  128. Interview with SĂŠbastien Noir, Head of Software, Technology and Innovation, and Dmytro Petruk, Developer, European Broadcasting Union (2021).
  129. Boididou, C., Sheng, D., Moss, M. and Piscopo, A. (2021), ‘Building Public Service Recommenders: Logbook of a Journey’. RecSys ’21: Proceedings of the 15th ACM Conference on Recommender Systems, pp. 538–540. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460231.3474614
  130. Sørensen, J.K. and Hutchinson, J. (2018). ‘Algorithms and Public Service Media’. Public Service Media in the Networked Society: RIPE@2017, pp.91–106. Available at: http://www.nordicom.gu.se/sites/default/files/publikationer-hela-pdf/public_service_media_in_the_networked_society_ripe_2017.pdf
  131. Interview with Olle Zachrison, Deputy News Commissioner & Head of Digital News Strategy, Swedish Radio (2021); BBC News Labs. ‘About’. Available at: https://bbcnewslabs.co.uk/about
  132. Evaluation of recommendation systems in not limited to the developers and deployers of those systems. Other stakeholders such as users, government, regulators, journalists and civil society organisations may all have their own goals for what they think a particular recommendation system should be optimising for. Here however, we focus on evaluation as seen by the developer and deployer of the system, as this is where there is the tightest feedback loop between evaluation and changes to the system and the developers and deployers generally have privileged access to information about the system and a unique ability to run tests and studies on the system. For more on how regulators (and others) can evaluate social media companies in an online-safety context, see: Ada Lovelace Institute. (2021). Technical methods for regulatory inspection of algorithmic systems. Available at: https://www.adalovelaceinstitute.org/report/technical-methods-regulatory-inspection/
  133. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  134. Interview with Francesco Ricci.
  135. Interview with Francesco Ricci, Professor of Computer Science, Free University of Bozen-Bolzano (2021).
  136. Operationalising is a process of defining how a vague concept, which cannot be directly measured, can nevertheless be estimated by empirical measurement. This process inherently involves replacing one concept, such as ‘relevance’, with a proxy for that concept, such as ‘whether or not a user clicks on an item’ and thus will always involve some degree of error.
  137. Beer, D. (2016). Metric Power. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-55649-3
  138. Raji, I. D., Bender, E. M., Paullada, A. et al. (2021). ‘AI and the Everything in the Whole Wide World Benchmark’, p2. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2111.15366
  139. Gunawardana, A. and Shani, G. (2015). ‘Evaluating Recommender Systems’. Recommender Systems Handbook, pp 257–297. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-85820-3_8
  140. Jannach, D. and Jugovac, M. (2019), ‘Measuring the Business Value of Recommender Systems’. ACM Transactions on Management Information Systems, 10(4), pp 1–23. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3370082
  141. Rohde, D., Bonner, S., Dunlop, T., et al. (2018). ‘RecoGym: A Reinforcement Learning Environment for the problem of Product Recommendation in Online Advertising’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1808.00720; Beel, J. and Langer, S. (2015)., ‘A Comparison of Offline Evaluations, Online Evaluations, and User Studies in the Context of Research-Paper Recommender Systems’. Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Theory and Practice of Digital Libraries (TPDL), pp.153-168. Available at: doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-24592-8_12; Jannach, D., Pu, P., Ricci, F. and Zanker, M. (2021). ‘Recommender Systems: Past, Present, Future’. AI Magazine, 42 (3). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v42i3.18139
  142. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  143. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  144. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  145. This was generally attributed by interviewees to a combination of a lack of metadata to measure the representativeness within content and assumption that issues of representation within content were better dealt with at the point at which content is commissioned, so that the recommendation systems have diverse and representative content over which to recommend.
  146. Hildén, J. (2021). ‘The Public Service Approach to Recommender Systems: Filtering to Cultivate’. Television & New Media, 23(7). Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/15274764211020106
  147. Interview with Koen Muylaert, Project Lead, VRT data platform and data science initiative, Vlaamse Radio- en Televisieomroeporganisatie (VRT) (2021).
  148. By measuring the entropy of the distribution of affinity scores across categories, and trying to improve diversity by increasing that entropy.
  149. Interview with Arno van Rijswijk, Head of Data & Personalization, and Sarah van der Land, Digital Innovation Advisor, Nederlandse Publieke Omroep (2021).
  150. The Datalab team was experimenting with and evaluating a number of approaches using a combination of content and user interaction data, such as neural network approaches that combine both content and user data as well as collaborative filtering models based only on user interactions.
  151. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  152. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  153. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  154. Piscopo, A. (2021); Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  155. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  156. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  157. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021).
  158. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  159. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  160. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  161. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  162. See: BBC. RecList. GitHub. Available at: https://github.com/bbc/datalab-reclist; Tagliabue, J. (2022). ‘NDCG Is Not All You Need’. Towards Data Science. Available at: https://towardsdatascience.com/ndcg-is-not-all-you-need-24eb6d2f1227
  163. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  164. Interview with Greg Detre, ex-Chief Data Scientist, Channel 4 (2021).
  165. van Es, K. F. (2017). ‘An Impending Crisis of Imagination : Data‐Driven Personalization in Public Service Broadcasters’. Media@LSE. Available at: https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/358206
  166. Interview with Dietmar Jannach, Professor, University of Klagenfurt (2021).
  167. Ie, E., Hsu, C., Mladenov, M. et al. (2019). ‘RecSim: A Configurable Simulation Platform for Recommender Systems’. arXiv. Available at: https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1909.04847
  168. Stray, J., Adler, S. and Hadfield-Menell, D. (2020), ‘What are you optimizing for? Aligning Recommender Systems with Human Values’, pp. 4–5. Participatory Approaches to Machine Learning ICML 2020 Workshop (July 17). Available at: https://participatoryml.github.io/papers/2020/42.pdf
  169. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  170. This case study focuses on the parts of BBC News that function as a public service, rather than BBC Global News, the international commercial news division.
  171. As of 2021, BBC News on TV and radio reaches 57% of UK adults every week and across all channels, BBC News globally reaches a weekly global audience of 456 million adults., Ssee: BBC Media Centre. (2021). ‘BBC on track to reach half a billion people globally ahead of its centenary in 2022′. BBC Media Centre. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/2021/bbc-reaches-record-global-audience; BBC News is equally influential globally within the domain of digital news. By one measure, the BBC News and BBC World News websites combined are the most-visited English-language news websites, receiving three to four times the website traffic of the New York Times, Daily Mail, or The Guardian, see: Majid, A. (2021). ‘Top 50 largest news websites in the world: Surge in traffic to Epoch Times and other ring-wing sites’. Press Gazette. Available at: https://pressgazette.co.uk/top-50-largest-news-websites-in-the-world-right-wing-outlets-see-biggest-growth/; As of 2021, BBC News Online reaches 45% of UK adults every week, approximately triple the reach of its nearest competitors: The Guardian (17%), Sky News Online (14%) and the MailOnline (14%). Estimates of UK reach are based on a sample 2029 adults surveyed by YouGov (and their partners) using an online questionnaire at the end of January and beginning of February 2021. See: Reuters Institute for Institute for the Study of Journalism. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2021, 10th Edition, p. 62. Available at: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2021-06/Digital_News_Report_2021_FINAL.pdf
  172. The team initially developed an experimental recommendation system for BBC Mundo, the BBC World Service’s Spanish-language news website. See: Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p.1. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf; These are also live on BBC World Service websites in Russian, Hindi and Arabic and in beta on the BBC News App. See: Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  173. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  174. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  175. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  176. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  177. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk; Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2019). ‘Responsible Machine Learning at the BBC’ [presentation]. Available at: https://www.slideshare.net/alchueyr/responsible-machine-learning-at-the-bbc-194466504
  178. Crooks, M. (2019). ‘A Personalised Recommender from the BBC’. BBC Data Science. Available at: https://medium.com/bbc-data-science/a-personalised-recommender-from-the-bbc-237400178494
  179. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  180. Piscopo, A. (2021).
  181. Panteli, M., Piscopo, A., Harland, A., Tutcher, J. and Moss, F. M. (2019). ‘Recommendation systems for news articles at the BBC’, p. 4. CEUR Workshop Proceedings. Available at: http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2554/paper_07.pdf
  182. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  183. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo.
  184. Piscopo, A. (2021). ‘Building public service recommenders: Logbook of a journey’ [presentation recording]. The Academic Fringe Festival. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q2EYAxX5Pnk
  185. BBC. ‘What is BBC Sounds?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/contact/questions/help-using-bbc-services/what-is-sounds
  186. The BBC Sounds website replaced the iPlayer Radio website in October 2018; the BBC Sounds app was launched in beta in the United Kingdom in June 2018 and made available internationally in September 2020, with the iPlayer Radio app decommissioned for the United Kingdom in September 2019 and internationally in November 2020. See: BBC. (2018). ‘The next major update for BBC Sounds’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/03e55526-e7b4-45de-b6f1-122697e129d9; BBC. (2018). ‘Introducing the first version of BBC Sounds’, Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/aboutthebbc/entries/bde59828-90ea-46ac-be5b-6926a07d93fb; BBC. (2020). ‘An international update on BBC Sounds and BBC iPlayer Radio’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/internet/entries/166dfcba-54ec-4a44-b550-385c2076b36b; BBC Sounds. ‘Why has the BBC closed the iPlayer Radio app?’. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/help/questions/recent-changes-to-bbc-sounds/iplayer-radio-message
  187. In May 2019, six months after the launch of BBC Sounds, James Purnell, then Director of Radio & Education at the BBC, said that ‘“The [BBC Sounds] app, for instance, is built for personalisation, but is not yet fully personalised. This means that right now a user sees programmes that have not been curated for them. That is changing, as of this month in fact. By the autumn, Sounds will be highly personalised.’” See: BBC Media Centre. (2019). ‘Changing to stay the same – Speech by James Purnell, Director, Radio & Education, at the Radio Festival 2019 in London.’ Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediacentre/speeches/2019/bbc.com/mediacentre/speeches/2019/james-purnell-radio-festival/
  188. According to David Jones (Executive Product Manager, BBC Sounds, interviewed in 2021), his top-line KPI is to reach 900,000 members of the British population who are under 35 by March 2022. These numbers are determined centrally by BBC senior managers based on the BBC’s Service Licence for BBC Online and Red Button. See: BBC Trust. (2016). BBC Online and Red Button Service Licence. Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/service_licences/online/2016/online_red_button_may16.pdf
  189. Note that the business rules are subject to change, and so the rules given here are intended to be an indicative example only, representing a snapshot of practice at one point in time. See: Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  190. Smethurst, M. (2014). Designing a URL structure for BBC programmes. Available at: https://smethur.st/posts/176135860
  191. Interview with Kate Goddard, Senior Product Manager, BBC Datalab (2021).
  192. Interview with Alessandro Piscopo, Principal Data Scientist, BBC Datalab (2021).
  193. Al-Chueyr Martins, T. (2021). ‘From an idea to production: the journey of a recommendation engine’ [presentation recording]. MLOps London. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dFXKJZNVgw4
  194. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC R&Desearch & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research; Leonard, M. and Thompson, B. (2020), ‘Putting audience data at the heart of the BBC’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2020-09-personal-data-store-privacy-services
  195. Hansard – Volume 707: debated on Monday 17 January 2022. ‘BBC Funding’. UK Parliament. Available at: https://hansard.parliament.uk//commons/2022-01-17/debates/7E590668-43C9-43D8-9C49-9D29B8530977/BBCFunding
  196. Greene, T., Martens, D. and Shmueli, G. (2022). ‘Barriers to academic data science research in the new realm of algorithmic behaviour modification by digital platforms’. Nature Machine Intelligence, 4, pp.323–330. Available at: https://www.nature.com/articles/s42256-022-00475-7
  197. Sharp, E. (2021). ‘Personal data stores: building and trialling trusted data services’. BBC Research & Development. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/rd/blog/2021-09-personal-data-store-research
  198. Stray, J. (2021). ‘Beyond Engagement: Aligning Algorithmic Recommendations With Prosocial Goals’. Partnership on AI. Available at: https://www.partnershiponai.org/beyond-engagement-aligning-algorithmic-recommendations-with-prosocial-goals/
  199. Grayson, D. (2021). Manifesto for a People’s Media. Media Reform Coalition. Available at: https://drive.google.com/file/u/1/d/1_6GeXiDR3DGh1sYjFI_hbgV9HfLWzhPi/view?usp=embed_facebook

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